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1.1 Introduction 
The reduction of poverty, has emerged in a variety of forms and under ambiguous initiatives, 
from the Millennium Development Goals to microfinance institutions (Sumner & Tribe, 2008). 
Economically developed democracies have created a pursuit of universal values such as equality, 
and in return, these democracies have sought funding initiatives that seek to directly or indirectly 
increase world equality (or its equivalent) in developing countries (Evans, Azene, & Kirigia, 1997; 
Schreiner, 2012; Trussel & Parsons, 2007).  In recent decades, a trend has emerged that seeks to 
fund programs which reflect the proverb: ‘Give a man a fish and you will feed him for a day; 
teach a man to fish and you feed him for life’.  Hence, the current trend is to provide the poor 
with the tools they need to ‘lift themselves out of poverty’. The current research focusses on one 
of these programs: microfinance 
Access to financial services has been established in the literature as a key driving force behind 
‘bottom-up’ development driven by the initiatives of the poor themselves (Demirguc-Kunt & 
Klapper, 2012). However, in many developing countries the poor, and especially women, have 
no access to formal financial services (Brau & Woller, 2004). Whether this is a credit market 
failure or not is a topic which will be discussed in the third chapter of this thesis. The issue is 
that without access to financial services, those excluded do not have the same opportunities to 
achieve their personal financial and social goals (Al-Azzam, Mimouni, & Ali, 2012). This is 
potentially an issue for governments which seek equality as a social goal.  
A famous method of achieving financial inclusion is through microfinance, which in essence is 
small loans (or other financial services) provided to the poor who are excluded from the formal 
financial system. This system has received much acclaim, and also critique in the vast body of 
literature which has considered the topic from various bottom-up perspectives (Aggarwal, 
Klapper, & Singer, 2012; Brau & Woller, 2004; Buera, Kaboski, & Shin, 2012; Di Bella, 2011). 
Despite the body of literature on microfinance, previous research is generally concerned with the 
efficiency of microfinance in achieving social goals, rather than discussions of how microfinance 
can be promoted through regulation, with few exceptions (Satta, 2004). Hence, there is a large 
gap in the literature in terms of strategic1 perspectives of the issue, and this is a gap which the 
current thesis aims to address.  
                                                 
1 For the purposes of the current discussions, strategic perspectives refer to considerations of how the government 
affects regulations, which affect business operations, which subsequently affect microfinance borrowers. On the 
other hand, a bottom-up perspective considers the microfinance borrowers and their personal characteristics, before 
considering how business operations and regulation have influenced those borrowers. 
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Microfinance has the ability to mobilise the household savings of those in the country itself, 
without relying on external financing. In this way microfinance has the ability to bypass 
corruption or non-existent donor capital flows to support the social development of the poor 
(van Bastelaer, 2000). Although investment in education, health, and other areas where 
developing economies need assistance is also vital, it is microfinance’s ability to stimulate internal 
growth which ensures its on-going attraction for external funding. As we will discuss, there are 
many practical issues which mean that this theory of internal growth support is not always the 
case, however, there are few avenues for financial support which offer such promising outcomes 
at all societal and economic levels, as microfinance. Thus, regardless of whether the political goal 
is inefficient (in that it is costly and serves no economic gain), the method to achieve the goal 
may be cost-effective (Ogus, 1994, 1995). However, if microfinance has the potential to help 
achieve government social goals through relatively simple regulation, it needs to be understood 
why there is not more microfinance-supporting legislation, nor research on the topic. 
The financial management of Microfinance Institutions (MFI’s) is a topic of research which, 
while touched upon, has not been seriously covered to date. The relationship between regulation 
and the financial management of MFI’s is a very important issue if the current donor funding of 
MFI’s reduces. Research has found that financially self-sustainable MFI’s are more likely to 
provide long term financial service access than donor-reliant MFI’s (Arch, 2005). The specifics 
of this relationship will be discussed in more detail in the third chapter of this thesis. At this 
stage it is important to understand that microfinance is more likely to continue in the long term 
if MFI’s are able to operate independent of donations, and that this is potentially related to the 
incentives created in the regulation. The current thesis is thus concerned with the issue of how 
governments can, through regulation, affect long term financial inclusion through financially self-
sustainable MFI’s.  
The structure of the current chapter is as follows. The second section presents the background 
research environment for the current topic. The third section considers the research approach 
and methodology. The fourth section presents a brief literature review, and the fifth section 
provides the reasons for the research. The sixth section discusses why this topic is interesting for 
law and economics. The seventh section details the objectives and scope, and the eighth section 
defines the problem outlines the research question. The ninth section presents the research 
process and the structure of future chapters.  
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1.2 Background and Research Environment 
Research on microfinance has been undertaken in various forms and taken different perspectives 
to the extent that determining the relevance of the research is more of an issue than finding 
research papers on the topic. This is a result of the fact that microfinance is intuitively a ‘feel-
good’ solution for achieving social goals, and has become a common topic of development 
research. The issue for this thesis is that the previous studies have not considered microfinance 
from a law and economics perspective, nor considered the effect of regulation on the long term 
financial self-sustainability of MFI’s. Given the vast body of literature on microfinance it is the 
task of chapter two to sort through the findings of previous research and present the academic 
context of the current thesis. 
In order to fill the gap in the literature to date it is proposed that an empirical qualitative study be 
designed to understand the effect of microfinance regulation on MFI’s in different countries and 
from the perspectives of different stakeholders. In addition, regulatory comparison will be 
undertaken to understand exactly where the regulatory differences lie. In order to understand 
preliminary trends in the data statistical considerations will also be used, and will guide the 
qualitative methodology. The current thesis thus builds on a broad research environment to 
consider the issue from key perspectives. 
1.3 Research Approach and Methodology 
The research approach for the current thesis builds on the foundation of law and economics 
methodology and theory to develop an understanding of the relationship between regulation and 
MFI operations. Considering the lack of research on this specific topic, the current thesis 
provides a description of the effect of regulation on MFI operations. The use of the law and 
economics perspective for this particular research adds a large amount of value by allowing an 
explicit consideration of the practical effect of the incentives created by regulation. As with the 
pioneer research in the field of law and economics, the current thesis also seeks to use 
methodology to complement each other to develop an understanding of the research question. 
The methodology includes comparative law, statistical considerations and qualitative interviews. 
Key authors in the field of law and economics, such as Posner (1987) have documented the 
worth of similar strategies which also ensure that the results are founded in what is really 
happening in the situation described in the research, hence providing inherent value to 
qualitative research in law and economics.  
13_Edle Hunt BW Stand.job
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The current research completes a large gap in the existing literature regarding the law and 
economics of microfinance. Given the body of research on microfinance to date the current 
thesis will discuss the existing literature to set the context for subsequent discussions. Further, 
this thesis will discuss previous empirical literature in isolation from the non-empirical literature 
because of the limited number of empirical studies. The law and economics theory relevant to 
the research question will also be presented, which will provide a perspective from which to 
prepare empirical analyses. Given the nature of the research question, legal comparison will be 
used in the fifth chapter. Trends in the quantitative data will be presented in the sixth chapter to 
understand how regulatory changes are related to MFI financial self-sustainability indicators. 
Statistical considerations can help to understand trends in associated factors to microfinance, 
both in a micro and macro sense. However, the current research realises that for such a complex 
research question quantitative analysis may not be sufficient. Empirical qualitative research will 
also be used to present the results of fieldwork interviews in the countries of interest. The 
methodological approach for the current thesis is thus comprehensive and ensures the research 
question is considered from a range of methodological perspectives. 
1.4 Literature Review 
When considering the perspectives from which to analyse microfinance it is important to 
consider the types of perspectives that can be validly used. This is because microfinance does not 
follow the traditional logic of economics, which is why it is not a topic widely found in the 
empirical economic literature. This section explains why we need microfinance and the 
foundations of analysis which subsequent chapters will use. In particular the foundations of 
knowledge regarding empowerment, information, development, success indicators, type of 
regulation, and operational self-sustainability will be presented.  
The literature is comprehensive in regards to the impact assessment of microfinance, such as the 
positive effect on consumption, poverty, employment, education and social status (Torkestani & 
Pari, 2008). However, there is a general lack of data on microfinance borrowers, their 
characteristics, contextual influences and success rates (Emeni & Kehinde, 2008; J. Weiss, H. 
Montgomery, & E. Kurmanalieva, 2003). Further, the research to date has focussed on 
microfinance as a socio-economic mechanism rather than as a tool to promote latent 
entrepreneurship and economic growth (Affleck & Mellor, 2006). Considering that microfinance 
emerged as a tool to fight poverty, this is not surprising. However, microfinance allows self-
employment, which requires a whole new set of skills to overcome difficulties at every stage of 
operation (Felsenstein & Schwartz, 1993). Microfinance leads to entrepreneurship (Emeni & 
14_Edle Hunt BW Stand.job
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Kehinde, 2008) and limited access to capital has been found to be a contributing factor on the 
poor economic growth of many developing countries (Collier & Dasgupta, 2007). Given the 
importance of entrepreneurship and the role MFI’s play it is surprising there is little research on 
the topic of how regulation of MFI’s can affect developing economies.  Further, entrepreneurs in 
developing countries do not only get their finance through MFI’s, with 36% of rural credit in 
India coming from informal sources (Sharma, 2005). There is no research which looks at the 
effect of regulation of MFI’s on the source of capital used by entrepreneurs in developing 
countries and the subsequent economic effects. Hence, there are various gaps in the literature. 
This thesis will address part of this issue by comparing the regulation of MFI’s across four 
countries to work towards understanding the effect of particular regulatory features.  
1.4.1 Microfinance Definition 
Microfinance is a term which has become a buzz word leading to inconsistency about what it 
actually refers to. For this reason it is important to establish a definition of microfinance in this 
chapter so that subsequent chapters can refer to it with consistency of understanding. In a World 
Bank microfinance impact assessment, Karlan and Goldberg (2007) define microfinance as ‘…the 
provision of small-scale financial services to people who lack access to traditional banking services’ (pp 10). 
However, this definition is too broad to allow a detailed understanding of what microfinance is 
for the current thesis.  
The current thesis considers that microfinance is specifically:  
Loans under €1,000; for the purpose of business establishment or expansion or for the 
smoothing of consumption expenses; by a group of geographically and socially related people or 
individually, without collateral requirements; at market interest rates no higher than 50%pa2; with 
no personal recourse for default to other financial resources; with no threat of personal harm in 
the case of default; primarily to women; solely to people who would otherwise be unable to 
obtain loans from the traditional financial system; provided by either a regulated or non-
regulated MFI or bank subsidiary providing primarily microfinance services; by institutions 
whose primary aim is the provision of credit availability to the poor. Further, the definition of 
microfinance used in the current thesis does refer to the associated financial products of micro-
insurance, micro-pensions and micro-savings accounts, which will be explicitly identified where 
relevant. 
                                                 
2 This excludes loans from loan sharks and payday lenders 
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Unless indicated as such, microfinance refers to the provision of small loans. This is because a 
majority of the literature considers microfinance as just the provision of loans. As the current 
research is interested in the overall functioning of MFI’s with the overall objective of financial 
inclusion, the current definition is broader than just the provision of loans. 
1.4.2 Micro and Macro Benefits of Microfinance 
The theory of microfinance addressing ‘home grown’ poverty alleviation is based on local and 
macro effects on entrepreneurship and wages. Indeed, the initial effect on local markets is 
potentially as important as potential flow-through effects to macro-economic growth. 
Authors have supported the economic effects of microfinance at a macro and also at a local level 
(Buera et al., 2012). These authors have found that the macroeconomic effects of increasing 
equilibrium wages and redistributing wealth are also relevant for smaller markets especially 
because local markets are often segmented with high transportation and trade costs and 
information friction (Buera et al., 2012). Thus the positive effect of microfinance may also be at 
a local level because of the information and cost advantages posed by developing segregated 
markets. Although a lot of the research focusses on a particular locality, meta-analysis studies 
have also confirmed the positive effect of microfinance on quality of life, as a result of the 
increases in micro-entrepreneurship (Eichner, 2012). A more detailed consideration of the 
benefits of microfinance will be covered in the second chapter of this thesis. 
1.4.3 Success Indicators 
Microfinance is an initiative which takes many forms to achieve the different goals of different 
MFI’s. Given the differing goals of microfinance institutions, the ‘success’ of microfinance 
depends on the benchmarks set. This means that the ex-post analysis of microfinance, and in 
particular the ‘success’ of microfinance law depends on the benchmarks by which microfinance 
success is measured in the first place. Different success indicators would thus be relevant for 
different legislative goals.  
Where the regulation aims to ‘protect the poor’, success indicators may be more likely to include 
average loan size (to check loans are given to the poorest), complaints filed to the credit 
bureau/self-regulatory body, average interest rate charged, outreach growth, or percentage of 
women borrowers. On the other hand, if long term financial inclusion were the regulatory goal, 
success indicators may be more likely to include source of capital, ROE (Return on Equity), 
profit growth, or PAR 30/90 (Portfolio at Risk). The theory behind success indicators will be 
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discussed in detail in the third chapter of this thesis where an overview of the law and economics 
of microfinance will be presented. 
Microfinance law, regardless of whether the aim is microfinance sustainable development or 
protecting the poor, actually has overall strategic aim of increasing financial services to the poor 
and increasing equality. Thus, in a strategic view, optimal microfinance regulatory systems should 
be similar across countries. However, in reality that is not necessarily the case because of 
different focusses of the (inherently political) regulator (Grossman & Helpman, 1996; Kuotsai 
Tom, 2007; Kyereboah-Coleman & Osei, 2008) or different microfinance sector characteristics 
and history (Brau & Woller, 2004). However, to achieve regulation which is suitable for a 
particular country, there are potentially two methods to make the rules. The methods are: 
a) Start with the benefit to the poor and build rules with their position in mind; 
b) Start with a given set of laws and adjust them for the poor. 
The current thesis will examine the individual laws in the countries of interest to determine what 
optimal microfinance systems look like and whether using a template set of laws adjusted for 
each country may work or if custom made regulation is more appropriate. The current thesis will 
use a series of complementary techniques to develop these conclusions in answering the research 
question and will be discussed in following sections. 
1.4.4 Operational Self-Sustainability 
Financially self-sustainable MFI’s contribute to ensuring long term financial inclusion (Haq, 
Skully, & Pathan, 2010). At the heart of the research question for this thesis is the discussion of 
why MFI’s should be operationally self-sustainable. A report by the IMF explained how MFI’s 
which rely on donations are restricted by limited resources (Sarr, 2006). Indeed, this report goes 
on to say that subsidised lending by NGO’s may actually have adverse effects on the operations 
of MFI’s (Sarr, 2006). Throughout this thesis, MFI financial self-sustainability, or OSS will refer 
to the following definition from Indian microfinance organisation Sa-Dahn (2013): 
‘Financial sustainability means that the MFI is able to cover all its present costs and the costs incurred in growth, 
if it expands operations. It would mean that the MFI is able to meet its operating costs, its financial costs adjusted 
for inflation and costs incurred in growth. Financial sustainability is a tangible parameter and can be measured 
and monitored continually through a set of indicators…’ (pp. 2). (Sa-Dahn, 2013) 
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If MFI’s are not financially sustainable (or otherwise unable to access these sources of 
sustainable capital to lend to borrowers) they must primarily rely on other funding sources; either 
from NGO’s or subsidised credit from governments (Di Bella, 2011). The result of this is that 
although the social benefits from microfinance may continue to be reached, the continuation of 
these benefits relies on a cycle of charitably motivated funding. Indeed, authors have found that 
although the microfinance industry is transforming, funding is not (Al-Azzam et al., 2012). A 
financial model which relies on donor funding when a self-sustaining model is available may put 
MFI’s under unnecessary risk. This is because if MFI’s are reliant on donor or subsidised funding 
and there is a change in the financial stability or focus of their sponsors, MFI’s may be left 
without funding. However, it is the legislation of MFI’s which potentially influences whether 
they are regulated to a financially stable level where they can receive deposits and also whether 
international and credit market funding sources are available. 
1.4.5 Public Regulation v Reputational Motivations 
Microfinance is an initiative which benefits from a ‘feel-good factor’ which allows for donations 
from international organisations. This is inherently an advantage for microfinance publicity and it 
brings to light the potential for reputation to achieve the same goal as regulation under certain 
situations. However, this possibility is difficult to determine because of a lack of a counterfactual. 
The third and final chapters of this thesis will consider whether public regulation is what is most 
suitable for microfinance or if Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) or reputational incentives 
are also going to achieve regulatory goals. Hence, soft law is theoretically an option for the 
current thesis and will be discussed. 
Work by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has discussed how microfinance regulation 
needs to be considered by governments, although falls short of outlining actual regulatory detail 
(Basu, Blavy, & Yulek, 2004). This paper states that the goal of microfinance regulation should 
be to create a healthy environment without decreasing growth and onerous requirements on the 
MFI’s. However, although this paper does recommend a tiered3 regulatory structure, the authors 
emphasise that the regulation needs to be flexible to suit each country and their different stages 
of evolution of the microfinance sector. This report recommends that the tier levels be based on 
whether services are: deposits and loans to members; deposits and loans to anyone; or only loans 
(Sarr, 2006). The fact that microfinance regulation is a topic which has been considered by the 
                                                 
3 A tiered regulatory structure means that MFI’s are regulated depending on their characteristics, such as portfolio 
size. The tiered regulatory structure in theory allows smaller MFI’s to grow, and to ‘graduate’ to ‘higher’ tier levels 
which have more onerous reporting, capital, and other requirements, as befits the higher level of societal risk from 
collapse of a larger MFI. 
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IMF and other key bodies, yet not addressed in substantive detail provides further evidence for 
research which fills this gap in the literature.  
1.5 Reasons for Research 
Microfinance is an interesting but debated instrument. The topic of microfinance has been 
covered by empirical research with a focus on the social benefits of the system. The social 
benefits are documented at a policy level; governments set social goals and subsequently 
determine regulatory, economic, and other strategies to achieve them. Hence, the policy agenda 
is the driving force behind the setting and achievement of social goals. However, for goals set at 
a policy level such as access to credit, there are various methods to achieve this goal, and one of 
those is microfinance. Given that microfinance is one of the initiatives which seems to 
potentially increase access to credit while not costing the government onerously (Arch, 2005), it 
is an important area for research. Indeed, it is the ability for microfinance to potentially provide 
long term and sustainable access to credit for a majority of the world’s poor which makes the 
industry such a focus for research.  
The importance of microfinance can be seen in the quantity of research there is on the topic, 
despite that relatively few publications are empirical in nature. The literature to date primarily 
takes a bottom-up4  perspective on the effect of microfinance on increasing the economic and 
social situations of borrowers and their families. Hence, there is a large gap in the microfinance 
literature which considers how to promote microfinance from a strategic perspective, namely 
through regulation. The current research seeks to partially fill this gap in the existing literature by 
considering the relationship between regulation and MFI operations. In particular, research is 
needed which focusses on how regulation can affect MFI’s in operating in a financially 
sustainable manner, as this has the potential to reduce reliance on donations and means that 
microfinance can continue regardless of donor whims in the long term (Di Bella, 2011). There 
are associated reasons for research, which include: the social benefits of microfinance; achieving 
the goal of development; flow-through effects to other social areas such as education; driving 
entrepreneurship through credit availability; and these reasons will be presented in the following 
paragraphs. Key reasons for research on microfinance regarding the political goals of 
microfinance and poverty reduction will be addressed in separate sections 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 
following.  
                                                 
4 A bottom-up perspective considers the microfinance borrower and their characteristics before considering how 
business operations of the MFI or regulation have led to those conditions. For the purposes of the current thesis a 
bottom-up perspective is considered the opposite of a strategic perspective, which considers the effect of regulation 
through the various avenues to subsequently affect the borrowers. 
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Microfinance has long been identified as an important topic for research in terms of 
socioeconomic benefits to those in developing countries (Brau & Woller, 2004; North, 1989). 
This reason for overall research in the industry has not changed. There is still a great need for 
further research in different countries than the existing studies because there are specific country 
effects caused by the unique combination of culture and regulation in each country. Despite a 
wealth of research in this field there are few studies which examine microfinance from a law and 
economics perspective. Indeed, existing research predominantly takes a bottom-up perspective 
and thus ignores the effect of the law in creating incentives for behaviour, particularly on the 
behaviour of MFI’s. Further, the reasons for research in the industry of microfinance are 
focussed on three key areas regarding the political motivations of development, financial 
inclusion (and credit availability) and the legal institutions required to support MFI’s, and none 
of these three reasons have been adequately covered in the literature to date. 
The goal of development is an important reason for research in this field. Given the sheer sums 
of money invested in microfinance it is critical that the system is studied. Academic research in 
this field aims to build a body of knowledge which may potentially allow the goals of 
microfinance are achieved. Further, by supporting financial institutions which can promote 
development there are fewer burdens on the governments of developing countries so they can 
focus on other key aspects of raising the standard of living such as through health care or 
education.  
Microfinance is such an important area for research because there are potential flow-through 
effects to other areas of a developing countries economy. In this way it can be intuitively 
extended that helping to allow people to raise themselves out of poverty via access to financial 
services has positive effects on the health care and education systems because these individuals 
may then be able to afford private health care, or indeed be healthier than when they were in 
poverty (Abdul Rahim Abdul, 2010; Ahlin & Jiang, 2008; Al-Azzam et al., 2012; Muhammad 
Kashif Khan, Usman, Malik, & Shafiq, 2011). Further, there may be increased rates of child 
schooling, especially of girls when parents can afford the school fees, although this has not been 
empirically supported (Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, & Kinnan, 2010), and actually the opposite 
has been empirically found (Augsburg, De Haas, Harmgart, & Meghir, 2012). However, there are 
mixed empirical results regarding the reality of these dreams and this will be covered in the 
second chapter of this thesis. Thus the potential wide ranging positive effects of microfinance on 
economic development is a key reason for research in this area. 
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Authors have discussed that microfinance is a financial innovation which increases the 
repayment probability of uncollateralised loans (Buera et al., 2012). Microfinance directly 
influences the amount of credit available and general access to financial services to the poor in 
developing countries (Di Bella, 2011). It can be argued that credit availability is a key driver of 
entrepreneurship in both developing and developed countries (Archer & Jones-Christensen, 
2011). Microfinance thus has a potential direct influence on entrepreneurship, which can have 
wide ranging and long lasting effects on economic development (Ahlin & Jiang, 2008). The 
effect of the regulation on increasing access to financial services for the poor is a topic of 
research not covered to date. Thus the current research is required to fill a gap in the literature. 
The effect of microfinance on financial inclusion and credit availability makes this research topic, 
and in particular the law and economics perspective of microfinance particularly poignant. 
 Issues with financial inclusion are more broad and all-encompassing than first considerations 
would suggest. This is because it is not simply a matter of ‘access’ to financial services. In 
developing countries, with a majority of the population illiterate, financially illiterate, and 
subsistence farmers, microfinance branches in each village is not the complete solution for 
financial inclusion, as people do not know what access to financial services means for them. 
Indeed, without identification documents (or an alternative such as fingerprint scanning currently 
being piloted in Pakistan), financial services cannot realistically be extended to the majority of the 
population. 
The definition of financial inclusion which will be used in the current thesis is the definition 
detailed by Dev (2006) which is as follows: 
‘… delivery of banking services at an affordable cost to the vast sections of disadvantaged and low-income groups.’ 
(pp. 4301). 
The economic and development dreams of microfinance rest on the idea that entrepreneurs 
need access to finance to create and build businesses. However, an important consideration in 
micro-entrepreneurship is the heterogeneity of borrowers. This means that simply providing 
access to credit does not necessarily create entrepreneurs (Aggarwal et al., 2012). Indeed, this is 
an intuitive consideration and needs to be remembered when resting the economic development 
dreams on the shoulders of microfinance. This is potentially one of the reasons why the 
economic effect of microfinance is still unsupported in the literature and this will be discussed in 
the second chapter of this thesis. 
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Research has found that firms in developing countries are credit constrained (de Mel, McKenzie, 
& Woodruff, 2009; Webley, 2010). Credit availability is theoretically and practically critical for 
households to set up and expand businesses and time the purchasing of business assets for 
growth (Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, & Kinnan, 2009). Banerjee et al. elaborate on this theory 
by applying the ‘separation theorem’, where efficient credit markets allow investment decisions 
to be based on rates of return rather than on the timing of income and expenditure. The effect 
of this may be to allow greater credit availability for small (and highly profitable) firms, which is 
the opposite of what is currently happening (de Mel, McKenzie, & Woodruff, 2011; Karlan & 
Zinman, 2008; Kiweu, 2011). Access to credit will be considered in the following chapters. 
Research into the law and economics of development has followed the heterodox theory of 
institutional economics, finding that it is more than quantitative market forces which determine 
prices and the success of markets (Viner, 1927). Indeed, the law and economics of development 
indicates that market institutions and culture are important, along with legal institutions. This is 
in contrast to the neo-classical or orthodox perspective which ignores influences on the market 
other than the market forces of supply and demand (Commons, 1936). The neo-classical 
approach rejects state intervention in the form of laws and regulations in the opinion of Adam 
Smith, and partially in the opinion of John Maynard Keynes. However, the institutional 
economics perspective identifies cultural norms, heritage, history, religion and the state of mind 
along with laws and regulations as influencing the success of markets (Coase, 1984). 
It may be argued that it is obvious that the market is not the only aspect worthy of consideration 
when the research considers laws from the start. However, it is important to state the perspective 
of the research and motivations behind the approach used. The current research aims to 
investigate the research question and in doing so consider whether or how legal institutions 
matter to microfinance. The ‘law matters’ perspective will be considered at regular intervals, 
because although the focus is on the effect of the law on MFI financial self-sustainability, a 
natural by-product of this analysis is whether legal institutions are necessary and have any effect 
at all. 
The reasons for research on the topic of microfinance have been shown to include: the social 
benefits of microfinance; achieving the goal of development; flow-through effects to other social 
areas such as education; and driving entrepreneurship through credit availability. These reasons 
provide a perspective of research which can be potentially analysed from different perspectives. 
The current research uses a law and economics perspective because of the lack of previous 
research on the topic of microfinance which uses this framework. Indeed, given the gap in the 
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microfinance research which strategically considers the effect of regulation on microfinance, the 
current research project has a strong motivation and fills a large gap in the literature. 
1.5.1 Socio-Political Goals of Microfinance 
In democracies, government policies often reflect (at least on the surface) social values 
(Linklater, 2007; Sachs & Bajpai, 2001). Hence, political goals regarding financial inclusion are 
often politically motivated and not necessarily efficient (Sumner & Tribe, 2008). It’s not 
important that the goals are inefficient, because social goals often are (Sumner & Tribe, 2008). 
Governments systematically make goals which revolve around increasing access to and quality of 
education health care, neither of which are ‘efficient’ in an economic sense to pursue. Authors 
have commented that articulation of social goals helps governments to be supported by the 
population in working towards both social and economic goals (Sachs & Bajpai, 2001). The 
discussion point is how the goals are achieved. Hence the current thesis is not concerned with 
determining whether it is worthwhile for governments to promote microfinance and the 
socioeconomic goals which it helps to achieve. Instead, the current thesis accepts the political 
motivations behind supporting microfinance and seeks to determine how regulation may be able 
to affect these social goals. In this sense, the current thesis is concerned more with the 
effectiveness of regulation than the efficiency of it. However, the purpose of this thesis is not to 
undertake an effectiveness study, rather to describe the effect of microfinance regulation on MFI 
financial self-sustainability. Authors have discussed the differences between efficiency and 
effectiveness regulatory studies (Ogus, 1994, 1995) and this thesis falls outside of the scope of 
these issues. 
In the context of the current thesis, microfinance is seen as a mechanism to increase financial 
inclusion, a widely stated political social goal. This thesis considers that the goal of financial 
inclusion has been made by governments, and these governments have identified microfinance 
as a mechanism to increase financial inclusion and thus achieve their social goals. However, this 
thesis does not consider whether the pursuit of the goal of financial inclusion is efficient, nor 
whether microfinance is the most appropriate tool to achieve that goal. These issues of economic 
efficiency and economic growth have been covered in previous research and are not the focus of 
the current thesis. As a result, the current research seems to leave the separate goals of 
microfinance unexplored, when in reality they are simply outside of the scope of this research 
and covered in previous publications. The current thesis accepts that governments establish 
social goals and that regulation can assist with achieving these goals (Sachs & Bajpai, 2001; 
Sumner & Tribe, 2008). Hence, this thesis considers how the regulation can affect the financial 
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self-sustainability of MFI’s because of the flow-through effects to financial inclusion, not 
necessarily because this is the most efficient method of achieving this social goal. Microfinance is 
an instrument to achieve development goals (Di Bella, 2011). This is because development goals 
often include female empowerment and financial inclusion. However, whether microfinance is 
what achieves development at the lowest cost is an issue for efficiency research, which is outside 
the scope of the current thesis. An efficiency analysis would need to determine if microfinance 
actually results in entrepreneurship. As already discussed, heterogeneity of borrowers means that 
simply providing access to credit does not necessarily create widespread entrepreneurship 
(Aggarwal et al., 2012). Hence, the political goals of microfinance and the link to development 
are issues which fall outside the scope of the current thesis. 
Governments have various social goals which they aim to achieve through different regulatory 
regimes or the creation of legal institutions. The social goals are assumed in this thesis to be a 
reflection of societal goals in general because governments are usually (in particular in 
democratic countries) a reflection of the people and will thus act in ways consistent with being 
re-elected by the population (Grossman & Helpman, 1996). Hence, the current thesis is not 
concerned with analysing whether the social goals established by the government are actually 
efficient or worth achieving in the first place. The current research has maintained the 
perspective of considering how the regulation affects MFI’s in their operations, which has 
subsequent effects on the achievement of governments’ social goals. 
The aim of microfinance is threefold: providing access to credit; shifting household bargaining 
power; and providing incentives to change the way people decide on ‘temptation expenditure’ 
and ‘efficient expenditure’ (Banerjee et al., 2009) (pp. 11). The purpose of microfinance is 
derived from the philosophical perspective taken. Many stakeholders see microfinance as a 
method to distribute welfare in the form of low interest loans and associated services. Others 
perceive the role of MFI’s as social businesses to increase financial inclusion across the world – 
operating with the goal of serving society and not for profit maximisation. On the other hand a 
third group view the poor as a potential market whose demand for credit allows that they are a 
profitable market for MFI’s. The current thesis does not rest on a foundation of assuming a 
purpose for microfinance as one of these explicit purposes. The current thesis accepts the variety 
of research which indicates that microfinance is an initiative which does not have large negative 
effects and is not expensive for governments to support (Brau & Woller, 2004; Eichner, 2012), 
which is elaborated in the second chapter of this thesis.  
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Thus, the current thesis treats microfinance as an innovation which can be supported by 
governments through regulation. However, where necessary the current research does take the 
perspective that financially sustainable MFI’s are an optimum outcome because non-reliance on 
continued donor funding is something which will ensure the positive social outcomes of 
microfinance can continue to be achieved (Haq et al., 2010). It is possible to intuitively consider 
that the perspective which promotes microfinance as a purely social initiative is also supported 
by MFI’s being sustainable organisations. Indeed, research has found that efficient MFIs have 
greater outreach and that efficiency in operations does not depend on only the scale of 
production (Haq et al., 2010; Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007). The research behind this 
perspective is covered in more detail in the second and third chapters of this thesis. 
1.5.2 Poverty 
Political goals often refer to reductions in poverty through initiatives such as microfinance. 
Hence, an understanding of poverty in terms of definitions and measurement continues the 
discussion regarding the link between policy goals and methods to achieve those goals (such as 
microfinance). Research regarding how microfinance addresses the eradication of poverty has 
not been extensively covered in the literature. Indeed, there is a plethora of research which 
considers microfinance and poverty at an individual household level (for example Eichner 
(2012)), but the empirical research to date does not take a strategic perspective to consider the 
direct relationship between the policy goal and specific microfinance regulations. Hence, 
although the literature on poverty and on microfinance is extensive, the overlap between them 
leaves out the strategic perspective. The strategic perspective is potentially critical because it 
allows us to understand the effects of regulation. This is the gap in the research that the current 
thesis seeks to address. 
As will be discussed in chapters two, three and four, those in absolute poverty have no use for or 
method to repay a microfinance loan. Hence, microfinance actually serves those above the 
poverty line, and only rarely the poor. For the purposes of this research, the ‘poor’ are 
considered as those below the ‘middle class’ in each country. The strategic perspective of the 
current research requires this broad definition and recognises that it misses a lot of detail 
regarding those in need in developing countries. ‘Mission drift’ refers to the tendency for MFI’s 
to provide larger and larger average loan sizes to the middle classes in order to maintain 
operational sustainability. These trends are related to poverty and the ability for microfinance to 
address poverty. 
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1.6 Why is Microfinance Interesting for Law and Economics? 
The issue of how microfinance can be supported in the regulation is an important topic of 
research, as previously discussed. The research to date has focussed on techniques which 
although covering theoretical and empirical methodologies also fail to address the law and 
economics of microfinance. The current thesis aims to fill the gap in the literature by analysing 
microfinance from a law and economics perspective. In order to do this the purpose of the law 
needs to be established with an analysis as to whether the law succeeds in its objective. Thus the 
current thesis is written from the perspective of considering the effectiveness rather than the 
efficiency of law (Ogus, 1994). This means that the political goals of microfinance are accepted 
as a given. Whether microfinance is an initiative worthy of financial support is not a topic of 
discussion in the current thesis as the research question requires that a strategic perspective of 
the issue at hand takes prominence.  
A law and economics perspective of microfinance will utilise a methodology previously 
untouched in the literature. The law and economics perspective will theoretically consider 
microfinance in the context of the financial market and regulatory environment. Further, the law 
matters tradition (Faure & Smits, 2011; O'Donnell, 2004) will be followed in subsequent 
chapters to identify the relationship between the microfinance laws (including the goals of the 
law and the regulation of financial institutions) and the promotion of microfinance. An analysis 
of legal institutional conditions which would result in conditions within which microfinance can 
develop (ie. the role of law) is important for the current research and is based on a law and 
economics approach. The law and economics perspective is required to conduct these analyses 
and draw appropriate conclusions. 
A strategic view of microfinance law is taken in subsequent chapters. There is no specific 
literature on this topic because currently there are solely country-specific provisions within the 
laws. There is no set of rules or overarching literature providing regulators with a blueprint from 
which to develop their microfinance regulation. For this reason the current thesis also looks at 
microcredit legislation, which may also encompass the microfinance legislation, and this will be 
covered in detail in chapter five. Although under a law and economics analysis, the current 
research takes a strategic view of the effect of regulation on behaviour and thus provides the 
literature with an alternative perspective than the majority of ‘bottom-up’ research which exists 
already.  
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1.7 Objectives and Scope 
The current thesis considers a potentially broad area of research: microfinance. For this reason 
the current research focusses on considering a particular aspect of microfinance from a particular 
methodological perspective. The objective of the current thesis is to answer the research 
question using theory and methodology which allows a law and economics analysis. The 
objective of the current research extends to contributing to the literature by providing a strategic 
perspective of a research question not explicitly considered to date. In order to focus on these 
objectives the scope of the current research is limited to considering those theories and 
methodologies which can potentially contribute to understanding the research question. 
Important issues which are outside the scope of the current research include: how the regulation 
is enforced; the efficiency of social goals; the role of poverty on well-being; the role of women’s 
empowerment in equality; among others. Issues not discussed in the current research are outside 
the scope of the research question. 
1.8 Research Question and Problem Definition 
The research question for the current thesis is: 
How does regulation affect the financial self-sustainability of Microfinance Institutions? 
Related to this are the sub-questions of: 
- Does microfinance law actually matter at all to the functioning of MFI’s? 
- How important are country-specific microfinance sector factors for determining the 
regulatory details? 
- Which regulations help MFI’s to operate financially self-sustainably? 
- Which regulations hinder MFI operations? 
The current research focusses on the factors, methodologies, and perspectives which contribute 
to answering the research question. The current research provides a description of the topic 
which contributes to the gap in the literature. The problem is defined as those issues which 
directly concern the effect of microfinance regulation on MFI financial self-sustainability. In 
order to understand this question it needs to be understood what these terms mean. 
Microfinance regulation refers to the regulation which governments have defined as covering 
MFI’s and their operations. This excludes the general financial regulation and regulation which 
although addressing other social goals indirectly affects microfinance. MFI financial self-
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sustainability refers to the ability of MFI’s to operate without any donor capital or reduced 
interest loans. Thus it refers to the ability of MFI’s to fund their ongoing operations in isolation 
from donor funding sources. 
1.9 Research Process 
The research question of the current thesis means that a combination of theoretical and 
empirical research is needed to accurately and completely understand the key issues at play. The 
research question considers the issue of microfinance regulation from a strategic perspective, and 
this requires a suitably broad and strategic methodological approach, as discussed in the previous 
section. As a result of this strategic perspective the initial chapters of this thesis will consider the 
published research to date in a manner which allows for a law and economics foundation of 
understanding to be developed, by looking at the effects of regulation on business operations 
and subsequently on microfinance borrowers. Specifically, there will be three chapters which 
consider microfinance research in structured ways to determine how the current research 
contributes to the gap in the literature. Previous research is primarily bottom-up focussed and 
hence the current research will examine select previous publications to build a foundation for the 
current thesis. In addition, there will be three chapters which present the original research and 
results of the current thesis. In this way the current thesis is balanced and presents original 
information as well as considerations of previous research. In addition, an introduction and 
concluding chapter are provided. 
1.10 Dissertation Structure 
The current thesis focusses on answering the research question. In order to answer the research 
question in a way that allows for valid and reliable results a specific series of methodology has 
been designed to consider the issue from complementary methodological perspectives. This 
means that both quantitative and qualitative methodologies have been selected to analyse the 
research question. The content of the thesis is thus a description of the effects of the regulation 
on MFI financial self-sustainability, which hasn’t been considered in the literature to date. The 
strength of this methodological diversification is that the questions raised by legal comparison 
can be sequentially answered by quantitative and qualitative methodologies. The result of this is 
that consistency of answers will be systematically reinforced and gaps in the understanding of the 
research question will be focussed on through further methodological techniques.  
The structure of the current thesis will be as follows. The second chapter will present a review of 
the literature on microfinance, analysing reasons for the divided and one sided literature 
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regarding the effects of microfinance. In order to consider the issues around microfinance from 
a law and economics perspective, the third chapter will consider the issues in the literature which 
allow an understanding of how regulation can potentially affect the functioning of MFI’s, and 
potential methods for the law to address these issues. A focus on the empirical literature on 
microfinance will be provided in the fourth chapter, as most published research relies on 
unempirical methodology. Hence a focus on the empirical studies allows that the quality research 
does not get lost in the vast body of published unempirical research. The fifth chapter builds on 
the law and economics chapter by detailing the regulatory features of case-study countries which 
have the potential to impact MFI financial sustainability. The fifth chapter provides a regulatory 
comparison which provides unique research content not covered before in the literature. The 
sixth chapter uses the analysis from the fifth chapter to consider statistical trends in the data 
regarding macro and micro indicators. However, the statistical considerations of the sixth 
chapter actually raise as many questions as they answer, and for this reason fieldwork interviews 
are documented in the seventh chapter of this thesis. The seventh chapter outlines the 
methodology and results of empirical fieldwork interviews in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and 
Italy with key stakeholders. The eighth chapter combines the results from the previous chapters 
to develop an answer to the research question and policy recommendations. 
Chapter  
1. Research Question and Methodology 
2. Microfinance: Dreams and Reality 
3. The Law and Economics of Microfinance: An Overview 
4. Microfinance: Empirical Findings 
5. Microfinance Law Across Countries  
6. Statistical Considerations 
7. Empirical Results of Fieldwork Interviews 
8. Policy Recommendations and Conclusion 
The current thesis addresses an issue which is important for academics and policy makers alike. 
How regulators can support long term financial inclusion via microfinance is a topic which 
requires a ‘non-classical’ perspective, because microfinance and the related issues5 are not ‘classic’ 
problems. Indeed, the research question of the current thesis will be considered from a law and 
economics perspective in order to understand the associated factors which influence incentives 
in a holistic top-down perspective, as demanded by the research question. A bottom-up 
perspective which focussed on details (such as the effect of microfinance loans on 
entrepreneurship) does not suit this research question because the issue is strategic and requires 
                                                 
5 Such as why repayment rates are so high for uncollateralised loans to people in poverty. 
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the consideration of a number of associated factors such as regulation and business operations. 
For this reason, the current thesis will use a variety of methodological techniques to address the 
strategic nature of the research question. In particular the individual chapters will present the 
microfinance environment, previous empirical research, the law and economics of microfinance, 
comparative law, statistical considerations, and empirical fieldwork interviews. The combination 
of techniques will allow the research question to be answered and academic and policy 
conclusions to be made. In order to understand the context from which the current research 
question will build discussions, the second chapter, which follows, will consider the dreams and 
reality of microfinance.  
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2. Microfinance: Dreams and Reality 
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2.1 Introduction 
The inequality in global wealth and access to social resources is one of the most discussed issues 
in the world today. The development of global social morals (Linklater, 2007) has resulted in the 
formalisation of political and cultural goals towards equality and fairness. Despite the rationality 
challenges these morals pose to traditional economists, the achievement of socially based moral 
goals via regulation has wide ranging effects, including on financial inclusion in developing 
countries (Augsburg, De Haas, Harmgart, & Meghir, 2012; Economist-Intelligence-Unit, 2013; 
Gibson & Tsakalotos, 1994).  
The fact that most of the world’s population does not have access to a social safety net or a 
formal banking system has led to the development of microfinance to fill this gap in services 
(Sharma, 2005). Indeed, with 1.4 Billion people living on less than US$1.25 per day there are 
potentially billions of people who are deemed unprofitable to traditional financial institutions all 
over the world (The-World-Bank, 2012). Further, the global average for financial inclusion is 
50% of the population (using a bank account as a proxy for financial inclusion) (Demirguc-Kunt 
& Klapper, 2012). Using this trend in statistics it can be seen that potentially half of the global 
population is excluded from the formal financial system (Abbad, Abbad, & Malik, 2011), and this 
is at odds with global social morals of equality (Hofstede, 1983) 
Microfinance has seen exponential growth over the last twenty years because of its ability to 
include the poor in the financial system and provide capital to facilitate income generating self-
employment activities and smooth consumption expenses (Ahlin & Jiang, 2008). This has 
mobilised household savings and encouraged emerging small scale entrepreneurs (Rogerson, 
2001). There is intuitively a potential effect on economic growth because the impetus to achieve 
economic growth needs to come from within the developing country, not be imposed from the 
outside (Collier & Dasgupta, 2007). This concept is congruent with microfinance, which has the 
potential to enable economic growth through funding small-scale entrepreneurs, bypassing 
external aid and internal political issues in the process. How microfinance helps achieve this is 
potentially influenced by microfinance law.  
The current chapter sets the context for the current thesis by presenting microfinance in terms 
of the motivation and history behind it, and factors which are relevant for the effect of 
regulation on MFI operations1. Hence this chapter contributes to answering the research 
                                                 
1 The current chapter is a re-written version of the publication of the same name in the Dovenscmidt Quarterly 
Volume 2, 2013. 
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question by identifying the key reasons behind the political goals which microfinance regulation 
seeks to achieve along with MFI operational considerations. In order to answer the research 
question it is important to understand the aspects of MFI operations which may affect long-term 
operating self-sufficiency of these institutions. Given that microfinance is not a ‘classic’ initiative 
it can be understood that the dynamics of the products and MFI operations warrant presenting 
in the first chapter of this thesis. 
It is important to understand that those in poverty have had access to finance prior to the 
emergence of Microfinance Institutions (MFI’s) through Traditional Money Lenders (TML’s). 
Loans through TML’s such as banks were rarely approved because of the high transaction costs 
associated with small loans, no collateral, no credit history, or no business plan (Shankar, 2007; 
Sharma, 2005) (pp 1337 and pp 295 respectively). Other TML’s which operate outside of the 
formal financial system, such as ‘payday lenders’ have also been available to the poor, however 
with potentially extortionate terms (Francis, 2010). Given the emergence of MFI’s to fill this gap 
in financial services, there is little research as to how MFI’s are regulated and the subsequent 
effect on economic development. The regulation of MFI’s is crucial because these institutions 
hold the power to provide or withhold finance which can be used for either the creation of 
microenterprises or to smooth consumption expenditure. Despite the importance of 
microfinance there is limited research which provides an indication of how regulation affects 
MFI’s (Etzensperger, 2012).  
Microfinance is a topic of research because of the potential wide-ranging and long-lasting effects 
it can have on a majority of the poor people on Earth. However, there is little empirical research 
on the area which focusses on the economic benefits of microfinance. This is due to sample 
selection bias, i.e. it is not possible to compare borrowers from MFI’s and those who do not 
borrow (Aggarwal, Klapper, & Singer, 2012). However, various authors have found direct social 
benefits from microfinance programs (Affleck & Mellor, 2006; Cabello, 2008; Hossain & Knight, 
2008; Husain, 2008; Mayoux, 1999; Molyneux, Hutchison, Chuma, & Gilson, 2007; Roper, 2005; 
Sharma, 2005). In addition, authors have found that microfinance has the potential to reduce 
individual and regional poverty levels (Emeni & Kehinde, 2008; Hossain & Knight, 2008; 
Mogale, 2007; Mwenda & Muuka, 2004; Sharma, 2005). However, the requirements for 
development to be achieved at a micro and macro level require not only microfinance, but 
savings of the resulting profits (Opoko, Dzene, Caria, Teal, & Zeitlin, 2009; Rogerson, 2001). 
Ahlin and Jiang (2008) have gone so far as to say that microfinance will have no effect on GDP 
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unless there are long-term savings patterns by borrowers. The research on the socioeconomic 
benefits of microfinance will be reviewed in more detail in the coming sections of this chapter.  
In contrast, The World Bank has found that most microfinance is used to meet basic needs (such 
as housing and food) rather than to generate income via investment activities. In addition to this, 
critics of microfinance generally comment on the mechanism not meeting the needs of the 
‘bottom of the pyramid’ chronic poor (Collier & Dasgupta, 2007; Hartungi, 2007; Molyneux et 
al., 2007; Roper, 2005; Sykes & Quesenberry, 2009; Webb, Kristiani, & Olaru, 2009; Weiss, 
Montgomery, & Kurmanalieva, 2003), and does not actually reduce poverty at all (Rogerson, 
2001; Zeller & Meyer, 2002). It is clear from the literature that there are a number of factors 
which affect individual and regional outcomes, which are not limited to microfinance such as 
agricultural cycles and government policy (Baulch & Hoddinott, 2000; Mwenda & Muuka, 2004; 
Sharma, 2005).  
The equivocality of the research findings regarding the socio-economic benefits of microfinance 
provides motivation for: clarifying the origins and current situation of microfinance; establishing 
the areas where the current research will focus (ie. the gap in the literature), and; developing a 
foundation from which subsequent chapters can build. This chapter contains a positive analysis 
which seeks to describe the microfinance environment in terms of establishing success 
benchmarks and determining the empirical findings regarding success or failure to date.  
Although the system of revolving savings and loans groups has existed for hundreds of years 
(Mercy-Corps, 2006) and is theoretically a method to reduce poverty and advance economies 
through entrepreneurship, in reality there has been little positive recorded effect of MFI’s over a 
large amount of time (Buera, Kaboski, & Shin, 2012).  
Existing literature shows no consistency in findings regarding the existence or magnitude of 
social benefits or poverty reduction as a result of microfinance (eg. Arch (2005)). Further, the 
interrelationship between microfinance and legal institutions is still not clearly understood. These 
main issues will be discussed in this chapter in order to establish the existing findings which may 
illustrate structural or methodological reasons for literature discrepancies, and assist with 
focussing the current research. 
The current thesis aims to discuss from a law and economics perspective how legal institutions 
can affect long term financial inclusion particularly through financially self-sustainable MFI’s. In 
order to examine this, the research question is: How does regulation affect the financial self-sustainability 
of Microfinance Institutions? Positive and normative chapters will be developed to answer this 
34_Edle Hunt BW Stand.job
Ch.2.  Katherine Hunt 
   30 
 
question. The third chapter will examine the development of microfinance regulation from a law 
and economics perspective. The fourth chapter will present a review of the empirical literature to 
date. The fifth chapter will present a regulatory comparison between the countries of focus for 
the current chapter: Italy, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The sixth chapter will quantitatively 
consider trends in the data which can explain the effect of some of the differences in law 
presented in chapter five. The seventh chapter will present the results of empirical fieldwork 
interviews conducted with different stakeholders to gain a qualitative perspective of the research 
question. The eighth chapter concludes and presents policy recommendations. Subsequent 
chapters will seek to describe a regulatory environment for supporting microfinance based on a 
law and economics framework of analysis. 
2.2 What is Microfinance? 
In a World Bank microfinance impact assessment, Karlan and Goldberg (2007) define 
microfinance as ‘…the provision of small-scale financial services to people who lack access to traditional 
banking services’ (pp 10). This definition of microfinance has been clarified in the first chapter of 
this thesis in order to ensure that subsequent reference to the term microfinance is consistently 
understood. Thus, the term microfinance in this chapter builds on the previously established 
definition. The provision of microenterprise loans has been diversified to include the provision 
of other financial services such as micro-insurance, micro-pensions, deposits and loans for 
consumption, education and medical expenses. The term microfinance thus refers to a range of 
small sum financial services provided to the poor, and the primary service is usually loans for the 
establishment and expansion of micro-enterprises depending on the country.  
Microfinance has been formally developed in recent decades with the explicit motivation of 
providing financial services to the poor. Low balance transactions and high operating costs result 
in perceived unprofitable relationships from the banks’ perspectives, leading to potential 
borrowers being un-serviced. The development of the microfinance industry has been primarily 
motivated by socio-economic goals. However, this thesis is primarily interested in how 
microfinance regulation helps to achieve government social goals and does not judge whether 
these social goals are actually efficient. 
There is a potentially large effect on economic development from microfinance because it 
supports small scale entrepreneurship which is a vital first stepping stone to lead towards the 
creation of larger businesses which contribute to the formal economy and employ more people. 
In order for the economies of developing countries to grow there must be businesses employing 
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people and using economies of scale to ensure sustainable profit (Carree & Thurik, 2005). The 
development of microenterprises into businesses employing people generally requires increasing 
amounts of credit at strategic growth points in the life cycle of the business (de Mel, McKenzie, 
& Woodruff, 2011; Parvin, Rahman, & Jia, 2012). Microfinance thus supports the establishment 
and growth of microenterprises so that some might become fully fledged businesses contributing 
to regional and national economies.  
2.2.1 Why is there Microfinance?  
Despite the recent popularisation of microfinance as a tool for socioeconomic advancement of a 
majority of the world’s poor, microfinance is not actually a new concept. Although our modern 
understanding of microfinance can theoretically be traced to Jonathan Swift (Hollis, 1999), the 
famous author and Irish nationalist, savings and credit groups have actually existed for centuries 
all over the world (Mercy-Corps, 2006). 
It is not surprising that small scale informal savings and credit groups existed long before the 
establishment of formal microfinance institutions. Indeed there are many aspects of society 
which emerged simultaneously and without collaboration all over the world before small-scale 
trends became a wide-ranging system. For example, farming and medical care were present at a 
family level before expanding to the industries they are today. It is understandable that before 
formal banking institutions were developed, groups of people collaborated to support each 
other’s savings and credit requirements. In particular, we know of savings and credit groups in 
India (Chit Funds), Indonesia (Arisan) and West Africa (Tontines) (Mercy-Corps, 2006). It is 
important to recognise the existence of quasi-MFI’s centuries ago because it reinforces the 
important role that banking services have played in rural and poor communities throughout 
recent human history. It further highlights that for institutions to contribute to society they need 
not be formal – informal institutions which spontaneously grow may be equally as effective. 
The development of financial systems and the effect of financial regulation is a subject covered 
in chapter three. However, in the case of microfinance it can be seen that without regulatory 
support savings and credit would have been provided to the poor in a decentralised and village 
based system. This is because a lack of regulation may have theoretically had effects not only on 
the functioning of capital markets, but also on NGO’s who administer a majority of 
microfinance. The success of these systems will be discussed in further detail at a later stage of 
the current chapter. This village-based system may be unable to allow for the scope of 
entrepreneurship because the amount of available finance is limited to the savings of other group 
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members. However, this is not the case in Peru where most MFI’s are primarily funded by 
domestic deposits (Carrasco, 2006; Etzensperger, 2012). This is particularly important in 
developing countries where the imposition of external aid has not yielded economic success 
because of a range of psychological and corruption related factors (Buscaglia, 2011). There is 
some doubt about the efficiencies of donor aid (Mersland, 2011), which serve to provide further 
support for the importance of internal sources of growth, of which entrepreneurship supported 
by microfinance is arguably one. The history of how microfinance developed will potentially 
allow us to consider factors which influence future trends. 
 The development of microfinance in Western Europe followed a trend which reflects the 
current waning and waxing of banking services to different market sectors. Of note for this 
chapter is the Irish Loan Fund system, established and initially financed by Jonathan Swift, to 
provide small loans to rural farmers unable to guarantee collateral. This system began in the early 
1700’s and was widespread in the middle of the 19th Century with loans to 20% of Irish families 
every year (Hollis, 1999).  
In the middle of the 19th Century on continental Europe a similar trend developed in Germany 
backed by the altruistic wealthy and unions. With the motivation of improving welfare and 
helping the poor reduce their reliance on money-lenders, rural community credit unions and 
savings co-operatives increased their clientele (Mercy-Corps, 2006). During this period the co-
operatives were also successful in obtaining funds from donors, a key ingredient for the scale of 
MFI’s which lies within the law and economics environment. Western Europe’s focus on the 
development of microfinance has a foundation in the union movement and the underlying 
socialist nature of many European states. However, elsewhere in the world a similar trend has 
been developing (Hollis, 1999). 
In Indonesia there has been a formal MFI in operation since 1895 (Mercy-Corps, 2006), showing 
that in developing countries too, it is the media coverage of the sector which is new and not 
necessarily the sector itself. However, if microfinance has been present at a large-scale in 
Indonesia for more than a hundred years, it is fair to question how that country still remains in 
the development phase. This is an important consideration because the current thesis is primarily 
concerned with the regulation of MFI’s in developing countries and using a law and economics 
approach to establish policy recommendations and suggest a framework for legislation. The 
historical and globally wide spread existence of microfinance supports the focus of the current 
thesis. This is because an initiative which affects so many and has such a history is undoubtedly 
an important topic for research.  
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Over the last 50 years the development of microfinance has become very particular for each 
country and it is not accurate to present a general overview of progress because there are such 
wide differences in uptake, service provision, and effects across a number of the key 
microfinance countries. It can be argued that what we now consider microfinance was pioneered 
by Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunus in 1974, then a professor of economics at the 
University of Chittagong in Bangladesh. In collaboration with graduate students and designed as 
a somewhat experimental design, initial loans were provided to groups of poor villagers (Shukran 
& Rahman, 2011). The success of the pilot study and observed positive effects on empowerment 
of the poor, especially of women, alongside the self-sustaining model when funded by deposits 
resulted in the creation of the Grameen Bank in 1983 (Zapalska, Brozik, & Rudd, 2007). Initially 
the bank was forced to be self-sustaining because donor and investor funds were difficult to 
obtain due to the unchartered waters in which the microfinance system was being formally 
established. A solid foundation of self-sustaining financial services has allowed the bank to light 
the way for many more large sized MFI’s and for international financing to be widespread from 
both donors and investors (Hulme, 2008). The product foundation on group-lending has 
ensured that the risk of the loans are low while the poorest in society are sought to be reached 
(Shukran & Rahman, 2011), which allows MFI’s to present a case for reaching the target market 
with financial services. 
Although some aspects of microfinance, such as group lending, have evolved little as a result of 
their continued ability to meet the needs of the poor, some aspects of microfinance have needed 
the intentional creation in order to achieve socioeconomic goals. Throughout the history of 
microfinance the system has only really provided benefits to those who are poor but still above 
the poverty line, and has not been able to address the needs of the ‘Bottom of the Pyramid’ poor 
who do not even have the ability to seek microfinance (Hartungi, 2007; Molyneux et al., 2007; 
Webb et al., 2009; Weiss et al., 2003). Authors have discussed the chronic poor, and recommend 
that microfinance be distributed directly to them (Sykes & Quesenberry, 2009) and that 
associated services be provided to reduce the higher than average drop-out rates for those in 
extreme poverty (Roper, 2005). Thus, MFI’s such as the Grameen Bank have initiated programs 
designed to directly support the destitute members of society, for whom the traditional 
microfinance programs are of little use (Hulme, 2008). The ability of microfinance to adapt to 
the relevant societal issues is an important aspect of the historical development of this industry. 
The intentional creation of programs to meet the needs of the poorest in society while still 
maintaining a self-sustaining business model illustrates that the motivation for microfinance 
development is strong.  
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It is understandable that people, who are generally risk averse (Hofstede, 1983) would prefer to 
have a stable income-producing job than have the risk associated with a microenterprise and 
associated debt. Thus, the fact that most microfinance is used to finance living expenses is an 
expected outcome and reflects risk aversion which exists across all countries (The-World-Bank, 
2003). Indeed, even in developed countries the level of business failures outweigh business 
successes and this inherent risk is even more pronounced in developing countries (Klapper & 
Richmond, 2011). It is with reflection on risk tolerance that it can be understood how only a 
small portion of borrowers ‘graduate’2 from consumption based microfinance to obtaining a loan 
to fund the establishment and expansion of microenterprises, despite increasing growth over the 
last 50 years. 
2.2.2 Microfinance and Entrepreneurship 
Microfinance has existed in some form for centuries. However, the structure of microfinance did 
not adapt to serve a greater number of people, and it is only in recent times that sheer scale of 
borrowings has been achieved. The reasons for the development of microfinance into the form 
we recognise today is based on economic and non-economic reasons. This section of chapter 
two discusses the reasons for microfinance, followed by the logistics of how the microfinance 
system has developed.  
Given the fact that microfinance has reached increasing amounts of borrowers across most 
developing countries with a microfinance infrastructure, it can be assumed that there are also a 
larger number of microenterprises funded by microfinance each year as they form a portion of 
all microfinance provided. Indeed, there has been year on year growth in microfinance loans of 
40% globally over the last decade (Di Bella, 2011). Thus, although most microfinance borrowers 
are not micro-entrepreneurs but are rather using the credit to smooth consumption, as the 
amount of people served by the financial system grows, so will the amount of people who 
borrow to form micro-enterprises. This is because there has been a constant percentage of 
borrowers using the funds for consumption through the years of increasing microfinance lending 
(Di Bella, 2011) It is this that ensures the theoretical positive effect of microfinance throughout 
history will continue to increase in magnitude and scope. Thus, the historical underperformance 
of microfinance on increasing the economic growth of developing countries may indeed be 
because of a combination of adverse regulation, and also that the outreach to borrowers needs to 
be greater. 
                                                 
2 Borrowers ‘graduate’ from microfinance by building their financial portfolio to a size that they are able to enter the 
formal financial system and hence stop being microfinance clients. 
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2.2.3 Goals of Microfinance 
For microfinance to be successful in the socioeconomic objectives defined by each MFI support 
needs to be maintained from national and international governing bodies. From a political 
perspective it can be said that development and credit availability are primary goals and that the 
regulation of MFI’s theoretically supports the achievement of these goals. It is these political 
goals which specific regulation aims to achieve. Whether the political goals to achieve 
development are efficient is not a focus of the current thesis. 
The goal of development is an important reason for research in this field. Given the sheer sums 
of money invested in microfinance it is critical to ensure that the system is efficient, which means 
benefiting the poor relative to the costs associated with doing so. Indeed, the increasing amounts 
invested in microfinance from NGO’s and the governments of developing countries is 
staggering and increasing, with US$21.3 Billion invested in 2009, a 17% increase on the year 
before (El-Zoghbi, Gahwiler, & Lauer, 2011). Research in this field may contribute to ensuring 
that the microfinance system is efficient and that the goals of microfinance are achieved. The 
current research is not designed to assess the efficiency of microfinance, however it is an 
important consideration at this early point in discussing the associated literature. Further, by 
supporting financial institutions which can support development there are fewer burdens on the 
governments of developing countries so they can focus on other key aspects of raising the 
standard of living such as through health care or education. In this way critics of microfinance 
have commented that it is simply a privatisation of welfare . Microfinance is such an important 
area for research because there are potential flow-through effects to other areas of a developing 
countries economy. In this way it is intuitive that helping to allow people to raise themselves out 
of poverty has positive effects on the health care and education systems and subsequent health 
and education levels. Further, there may be increased rates of education, especially of girls when 
parents can afford school fees. The link between economic development goals and political 
social goals is blurred, and political goals of microfinance are often aligned with development 
goals. Thus the potential wide ranging positive effects of microfinance on economic 
development are key reasons for research in this area. 
The role of legal institutions in supporting financial institutions to provide products to their 
customers has been well documented (Diamond & Dybvig, 1986). Research in this field has 
focussed on developed countries and found that financial regulation increases transparency 
between customers and banks and decreases risks for both parties (Diamond & Dybvig, 1986; 
Satta, 2004). Indeed, research into the role of legal institutions is widespread in developed 
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countries, and is an emerging area of research for developing countries. The potential impact 
that legal institutions have on MFI’s and subsequently on economic development is large. This is 
related to the political motivations for research which examine the way in which legal institutions 
achieve the goal of supporting credit availability for the poor in developing countries. 
2.2.3.1 Economic Reasons for Microfinance 
Economic reasons for the development of microfinance follow the development economics 
trend of argument which provides that economic growth is more surely achieved from business 
growth within a country rather than the imposition or provision of aid from external sources 
(Collier & Dasgupta, 2007). This argument further lends itself to support that economic 
development needs a foundation of sustainability and this is achieved most efficiently from 
internal impetus in the country. The widely referenced work of Amartya Sen illustrates the 
advantages and the pitfalls of globalisation in the current world (Sen, 2001, 2002), Of which 
widespread development and social empowerment are suggested as two advantages. 
It can be argued that development is the overall aim of microfinance from an economic 
perspective. It may be of benefit to developed countries to raise individual wealth and reduce 
poverty, as wealthier countries may be more politically stable and ensure the societal objectives 
of governments are upheld (Bowles, 2008), Which has flow-through positive effects to 
developed countries. Behavioural economics, game theory and experimental economics seek to 
explain the behaviour toward supporting moral values financially (Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-
Fujuwara, & Zamir, 1991; Tomer, 2007). Importantly, modern societies uphold certain moral 
values which, regardless of their efficiency or rationality, seek to be achieved across the globe 
(Hofstede, 1983; Kinnier, Kernes, & Dautheribes, 2000; Sumner & Tribe, 2008). Indeed, it is this 
sense of fairness and moral obligation which drives many large scale government funded NGO’s 
in the world today (Schwartz, 2007). The relevant question regarding this issue is not whether the 
moral values of fairness are appropriate, rather whether the model of microfinance achieves the 
morally founded development goals.  
The model of microfinance which we recognise today has been designed and supported by 
particular regulation because of development goals. Governments of developing countries 
recognise that if self-sustaining MFI’s are able to increase entrepreneurship and reduce poverty, 
that will in turn reduce the amount of funding and monitoring required by the government, 
allowing more focus on other social objectives such as education or health care. It is thus very 
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strategic for governments of developing countries to provide a regulatory environment which 
supports microfinance. 
Indeed it can be intuitively extended that the financial support of microfinance by NGO’s, the 
governments of developed countries and external investors is extremely efficient in promoting 
development. This is because the money that is used by MFI’s has potential exponential effects 
on the social economy by providing support for entrepreneurship which further stimulates the 
economy. Although investment in education, health, and other areas where developing 
economies need assistance is also vital, it is microfinance’s ability to stimulate internal growth 
which ensures its on-going attraction for external funding. As we will discuss, there are many 
practical issues which mean that this theory of internal growth support is not always the case, 
however, there are few avenues for financial support which offer such promising outcomes at all 
societal and economic levels, as microfinance. 
Various studies have found that entrepreneurship and the development of large businesses is key 
for the economic development of countries (Hartungi, 2007; Sharma, 2005). This is not 
surprising given the logical economies of scale achieved when businesses are able to employ 
hundreds of wage earning people while generating a profit. The role of microfinance in this 
system of economic development occurs at various stages of the entrepreneurship lifecycle. It 
has been established that microfinance does not not generally support the destitute members of 
developing countries, but rather those who are just above the poverty line of US$1.25 per day (in 
2005) (The-World-Bank, 2009). Indeed, The World Bank estimates that there are 1.4 billion 
people living below this poverty line, and thus out of the scope of microfinance services. 
Microfinance has the ability to smooth the consumption of those who are just above the poverty 
line so they are able to save some money in the form of micro-deposits. Of the millions of 
borrowers who use microfinance for consumption expenses such as education or medical costs, 
some of those borrowers will ‘graduate’ to obtaining loans to establish microenterprises and 
subsequently join the formal financial sector. Of those who obtain loans for microenterprise 
establishment, 90% will continue to obtain microfinance for working capital (Roper, 2005). In an 
ideal microfinance situation, a proportion of these borrowers go on to obtain microfinance in 
larger amounts at strategic points in their business life cycle to allow for expansion. As these 
businesses expand, they employ more and more people and generate more and more cash flow 
and profit which allows them to graduate completely from the microfinance system and join the 
formal financial system. This, in theory, is how microfinance can assist with large scale internally 
supported economic development. 
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This theoretically ideal structure of microfinance leading into fully fledged businesses is a model 
on which goals of development are based. This is because large businesses provide more 
economic benefit to countries than small businesses (Carree & Thurik, 2005). However, as 
discussed it is only a small portion of borrowers who borrow to fund microenterprises and only 
a small portion of those ‘graduate’ to the formal financial system. Even in theory, the potential 
economic benefit of microfinance is thus small. This is one of the many shortcomings of 
microfinance and one of the foundations of criticism by research on the topic. In later chapters 
of the current thesis data and empirical results will be discussed regarding this issue.    
The economic motivations of the microfinance industry to be developed to reflect the current 
situation revolve around the mobilisation of household savings for economic development. The 
theory efficiently aims to provide a financial and psychological empowerment foundation from 
which all members of developing countries are able to contribute to economic development. As 
the impetus for entrepreneurship will come from within the country it is thought that the effects 
will be self-sustaining into the future. 
2.2.3.1.1 Development 
Throughout history microfinance has been used as a tool for the poor to meet unexpected costs, 
and to smooth their consumption expenses. It is the ability of microfinance to meet the various 
needs of the poor that has ensured its wide-ranging success. However, authors have noted that it 
is the ability of microfinance to fund microenterprises and provide on-going credit through 
expansion phases which provides the real potential benefits to regional and national economies. 
Microfinance was designed in modern times to mobilise household savings in order to smooth 
the consumption expenses of the poor. A key goal of microfinance is that it serves as a tool for 
the development of developing countries. Indeed, much of the evidence indicates that 
microfinance reduces poverty (Emeni & Kehinde, 2008; Hossain & Knight, 2008; Mwenda & 
Muuka, 2004). These findings have been supported by research in retail mortgage markets of 
developed countries which have found that there is a relationship between net worth and 
economic activity (Caplin, Freeman, & Tracy, 1997). However, other authors have commented 
that most microfinance is used to meet basic needs and the smoothing of consumption outlays 
which postpone expenses but do not not increase wealth (The-World-Bank, 2003).Specific 
microfinance research indicates that often the borrowed funds are used to smooth consumption 
and increase consumer spending (Aggarwal et al., 2012; Buera et al., 2012) rather than to support 
the creation or expansion of businesses. Further, authors have specified that long term positive 
effects of microfinance requires on-going savings, and that this will not have an effect on GDP 
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(Ahlin & Jiang, 2008). However, despite the ambiguity of the effect on development, authors 
have also found that there may be both macro and micro-economic benefits of microfinance 
(Sharma, 2005). In terms of the development motivation for the design of microfinance we can 
conclude that authors have found it is an accepted development agent (Hartungi, 2007) and that 
it contributes to both financial stability and social outreach (Cabello, 2008). 
When discussing the macroeconomics of microfinance, authors have found that microfinance 
increases equilibrium wages and reduces interest rates, in general equilibrium (Buera et al., 2012). 
In quantitatively assessing the macroeconomic effects of microfinance these authors identify that 
general equilibrium analyses are now possible in many countries as a result of the large increase 
in microfinance. The flow through effect on redistribution from an increase in equilibrium wages 
means that there are macroeconomic positive effects on the economic development of the poor 
(Buera et al., 2012). 
The research on the development reasons for microfinance indicates that the effect on 
development is not as grand as the goals microfinance is designed to support (Aggarwal et al., 
2012). It has been found that there are increases in equilibrium wages and redistribution of 
wealth to some extent and only in some circumstances (Buera et al., 2012). However, authors 
have also found that the theoretical conditions under which microfinance can lead to aggregate 
development are narrow and not commonly present in developing countries (Ahlin & Jiang, 
2008). The research on development shows that although the economic effects from 
microfinance are often non-existent and small when they are, nonetheless there are potential 
positive effects and this ensures that the development reasons for microfinance will remain even 
if indeed the scale of benefit is small. 
2.2.3.1.2 Credit Availability 
Microfinance directly influences the amount of credit available to the poor in developing 
countries. It can be argued that credit availability is a key driver of entrepreneurship in both 
developing and developed countries (Aggarwal et al., 2012; Berg, 2012). Microfinance thus has a 
potential direct influence on entrepreneurship, which can have wide ranging and long lasting 
effects on economic development as previously discussed. This effect on credit availability makes 
the study of microfinance from a law and economics perspective particularly poignant. 
The role of credit availability in business growth (Agyapong, Agyapong, & Darfor) has been 
documented in a World Bank report where it is stated that limited access to finance is often a 
constraint to business growth in developing countries (Aggarwal et al., 2012). It can be seen from 
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this research that the availability of credit may have a significant effect on small businesses. 
Indeed, foundation research by Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, and Kinnan (2009) found in a 
randomised experiment that the provision of microfinance in slums results in 32% more 
businesses created than in slums with no microfinance implemented. These authors further 
found that there is a clear difference between households with a propensity to be entrepreneurial 
and those who are not not, which provides further support for a criticism of microfinance that 
the provision of credit is not enough to create businesses and business growth (Banerjee et al., 
2009). 
Research has found that during real economy shocks credit availability is reduced whereas in a 
funding shock credit availability remains constant although borrowers are discouraged from 
applying in the first place (Berg, 2012). However, the same research does find that microfinance 
increases credit availability for the vulnerable in society. Credit availability is a result of 
microfinance which has wide ranging implications and this topic appears at various points in this 
thesis. Access to credit also provides one of the pillars of financial inclusion which microfinance 
addresses.  
2.2.3.2 Non-economic Reasons for Microfinance 
Microfinance is not only a tool for economic development; it also provides borrowers all over 
the world with social benefits which cover status, and empowerment. Indeed, a significant body 
of literature has been devoted to the non-economic benefits of microfinance. 
2.2.3.2.1 Social 
The focus of much of the research to date on microfinance has been on the social motivations 
and benefits of the system and the potential for sustainable socioeconomic transformation 
(Sharma, 2005). This is not surprising given that since inception modern MFI’s have had explicit 
social goals. The social goals of microfinance generally relate to the empowerment of women 
and a broad based increase in the standard of living. Authors have pointed out that the definition 
of poverty relies on socially acceptable wealth standards (Husain, 2008). Thus the measurement 
of microfinance success is built on a foundation of societal values. In the case of microfinance 
and other mainly externally funded development initiatives it is thus important that donor 
countries do not impose their own standards of poverty on those of other countries, and rather 
allow the internal definition to support country-specific development. 
One of the abilities of microfinance to foster development from within is to provide capital to 
those in countries where donor funds do not not reach (Hudon, 2009). There are some countries 
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where for political, corruption, or economic reasons, donor funds do not not reach those 
intended (Mersland, 2011). However, microfinance has the ability to mobilise the household 
savings of those in the country itself, without relying on external financing. In this way 
microfinance has the non-economic ability to bypass corruption or non-existent donor capital 
flows to support the social development of the poor (van Bastelaer, 2000). 
The potential for social outreach of microfinance has been widely stated by authors (Cabello, 
2008). Authors have emphasised that microfinance is a socioeconomic financial mechanism 
(Hossain & Knight, 2008) and as such needs to measure and take into account social 
performance (Roper, 2005). It has been found that microfinance has a positive effect on health 
outcomes (Molyneux et al., 2007), female empowerment (Hossain & Knight, 2008) and in 
reducing social exclusion (Affleck & Mellor, 2006). However, longitudinal and large scale cross-
sectional studies have not been published which confirm these findings. Although the research 
regarding the effect on poverty and economic growth are ambiguous there is consensus that the 
social effects of microfinance are wide ranging and present in most countries which have 
microfinance. 
2.2.3.2.2 Empowerment 
Empowerment has been defined in various World Bank reports and hand books as the ability to 
make choices and take actions, which is usually associated with control over resources and 
decisions (Narayan-Parker, 2005). Authors have further commented that poverty provides great 
restrictions to empowerment through powerlessness in formal and informal institutions 
(Narayan-Parker, 2005). Although this particular World Bank definition of empowerment is 
closely related to institutions, other authors have used a more broad perspective which relates to 
psychological as well as physical control. In this way, empowerment has also been defined as the 
‘…capacity to make effective choices’ (Alsop & Heinsohn, 2005). The concept of empowerment is 
integrally related with that of microfinance because the definitions clearly show that 
empowerment is a core psychological concept which can be increased through poverty 
reductions, of which microfinance is designed to achieve. 
The empirical measurement of empowerment has been applied in various contexts ranging from 
poverty interventions (Alsop & Heinsohn, 2005) to the financial planning relationship (Hunt, 
Brimble, & Freudenberg, 2011). Authors have developed reliable and valid surveys to determine 
self-reported empowerment regarding specific situations and contexts (Alsop & Heinsohn, 2005; 
Hunt et al., 2011). The established research in the field of empowerment allows the microfinance 
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literature to implement these surveys and determine the effect of empowerment from 
microfinance. 
In terms of the empowerment benefits of microfinance research has yielded equivocal results. 
Much of the research on empowerment focusses on women empowerment in developing 
countries, and indeed that is the strategic focus of many MFI’s. However, it has also been found 
that microfinance does not not itself increase female empowerment because women already have 
high social networks on which to rely (Mayoux, 1999). On the other hand, it has been found that 
microfinance does directly increase women’s empowerment (Mwenda & Muuka, 2004). Research 
has elaborated that the increase in empowerment comes from higher levels of income, 
independence and self-reliance (Roper, 2005). It can be logically extended that empowerment of 
women and poor societies have the potential to increase the standard of living for a wide range 
of community members. Development goals generally aim to raise the wealth of individuals in 
society not solely so they are wealthier, but also because it has been found that there is a general 
trend supporting happiness and wealth to a certain level (Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2002). 
However, authors have also supported the need to measure life satisfaction in order to ensure 
that there is not not an assumed association between wealth and happiness in the poor (Rojas, 
2009). 
The relationship between microfinance and empowerment has been supported in the literature. 
It is so well covered in the literature because of the integral importance of social goals and 
microfinance. The current research is interested in these findings because they indicate that 
microfinance does benefit the borrowers it serves. This is a foundation which allows the research 
question to be answered without delving into how empowerment is a result of microfinance. The 
current thesis accepts the previous findings on empowerment; however the current thesis will 
address in future chapters how microfinance is affected by microfinance regulation. 
2.3 Microfinance Organisation 
Microfinance companies are organised around corporate objectives in the same way that banks 
in developed countries are structured. However, the content of these objectives varies widely to 
reflect the goals of the MFI. For example, while a large bank such as Barclays may have the 
motivation of being admired and innovative (Barclays, 2012), MFI’s generally have goals of 
meeting social objectives and operating efficiently, as is the case of KIVA, a large MFI with 
established web presence (Kiva, 2012). MFI’s have a mission to fight poverty and often operate 
as non-profit entities without underlying legal owners (Spahr, Ashraf, Scannell, & Korobov, 
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2011). MFI’s are generally promoted by international Non-Government Organisations (NGO’s), 
a financial reliance which continues to be a concern for the sustainability of microfinance (Spahr 
et al., 2011). MFI’s focus on the provision of credit to those who, without collateral or evidence 
of being able to service the loan, are otherwise rejected by the formal financial system. This 
general goal of credit availability is built on a foundation of flow through social goals such as 
increases in empowerment, education and health care, as previously discussed in this chapter. 
In discussing the organisation of MFI’s it may be relevant to consider the marketing strategies 
involved. In general the marketing strategies by NGO’s in developed countries seem quite 
sophisticated in their methods to extract donations from the population. However, descriptive 
data research in Ghana has found that MFI’s do not not use targeted marketing strategies to 
attract borrowers (Brafu-Insaidoo & Ahiakpor, 2011). Rather than being indicative of the relative 
failure of MFI’s, this research may indicate the large scope of potential future borrowers if 
marketing strategies were employed or is a reglection of the market environment of developing 
countries. Thus, although the marketing strategies of MFI’s are not as advanced as the design of 
financial products to suit the poor, it does provide scope for expansion of the sector in the 
future. 
2.3.1 Financial Organisation 
2.3.1.1 Group Lending 
The financial model in which microfinance has been built is one of group lending (Rogerson, 
2001), however, product innovation means that individual lending is becoming more and more 
common. This is because of a trend in regulation which allows for innovation in product features 
such as those which allow collateral to be taken in the form of gold rather than joint liability. 
Group lending is where the MFI supports groups of people who save together and then lend out 
the deposited amounts to each other as needed. Understandably, repayment rates are very high 
with this model because in effect the loans are from family and friends to whom the borrower is 
accountable on a social as well as a financial level (Ahlin & Jiang, 2008; Besley & Coate, 1995; 
Mayoux, 1999; Molyneux et al., 2007; Opoko et al., 2009). These levels of responsibility also 
provide explicit and implicit insurance as the risk is shared (Torkestani & Pari, 2008). However, 
this also raises one of the issues of microfinance, which is that it is only those who are above the 
poverty line and have the financial trust of the community who have the opportunity to join 
these borrower groups. On the other hand, this financial service has not required great evolution 
since it was common practice in savings and credit groups hundreds of years ago. In this way, 
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this model of microfinance services may be one of the aspects of this industry which requires 
less legislation than the direct provision of loans to the poor or for the regulation of the MFI 
itself. The success of microfinance is consistent across the world and although many studies have 
focused on a particular geographic area there are consistent trends. In terms of loan repayments, 
there are generally 97% repayment rates globally and PAR-30 (Portfolio At Risk at 30 days) of 
1% (Di Bella, 2011)3. Indeed, other authors have found the NPL (non-performing loans) ratios 
at only 0.9% in 2010 as an Indian average because of the social pressure guarantee provided by 
each borrower inherently (Herd, Koen, Patnaik, & Shah, 2011). The consistency of findings 
regarding the actual rates of full repayments of loans indicates that microfinance is not a risky 
business for financial services firms. Despite the high transaction costs discussed, the loans are 
being repaid consistently. 
Group lending has been a service provided since the first microfinance evolved across the world 
to meet the demands of groups of rural villagers without access to the formal banking sector. 
Given the prominence of this service through history it can be seen that it is a core aspect of 
microfinance and a feature which requires little adaptation or control by regulation, although 
product innovation and collateral requirements are aspects of the regulation which can 
potentially affect this traditional financial model4. Regulation potentially affects the traditional 
model of microfinance by allowing MFI’s to potentially diversify their product offering over and 
above group lending to include loans which accept collateral in the form of gold or other 
valuables, or alternative contract types. The potential effect of the law on product innovation is 
an issue which will be considered in subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
2.3.1.2 Financial Trends 
The organisation of MFI’s differs widely. Given that most MFI’s have a similar goal around the 
provision of credit to the poor, this is particularly interesting. As often unregulated and 
international organisations5, MFI’s have the flexibility of being able to innovate and develop 
business structures which creatively achieve the final goal. The increasing use of the internet 
means that MFI’s are able to utilise web-based peer-to-peer lending systems which connect the 
poor directly with the financial provider. For example, organisations such as United Prosperity, 
                                                 
3 In the IMF Working Paper Di Bella (2011) refers to the global averages of repayment rates (write-off rates) and 
PAR-30, which is taken from all the available data in the world at the time of publication. 
4 Many MFI’s operate internationally, or are owned by international NGO’s. This means that the traditional financial 
model includes large institutions and their associated issues.  
5 MFI’s are often unregulated in countries where the regulation covers only the largest MFI’s or where the regulation 
does not cover MFI’s at all. Many NGO-based MFI’s are internationally operated, and while this does not 
necessarily mean they are outside the scope of regulation, their international nature means that they do not always 
have a strong motivation for structuring in a way which subjects them to regulation.  
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rather than providing finance to the borrower, guarantee the borrower’s loan with the traditional 
bank. United Prosperity claims that this system enables financial leverage over and above 
traditional microfinance and also results in greater long term financial freedom as the borrower 
builds a relationship directly with the bank which may increase the chance of ‘graduating’ from 
the microfinance system (United-Prosperity, 2012).  However, these trends do form only a small 
portion of total microfinance loans. 
The trend toward the mobilisation of small donations from individuals in developed countries 
supports microfinance programs overseas based on a peer-to-peer model. This is an innovation 
which leverages off existing technology and the increasing awareness of the benefits of 
microfinance in meeting social goals. Indeed, it is innovations in the financial organisation and 
strategy of MFI’s which may provide results for the success or failure of microfinance which 
other models have been unable to quantify. Trends in accessing capital are hence closely related 
to innovation in general, which is an aspect of business operations potentially affected by 
microfinance regulation. 
2.3.1.3 Interest Rates 
Critics of microfinance have lamented the fact that poor borrowers have to pay interest rates 
above 30%pa (median of 36%pa from 1998-2006 and 32%pa from 2007-2009) while the middle 
and upper classes who have access to the traditional financial system pay interest rates below 
10%pa on personal loans (Di Bella, 2011). The moral argument is that the poor should pay lower 
interest rates than the rich, because of affordability arguments. Organisations such as 
Microfinance Transparency pay particular attention to differences in interest rate calculations 
depending on when the repayments begin, and the inclusion of particular features such as 
compulsory savings (Microfinance-Transparency, 2013). 
However, in terms of the efficient use of capital theory, it is most efficient to allocate capital to 
micro and small businesses as well as the poor because these are the most productive users of 
capital (Aggarwal et al., 2012). Indeed, it may be that the price of capital is based on the risk 
premium as well as the transaction costs associated with providing such low balance loans to 
such a group of people. However, in fact the repayment rates from microfinance loans are 
generally above 99% (for all the available data from Microfinance Information Exchange across 
the world) (Di Bella, 2011), and this indicates that in fact the risk from microfinance loans is not 
high. This logic indicates that the high average interest rates are indeed as a result of the 
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transaction costs associated with providing and monitoring each loan. More detail about this 
controversial issue will be discussed in the third chapter of this thesis. 
2.3.2 Distribution  
The concept of the distribution of services and products is dependent on the location within 
which the analysis is made. Distribution can refer to the distribution of services, or the 
distributional issue of whether the initiative actually serves the poor. These are two different 
concepts which may be confused easily given the common term of use. Unless discussed 
otherwise, the current thesis refers to the term distribution with the meaning of whether the 
initiative really serves the poor.  
Given that microfinance is an initiative which addresses a distributional issue this is particularly 
relevant. Further, microfinance relies on distributing loans to the illiterate poor who are 
geographically spread. For example, the distribution of sim cards and mobile phone calling credit 
in developed countries generally requires a shop authorised to provide the relevant companies 
products. However, in developing countries these products are generally provided by lone sellers 
who can be found at many street intersections or in makeshift stalls on the side of the road. The 
distribution of different products is adapted depending on the market. This is also relevant for 
microfinance, although not on the same scale as the difference in telecom service. Indeed, the 
distributional diversity in microfinance is more likely explained by the target market that 
borrowers are unlikely to enter microfinance offices which resemble the banks which have 
previously rejected their community. For these reasons microfinance ‘branches’ are designed to 
be unimposing so the poor feel comfortable entering them. 
This flexibility and diversity of the distribution of otherwise identical products depending on the 
country in question is directly relevant for the current research. In developing countries where a 
majority of the banking research is focussed, the banking system is based on a system of physical 
branches and intermediaries such as post offices. However, this model of banking for 
microfinance would not translate well in developing countries for a number of reasons. The 
main reason that a transplant of the banking distribution model favoured in developed countries 
would not necessarily work well for MFI’s developing countries is because the scale of 
operations in MFI’s requires a lot of small balance customers and a formal distribution system 
requires excessive operating expenses to allow self-sustainability. Hence MFI’s use a system of 
loan officers which are in effect ‘mobile branches’ to increase geographical scope and outreach.  
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Further, there are psychological factors which may impede potential borrowers from entering a 
formal looking MFI. This effect has been noticed in the design of churches in countries such as 
Australia where the general population feel intimidated by imposing church structures and may 
never enter them for regular worship. However, when the churches are designed to look like 
large community halls equipped with sports facilities and child playgrounds, the population feel 
no hesitation at joining a community for worship. In this sense, the physical environment in 
which MFI’s operate may be critical for their outreach success.  
The current distribution of microfinance is adapting to recognise the challenges faced by 
financial services distribution in developing countries. In order to scale out from the traditional 
branch model of permanent credit issuing staff MFI’s such as Accion are developing ‘Alternative 
Channels’. The motivation for the development of new distribution models is that the branch 
model physically limits the potential number of borrowers to those who are willing and able to 
enter a branch for the administration of the loan. Indeed, it is a poignant moment to recognise 
that it is the rural destitute who are in most need of microfinance, and are simultaneously those 
who are not serviced by the distribution and product model as it stands (Hartungi, 2007; 
Molyneux et al., 2007; Webb et al., 2009). There is a need to innovate to distribute microfinance 
directly to the chronic poor (Sykes & Quesenberry, 2009). The innovations in development aim 
for ‘massive outreach’ by establishing MFI brokers in supermarkets and pharmacies across the 
developing world. Further, Accion has the motivation of reducing costs (which traditionally are 
heavily in human resources) by finding a balance between personal one-on-one service and 
transactional services such as those which utilise mobile phone technology. The reduction of 
cash in the microfinance system has the added benefit of increasing transparency and reducing 
the risk of corruption or fraud, providing more security for depositors and borrowers (Mesarina, 
2012). ‘Branchless Banking’ innovations have also been developed in Pakistan where the 
government-led initiative has seen exponential growth in recent years (SBP, 2011). 
An aspect of distribution which should be stated is the potential for the provision of other 
socioeconomic goal driven services. Although outside the scope of the current research it needs 
to be recognised that the distribution of microfinance is important not only because of the 
implications for the provision of the services to those who really need it, but also because of the 
potential scope for the cross-provision of other services. For example, education can be 
considered as a potential cross-provided product, and indeed some MFI’s do provide other 
services such as education, particularly business skill education (Mesarina, 2012). In the way that 
religions in modern Australia seek to first make people feel welcome and give them a space 
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where they can play sport or organise community groups, so may microfinance operate in a 
similar manner. This potential scope in the strategy of distribution of microfinance not only 
allows for customers who would otherwise have remained unaware, but also for efficiencies of 
scale in supporting other socioeconomic motivated strategies. 
The distribution of microfinance to those who require credit to smooth consumption or to 
finance microenterprises is an important consideration for the current research. The distribution 
of microfinance services has the potential to be affected by MFI regulation which is specific to 
each country. Further, developments in distribution of microfinance to the ‘bottom of the 
pyramid’ poor are required to ensure scale of the development model to achieve socioeconomic 
goals. Distribution is an important aspect of microfinance and will be discussed in more detail in 
the third chapter of this thesis. 
2.4 Geographical Trends in Microfinance 
The geographical spread of microfinance is built on a foundation of the historical and natural 
development of loan societies in communities all over the world. As a result of the home grown 
evolution of microfinance it is not surprising that the system enjoys success in most developing 
countries where the legal institutions allow it. However, the main growth in microfinance in 
recent decades has been in South Asia since Professor Yunus developed the microfinance system 
we recognise today in Bangladesh. 
Research into microfinance has generally been based in specific countries. Although many of the 
results are applicable in other developing countries it is the case that there is a lot of country 
specific research. Research has been conducted in Peru (Etzensperger, 2012; Pait, 2009), El 
Salvador (Cabello, 2008), Indonesia (Hartungi, 2007; Webb et al., 2009), Nigeria (Emeni & 
Kehinde, 2008), Bangladesh (Eichner, 2012a; Hossain & Knight, 2008; Weiss et al., 2003), Africa 
(Mayoux, 1999; Mwenda & Muuka, 2004; Rogerson, 2001), South Africa (Mogale, 2007; Sykes & 
Quesenberry, 2009), Kenya (Molyneux et al., 2007), Ghana (Opoko et al., 2009), India (Eichner, 
2012b; Shankar, 2007; Sharma, 2005), Kyrgyzstan (Struyk & Roy, 2006), Iran (Torkestani & Pari, 
2008), Israel (Felsenstein & Schwartz, 1993), Guatemala (Kevane & Wydick, 2001), Argentina 
(Pereiro, 2001), China (Rahman & Luo, 2011; Zhang, 2008), Tanzania (Satta, 2003, 2004), and 
Pakistan (Eichner, 2011). The countries in which research has primarily been conducted are of 
interest for the current thesis because it is indicative of the countries which have available data of 
MFI’s, economic growth and a supportive regulatory environment.  
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Knowledge of prior studies geographic focus will allow the current study to focus on a few key 
countries in subsequent chapters of this thesis. The country selection relies on two key criteria, 
namely the availability of data, and regulations in or translated into English. Based on initial 
screening of countries, India, Bangladesh, Italy and Pakistan are suggested. The procedure for 
identifying available data will focus on the Microfinance Information Exchange data. 
2.4.1 Countries Where Microfinance is a Success 
The consideration of microfinance success across countries is important to establish at this stage 
of the thesis because it will provide a foundation from which the fifth, sixth, and seventh 
chapters can build. In chapter three it is discussed how microfinance has developed to complete 
the financial market. Chapter four considers in detail the empirical microfinance research to date. 
Further, chapter five provides qualitative comparative analysis of microfinance regulation in four 
countries. The countries which will be analysed in the fifth chapter will be chosen based on the 
criteria of: legislation in (or translated into) English; one widely regarded ‘successful’ regulatory 
environment and one ‘unsuccessful’ regulatory environment; developing countries comparable 
across cultures and history; high microfinance uptake and awareness; available data on MFI 
sustainability; available data on microfinance borrowers and contract types. 
Much of the focus of microfinance research has been on Asia, in particular Bangladesh, and also 
Africa. This is because these ‘hot spots’ have not only the most developed microfinance systems, 
but also most of the people in need of financial services. Although the major source of finance 
across the globe is borrowing money from family and friends (Aggarwal et al., 2012), in Africa 
the countries with large amounts of microfinance proportional to other sources of finance are 
Chad, Malawi and Sierra Leone (Aggarwal et al., 2012).  n 
2.5 Overview of the Literature  
This section seeks to determine the success or failure of microfinance given the goals which it 
has sought to achieve. In considering microfinance from an empirical perspective the influences 
of microfinance will also be discussed, along with credit market failure motivations for the 
introduction of laws. However, it is important to consider the limitations of the underlying data 
on which empirical research is conducted. Microfinance-Information-Exchange (2010) has 
documented that it is difficult to compare country data when reporting periods differ across the 
year from March (India) to July (Nepal) and other months depending on the country. Given that 
previous research is built on integral issues such as these, results need to be interpreted with care. 
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The literature regarding microfinance covers a broad range of topics directly relevant to the 
current thesis such as the factors which influence success, institutions, and credit market failure. 
2.5.1 Success Influencers 
The process of describing microfinance requires that as well as identifying whether it is 
successful, the influencing factors also need to be identified. Previous literature on the 
influencing factors of development have illustrated that it is institutions which play a main role 
(North, 1990), and this is integral for the current thesis where legal institutions potentially impact 
the financial self-sustainability of MFI’s. Other factors which influence development have been 
found  such as reproduction and female employment (Benería & Sen, 1981), health and nutrition 
(Strauss & Thomas, 1998) and science, skills and incentives (Jovanovic, 2001). However, it is 
outside of the scope of the current thesis to delve into these details, as the focus remains on the 
role of institutions, particularly regulation, on MFI operational self-sustainability. 
2.5.1.1 Institutions 
The literature in the field of institutional economics indicates that institutions impact 
microfinance success in developing countries (North, 1989, 1990). Research has indicated that 
the relevant institutions are broader than those related to the black letter law, and include the 
political and social institutions found in each country, as previously identified (Lee & Kim, 2009). 
Indeed, when considering the political institutions it needs to be considered not only the formal 
regulations, but also the informal regulations such as the soft law which is implemented via the 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs of large corporations as well as self-regulatory 
institutions. The relationship between microfinance and CSR is that many large banks in 
developed countries have clearly set goals for supporting microfinance programs in developing 
countries as part of their CSR strategy. The effect of this strategy across many developed country 
banks is unknown, and the direct impact may be relevant for the current research in terms of the 
sustainability of MFI’s and the reaching of economic and non-economic goals. However, the 
issue is not not at the core of the research question. 
It is the relevance of institutions, in particular legal institutions, for the potential success or 
failure of microfinance which requires the current thesis to take a law and economics approach. 
It is the analysis of legal institutions and the subsequent effect and relationship to social 
institutions and microfinance which will provide the primary contribution of this research. 
In terms of developing countries, it is often the cultures and national identities which affect the 
success of markets and the transplant of legal systems. Indeed, research has identified the legal 
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institutions which foster growth as property law, contract law, corporate law and banking and 
investment law (Beck & Levine, 2005). In terms of the current analysis of legal institutions it is 
the banking and investment law, which affects the sources of money, which is of most relevance. 
As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, the content and enforcement of contract law also 
has a potential influence on markets (Wilkinson-Ryan, 2011).  
The discussion regarding legal institutions leads to the preliminary questions regarding the role of 
law and how legal institutions can promote microfinance. These issues will be covered in chapter 
three where the law and economics of microfinance is presented by examining how microfinance 
completes a gap in the financial markets. 
2.5.1.2 Microfinance Stakeholders 
The stakeholders of microfinance are important to consider for the current chapter because the 
perspective of each group differs, and this can have an effect on the success of microfinance and 
the regulation under which MFI’s fall. For this reason, the seventh chapter will present the 
results of the empirical interviews conducted with stakeholders in the four countries of focus. 
Mori (2010) has identified the stakeholders in microfinance in order to determine the role they 
play in strategic board decision making as clients, employees, governments, donors, creditors, 
and owners. These stakeholders have the potential to affect microfinance in different ways and 
thus the consideration of different points of view is relevant for the current and subsequent 
chapters in the current thesis. 
2.6 Conclusion 
The research on microfinance is comprehensive in terms of analysing the social benefits of the 
program, especially on the benefits for women. However, the literature is one sided in that the 
relationship between microfinance and the economy has not been established conclusively.  
This chapter has presented an analysis of the background of microfinance in terms of the 
historical progress along with the reasons for microfinance development and the relevance for 
law and economics. 
The microfinance literature is divided in terms of the social and economic benefits. Further, the 
interrelationship between microfinance and legal institutions is still not clearly understood. These 
main issues have been discussed with reference to the existing literature in order to provide an 
indication of why there is such a division in the one-sided literature and to provide a foundation 
from which subsequent chapters can build. Indeed, although research has not consistently 
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supported the positive effect on social or economic political goals, there are few avenues for 
financial support which in theory offer such promising socioeconomic outcomes as 
microfinance. 
Conclusions about the role of law will be drawn in subsequent chapters based on theoretical and 
empirical analyses of particular environments in which MFI’s operate. Subsequent chapters will 
seek to identify and narrow the scope of the research to specific aspects of microfinance and 
microfinance regulation. It is through the law and economics structure of analysis that a model 
of how institutions should be shaped in order to stimulate microfinance will be developed. This 
methodological perspective is important because it provides a basis of analysis that previous 
studies have overlooked. The potential impact on microfinance performance through 
appropriate regulation is large. 
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3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to determine how law and economics can help explain what legal 
instruments and institutional conditions can promote the financial self-sustainability of MFI’s 
(microfinance institutions). This is an important topic of research because financially self-
sustainable MFI’s are able to develop outreach without relying on the whims of donors. To 
examine this, theory will be used in order to develop an analysis of legal initiatives and the effect 
on promoting microfinance. This chapter presents a theoretical analysis without practical 
solutions regarding the law and economics of microfinance1. The theoretical perspectives 
presented in the current chapter inherently scratch only the surface of the potential analyses on 
the financial and structural detail of microfinance and general financial relationships. The 
problem-oriented discussions presented in this chapter hence provide a framework for 
discussing microfinance relationships with the goal of being able to subsequently work towards 
addressing the specific research question of the current thesis. A comprehensive analysis of 
financial relationships can be found in the final doctoral thesis of Deniz Akün (2013). 
It has been established in the second chapter of this thesis that microfinance has confirmed 
social benefits and potential economic benefits through providing access to credit for the poor. 
Although the economic benefits of microfinance have not been empirically studied in an 
exhaustive number of studies, there is enough evidence to suggest that microfinance does not 
have a negative effect on economic development, does not cost society or the government 
excessive amounts to support, and thus may be an appropriate system for increasing credit 
availability of the poor. In light of this the current chapter seeks to understand what institutional 
conditions can promote microfinance. Further, it is of interest to analyse what the legislators can 
do wrong in trying to promote microfinance. These discussions will be framed by consideration 
of the goals of microfinance set in a framework of the normal banking relationship. 
In analysing the development of microfinance law it is intuitive to begin at a consideration of 
regular financial relationships and why regulatory support may be needed to promote 
microfinance. It has been established that microfinance is a method to increase financial 
inclusion. However, the poor have always had (expensive and unreliable) access to credit via 
family and friends, and ‘loan sharks’2. As an empirical issue, these credit sources are not efficient: 
                                                 
1 A modified version of this chapter and chapter 4 (a combined paper titled The Law and Economics of Microfinance) has 
been accepted for publication in The Journal of Law and Commerce for print in March 2015. 
2 Loan sharks make credit available to those in need with flexible loan and repayment terms. They do not always 
take collateral, however, as they are outside the financial system non-repayment often results in violence, slavery, or 
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during economic or weather disasters, the regular sources of credit may no longer become 
available because the family or friends need the capital for their own family’s survival. Thus, 
microfinance provides an avenue for a source of credit which is potentially more reliable. 
The previous chapter balanced the research on microfinance effectiveness in achieving the social 
and economic goals it has been promoted as doing, against the reasons behind the promotion 
and financing of microfinance. The previous chapter established the strong evidence for social 
benefits for microfinance, especially for women. The economic effects of microfinance are not 
supported by a consistent body of literature. However, the chapter concluded that microfinance 
would not have adverse economic effects. 
The chapter which follows will provide an overview of the empirical literature, in particular those 
which have employed rigorous research methodology. The subsequent chapter will analyse this 
literature with the perspective of determining whether the theoretical analysis contained in the 
current chapter has been supported in the literature. Future chapters will include country case 
studies to examine in depth how the regulation of particular countries promotes or inhibits 
microfinance. 
This chapter is structured as follows: the first section considers normal banking relationships in a 
problem-oriented way designed to provide background information from which subsequent 
discussions can build. This means that the current thesis will discuss the banking literature as far 
as it is relevant for microfinance and hence will remain at the surface of understanding and 
analysis. Section two discusses access to finance being restricted from the poor; section three 
outlines the effectiveness and distributional goals of microfinance; section four discusses soft 
regulation and CSR as potential initiatives; section five discusses direct regulation as a potential 
initiative to support microfinance; and the conclusion compares and contrasts the fourth and 
fifth sections to determine the process of regulation required to promote microfinance. 
3.2 Traditional Financial Relationships 
3.2.1 Law and Economics of Finance 
The interrelationship between law and finance has been well documented in the literature of the 
law and economics of finance. This literature generally indicates that banks lend when there is 
contract law which is precise and enforced (Waziri, 2012). Solid contract law is also associated 
                                                                                                                                                        
worse (Mayer, 2012). Loan sharks are part of the TML (Traditional Money Lender) system, which is a blanket term 
including also family and friends as traditional sources of capital. 
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with a high trust environment, and this leads to economic development and growth (Aggarwal, 
Klapper, & Singer, 2012; Buera, Kaboski, & Shin, 2012). Authors have commented that this link 
is because it is institutions which strengthen the property rights of entrepreneurs and investors 
which provide lasting increases in productive capacity (Arch, 2005). The result of this is that 
traditional financial relationships develop in a contractual environment.  
The consideration of the functioning of traditional financial relationships is an important starting 
point for the current chapter because it is important that the role and design of microfinance is 
understood in a context of how traditional banks have failed to address the poor segment of the 
market. This section of the current chapter thus establishes a context for the discussion on 
microfinance. Given that microfinance is a financial innovation this is a critical starting point. 
Indeed, given that the focus of the current thesis is on the financial sustainability of MFI’s the 
importance of establishing this foundation of knowledge is readily apparent. However, the 
traditional financial relationship model is not presented as an ideal situation from which 
microfinance may attempt to replicate. Indeed, as the GFC (Global Financial Crisis) illustrated, 
the traditional banking model suffers from such inbuilt and widespread structural issues that a 
worldwide financial crisis can be the result. Further, this crisis also illustrated that the importance 
of assessing the risk of borrowers applies to developed and developing countries. Rather, the 
consideration of traditional financial relationships serves as a consideration of what is ‘normal’, 
but not what is ‘best’. The evolution of microfinance to serve a particular segment of society 
with the model it has may be no accident. 
However, despite the consensus in the literature, it may be relevant to consider the operation of 
ancient moneylenders (and indeed modern payday lenders, loan sharks, or moneylenders 
operated by organised crime), as they were not able to rely on the enforcement of specific 
contract law in the way current banks can and yet seemed to thrive in all economies where a gap 
in legal institutions allowed it (Buscaglia, 2011; Mayer, 2012). Indeed, we know that these money 
lenders often relied on the threat of physical harm (and many still do in slums all over the world), 
and despite the ethical issues of this technique, it did assist with the repayment of loans without 
enforced contract law (Mayer, 2012).  
The law and economics of finance helps explain the environmental risk management conditions 
under which banks will lend money. The relevance of this is that these conditions are similar to 
those which affect MFI’s. That is, access to capital and supportive regulation affect the 
operations of financial markets and also of financial markets. 
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3.2.1.1 What Does a Normal Banking Relationship Look Like? 
Financial relationships are an aspect of normal life which many in the developed world may take 
for granted, because in developing countries what is considered a normal financial relationship 
exists only for the middle and upper classes. As a result of this heterogeneity in who has access 
to financial relationships, much of the ideas of ‘normal financial relationships’ come from 
developed countries. The current chapter will examine aspects of normal financial relationships 
which have resulted in the lack of access to capital by the poor and which subsequently explains 
the development of microfinance as a method to overcome this. 
Regardless of the location of the financial institutions or the characteristics of the client base, 
aspects of the financial relationship remain consistent. This is because people all over the world 
require financial institutions for consistent reasons and products are tailored to provide for these. 
In particular, people go to the bank to manage their risk (e.g. Insurance and fixed rate loans and 
deposits), build wealth (e.g. Interest bearing savings accounts, investment portfolios or home 
mortgages), manage cash flow (e.g. Personal loans), and transfer money (e.g. Money transfers to 
sellers or to family overseas). These financial services are demand driven and products are 
designed within regulatory environments to suit the needs of customers. Thus, customers choose 
to have financial relationships with banks because they have specific needs which banks can 
meet. Normal financial relationships have consistent motivations and designs across the world.  
The current research is primarily concerned with microfinance as a source of credit for the poor. 
As such, it is the provision of loans (microcredit) which forms the focus. In traditional banking 
relationships borrowers pay interest rates as a way to provide an incentive to the bank to give up 
capital which they otherwise could have used. The interest rates charged depends on the level of 
cost associated with providing the loan and the risk associated with doing so. The consideration 
of a traditional financial relationship allows that the role of microfinance can be better 
understood, as interest rates are also charged relative to the cost of providing the loan.  
3.2.1.2 Information Asymmetry 
Traditional financial relationships include information asymmetry for both parties where the cost 
of information and search provides customers and banks with avenues to benefit from the 
relationship (Stigler, 1961). Information asymmetry is a generic problem in banking relationships 
and banking law is often designed to attempt to reduce these asymmetries because of the 
resulting market failure. In traditional banking relationships information asymmetry is reduced 
through signalling and monitoring. That is, borrowers signals to the bank that they are worthy of 
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loans. The bank then monitors the borrower. In terms of banking relationships for the poor the 
problems of information asymmetry are magnified because the poor are without methods to 
signal loan worthiness: they are unlikely to have collateral or financial statements. As a result of 
this, banks are faced with high monitoring costs so they expect a signal of quality but the poor 
do not have collateral (ie. the signal) to give. The result of this is the poor are left without access 
to capital. Hence, MFI’s have been created which are designed based on a model where the poor 
are able to provide intangible collateral (ie. social pressure). This is a key innovation of 
microfinance from an economics perspective – the ability to substitute tangible with intangible 
collateral (Ekpe, Norsiah Binti, & Razli Che, 2010b; John, Lynch, & Puri, 2003; Ono & Uesugi, 
2009; Stroebel, 2011). 
The information which is so costly to obtain may be from the clients perspective expertise about 
financial products to a level which may allow them to bypass banking relationships and act for 
themselves in the capital and asset markets. From the banks perspective, this information may 
relate to the complete social and financial history of a client, of which only the client has privy 
details to. Both parties benefit from acquiring a certain amount of information on these areas, up 
until a point at which it is most efficient to either pay (by the client) and charge (by the bank) for 
the information/expertise (the client pays the bank interest or fees) which is asymmetric. These 
costs of search outweigh the overall benefit from extended search (that is a search process which 
results in complete expertise in an area) compared with relying on the expertise of financial 
institutions. Information asymmetry makes banking relationships desirable for both parties 
because fees based on the costs associated with search, uncertainty, and the resulting asymmetric 
information mean that customers are willing to pay for expertise and banks are willing to accept 
fees to compensate for the asymmetric information. Although it may be argued that banking 
relationships would also exist in an environment without information asymmetry as discussed, it 
is also important to consider that the existence of asymmetric information allows for greater 
profit, and thus greater incentives from the relationship. Thus, information asymmetry is a key 
consideration for traditional banking relationships and the microfinance sector in that it provides 
a foundation upon which the pricing of loans are set based on uncertain risk levels. 
In the example of the second hand car market, Akerlof (1970) describes how the seller has more 
information, and because the buyer cannot possibly know the difference between seemingly 
substitutable cars (and thus pays the same price for a good and bad cars) the bad cars outnumber 
the good cars in the market. This is applicable to the current research because it could be 
extended that banks cannot know the difference between seemingly identical borrowers and thus 
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good borrowers self out select from the application process for loans with high interest rates, 
knowing they will be getting the same terms as lower quality borrowers. Although this logical 
extension for the financial markets requires tempering with the clear logic that good borrowers 
are unlikely to completely out-select from the financial system, as unlike the second hand car 
market there are few alternatives. However, research on the effect of interest rates charged in the 
microfinance sector has indicated that in fact higher interest rates result in potentially lower 
profits because of adverse selection and moral hazard effects (Hermes & Lensink, 2007). Thus, 
the example of Akerlof’s second hand car market may be directly relevant to the microfinance 
sector or alternatively to the ‘low-doc’3 loans in the traditional financial system. A consideration 
of the literature of the economics of information is important for the understanding of how this 
system operates. 
Asymmetric information is an important consideration for the current research because it 
influences microfinance credit availability through the effect on loan pricing, credit rationing and 
collateral requirements. Thus the effect on the quantitative aspects of credit availability is a 
possibility. Each party has unaligned goals in the retail loan relationship, and each wants the 
other to co-operate and not exploit information asymmetries (Brown, Potoski, & Van Slyke, 
2010). Information is asymmetric for both parties, with the borrower not always revealing their 
full product preferences such as which price is acceptable or their motivation for fulfilling the 
loan contract (Chiappori, Jullien, Salanié, & Salanié, 2006). Further, the lender also has 
information that the borrower does not know, such as the actual costs associated with providing 
the loan including technology and overhead costs (Chiappori et al.). From this perspective 
information asymmetry affects both parties and the inherent design of financial relationships is 
an on-going remedy to these issues. 
Despite the asymmetry of information within financial relationships, authors have commented 
that competition makes the information asymmetry irrelevant to financial market functioning 
(Chiappori et al.) and that there is actually a large amount of information available to both parties 
(Casellina, Landini, & Uberti, 2011). Indeed, the extensive application process leaves few 
financial stones unturned from the borrower’s perspective. This research indicates that in an 
increasingly technological financial market, other avenues for product design and provision may 
outweigh information asymmetry. However, information asymmetry has been found to be a 
                                                 
3 Low-doc loans (or low-documentation loans) are loans provided to those in the traditional financial system based 
on smaller amounts of evidence for repayment ability than regular loans, and are subject to higher interest rates as a 
result of this. Regular loans generally require two years of previous financial records. Thus, new business owners or 
those with fluctuating annual income in need of finance have the option of a ‘low-doc’ loan, as do those without the 
ability to substantiate their ability to repay the loan. 
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credit market friction (Chiuri & Jappelli; Vayanos & Wang, 2011) which results in the 
requirement of collateral (Buera et al., 2012; Chiuri & Jappelli, 2003; Stroebel, 2011). 
Microfinance is in essence a financial innovation which allows social rather than material 
collateral, hence this is of interest to the current thesis. 
Influencing factors on information asymmetry have been thought to be distance between the 
financial institution and customer, however, recent research has found that location is not an 
issue in corporate loan relationships (Carey & Nini, 2007). Authors have also indicated that the 
result of information asymmetry is an interest rate charged which is too low for banks to make 
profit from the loan (Sharpe, 1990), although this research is outdated and may no longer be the 
case. Long term relationships also mitigate the effect of information asymmetry (Chakravarty & 
Scott).  
Another implication of asymmetric information is credit rationing. Authors have claimed that 
credit rationing to small firms and individuals is a result of asymmetric information (Chakravarty 
& Scott, 1999; Frame, Srinivasan, & Woosley, 2001), and this is directly relevant for subsequent 
discussions on microfinance. Information asymmetry is an aspect of financial relationships which 
ensures continued innovation in processes, products and contract design. 
In the microfinance sector, the demographics of borrowers make issues around information 
asymmetry particularly relevant. However, the community selection and endorsement of 
borrowers minimises the information asymmetries and subsequent possibilities for the adverse 
selection of borrowers. Although traditional banking relationships do not use community 
selection or social pressure in the models of repayment this contractual technique in 
microfinance has shown repayment rates of 99% (Di Bella, 2011) and wide ranging and long 
lasting social benefits, as discussed in the previous chapter. Hence credit rationing is an 
underlying aspect of credit markets which occurs as a result of information asymmetry including 
microfinance.  
3.2.1.3 Credit Rationing 
Money comes in the form of different financial instruments, so ideas of credit worthiness are 
enforced by banks based on a set of institutionalised categories (Polillo, 2011). Authors have 
commented that money is a collective process of abstraction, and so authority is required to 
enforce it (Polillo, 2011). Credit rationing is relevant to the current research because it highlights 
market imperfections in a situation when a borrower is denied funds despite being willing to pay 
for it. Credit rationing occurs when there is excess demand for credit and rather than increasing 
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interest rates or collateral requirements to reduce demand the bank simply rejects borrowers who 
are indistinguishable from those approved (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). This could have implications 
for microfinance credit availability because affected people may be less likely to seek credit the 
next time. In this way, potential borrowers may self out-select from the microfinance application 
process altogether.  
Indeed, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have documented that there are a variety of factors which 
influence the optimal interest rate charged by a bank and that the these may in itself affect the 
riskiness of loans through adverse selection of borrowers or incentivising borrowers to change 
their behaviour. The implication of this is that the financial return from increasing interest rates 
on loans is less than the proportional interest increases (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). However, this 
may not be directly relevant to microfinance because 99% repayment rates (Di Bella, 2011) 
indicate that adverse selection is not at play in this market. This is because the microfinance 
model of community selection and social pressure to repay, which are discussed in detail at later 
stages of this chapter, minimise information asymmetry, which is a key requirement for adverse 
selection. 
Research has found that credit rationing exists in certain environments and is lower where a 
client-bank relationship exists (Chakravarty & Scott, 1999) and when the bank has a large 
amount of deposits available (Berlin & Mester, 1999). Further, it has been argued that loan 
commitments are effectively insurance against future credit rationing (Thakor, 2005). The 
existence of credit rationing is relevant in both the consumer and small business lending fields of 
research because of the ramifications it can have for the retail loan market, credit availability, and 
the economy as a whole.  
3.2.1.4 Discrimination 
Following on from credit rationing, discrimination against certain consumer groups by lenders is 
widespread and difficult to monitor. The aspect of discrimination is directly relevant in 
answering the current research question because it provides a potential explanation for a lack of 
access to credit for the poor other than market failure from asymmetric information. For the 
purposes of this discussion discrimination is the unequal treatment of people based on grounds 
other than those which relate directly to the provision and repayment of loans. Discrimination 
and self out-selection (both sides of the credit rationing coin) are important for the current 
research because they affect who applies for loans in the first place, and which clients are more 
likely to be rejected. Discrimination has been studied in terms of the effect it has on the loan 
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terms offered to borrowers but not in terms of the loan rejections, because of a lack of reliable 
counterfactual data. However, this information is important because the rejections and those 
who do not apply in the first place because of perceived discrimination do have the potential to 
influence the overall microfinance repayment results. 
Discrimination does exist in the retail loan market in developed countries (Chakravarty & Scott, 
1999). Authors have found that there is in particular price discrimination (Degryse & Ongena, 
2005) and that race and neighbourhood racial blend interact in discrimination (Holloway, 1998). 
Research has yielded some interesting albeit seemingly contradictory results with some authors 
finding that women pay more for mortgages (Cheng, Lin, & Liu, 2011) and others finding that 
singles and widows are discriminated against but not along gender lines (Elliehausen & 
Lawrence, 1990). Subsequent sections discuss microfinance specifically and given that most 
microfinance borrowers are female and in poverty (MIX, 2013) the issue of potential 
discrimination in the provision of loans is relevant.  
3.2.1.5 Information Technology 
The value of the banking relationship has been widely covered in the literature to date. However, 
authors have also documented the trend created by innovations in information technology in the 
banking sector which have reduced the cost of information and subsequent information 
asymmetry (Frame et al., 2001). The result of this is that the value of banking relationships is 
lower, and subsequently banks are able to price their financial products more appropriately for 
the risk taken. In line with this theory downward trends in interest rate spreads (the difference 
between the cost of the capital and the interest rate charged to retail borrowers) on retail loans 
have been well documented (Bradley, Gabriel, & Wohar, 1995). Trends in information 
technology are one of the key sources of hope for increased awareness and penetration of 
microfinance in developing countries.  
The increasing uptake of mobile phones provides a technological foundation on which MFI 
innovation in distribution and marketing can build. Indeed, the potential scope for financial 
services provided via mobile phones has been shown in Kenya. The Kenyan M-Pesa (Swahili for 
Mobile-Money) money transfer system is used by 70% of the country’s population (Aggarwal et 
al., 2012), effectively including them in the financial system. This widespread use of the money 
transfer system is especially thorough considering that total mobile phone penetration in Kenya 
is only 71.3% (CCK, 2012) (p. 10). The potential scope for similar innovations to include people 
in the financial system can be built on mobile phone penetration across many developing 
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countries such as Pakistan (69.8%, (PTA, 2013)) and India (73.02% (TRAI, 2012) which already 
have a trend towards mobile phone uptake. However, these innovations need to be balanced by 
regulation which ensures ‘eMoney’ is backed by ‘real money’ in bank accounts because of the 
potential effects on the supply of money usually government controlled in money markets. 
Information technology can increase the operating efficiencies of various microfinance services 
to particular segments of borrowers. For example, the potential portion of microfinance 
borrowers who are literate and computer literate may be able to provide initial demographic data 
online which could then be checked at the initial meeting, saving time documenting basic 
information. Although the computer literate are not the exact target market for microfinance 
given their relative education and poverty levels, using those with computer literacy can have 
flow through effects to marketing design and process operations as the online behaviour can be 
measured and trends exploited to maximise microfinance awareness. The potential increases in 
productivity from information technology are promising, especially for increasing microfinance 
penetration and financial system inclusion. 
3.2.2 Supply and Demand Story of the Bank 
Banks operate across retail and corporate financial services industries and have various supply 
and demand issues which affect how they operate their businesses profitably.  
3.2.2.1 Supply 
‘3-6-3: Give interest of 3%pa for deposits; charge 6%pa interest on loans; be on the golf course by 3pm’. 
Although this banking motto may reflect the localised bank branch system which has long been 
left behind in many developed countries because of increasing competition, the phrase shows 
that through interest rate spreads between the cost of financing and the return on assets (loans 
are assets from the banks perspective and deposits are liabilities) banks can make a comfortable 
profit. It is this spread difference which formed the basis of bank operations through history and 
has ensured that money lenders (and the ethnic groups not religiously forbidden from operating 
in the capacity of) have a stigma and prejudice which arguably continues to the current day 
(Jones, 2008). 
However, the nature of current day bank credit supply models has adapted significantly in line 
with the increasing sophistication of structured products (Frame & White, 2004). Indeed, it may 
be argued that modern banks are more customer focused than ever before, and this leads to the 
innovative design and provision of niche products which fall well outside of the ‘3-6-3’ model of 
banking relationships.  
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Banks must develop contracts (or Product Disclosure Statements as they are called in Australia) 
when there is a financial product offered (RG 168.36 (ASIC, 2011)). In highly regulated 
environments such as Australia contracts for financial products are restricted in that all publicly 
offered contracts (i.e. financial products) must follow a certain structure and contain certain 
information which then must be approved by the relevant government supervisory body. This 
level of initial and on-going supervision of financial products is to an extent which limits 
competition by creating high barriers to entry through high costs of applying to be regulated and 
on-going compliance with the regulation. The issue of transaction costs will be covered in 
subsequent sections. 
Much economic literature has documented the risks of overregulation (Di Bella, 2011). Indeed, 
Australian financial regulation is designed to be tight so as to ensure that customers are not likely 
to lose any of their investments in unsafe or fraudulent schemes. However, the result of this may 
arguably be less financial products offered, and less benefit to customers because there is less 
market competition as a result of high barriers to entry for competitive banks (Di Bella, 2011). 
Indeed, in Australia this has been seen (CBA, 2010; Ellis, 2012). The government officially 
supports the four major banks, and there is competition between them, but smaller banks and 
credit unions do not have significant market share. The Australian Government has a well-
defined ‘Four pillars policy’ regarding mergers and acquisitions within the main four banks 
(Millenium-Challenge-Corporation, 2013). Further, market share is guaranteed through 
government approval required for mergers and acquisitions. Thus from the supply side banks are 
potentially influenced by regulation in terms of the products they can offer and the amount of 
competition and potential takeovers they face. 
As well as mortgages, there is demand for loan products such as personal loans, credit cards, 
business loans, and asset loans, as well as specific loan structures such as car leasing and 
factoring. In normal financial relationships the fees and interest charged for these loans depends 
on the costs and risks associated with the type of loan and the characteristics of the borrower. 
With consumer loan types where there is no collateral (such as credit cards or personal loans) the 
interest rates charged in Australia are generally between 18%-25%pa. The high interest rates 
reflect the increased risk to the bank, higher transaction costs than other loans, and the strong 
demand for such loans from consumers. This is despite the fact that borrowers are personally 
liable for any debts and all borrowers pass serviceability4 tests before being provided with any 
                                                 
4 Serviceability refers to the ability of a borrower to ‘service’ or make the regular repayments (for the principal and 
interest) for the set loan period and takes into account income, expenses, and living situation. 
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loan. Considering this, the high interest rates of microfinance loans are understandable, even 
compared with normal financial markets. 
The serviceability test is a main test to gauge the borrower’s ability to repay the loan and 
generally works in tandem with collateral in retail mortgage markets in developed countries. In 
this way banks determine whether the borrower is able to repay the loan with ease, effectively 
reducing the risk they face of delayed payments or default. In addition to ensuring that 
borrowers can ‘service’ the loan, banks also require collateral for relatively large loans such as 
home loans.  
3.2.2.2 Demand 
Customers in financial relationships apply to have access to financial products because they have 
a direct need. Thus, despite the requirements for collateral, serviceability tests and LVR’s of 
below 80% (in Australia), borrowers still seek and willingly pay the interest on loans. Despite the 
interest costs of up to 25% on some uncollateralised loans such as credit cards, consumer 
outrage is generally regarding hidden fees, costs and interest repayments, rather than the interest 
rate itself.  
It can be argued that the LVR of retail mortgages is a reflection of the attitude toward debt in 
different countries. Indeed, we can see cross country differences between Australia, with low 
average LVR’s at 67.7% (ABS, 2011) and the USA and Germany each with 74% (EMF-
Hypostat, 2010). Relative economic situations in the country also have the potential to influence 
borrower decisions at the time of loan application and also at the point of refinance. This relates 
not only to the boom and bust of the property cycles, but also the overall pricing of homes 
relative to income.  
The personal characteristics of the borrower have great importance for the financial decisions 
made. The combination of various practical and emotional influences on borrowers makes 
predicting financial behaviour precarious without a broad ranging understanding of the other 
parties involved. Influencers on borrowers include the psychological concepts of confidence and 
trust in online retail loan quotes. These concepts are built on a foundation of financial literacy 
(Yoong, See, & Baronovich, 2012). This is particularly relevant for the microfinance sector where 
borrowers often have very low financial literacy and borrow in very low trust environments, 
despite pervasive demand for the loans. 
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3.2.3 Financial Market Players and Their Incentives 
The key financial market players which will be considered in the current chapter are borrowers 
and lenders, because of the direct relationship to microfinance relationships. 
3.2.3.1 Borrower 
The level of commitment to a loan dictated by legislation has ramifications for consumer loan 
behaviour. For example, in Australia and Germany it is not possible to leave a mortgage without 
being personally liable for the loan, known as full recourse loans. This means that if property 
prices drop and the property is sold for less than the outstanding loan amount, the borrower is 
personally liable to make up the missing amount. In America, this is not the case, as borrowers 
are free to leave their mortgage and hand in the keys to the property, one of the magnifiers of 
the situation which resulted in the GFC. 
In addition to incentives for loan repayments, there are also contractual methods to ensure on 
time regular payments such as late fees and permanent credit history (or credit score) records. 
Thus, legislation can affect bank competition and underlying contract design to the extent that 
borrower incentives are affected. Borrowers with full recourse contracts have incentives to repay 
the loan whereas those without only have the loan repayment incentives if capital values increase. 
3.2.3.2 Lender 
Lenders operate in different environments depending on the legislation of the country, and the 
subsequent nature of the competition they face. The strength of the competition has the 
potential to influence the products that are developed, the level of relationships sought with and 
by borrowers, and the marketing strategies employed to obtain new and maintain existing 
customers (Abbad, Abbad, & Malik, 2011). Thus there are diverse incentives on lenders in 
operating and managing customer relationships, affected by regulation. 
Bank financing has been constantly changing over the past few decades, with an increased use of 
securitisation and lower reliance on deposits. However, authors have found that there is a 
relationship between the cost of capital and internal financial resources if there are external 
financing constraints (Campbell, Dhaliwal, & Schwartz, 2012), and that this can also affect real 
economic activity through the provision of finance through business and personal channels. The 
trend away from reliance on deposits and towards financial leverage has a variety of advantages 
and disadvantages particularly relevant for MFI’s and is discussed in sections following.  
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Authors have commented on the factors which banks are interested in within the lending 
relationship. Namely, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) detailed how the contract effectively induces the 
borrower to act in the best interest of the bank, but can also incentivise self-out-selection of bad 
repayment behaviour in the loan term. 
Lenders are affected by the different legislative and competitive situations. The result of a 
combination of environmental factors results in different market practices. The USA has seen 
relatively relaxed lending practices relative to Germany and Australia, and this can be seen in the 
resulting quality of the loans. A benchmark measure of loan quality is whether the loans can be 
considered non-performing or sub-prime. Non-performing loans (NPL’s) are loans with 
outstanding payments for more than three months. Sub-prime loans are generally referred to as 
loans to people who have not provided evidence of the ability to repay the loan. Specifically, the 
percentage of subprime loans in each country is an important quantitative reflection of lending 
practices of the various banks. In Australia there are approximately 0% subprime loans, and yet 
36% of USA mortgages are classified as subprime (CBA, 2010). Understandably, this has 
ramifications for the current environment in which banks operate, and is also a reflection of 
borrower willingness to take on unmanageable debt. That is to say that although the appetite for 
debt in Australia is higher than that of the USA and Germany based on the overall indebtedness, 
this combined with a culture of paying off debt may be the reason subprime mortgages are so 
low.  
It can be argued that the result of this on behaviour is that there is lower refinance behaviour in 
the USA because borrowers are not generally in such good financial position as to re-negotiate a 
competitive loan with another lender. Indeed, the research supports this argument with authors 
finding that borrowers in stronger financial shape are more likely to refinance (An, Deng, & 
Gabriel, 2011; Hurst & Stafford, 2004). 
In Australia the lender can seek recourse against other assets of the borrower, including future 
income. The National Consumer Credit Protection Act (NCCP) (NCCP)   places emphasis on 
the lender’s obligation to ensure the borrower has repayment capacity, knows their 
responsibilities, and loans are not unfair or misleading. In this way lenders are provided with 
incentives to provide loans to those who are worthy because the law places the obligation on 
them. On the other side of the coin, the bank is potentially protected in the case of default with 
personal liability for the loan amounts. The Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
(ASIC) regulates credit providers and credit providers must apply for a consumer credit licence. 
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Lenders are influenced by the legislative and competitive environments in which they operate 
which affects product innovation and relationships with borrowers. 
3.2.4 Contracts 
Key components of contracts which relate to microfinance loans and financial services are the 
methods by which contracts are enforced and the interest rates charged to borrowers. 
3.2.4.1 Contract Enforcement 
The law regarding the enforcement of contracts is a result of the information asymmetries 
between contract parties and ensures that property rights are upheld (Waziri, 2012). Without a 
mechanism to enforce contracts and a low trust environment it is possible for the financial 
system to be very inefficient (Mouzas, 2007; Nawaz, McKinnon, & Webb, 2002). Financial 
system functioning in developed countries is built on a foundation of trust and enforced 
property rights legislation (Waziri, 2012). However, the microfinance sector in developing 
countries usually do not have this foundation (Nawaz et al., 2002), and the result of this may be 
the lower economic benefits of microfinance (Brau & Woller, 2004). Contract enforcement in 
developed countries thus relies on cultural norms and institutional support. This is in contrast to 
microfinance contracts whose enforcement is instead supported by social pressure from other 
community members (Rodríguez-Meza, 2000).  
Contracts are designed to ensure both parties have reduced risk despite the inherent information 
asymmetries present in all financial relationships. In this way, contracts are essentially a risk 
management tool. This is because it is not that risk should be avoided, simply that uncertainty is 
something people will pay to circumvent because it is unquantifiable (unlike risk) (Akerlof, 1970).  
Banks manage their risk when providing products to clients by ensuring they have collateral for 
any loans, receiving deposits (Berlin & Mester, 1999), by securing long term funding by locking 
in interest rates for long term deposits, building long term clients relationships (John et al., 2003; 
Petersen & Rajan, 1995), and by getting large amounts of personal financial information from 
clients at the point of application. Clients manage their risk by building relationships with the 
banks (Dahiya, Saunders, & Anand, 2003), reading the PDS (Product Disclosure Statement) 
(ASIC, 2011) and by having multiple products with different banks, especially savings accounts 
(Detragiache, Garella, & Guiso, 2000). However, bank loyalty is high in developed countries. 
This is supported by the data where in Germany 78% (and 65% in Australia) of people refinance 
with the same bank (ING-DiBa, 2008).  
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Banks are very prudent in lending large amounts of money in developed countries. Unsecured 
loans are generally only present in credit cards and other personal loans of relatively small 
balance, and even then the loan amounts are secured against the person in the event of default. 
Regular banking relationships for the provision of loans revolve around two main issues: 
collateral and serviceability. Collateral is the provision of an asset of value at least that of the loan 
amount  to ensure that the bank has the security of knowing they will not lose capital from the 
loan even in the event of default because asset ownership remains with the bank. Regardless of if 
the loan is for the purchase of a new property, or for the establishment or expansion of business, 
collateral is generally required.  
The provision of collateral also has a psychological effect on the borrowers: if you borrow 
money ‘against’ your otherwise debt-free home in order to take a business loan there are large 
motivations to ensure the business loan is paid back.  
3.2.4.2 Risk Based Interest Rates  
The risk management practices outlined above ensure that the pricing of risk into financial 
products is easily reflected in the interest rates charged. That is, large balance loans are linked 
with collateral and charged low interest rates (because the costs of providing the loan are not 
directly proportional to the loan size and thus easily covered by the interest on such a large 
principal) (Ono & Uesugi, 2009). In contrast low balance unsecured loans are charged high 
interest rates reflective of the risk of delayed repayment or higher recovery costs in the event of 
default as well as higher proportional transaction costs, as covered in detail in the next section of 
this chapter (John et al., 2003). 
3.2.5 Theory of the Firm  
The reliance of the ‘Theory of the Firm’ on the absence of externalities and transaction costs has 
nonetheless not stopped it from being applied when analysing regulation, including financial 
regulations. The conditions under which firms emerge and the factors which influence the hiring 
of contractors or staff was discussed by Ronald Coase in the ‘Theory of the Firm’ (Coase, 1937). 
This theory is particularly relevant for this discussion because of transaction costs which Coase 
identified as being critical for the emergence of financial firms. Further, decreasing returns from 
entrepreneurship investment indicates that it is more efficient for financial firms to support small 
businesses as they are more able to pay higher interest rates because of higher profits than 
established firms (Ferro Luzzi & Weber, 2006). This trend in argument links the discussion on 
the theory of the firm to banking theory previously discussed. 
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When considering the traditional banking relationships the Theory of the Firm allows us to 
understand why financial institutions should support business establishment loans and loans to 
small businesses (Singh, 2008). This is directly relevant for microfinance theory, because many 
definitions of microfinance (although not that used in the current thesis) refer solely to the use 
of the credit for the creation or growth of micro enterprises. This is because loans to small 
businesses are an effective use of capital with higher returns from investment than established 
firms (Aggarwal et al., 2012). However, because of transaction costs and risk management, 
financial institutions do not necessarily follow this trend and lend to small businesses. Indeed, 
loans to small businesses are a small proportion of total loans in developed countries (Buera et 
al., 2012). A similar trend can be found in developing countries (Satta, 2004) and it has also been 
found that it is the efficient use of capital (i.e. supporting entrepreneurship) which can provide 
long term and sustainable economic growth for developing countries (Eichner, 2012b).  
Financial institutions have grown to such a size that there are generally very high overhead 
(fixed) costs which outweigh product specific variable costs. These ideas are connected to 
transaction costs when considered in a much broader sense and the Theory of the Firm as 
discussed in the previous section. Indeed, with the use of technology and automatic payment 
systems delayed repayment and default are quickly identified and managed. The system of 
monitoring loan repayments, even those of very large sums are systemised so that problem loans 
are identified and tracked (Ryan, Engel, & Melamed, 2001). This process is designed to be 
efficient and utilises the generally internet-savvy, literate, and somewhat engaged borrowers. 
However, in the case of default or delayed payment transaction costs increase. It is more 
profitable for a bank to try and help customers to keep their loan serviced than to repossess the 
loan (Berkowitz & Hynes, 1999). When repayments are delayed the process is systemised with 
electronic and personal follow-ups and escalation through bank bureaucracy to determine on-
going responses. Thus, the transaction costs associated with delayed payment and default are 
relatively high but not common and the systems to deal with the problems which arise ensure 
that the bank and the borrower have flexibility. 
More frequent than the transaction costs associated with default and late payment are the costs 
associated with initially starting a loan. As discussed, high fixed costs in most financial 
institutions means that the costs associated with issuing a loan are concentrated in human 
resources rather than in the costs of systems and procedure of processing. However, given that 
the process of loan application has been systemised, it can be inferred that the cost of issuing 
loans is relatively consistent, regardless of the loan size. Thus, banks have more incentives to 
75_Edle Hunt BW Stand.job
Ch.3.  Katherine Hunt  
71 
 
charge a higher interest rate to lower balance loans in order to cover the higher proportional 
transaction costs to issue the loan. Small loan sizes, short loan terms and rurally dispersed 
illiterate customers (the target market of microfinance) means that the transaction costs 
associated with providing and monitoring microfinance loans is very high, despite the 
outsourcing of many key loan operations to the community. Indeed, average loan sizes have 
been found to be 1.5 times annual earnings (Buera et al., 2012) which is a low absolute amount in 
the target borrowers. Further, although the use of the community in borrower selection and 
monitoring reduces information costs and risk to the MFI, there are features of microfinance 
loans and borrowers which mean that there are still high transaction costs in providing the loans. 
3.2.6 Credit Market Failure 
The combination of lack of collateral, undocumented abilities to repay the loan and associated 
factors of illiteracy and regional diversity means that in the traditional financial relationship, the 
poor do not have access to financial services. In the situation of credit, where those who are the 
most productive users (the poor) are willing to pay for finance yet unable to have the service 
because of a lack of products designed to accommodate their particular characteristics (ie. 
collateral and deemed riskiness) this is partially a failure of credit markets (Aggarwal et al., 2012).  
This failure in the allocation of credit is arguably a result of the unjustified belief by banks that 
the poor are a market segment too costly and risky to serve. Thus, the distinction between real 
and perceived risk is a relevant discussion in this context. Further, risk perception and risk 
tolerance are aspects of this potential credit market failure on which future research may benefit 
and will not be covered in detail in the current thesis. Subsequent sections of this chapter will 
address specific regulatory interventions which may support access to finance for the poor. 
3.2.7 Conclusion 
Traditional financial relationships follow a simplistic model where the bank obtains capital in 
large bundles which are dispersed to many borrowers at interest rates which cover the risk of 
default, transaction costs and profit. The target market of microfinance borrowers as being 
rurally dispersed, illiterate and generally uneducated members of society results in a perception 
that transaction costs remain unbalanced by the return from market interest rates on such small 
loan balances. The result of this is that the poor do not get access to finance in traditional 
financial relationships, and this is a credit market failure which has led to the development of 
MFI’s to complete the market. 
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3.3 The Poor Also Need Finance 
The model of traditional financial relationships leaves a gap in services provided to the poor. The 
previous section established that the banks in developed countries may deem providing credit 
and other financial services to the poor excessively high risk (when no collateral is available) or 
unprofitable (where high transaction costs relative to income earned are small). The result of this 
is a lack of access to capital for the poor as small loan sizes are not offered or applications are 
rejected. This situation is relevant across the world, and is especially poignant in developing 
countries where there are potentially more poor left un-serviced by this credit market failure. 
Evidence of this credit market failure can be found in developed countries where the relatively 
poor are also excluded from the formal financial system, which has resulted in a trend towards 
microfinance and microcredit programs across countries such as Holland, Italy and Germany 
(European-Microfinance-Network, 2013). Poverty is an absolute and a relative socially 
constructed definition. It is logical that financial system exclusion exists in all economies, because 
there will always be a group of people who banks deem unprofitable because of excessive 
uncertainty of collateral and repayment ability. For this reason, the development of microfinance 
(in particular microcredit) programs in developed countries such as Italy will be considered as 
well as in developing countries in the following chapters. Regardless of the country of interest, 
various supply and demand side issues will exist which contribute to the poor being excluded 
from the formal financial system. 
3.3.1 Supply side 
In considering how the financial needs of the poor are related to traditional financial 
relationships it is worthwhile to consider the issues from the supply perspective. Issues such as 
distrust, lack of information, interest rates, non-diversified alternatives, Islamic microfinance and 
loan sharks will be discussed in this section. 
3.3.1.1 Distrust 
Banks in developing countries have more funding and operational challenges to overcome than 
banks in developed countries (Hartungi, 2007). Among other challenges, authors have 
commented that the level of trust within a country and within the financial sector is particularly 
important for innovation and outreach to poor customers (Aggarwal et al., 2012). The issue for 
banks in developing countries is that general levels of trust are relatively low and contract law 
and enforcement are not always reliable to fill the gap in general trust levels (Aggarwal et al., 
2012). This is especially relevant for microfinance, and in particular microsavings. In a low trust 
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environment it may still be likely that people borrow from MFI’s, but the likelihood of them 
depositing savings is much less likely (Aggarwal et al., 2012). 
In an environment of low trust and with the operational and cost restrictions identified in the 
previous section, it can be extended that access to finance is not available to the poor, and 
especially not the rural poor who form the majority of those targeted by political goals for 
development. 
3.3.1.2 Lack of Information 
Traditional banking relationships manage risk by collecting a lot of information from future 
customers before and during the provision of financial products. However, the target customers 
of MFI’s may have no evidence of income, no assets, or ability to prove they can repay the loan. 
Because of the general lack of information available from microfinance borrowers there is a very 
large perceived risk associated with lending to them. This is particularly the case for traditional 
banks with no first-hand experience in the high repayment rates of microfinance loans. 
With technological advances and financial services product innovation it is becoming easier and 
easier to provide financial access in developing countries. For example, in Kenya, which has 
bank density at one third the density of India, 70% of people use mobile phone banking and 
bypass traditional banking relationships (Aggarwal et al., 2012; Economist-Intelligence-Unit, 
2012; Herd, Koen, Patnaik, & Shah, 2011). However, this system is hinged on the requirement of 
agents to receive and give cash (Herd et al., 2011). The potential scope of microfinance 
expansion which builds on the use of mobile phone technology is large. Detail of distribution 
scope was covered in the second chapter of this thesis. 
3.3.1.3 Interest Rate 
Interest rates on microfinance loans have a median of 32%pa (from 2007 to 2009) (Di Bella, 
2011). The rate of interest is generally explainable by higher costs from a lot of small transactions 
and higher risk to the lender than for traditional collateralised loans as discussed in the previous 
sections (Arch, 2005), however this reasoning is not certain. Further, the interest rate reflects a 
risk allocation and a risk premium given the demographics of the borrowers and subsequent 
costs. The primary actions of MFI’s (and banks when granting loans) is to adequately select a 
borrower who will repay the interest and loan principal, and then to monitor on-going 
repayments. The microfinance model uses the community knowledge to select borrowers of low 
risk, by getting recommendations from non-family members (this system works for both 
individual and group contracts). Further, these recommendations create social pressure on the 
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borrower which results in them monitoring their own repayments. These two mechanisms build 
on community knowledge and social pressure, and leave the high interest rates partially 
unexplained.  
A potential reason for such high interest rates may be MFI inefficiency. That is, despite the fact 
that borrower recruitment, selection and monitoring is effectively outsourced to the community 
(in both group and individual based loans), MFI’s fail to be financially sustainable. Given the 
social objectives of microfinance it is understandable that NGO funders may monitor and 
evaluate microfinance performance based on social outcomes rather than the ultimate 
operational costs and subsequent interest rates. From this it can be logically extended that 
operating efficiency is not incentivised for MFI’s, and the result is high interest rates.  
However, a trend towards MFI’s self-reporting their financial and outreach data to organisations 
such as the MIX Market Exchange is that donors can better allocate their funds. This trend 
creates further issues regarding whether MFI’s should be rewarded for being more efficient if 
there is most likely a trade-off between outreach and operating efficiency (Hermes & Lensink, 
2007).  
The interest rates on microfinance loans are generally between 32%-37%pa (Di Bella, 2011). 
This is relatively high compared to the interest rates charged to middle and upper class 
borrowers in the same developing countries, which may often be below 10%pa. However, in 
comparison to the interest rates charged by loan sharks in the slums of many developing 
countries (Mayer, 2012), the interest rates of microfinance are relatively cheap. Indeed, 
microfinance interest rates are not so different from the 25%pa charged on unsecured credit 
cards in Australia. The relatively low interest rate is because of the cheap source of capital which 
MFI’s currently have access to, which allows the transaction costs associated with microfinance 
to be borne partly by the NGO or government providing the capital. 
The issue of microfinance interest rates is a hotly debated opinion topic rarely covered in the 
empirical literature. However, a key empirical paper by Karlan and Zinman (2008) has been 
published in the American Economic Review which analyses credit-elasticity in microfinance. 
This research implemented randomised trials in a South African MFI to determine if the poor 
are sensitive to interest rate changes. The motivation for this is that the authors claim regulation 
supports MFI’s raising interest rates on loans in order to reduce dependence on subsidies, but 
this strategy only makes sense if the poor are insensitive to interest rate changes. Among key 
findings, these authors found that loan size was more responsive to a change in loan maturity 
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than changes in interest rates. Long maturities mean there are small monthly repayments and 
easier cash flow management than short maturities. Hence, this finding is consistent with theory 
on binding liquidity constraints. Importantly, this research found that increasing the interest rate 
actually results in lower repayment because of higher information asymmetry. In terms of 
regulatory implications, this research suggests that lower microfinance interest rates result in 
greater outreach to poor women and at a very small cost to foregone profits. In this way, the 
research seems to support interest rate caps, although detail is not provided regarding what the 
interest rate caps should be. 
The discussion regarding interest rates is critical to the law and economics discussion of 
microfinance and will be elaborated in future sections of this chapter especially regarding 
legislated interest rate caps. If MFI financial self-sustainability is to be achieved, market interest 
rates need to be charged to borrowers which reflect the cost of providing the product. Indeed, 
the interest rates currently charged to microfinance borrowers are relative to those charged on 
uncollateralised credit card loans provided to consumers in developed countries. This is directly 
relevant to the provision of Islamic microfinance (discussed in a subsequent section) where the 
avoidance of interest rates has been achieved through financial engineering. 
Thus, with cheap sources of capital MFI’s still need to charge above 30%pa interest. For banks 
with traditional sources of capital it can be understood that the interest rate required to charge 
borrowers would be much higher. This is unless the need to access the financial and investment 
markets in itself creates operating efficiencies brought about by the process of on-going 
regulation. As discussed in the previous section, this means that the interest rates need to cover 
the transaction costs associated with providing and monitoring the microfinance loans, as well as 
the potential risk which arises from a lack of information about the borrower. 
3.3.1.4 Alternatives – Supply Not Diversified 
For the poor and chronic poor who need access to finance to smooth consumption expenses or 
fund businesses, there are few avenues to choose from. Microfinance is able to provide for the 
poor (that is those who have an average income below that defined of the average income 
required to maintain a decent standard of living), however the chronic poor (those who survive 
on less than US$1.25 per day) remain outside of the scope of microfinance having no way to 
repay the loan (Baulch & Hoddinott, 2000). It is logical that the loan sharks who dominate the 
slums and chronic poor areas are not the first choice of potential borrowers because of high 
interest rates and violent repayment tactics (Francis, 2010). However, with low awareness of 
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microfinance, especially in areas such as sub-Saharan Africa (Aggarwal et al., 2012) where the 
need is great means that the poor are effectively left with no choice. Unlike traditional financial 
markets, microfinance markets are not always composed of effective competition for all market 
segments. Indeed, authors have found that bank dominance limits the choice between 
alternatives and can range from 99% in Ukraine to 61% in Colombia (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, & 
Singer, 2011). However, Beck et al. (2011) found that the size of banks is not associated with 
access to finance in a study which used access to finance as the primary independent variable as a 
financial service indicator.  
However, authors have also commented that the lower than expected uptake of microfinance 
can in part be explained by the flexibility of financial services (for example flexible repayment 
options) offered by TML’s (Traditional Money Lenders), which cloud out the use of 
microfinance (Pearlman, 2010). Indeed, although the specific country relevant situations differ, 
access to financial services for the poor is limited to TML’s and microfinance (Brau & Woller, 
2004). In a market without diversification of supply such as with credit access for the poor it can 
be logically extended that the products available are not necessarily competitive or designed for 
the market. 
In a smoothly functioning financial market, there should theoretically be a variety of credit access 
sources which the poor can use, because where there is demand a market should appear. This is 
because the poor are willing and able to pay for access to credit (Aggarwal et al., 2012), and the 
best evidence for this is the use of loan sharks across the world. Despite the fact that loan sharks 
are not able to outsource the selection and monitoring of borrowers in the way MFI’s are, their 
continued existence seems to indicate that providing finance to the poor can be a profitable 
business. However, microfinance penetration is still relatively low in most countries (with the 
exception of Bangladesh which has 13% penetration (The-Heritage-Foundation, 2013) while 
neighbouring India has only 2% (MIX, 2012) and a financial solution to the problem of no 
access to credit has not developed other than through microfinance and loan sharks. The supply 
of access to credit for the poor is not diversified, and this creates potential problems not only for 
borrowers but also for the incentives to innovate and maintain efficiency from the banks 
perspectives.  
One of the reasons why there is relatively low microfinance innovation in contract design, 
efficiency, funding models and outreach may because a lack of competition between MFI’s 
means that innovation is not required. Meanwhile, microfinance is stuck in a rut and donors are 
beginning to question the efficiency of their funds’ use (Hermes & Lensink, 2007). In this way a 
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lack of competition may have put MFI’s ‘behind the eight-ball’ in ensuring financial self-
sustainability is achieved before a change in allocations of donor funds to other avenues of 
financial support. 
The poor are willing and able to pay for access to finance (Aggarwal et al., 2012; Di Bella, 2011), 
although the chronic poor are not (Mahmood, 2011). This is illustrated in the widespread use of 
TML’s (Traditional Money Lenders such as payday lenders or informal finance sources) by the 
poor across the world (Amadi, 2012; Francis, 2010). However, the market based financial 
institutions have not developed to provide this finance. Indeed, authors have found that banks 
are not encouraging entrepreneurship in that finance is not given to small businesses (Waziri, 
2012). The result is a lack of choice regarding where to access finance.  
Across the world the most common source of credit is from family and friends (Herd et al., 
2011). Thus, although there is a source of credit, there is no diversification of where credit can 
be accessed from, nor is this supply method efficient (for example in extreme weather or 
economic catastrophes’ which result in this credit source disappearing). This illustrates not only 
cultural issues and aversions to financial institutions, but also the low awareness and uptake of 
microfinance. An additional interpretation is that this shows there is a great demand for financial 
services from the poor. Indeed, with over 70% of loans from family across the world, there are 
potentially wide-ranging implications in an economic shock which would surely hurt all members 
of society with inter-community loans, and also restrict loans to cover the unexpected bad 
circumstances, which at an individual level a society can deal with. The issue of non-diversified 
access to credit from the demand perspective results in fewer choices from lower competition. 
3.3.1.5 Islamic Microfinance 
Many countries with strong microfinance sectors and legislation have populations of Islamic 
faith, such as Bangladesh and Pakistan. Lending for interest, or riba is forbidden by the Qur’an 
and this has led to the development of many Islamic financial institutions in recent times (Jones, 
2008). Most financial contracts are incompatible with Islamic law (Ismail & Achmad, 2010). 
Islamic microfinance contracts entail risk management between the bank and the borrower, 
bypassing interest, as banks are forbidden from making money from money (Ismail & Achmad, 
2010; Jones, 2008). The implications of this is that with contracts based on equity partnerships 
there also needs to be another regulatory system and supportive institutions (Ismail & Achmad, 
2010). The current study will need to take into consideration these contract designs in 
determining the relative impact of different microfinance regulation in different countries. 
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Islamic Microfinance is important not only because of the demographics of microfinance 
borrowers being substantially of Islamic faith, nor only because it reflects the ability of 
microfinance to be ‘engineered’ to suit changing market conditions or regulation. This type of 
microfinance is directly relevant for the current discussion because it highlights the potential 
impotence of usury laws in protecting the poor from financial exploitation. The reason for this is 
because although Islamic microfinance products do not charge ‘interest’, the products are not 
indeed charity, and banks do profit from these types of loans all over the Islamic world. 
Operating costs and profit by the bank are recouped in ways which include ‘fees’ effectively 
hidden within a ‘profit sharing’ or ‘investment’ type arrangements. Thus, usury laws could be 
potentially overcome with such innovations. Considering the controversy surrounding interest 
rates on microfinance loans in the current times, innovations in Islamic microfinance may be 
particularly relevant also for other ‘non-Islamic’ microfinance.  
3.3.1.6 Loan Sharks  
The prevalence of loan sharks in urban slums has been well documented (Mayer, 2012) and 
illustrates a demand for financial services by the poor. Although a source of credit, loan sharks 
offer access to financial services at an informal level which does not constitute diversification, 
nor financial market inclusion. However, the continued demand for credit from loan sharks 
mean that their prominence and relevance remains despite formal microfinance gaining market 
share. This reliable access to finance is a system of loan recovery which relies on intimidation 
and the threat of violence, a technique which has high success rates (Francis, 2010). Given that 
the loans are often to the poor and chronic poor without collateral and are used to smooth 
consumption expenses or fund businesses these loans have been confused with microfinance in 
the past. However, as established in the first chapter of this thesis, the term microfinance 
excludes those small loans provided by loan sharks, which have no goal of credit access and only 
seek profit. 
Authors have found that the flexibility of repayments for services by loan sharks means that it is 
not uncommon for borrowers to choose these loans rather than the rigid payment schedules of 
microfinance (Hudon, 2008; Karlan & Mullainathan, 2009; Pearlman, 2010). In a continually 
adapting microfinancial services market there exists a role for TML’s and loan sharks in 
providing flexible loans, despite the high interest rates. This is an issue from the demand 
perspective because it illustrates that there is a gap in the traditional market and microfinance has 
not been designed in a sufficiently adequate manner to complete the gap. 
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3.3.2 Demand Side 
In contrast to supply side issues, demand issues highlight that the poor often have cash flow and 
no savings and that the high interest rates of loan sharks are  
3.3.2.1 Cash Flow But No Savings 
The target market of microfinance is the poor who have cash flow to cover expenses as they 
arise, but have no ‘nest-egg’ to provide for a ‘rainy day’ or unexpected or large expenses such as 
medical expenses or expanding a business. As a contrast, it is important to recognise that 
microfinance is not even possible for the chronic poor and destitute who have no income or way 
to repay (Mahmood, 2011). This problem is less pronounced in the poor who have some cash 
flow to repay the microfinance loans. Indeed, this issue also explains the low tolerance for risk by 
the poor which subsequently affects less than hoped for microfinance-funded entrepreneurship. 
The financial situation of microfinance borrowers provides explanation for why most 
microfinance is used to smooth consumption expenses rather than to fund microenterprises. It is 
intuitive that people with a small amount of cash flow but no savings may need to borrow funds 
to pay for lump sum expenses such as education or medical costs. Indeed, humanities’ general 
risk aversive tendencies (Hofstede, 1983) indicate that even a better personal financial situation 
may not be enough to shift the use of microfinance from consumption to entrepreneurship. 
3.3.2.2 High Interest Rates For Loan Sharks 
Although there is a market for credit access among the poor, there are limits as to how much 
they are able to pay for the service. Despite the prevalence of loan sharks, the poor are not 
necessarily able to pay the high interest rates on loans from loan sharks which can be as high as 
300%pa (Mayer, 2012). This is because high interest rates effectively increase the regular outlay 
that borrowers have to integrate into their future cash flow. As interest rates increase so do the 
regular repayments of the loan. Given that the poor already have limited cash flow which does 
not allow for the saving of funds for future expenses, it is logical that high interest rates are not 
affordable for many, and may result in a debt-trap5. 
There is credit market failure because the poor cannot get finance in the traditional banking 
relationship, in that products have not emerged to profit from the demand. This is despite the 
fact that the direction of finance from those who have saved to those who need capital is an 
efficient market operation (Buera et al., 2012), especially considering the very high repayment 
                                                 
5 A ‘debt-trap’ is when borrowers take more and more loans to pay the interest and capital on previous loans.  
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rates of microfinance (Di Bella, 2011). This financial restriction creates issues for the model of 
financial sustainability of MFI’s because if borrowers are not able to afford high interest rates to 
cover the high transaction costs then these costs need to be recovered through other avenues 
such as reduced cost of capital. This is one of the limits of the traditional banking model, and 
one of the reasons why MFI’s have had to develop to complete the financial market by providing 
access to finance for the poor. 
3.3.3 Typical Microfinance Loan 
A typical microfinance loan is very different from a typical loan in traditional financial 
relationships. In particular, microfinance borrowers have no collateral, no financial security, no 
financial history, low technological ability, and low literacy levels. As identified in the previous 
discussions, microfinance loans differ from traditional loans in that there is supply side risk, 
demand side risk, high levels of uncertainty (which is different to risk because it is 
unquantifiable), and there are high interest rates charged. The design of microfinance contracts 
in this way addresses the supply and demand side issues identified previously. The relatively high 
interest rates charged reflect the high costs of serving the poor through microfinance despite the 
balance of funds provided by NGO’s. Organisations such as Microfinance Transparency serve 
the sector by examining and detailing how product features (such as forced savings, and when 
the first repayment begins) affect the real cost of the loan. 
These differences illustrate that traditional financial relationships would need to adjust greatly to 
account for microfinance borrowers and loans. Given these differences it can be understood that 
credit availability to the poor would not increase without MFI’s. Authors have discussed that 
microfinance is a financial innovation which increases the repayment probability of 
uncollateralised loans (Buera et al., 2012). Indeed, prior to microfinance an innovation with 
similar results in both social outcomes and high repayments was not institutionalised. 
MFI’s complement the financial markets by providing credit access to the poor who would 
otherwise remain un-serviced. This is because if poor borrowers were to be serviced by 
traditional financial institutions there may be unaffordable interest rates to cover the transaction 
costs (of over and above the current microfinance interest rates of above 30%pa), unreliable 
collateral (for example a cow), and indeed the bank may refuse the loan altogether. So, without 
MFI’s there is no credit for the poor, because the average loan comes with high administration 
costs which make giving the loan unprofitable to traditional banks. 
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3.3.3.1 MFI’s Complete The Market 
The credit market failure identified requires that MFI’s complete the market. However, there are 
a number of challenges which need to be overcome to ensure that the social goals around access 
to credit are achieved. These issues are overcome by cheap finance from NGO’s or 
governments, innovation in distribution, high interest rates and a model of outsourcing the 
identification of good borrowers and loan repayments to the community (Di Bella, 2011).  
MFI’s are in essence ‘middle-men’ who acquire capital and then on-lend in smaller batches to 
microfinance borrowers, as are the loan divisions of traditional banks. However, unlike 
traditional banks, MFI’s do not generally acquire capital in a traditional sense such as from 
capital markets, but rather acquire it from low interest loans or donations (Waweru & 
Spraakman, 2012). Most MFI’s are not publicly listed, and are funded primarily from donor 
funds (Di Bella, 2011), with the exception of MFI’s in Peru, Bolivia, and Pakistan where MFI’s 
are funded by deposits and equity partnerships (Economist-Intelligence-Unit, 2012, 2013). This 
means that equity from shareholders is not a reliable source of capital to use to lend to the poor. 
Thus, most capital is required to come from large loans (often subsidised) from NGO’s or 
governments, or donations (Di Bella, 2011), despite the fact that many MFI’s do seek operational 
sustainability (if not self-sustainability) given their particular sources of capital. In some countries 
the legislation allows that regulated MFI’s are also able to accept deposits, and this creates 
another source of capital (MIX, 2013). Indeed, savings as a source of capital seems to be the 
most promising development which will allow MFI’s to be financially self-sustainable without 
having high exposure to changing international economic conditions. 
Innovations in distribution are allowing MFI’s to reach an increasing number of target borrowers 
while keeping financial and operational costs low enough to be sustainable with subsidised credit 
available. MFI innovation is specific to the regulatory environment in which they operate and the 
trend is towards streamlined loan provision processes (Beck & Levine, 2005) and leveraging off 
innovations in technology (Herd et al., 2011). However, the rate of innovation in efficiency and 
distribution is not currently at a pace which reflects the growth of MFI’s and this may reflect the 
social (rather than financial sustainability) goals of microfinance or the lack of internal and 
external innovation pressure. 
The majority of microfinance loans are provided in a model of group lending which harnesses 
the power of social pressure. For example, group loans may be provided to a group of five 
women from the same village, generally neighbours. Loans are provided to the group and 
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although they borrow individually, they are jointly liable for each other’s loans within the group. 
This model harnesses the power of social pressure, especially in developing countries where a 
sense of community (or ‘collectiveness’) is often higher than in developed countries (Hofstede, 
1983). Indeed, individual loans are also designed to harness social pressure because of a 
requirement for ‘recommendations’, if not joint liability, from other community members. These 
models bypass the need for collateral or information about the borrowers’ abilities to repay the 
loans because essentially each borrower is selected by community members willing to stake their 
reputation on repayment. That is, borrowers are unlikely to enter groups if they are not certain of 
the other borrowers’ abilities to repay the loans because they will be personally liable for any 
defaults of the other members. Unreliable borrowers with individual contracts are unlikely to get 
recommended from community members. However, although microfinance has been founded 
on the model of group lending and joint liability, the trend is away from this model. Indeed, 
research has found that individual loan repayment rates are comparable to group loans when 
structured correctly around social pressure (Giné & Karlan, 2009). 
These operational structures of MFI’s and microfinance loans allow that the gap in the market is 
theoretically overcome and the poor are able to access credit. There are further contract 
specifications which increase the loan security while allowing that the social goals of 
microfinance are met and these are generally that loans are provided to females and on fixed 
repayment schedules, with social collateral an underlying factor. 
3.3.3.2 Microfinance Contracts  
The analysis regarding microfinance contracts is focussed on the theoretical and practical 
differences in repayment rates and borrower outcomes between individual and group contracts 
and repayment schedule rigidity.  
3.3.3.2.1 Repayment Schedules 
The repayment schedules of microfinance loans have been described by some authors as so 
restrictive that they ensure the social outcomes of microfinance cannot be achieved (Karlan & 
Mullainathan, 2009). As with the balance between financial sustainability and social outcomes, 
there is a balance between efficient contracts and financial inclusion. ‘Cookie-cutter’ standardised 
loan contracts with strict weekly repayment schedules beginning immediately do not allow for 
the complete financial inclusion which allows borrowers to choose between financial products of 
different banks.  
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Rigid contracts of borrowing amounts and repayment schedules disregard the volatile financial 
circumstances of the poor microfinance is sought to reach. The result of this is that many 
potential microfinance borrowers choose the higher interest rates of TML’s (Traditional Money 
Lenders) because of repayment schedule flexibility where borrowers can miss a repayment if they 
have a difficult week (Karlan & Mullainathan, 2009; Pearlman, 2010).  Indeed, research has 
found that two thirds of people who borrow outside of family and friends borrow from TML’s 
and that the gap between banks and TML’s is filled by SHG’s (Self Help Groups) and MFI’s 
(Herd et al., 2011). However, empirical field experimental research has been conducted into the 
frequency of repayments with authors finding no differences in default for weekly or monthly 
repayment periods (Law et al., 1998). However, this research by Law et al. (1998) assumes that 
the choice between weekly or monthly repayment schedules entails flexibility, whereas the 
repayment schedules from loan sharks also allow a much greater degree of flexibility. This spread 
of borrower’s shows that demand for financial services exists in the poor and that there is 
potentially large scope for future microfinance penetration. However, the design of microfinance 
contracts and their rigidity may help to explain the relatively low uptake of microfinance relative 
to the use of TML’s across the world. 
3.3.3.2.2 Contract Enforcement 
Microfinance contracts can be broadly categorised into individual and group contracts. The 
model of microfinance began with group lending contracts as a way to overcome the lack of 
collateral and information about repayment ability. This has developed into individual contracts 
which also harness social pressure. Microfinance helps with contract enforcement issues through 
utilising social pressure to bypass non-existing or poorly enforced contractual environments. 
However, the last decade has seen major MFI’s such as the Grameen Bank and BancoSol move 
most borrowers from group lending to individual lending contracts (Daripa, 2009). This is 
because although group and individual lending harnesses borrowers to recruit and monitor other 
borrowers, there are also disadvantages with this model such as vulnerabilities to free-riding and 
collusion (Giné, Jakiela, Karlan, & Morduch, 2010). MFI’s have found that groups of people (in 
particular men) have been found to agree together to all default on their loans. Microfinance 
contract design is a financial innovation which allows for reliable repayment from borrowers 
without collateral or income evidence by utilising community knowledge for borrower selection 
and social pressure for on time repayment. However, as with most contractual enforcement 
mechanisms, it has its weaknesses, and those are not a primary focus of the current thesis. 
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3.3.3.2.3 Risk Management 
Lending capital is rarely without risk. The main risks MFI’s face is delayed repayment or default 
(losing the loan balance entirely). The risk of default can be managed by selecting the most 
reliable borrowers, or having the community select the most reliable borrowers. However, in 
essence this risk management technique is at odds with the overall goal of microfinance which is 
to provide financial services to the poor, not only to the credit worthy. However, community 
borrower endorsements manage default risk. The social pressure generated by community 
endorsements manages the risk of on time repayments, for both group and individual loans. 
3.3.3.2.4 Risk Based Interest Rates  
Uncollateralised loans to the poor bring relatively higher risk than collateralised loans provided 
by traditional banks and this is reflected in the high interest rates. Interest rates on loans reflect 
the relative risk of the loan and the transaction costs associated with providing the loan. In 
combination with high interest rates, the design of microfinance contracts to include community 
endorsement and social pressure motivated repayments are further methods to manage risk in 
conjunction with high interest rates. 
It may seem unethical that the rich are able to borrow funds at lower interest rates than the poor 
through microfinance. It may be argued that high interest rates reflect nothing more than a new 
kind of financial exploitation of the poor. However, in order to treat the poor with respect 
(rather than the pity which often accompanies hand-outs) high interest rates are a reflection of 
the high costs associated with providing small loans to rurally dispersed and financially unstable 
borrowers (Eichner, 2012a). Practically speaking, interest rates above 30% allow MFI’s to recoup 
some of the costs associated with providing loans to such a group of people and with the 
specific loan characteristics involved (Di Bella, 2011). From an economic perspective, the 
provision of financial services to the poor by MFI’s is a service which is remunerated through 
interest rates. 
3.3.3.2.5 Contract Conditions - Gender 
The experience of MFI’s over the last few decades has found that women are more reliable at 
repaying their microloans than men, and that this holds across both individual and group lending 
(Besley & Coate, 1995). MFI’s have found that in general men use the microfinance for 
themselves, while women use the microfinance to provide for their family. In this way the social 
benefits of microfinance are much larger when the loans are provided to women. Indeed, while 
women repay loans because of social pressure to do so, groups of men have been found to 
collude and jointly default (Giné & Karlan, 2009). With no contract enforcement mechanisms 
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other than social pressure, this avenue is intuitive. Further, as discussed in the first chapter, the 
social pressure in the group lending model ensures that there is a very high repayment rate. The 
behavioural economics literature supports the social norms which result in high repayment (De 
Meza, Irlenbusch, & Reyniers, 2008; Elster, 1989; Tomer, 2007). Despite repayment rates above 
those of normal loans for developed country banks, high transaction costs and operations 
focussed on social goals rather than financial sustainability mean that the returns on investment 
in microfinance to target borrowers (the poor) are generally negative. Thus, most MFI’s 
supplement loans to the poor with loans to those just above the poverty line which have lower 
transaction costs because of population demographics. 
It makes economic sense to lend to women in microfinance loans rather than to men. The trend 
towards microfinance loans to women may also be an explanation for the increasing success of 
microfinance in terms of repayments and empowerment (Brau & Woller, 2004), in that MFI’s 
have learnt through experience that lending directly to women makes the most sense financially 
and socially. The higher repayment rates and targeted social outcomes such as empowerment 
mean that it is not surprising that most MFI’s lend only to women (Das, 2012). 
3.3.4 Conclusion 
Traditional financial relationships exclude the poor because of contracts which do not innovate 
to include social pressure as an enforcement mechanism nor expand distribution to include the 
rurally dispersed. Microfinance is arguably a financial innovation which allows credit access for 
the poor while completing the financial market with methods of distribution and contract design 
which bypass traditional requirements of collateral and evidence of repayment ability. 
Microfinance interest rates are priced to cover some of the transaction costs associated with 
providing finance to such a costly group of people while limiting financial reliance on NGO’s 
and low interest government loans. The design of microfinance contracts is that social pressure 
is harnessed to provide incentives for repayment. However, there are limited incentives to banks 
to provide microfinancial services and this will be discussed in subsequent sections of this 
chapter.  
3.4 Effectiveness and Distribution 
Based on the previous two sections it has been illustrated that there is a policy problem which 
results in no credit being made available to the poor in a traditional financial market. Based on 
the reasons in section two, political goals of credit availability are not realised without MFI’s. 
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Governments are interested in microfinance because of the social goals identified in the second 
chapter of this thesis. There are wide ranging female empowerment, financial inclusion and 
mental health benefits from microfinance which assist governments in equity goal achievement 
(Mahmood, 2011). However, the current thesis is concerned with testing the effectiveness of 
laws in promoting microfinance. This thesis is not claiming that microfinance is for efficiently 
achieving political goals. Thus this thesis contains a descriptive study which entails determining 
how to affect the incentives of stakeholders to promote microfinance via financially sustainable 
MFI’s. 
3.4.1 Policy Problem 
It is a policy problem regarding whether microfinance provides the efficiency of reaching the 
political and distributional goals of access to credit for low income people. For if microfinance 
helps achieve political goals then it is logical for governments to provide legislation which 
supports MFI’s in achieving those goals, and the converse is also true. Previous chapters of this 
thesis have established that microfinance is a policy problem which various social, regulatory and 
economic government initiatives seek to address.  
3.4.2 MFI Regulation Enforcement 
Despite the fact that many MFI’s are primarily donor funded, MFI-specific regulation exists in 
most countries where microfinance is present (Economist-Intelligence-Unit, 2013). This is 
because microfinance exists in that middle-ground between charity and formal financial services, 
which means that regulation is required to ensure consumer protection and the long term 
stability of the sector. However, despite the existence of regulation, little discussion has been 
given in the past to the enforcement of that regulation. It is intuitive that governments don’t 
highlight to the wider community when they have punished or banned and MFI in case it 
reduces future donation inflows. However, enforcement of the regulation is documented widely 
in the microfinance literature across countries with the most microfinance penetration 
(Economist-Intelligence-Unit, 2013). Indeed, if enforcement of microfinance regulation was 
documented to be unreliable or non-existent, this topic of study would be inherently useless. 
That isn’t to say that the enforcement of microfinance regulation is perfect, just that the 
literature to date is comfortable with the relationship between the microfinance regulation and 
the firms adapting their behaviour to that regulation.  
The topic of the enforcement of microfinance regulation is key to the analysis of distribution and 
the allocation of resources. Microfinance regulation has specific goals around community 
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empowerment and financial inclusion, and given the vast tendency towards donations it would 
be surprising if the regulation of the sector was lacking. Research indicates that microfinance 
regulation is continually updated and enforced by well-resourced government departments in the 
countries where microfinance is most prevalent (Economist-Intelligence-Unit, 2013). Given this, 
the current research is able to consider microfinance regulation in isolation, without having to 
question enforcement. 
3.4.3 Distribution 
The second chapter of this thesis has identified the goals of microfinance as being regarding the 
distribution of credit availability, social goals of empowerment, and economic development. This 
chapter is primarily concerned with identifying and describing how particularities of the 
traditional financial system exclude the poor and how microfinance fills that gap, which is in 
essence a distributional issue potentially answerable using law and economics methodology. 
With technological advances and financial services product innovation it is becoming easier to 
provide financial access in developing countries by building on existing technological 
frameworks such as the widespread uptake of mobile phones. In spite of the various challenges 
technological advances face in developing countries, the clear trend and potential leverage 
opportunities provide hope for innovation which will achieve distributional goals.  
The problem of microfinance success can alternatively be defined as one of distribution. This is 
because development and social goals are political and not efficiency based, but that does not 
mean that the goals should not be achieved. From this perspective the core aim of microfinance 
is exposed as credit availability. Through the distribution of microfinance credit availability will 
increase (Berg, 2012). Indeed, it is the distribution of microfinance to those in rural areas and of 
the chronic poor which is the aim of microfinance (Sharma, 2005). 
The link between the distribution of financial services and access to credit and subsequent 
distribution is an important consideration for the current thesis. Where there are formal banks 
present, the economic effect is that there are less financing constraints on small firms in 
developing countries (Beck et al., 2011). Specifically, these authors have found that it is the 
specialised lenders which increase access to finance and that access to financial services by 
SME’s (Small and Medium sized Enterprises) is critical in developing countries because they 
comprise most of the private sector (Beck et al., 2011). Indeed, authors have empirically found 
that microfinance results in increased wages across the board and as such has a redistributive and 
welfare effect on the economic development of developing countries (Buera et al., 2012). This 
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trend indicates that through the achievement of goals for access to credit, development can also 
be increased in certain areas. 
3.4.4 Measurement of Microfinance Effectiveness  
In order to measure the effectiveness of microfinance it is critical that clearly defined 
benchmarks are developed. This is particularly the case with development goals where a range of 
associated factors make the effect on development difficult to isolate. For the purposes of this 
thesis the benchmarks for measuring microfinance effectiveness is access to credit. This 
benchmark will be used as a proxy for effectiveness because it has been established in the second 
chapter that access to credit is the essential precursor to female empowerment and micro-
entrepreneurship which in theory leads to the meeting of political goals. Further, data on access 
to credit is quantifiable and available. 
3.4.4.1 Financial Sustainability 
There is a trade-off between MFI financial sustainability and financial access to the poor. Hence, 
for the purposes of this thesis, microfinance success includes MFI’s which are financially self-
sustainable. Financially self-sustainability is when MFI’s are able to internally fund their 
operations through revenue, without the reliance on donations or low-interest loans from 
government as discussed in the first chapter of this thesis. Financial sustainability can be 
described as an economic model of the relationship between the funding source, transaction 
costs and profit with outreach to target borrowers. Financial sustainability of MFI’s can be 
understood in the context of traditional financial relationships, hence why the current chapter 
began by considering how traditional financial relationships operate. Traditional financial 
institutions obtain their capital from savings, equity, capital markets, or return from investments. 
Hence, for MFI’s to be financially self-sustainable, and in comparison to traditional financial 
institutions, they would be able to access some of those capital sources and for diversification 
reasons, preferably all of those sources. However, the regulation in most countries restricts 
MFI’s not only from accessing capital through savings, but also through capital markets, equity 
and investments (in particular Bangladesh). Hence, regulation has the potential to condemn 
MFI’s to relying on low-interest loans from governments or NGO’s, or grants, to provide for 
ongoing capital to run their businesses. Although this model is still in operation today, regulation 
which allowed MFI’s to operate in a financially sustainable way would provide a system of MFI 
operations where a change in donor attitudes wouldn’t result in a collapse in access to financial 
services by the poor. In a situation where MFI’s are regulated in a way that allows them to be 
financially self-sustainable, any low-interest loans or grants are able to be used for branch 
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expansion or product innovation, with normal operating capital covered by the sources of capital 
identified previously. 
Financial sustainability is achieved if the MFI outreach and functioning occurs in isolation from 
the whims of donors or credit providers. Regulation can do this by allowing access to funding 
sources such as savings (as generally only banks can accept deposits) (Satta, 2004) and 
international investment funds and credit market access (by being regulated and monitored these 
sources of capital are able to flow towards MFI’s) as well as equity partnerships and investment 
returns (Di Bella, 2011). 
If MFI’s are not financially sustainable (or otherwise unable to access these sources of 
sustainable capital to lend to microfinance borrowers) they must primarily rely on other funding 
sources, either from NGO’s or subsidised credit from governments (Di Bella, 2011). The result 
of this is that although the social benefits from microfinance may continue to be reached, the 
continuation of these benefits relies on a cycle of charitably motivated funding. Indeed, authors 
have found that although the microfinance industry is transforming, funding is not (Al-Azzam et 
al., 2012). A financial model which relies on donor funding when a self-sustaining model is 
available may put MFI’s under unnecessary risk. This is because if MFI’s are reliant on donor or 
subsidised funding and there is a change in the financial stability or focus of their sponsors, 
MFI’s may be left without funding. However, it is the legislation of MFI’s which potentially 
influences whether they are regulated to a financially stable level where they can receive deposits 
and also whether international and credit market funding sources are available. 
Further, authors have found that increasing access to finance from international capital markets 
may theoretically increase sustainability but it also increases MFI vulnerability to international 
economic fluctuations (Di Bella, 2011). This indicates that combined with the trade-off between 
borrower outreach and sustainability, a trade-off also exists concerning the amount of 
vulnerability the MFI is exposed to financially. 
3.4.4.2 Parameters to Measure Microfinance Success 
Microfinance success is access to credit for the purpose of the current thesis. If there is access to 
credit then potentially there can be reductions in poverty and increases in economic 
development, along with well-established social benefits. However, this paper is concerned with 
examining the effectiveness of regulation and legal institutions in increasing access to credit via 
microfinance promotion. The reason for this focus is because access to credit is a political goal.  
94_Edle Hunt BW Stand.job
Ch.3.  Katherine Hunt  
90 
 
Further, given that reductions in poverty are theoretically linked to economic development, a 
measure of the success of microfinance could be (regional and national) economic growth. 
Entrepreneurship is theoretically important for mobilising resources (Mayoux, 1999), and 
microfinance mobilises household savings and promotes entrepreneurship (Sharma, 2005). Thus, 
a potential measure of the success of microfinance may be the availability of credit to 
entrepreneurs and micro-entrepreneurs. The availability of credit is a quantitative measure of 
which data is available in various countries. Given that absolute poverty benchmarks are 
continuously changing and the exact number of borrowers lifted out of poverty are difficult to 
quantify reliably, poverty benchmarks may be considered inappropriate for the current research. 
The explicitly stated and clearly measurable political goal of credit availability and the flow 
through effects that this has on financial inclusion, empowerment and the support of 
microenterprises means that this will be the benchmark for effectiveness in the current thesis. 
In determining the success of MFI’s or of the impact of microfinance it is important to establish 
criteria by which success can be measured. There are a range of factors integral to the focus and 
motivation of MFI’s, and there are other factors which are deemed important by external 
observers or those seeking long term success. Thus, depending on the perspective from which 
microfinance is viewed, benchmarks for success may be developed differently. For the purposes 
of the current research it is the regulatory success or failure which is of most relevance. 
3.4.4.3 What Factors Determine Success? 
The current research is primarily concerned with the measurement of the success of 
microfinance in achieving the goals of the legislator. Microfinance laws as with other sector 
specific laws are created with specific goals in mind.  These goals are not always obvious, but 
indeed laws are not created arbitrarily (Allott, 1981). The goal of the law is integral in 
determining by which benchmarks effectiveness is measured: laws designed to provide social 
outcomes need to be measured against social benchmarks and the same exists for economically 
motivated laws. If indeed it is not the case that regulation promotes microfinance then the 
factors which do influence the role of law, such as interest groups or psychology, need to be 
examined and identified. The current chapter is not primarily concerned with the detail of these 
issues as they will be covered in subsequent chapters. 
The establishment of MFI’s as poverty reduction mechanisms via the effective use of credit and 
entrepreneurship in itself provides ambiguous benchmarks from which comparison can be made. 
Indeed, the definition of poverty is based on what is socially acceptable (Husain, 2008). Thus, the 
95_Edle Hunt BW Stand.job
Ch.3.  Katherine Hunt  
91 
 
shifting goalposts which define poverty is an important consideration for the current research. It 
may be the case that even as every person is reached by microfinance and average wages increase 
tenfold, the new measure of poverty requires a never ending loop of poverty reduction. 
However, this consideration is broadly considered as philosophical in nature because there are 
many social and economic factors such as corruption, religion, women’s rights, and politics 
which ensure that even the initial goals of microfinance are achieved at a steady pace and the 
additional definition objectives do not restrict research in this field. 
Given that the goal of microfinance is to increase the socioeconomic conditions of the world’s 
poor this may be used to develop a benchmark. In particular it may be stated that at least 1.5% 
of microfinance borrowers need to be lifted out of poverty per year, which is the benchmark of 
poverty reduction measured by Khandker (2005).  However, given the nature of microfinance 
borrowers and loans (short term loans and with a sector of the population difficult to analyse) 
this data may have reliability issues. Indeed, the factors which result in borrowers being lifted out 
of poverty are many and difficult to isolate on a large scale with rigorous empirical methodology 
employed. There is a trend in microfinance to measure the effect of the loans, called the Seal of 
Excellence (Microfinance-Summit, 2013), where social and economic outcomes are quantified.  
Further, qualitative measures of microfinance regulatory success can be used to complement 
quantitative measures. For example, the relative reach of microfinance in serving those who are 
in most need of services is a measure of which data is unavailable. That is to say that the rural 
villagers and other ‘Bottom of the Pyramid’ poor (Collier & Dasgupta, 2007) are still un-serviced 
by microfinance but there are only vague estimates as to the number of people still un-serviced, 
generally based on poverty statistics. Qualitative analysis can thus complement the results of this 
thesis because of selection bias and issues of awareness, which potentially skew quantitative 
results 
3.4.4.4 Information Problem 
It has been identified earlier in this chapter that there are problems with information in 
microfinance relationships, particularly between the borrower and MFI. However, there are also 
problems with information between the MFI’s and potential finance sources in international 
credit markets in the cases where non-regulated and NGO-financed MFI’s have no publicly 
available financial data. The result of this particular information problem may be that it is 
difficult for the MFI’s with information problems to access external credit. The effect of a lack 
of access to external credit may be reduced financial self-sustainability and this may affect the 
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ultimate outreach of microfinance to target borrowers in the long term (Hermes & Lensink, 
2007). However, as previously discussed the information problem is partially addressed by 
community selection. 
3.4.4.5 Concentration Problem (Monopoly) 
Although the poor have limited access to finance, even in urban environments finance can be 
limited to two choices: the TML or the MFI (Block, 2010). The lack of competition between and 
within financial providers means that in many ways there is a problem of concentration in the 
microfinance sector (Di Bella, 2011). The research on monopolies have generally found that they 
result in worse outcomes for the customer. In the context of microfinance this is particularly 
important because customer outcomes are the goal of the microfinance sector (Al-Mamun, 
Malarvizhi, Hossain, & Tan, 2012). Indeed, even considering the growth of the microfinance 
sector, with a large number of poor to service oversaturation of MFI’s is still an unlikely reality.  
3.4.4.6 Incentives 
The law and economics analysis of microfinance will consider the incentives of all the 
stakeholders in the sector. The incentives to lend and incentives to borrow are an important 
point for consideration in the current discussion. From the banks perspective, there are limited 
incentives to provide loans to the target market of microfinance because of the high perceived 
transaction costs associated with doing so (compared with providing a loan to the middle classes 
or poor above the poverty line). From the borrowers perspective there may be issues where self-
selection bias discourages good borrowers from borrowing under the group lending model 
because of joint liability for loans (Malimba Musafiri & Ganesan, 2009) and also where high 
interest rates exist (Hermes & Lensink, 2007), which potentially creates a similar ‘market for 
lemons’ where the good borrowers out-select from microfinance loans. Individual loan contracts 
for microfinance are thus an innovation which may increase borrower quality within 
microfinance loans, however this does not address the social goals of microfinance which is not 
to identify the most suitable borrowers. Indeed, to the contrary, research has found that higher 
interest rates on individual contracts result in lower loan quality because good borrowers out-
select from applying (Hermes & Lensink, 2007; Karlan & Goldberg, 2007). Adverse selection 
applied in this way potentially draws lines of similarity between microfinance and regular 
financial relationship contracts. 
The effect of incentives on supply and demand in microfinance is a direct and (somewhat) 
predictable avenue for discussion. The law and economics approach allows for the designing of 
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incentives carefully by implementing the most appropriate legal instruments (institutions or legal 
rules). Thus, although this approach does not allow for an analysis of the efficiency of the goal in 
the first place, it does allow for the design of effective methods to achieve the goal. The effect of 
the law on incentives is an issue which will consistently underline many of the subsequent 
discussions and law and economics conclusions. 
3.4.5 Conclusion 
The goals of microfinance would not normally be reached in a market environment without 
intervention. This is because although microfinance exists and the growth of borrowing statistics 
are impressive, the political goals of credit access have yet to be reached. Supportive legislation is 
still required to ensure that MFI’s are able to be financially sustainable while achieving 
development and distributional goals. Given this, the legislator must do something to support 
microfinance, and the development of specific microfinance law in various developing and 
developed countries is evidence of this.  
MFI legislation may allow MFI’s to overcome risk management problems and facilitate market 
functioning. In order to achieve this, regulation may support CSR (Corporate Social 
Responsibility) programs, facilitative regulation, or direct regulation, and this will be discussed in 
subsequent sections of this chapter. 
3.5 CSR and Facilitative Regulation 
Microfinance has challenges to overcome in achieving political goals. There are financial 
sustainability barriers as well as cultural issues which may lead to the lower awareness and lower 
than expected microfinance economic success. It may be that regulation can assist in the 
promotion of MFI’s in increasing credit access to the poor. If regulation may assist microfinance 
there are three main types of regulation to be discussed. The regulation may fall under self-
regulation (or CSR), facilitative regulation, or direct regulation. The current and next sections of 
this chapter will discuss regulation opportunities in the context of microfinance. These sections 
aim to identify whether legislation can theoretically solve the market problems which were 
identified previously in this chapter. These discussions will identify the different types of 
regulation in terms of a tiered approach to microfinance promotion in that the ideal first step is 
CSR. If CSR fails, facilitative legislation may be implemented. If facilitative legislation fails, direct 
legislation may be required. Thus, the three approaches to regulation work together to achieve 
the desired outcome, complementing each other to achieve political goals. 
98_Edle Hunt BW Stand.job
Ch.3.  Katherine Hunt  
94 
 
3.5.1 Corporate Social Responsibility 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has potentially direct and strong impacts on microfinance 
promotion all over the world through such initiatives as ‘green finance’ where banks in 
developed countries provide low interest loans directly to MFI’s. CSR types of programs are 
supported by most large financial institutions and organisations all over the world with the aim 
of contributing to society as well as being profitable. This kind of program is sometimes referred 
to as the ‘triple bottom line’, where companies measure and report the social and environmental 
outcomes as well as financial. These programs are social initiatives designed by, financed, and 
implemented by organisations all over the world with the aim of increasing employee morale and 
reputation in the market.  
Many CSR programs are employee driven, or act as an incentive when attracting employee talent 
in that people are more likely to work for an organisation which not only makes profit, but also 
supports some social objectives and programs (Gamerschlag, Möller, & Verbeeten, 2011; The-
World-Bank, 2013). Research is ambiguous regarding the relationship between CSR programs 
and financial performance with studies showing that either there is a relationship, is not, or it’s 
unclear (Becchetti, 2005; Margolis & Walsh, 2001; McWilliams, 2006).  
In essence, CSR programs are self-regulation where institutions design programs to achieve 
political social and economic goals. In some developed and developing countries there is 
legislation which supports CSR programs, which can in turn benefit microfinance if that is the 
avenue of financial support. CSR programs can operate either in developed or developing 
countries. Further, CSR programs may entail green finance operated directly by the institution or 
the funding of development programs (or microfinance programs) which indirectly achieve the 
individual CSR goals of the organisation. Although the current thesis does not examine whether 
CSR is indeed efficient, it is most likely having positive effects overall and thus the legislative 
support of CSR is important to analyse. This is especially relevant considering that many CSR 
programs support microfinance (ING, 2012). If MFI’s are able to operate in a financially 
sustainable way it is possible for CSR to contribute to support MFI expansionary programs or 
through knowledge transfers rather than simply donations. 
3.5.1.1 Can Legislation Stimulate CSR? 
The legislation of developed countries can stimulate or support CSR directly via taxation 
incentives. Given that a body of funds come from developed country CSR programs, the 
stimulation directed regulation here may have a wider social effect than the regulation of 
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developing countries. In Australia donations to registered charities are tax deductible, and with 
corporate tax rates fixed at 30% this effectively results in a 30% discount to corporations for 
donations (ITAA, 1997). The consideration of Australian financial services will be considered in 
the current thesis because it provides a model of relatively high taxes and financial regulation, 
potentially providing an example of a regulatory environment which developing countries may 
consider. Indeed, the inclusion of donations in the expenses which can be claimed as tax 
deductible allows CSR programs to justify the cost of their programs to budgetary deciders 
within each organisation. In order to directly stimulate microfinance via CSR programs it may be 
possible for tax incentives or rebates to be higher for costs and knowledge transfers associated 
with microfinance. However, this strategy would need to be built on a foundation of studies on 
the efficiency of microfinance at achieving political goals, of which this study is not one. This 
study is concerned with the regulation which can promote financially self-sustainable MFI’s. 
The legislation of developing countries can indirectly support CSR programs by strengthening 
the market conditions in which CSR funded initiatives operate and by reducing corruption (Di 
Bella, 2011). Arguably, environments which have a more effective use of resources and fewer 
concerns about corruption may attract more consistent CSR program funding. In addition, many 
international banks have subsidiaries in developing countries and legislation may be able to 
support these locally regulated and taxed organisations in achieving social objectives. The tax 
incentives for microfinance CSR programs which are an opportunity may also be effective in 
developing countries with financially independent subsidiaries. 
3.5.1.2 North-South Development Story 
Development co-operation has been a trend since the success of the Marshall Plan of loans after 
WWII in reconstructing European countries with the use of donor funds (Rosseel, De Corte, 
Blommaert, & Verniers, 2012). However, the on-going donor relationships in developing 
countries have not seen the development success which was once expected, and the inherent 
master-servant style relationship is unavoidable (Rosseel et al., 2012). The flow of funds from 
developed countries to developing countries continues through government aid and CSR 
programs stimulated by regulation in developed countries. The flow of funds is generally 
allocated with purpose and donor-imposed ideas of what the developing countries should do to 
achieve social and economic goals. In this way, microfinance is in essence a modern 
manifestation of developed countries donor contributions to developing countries. The main 
difference is that in the microfinance model the philosophy is that the poor are provided with 
the opportunities to develop their own country (via micro-entrepreneurship), rather than having 
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development externally imposed. In reality this is not always the case, as discussed in the second 
chapter of this thesis. Authors have commented that this is the most sustainable method of 
achieving long-term growth and is built on a foundation of entrepreneurship, which arguably is 
supported by microfinance. With grand economic development plans for microfinance, the 
previous chapter of this thesis has already identified that many of the microfinance dreams are 
remaining unrealised. Hence the trend which continues to support donor flows from North to 
South MFI’s is in essence a continuation of the South relying on the North for development. 
3.5.1.3 Green Finance 
Operational challenges of microfinance rely on the sourcing of capital to on-lend to borrowers 
and fund business operations. One source of finance is through green finance, which are 
wholesale loans provided by large banks to MFI’s. One example of green finance is ING’s 
subsidiary ING Vysya and the Green Finance department which together provide more than €70 
million in wholesale loans to MFI’s in more than eight countries (ING, 2012).  
Banks have incentives to do this kind of CSR program not only for marketing content in 
developed countries, but also because of tax incentives in many countries for charity expenses, as 
discussed previously. It is possible that the reputational benefits from green finance CSR 
programs are enough to stimulate MFI’s without the need for direct regulation. 
3.5.1.4 Benefits 
The key benefit of CSR microfinance programs is cost effectiveness in terms of allocating funds 
to MFI’s without taking resources from the governments of developing countries, nor from 
NGO’s. In essence this is a Pareto improvement in the amount of funds available for 
microfinance in developing countries. However, it does of course bring further issues forward in 
the discussion of the ‘North-South’ debate and whether Western consultants are indeed the best 
allocators of microfinance funds. An additional benefit is that CSR programs allow direct MFI 
support which bypasses some avenues of domestic corruption which plagues many developing 
countries (Buscaglia, 2011). Further, CSR microfinance initiatives are designed and implemented 
by organisations with teams of qualified and experienced consultants who are able to use 
transferable skills to ensure operating efficiency in allocating the funds to each source. Those in 
developing countries may be capable of efficiently designing and implementing CSR programs, 
but using resources from developed countries means that the developing country resources are 
not diverted. 
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3.5.1.5 Disadvantages 
The imposition of microfinance charity externally through CSR programs has the potential to 
completely miss the target aims of the microfinance and other programs. This is because it is not 
possible for executives in developed countries to be able to understand exactly what is needed in 
developing countries to stimulate microfinance and achieve the subsequent political goals (Allen, 
Poteet, & Burroughs, 1997). Indeed, although CSR programs may consult with local operators 
and advisers, there may still be an air of the imposition of ethical ideas in a ‘we know what is best 
for you’ colonial sense. In light of this disadvantage, it is understandable that CSR programs 
invest heavily in knowledge of their programs before allocating funds (Burnard, 1991), although 
the extent of this presents a trade-off between using capital which could otherwise be allocated 
to microfinance and ensuring that the money serves the desired goals. An example of this is the 
failure to address both capital constraints and human capital constraints. Entrepreneurship 
development programs have often failed to create entrepreneurs out of the poor they give to, 
when inadequate training results in the ‘income generating assets’ (such as egg-laying chickens) 
becoming this evening’s dinner. In light of this trend of disadvantages the impact of CSR 
programs may be less than what would otherwise be expected. However, the Pareto benefits 
from CSR supporting legislation in developed and developing countries provides adequate 
motivations for supporting legislation. 
3.5.2 Facilitative Regulation 
Thus, facilitative legislation such as tax concessions can stimulate organisations to self-regulate 
through CSR programs to benefit microfinance. However, in the case of microfinance 
stimulation there are advantages and disadvantages of each type of regulation, and these indicate 
that the implementation of regulation may need to be across the different types, and tailored to 
each specific country. 
3.5.2.1 State Guarantee 
State guarantees of deposits are a technique recently used in many developed countries to 
prevent bank runs during the GFC6. State guarantees of deposits have the potential to increase 
the financial sustainability of MFI’s by providing for a source of capital which comes from the 
local population of MFI branches. Stage guarantees of deposits move the reliance of trust from 
the depositor on the MFI to the government, which may have the result of increasing deposits. 
State guarantees are also applicable to microfinance loans in order to reduce the risk to banks for 
                                                 
6 Global Financial Crisis 
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providing microfinance loans. The state guarantee of microfinance loans is thus effectively 
instead of collateral. Although there are already repayments of 99% on microfinance loans (Di 
Bella, 2011), perceived risk of microfinance loans by banks may not equate to this reality. In 
theory state guarantees of microfinance loan amounts provide incentives for banks to lend 
money to microfinance borrowers so long as transaction costs can be covered, as the risk of 
default is not borne by the bank, but by the government instead. However, at this stage almost 
all microfinance is provided by specialised MFI’s. 
In practice this theory does not account for the high transaction costs associated with providing 
and monitoring each microfinance loan. As discussed in the second section of this chapter, it is 
the high transaction costs which limit the ability of MFI’s to sustainably service the rurally 
dispersed poor, rather than the risk of default. Indeed, authors have discussed that it is the high 
transaction costs which result in the interest rates charged above 30%, and not necessarily solely 
the pricing of default risk (Di Bella, 2011). However, it is critical that the definition be set 
appropriately for what constitutes microfinance as banks may simply use the system as a 
guarantee of small loans to the middle classes, put large loans through as many little loans, and 
not do appropriate serviceability tests. The result of these potential methods to skirt the 
legislation could result in higher overall defaults on small loans and further emphasise the 
importance of not only adequate regulation, but also the enforcement of such regulation. The 
enforcement of regulation is discussed in  
An important disadvantage of state guarantees are potential mass defaults on loans which can 
destabilise the credibility of microfinance, and also the financial sustainability of MFI’s while they 
apply for their losses to be recouped from the state. In effect, the state guarantees of 
microfinance loans may potentially result in harm to the microfinance sector. As with all 
potential results, this depends on the specific country in question and especially the loan culture 
and levels of trust and cultural capital. 
Thus, the state guarantee of microsavings and microfinance loans is unlikely to have large 
negative consequences on the social and developmental outcomes of the poor, although it is 
unlikely in itself to have a large impact on the success of microfinance, and the sustainability of 
MFI’s. 
3.5.2.2 Support of Microsavings Products by MFI’s 
Microfinance is a financial innovation which has resulted in creative thinking across methods of 
increasing financial inclusion to the poor. Authors have discussed that if the poor can borrow 
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their way out of poverty then they can just as surely save their way out of it (Aggarwal et al., 
2012). Indeed, microsavings theoretically does the all things that credit does, but without the 
interest rate and inflexible loan amounts and repayment schedules. Specifically, savings can allow 
for precautionary savings and provide an amount for starting a business (Aggarwal et al., 2012). 
Further, savings puts the poor under no burden of debt and is not a resources diversion from 
other avenues of donor support (Aggarwal et al., 2012).  
It is possible for the government to provide regulation which supports the establishment and 
sustainability of MFI’s. This potential facilitative regulation option would theoretically work 
alongside a government guarantee of microdeposits. This is because people are already 
somewhat untrusting of MFI’s, so it can be imagined that trusting small organisations with 
savings is even less likely than borrowings (Aggarwal et al., 2012). A government guarantee can 
potentially increase the level of trust and the use of microsavings, but this also creates a potential 
moral hazard situation. The potential market for regulated and state guaranteed microsavings 
institutions is reinforced by the current use of savings accounts by the poor which are 
suboptimal in that they are costly and present some risk to the depositor. Many savings accounts 
currently used and active in Africa have no interest and charge a withdrawal fee, yet are still in 
use (Aggarwal et al., 2012). 
It is especially the case in developing countries, without adequate legislation and enforcement to 
avoid it, that savings abuses and pyramid schemes are frequent occurrences in the past. Because 
of the saliency of these abuses, combined with low financial literacy, relative trust in the financial 
system may be very low. Pyramid schemes are those where financial reward comes from 
enrolling others into the program without actually providing any product or service and as such 
is not sustainable, with some people guaranteed to lose money when the structure collapses. The 
result of these kinds of schemes, and the saliency in the minds of those in developing countries 
means that people often prefer to save in hard assets (such as a cow or gold bangles) or in 
unreliable methods such as under the mattress. These methods of saving expose people to high 
risk and no access to interest. 
The support of microsavings institutions by facilitative regulation has the potential to encourage 
the poor to save in efficient ways and may complement the use of microfinance by increasing 
awareness of microfinancial services in developing countries. This may ultimately lead to 
increased success of microfinance, as awareness and uptake are critical. 
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3.5.2.3 Benefits 
The main benefit of facilitative legislation such as tax concessions and state guarantees is that the 
overall cost to the government is small compared to the potential benefit from microfinance and 
other development initiatives. Indeed, tax concessions for charity spending or for the provision 
of green finance may result in some lost tax revenue, however there are limited actual 
expenditures which means the avenues for corruption are fewer than with cost-bearing initiatives 
(Ala, 2009). In addition, facilitative regulation may potentially allow the diversification of 
financial services provided by MFI’s. 
3.5.2.4 Disadvantages 
Facilitative legislation provides incentives for large financial institutions to use their funds for 
supporting development and microfinance initiatives in developing countries. However, this 
legislation does not take any positive action towards specifically achieving the political goals 
discussed. Further, the actual cost of facilitative legislation is difficult to quantify because of the 
problem in isolating CSR investment which is affected directly as a result of the tax concessions 
rather than through employee demands to management or a source for marketing content. In 
this way the measurability issues of facilitative legislation mean that concrete discussions and 
empirical research about which facilitative legislation is most effective at stimulating 
microfinance are difficult to achieve.  
Another key disadvantage is that facilitative regulation provides incentives for funds to be 
invested in philanthropic causes but not into the particularly effective avenues for development 
over others. The result of this is that funds may be balanced between avenues such as 
microfinance with historical empowerment benefits, and other avenues which result in lower 
benefit to the developing country. Further, in the event of a large economic shock with state 
guarantees of microsavings and microloans, an already under-resourced government may be 
required to divert resources to MFI’s, banks, and borrowers, rather than the chronic poor who 
are outside the financial system and are in more absolute need of immediate support during such 
crises. 
A key disadvantage of state guarantees of loans and deposits is that a large potential moral 
hazard may be created (Hulsmann, 2006). That is, MFI’s and banks may provide microfinance to 
those they know will not repay in order to collect the interest until they recoup the loan balance 
from the government. The costs and administrative burden of receiving the lost loan balance 
after default of a microfinance borrower from the government may in fact outweigh the loan 
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balance that will be returned, and this may create further problems than the actual incentives 
provided by this legislation. 
3.5.3 Conclusion 
The goals of microfinance generally revolve around distribution and socioeconomic benefits to 
the world’s poor. In order to support microfinance there are different ways to approach 
government support via regulation and institutional design. The inhibitors to microfinance 
include perceived risk from the borrowers and banks perspectives. Facilitative legislation and 
CSR have the potential to overcome these risks through providing incentives to both parties to 
engage more in the microfinance relationship and develop reliability of the industry. 
This section has discussed CSR and facilitative law approaches which may facilitate microfinance 
to achieve established political goals. It can be seen that although CSR and soft law can 
potentially achieve the established goals, the systems are not perfect, and a combination of 
approaches is required. Thus, if soft law is not sufficient in all situations to achieve the goals of 
microfinance, it may be that direct regulation provides the framework required, and this will be 
discussed in the next section. 
3.6 Direct Regulation  
Microfinance programs of CSR initiatives which are stimulated by facilitative legislation may not 
be enough to achieve the political goals which microfinance seeks to accomplish. If this is the 
case, direct regulation may be required. Direct regulation includes potential initiatives such as 
creating a maximum chargeable interest rate to microfinance borrowers or a minimum 
percentage of loans to microfinance out of the total loan portfolio for banks. Other options 
include the creation and management of government-owned MFI’s. Direct regulation is a 
potential way to stimulate microfinance, however, some direct legislation can result in a 
regulatory failure by providing incentives which impact the distribution of resources in a manner 
which would not occur in an unregulated market and this will be discussed. 
3.6.1 Why is There Microfinance Law? 
Microfinance law has been implemented specifically, as opposed to allowing MFI’s to generally 
fall under banking law, in order to support the political goals of credit availability and 
distribution. However, the development of specific MFI law depends on each country and there 
is as yet no international framework from which developing countries can design their own 
regulations (Satta, 2004). Although in essence MFI’s provide the same services as banks but on a 
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smaller scale, the motivation behind the provision of these services results in different risks to 
customers and different societal effects (Di Bella, 2011). Thus, the law which regulates a profit 
seeking bank must surely be different to the law regulating a non-profit MFI with socioeconomic 
objectives.  
The balance of services provided by MFI’s gives reason for different regulation to banks. While 
traditional banks generally have large deposit bases from which to finance their loans or the 
availability of international and inter-bank loans and securitisation, MFI’s generally are not 
financed by deposits but rather from external sources (Satta, 2004; Zhang, 2008). The exception 
to this is in a few select countries led by Peru, Bolivia, and Pakistan where supportive legislation 
allows that MFI’s are primarily funded by deposits (Economist-Intelligence-Unit, 2012, 2013). 
However, this is not the norm (Di Bella, 2011). The implication of this is that there is more risk 
to customers of traditional banks where individual deposits are at stake in the case of potential 
bank failure. Hence the theoretical solution of facilitative legislation where the state guarantees 
loan amounts and deposits is discussed in the previous section. This is a situation which also 
affects developed countries, and in the GFC potential bank runs (where all of the depositors 
seek to withdraw their capital resulting in the bank’s collapse) were anticipated by government 
guarantees of deposits in many countries such as Australia. Indeed, this potential effect on MFI 
financing provides motivation for increasing trust in the microfinance sector, potentially by 
guaranteeing microdeposits and microloans. 
It is logical that financial institutions which provide different products should be regulated 
differently. The fact that the objectives of microfinance are around credit availability to the poor 
and subsequent socioeconomic benefits, operational structures would naturally reflect this. In 
comparison, the profit motivated products and services of traditional banks would indeed be 
reflected by their operation. Although both entities may provide loans, insurance, pensions, and 
savings products, the motivation behind the operations and the subsequent effect on society 
require a different regulatory framework. Indeed, authors have commented that because of the 
scale of operations and products affected, the collapse of a single MFI is unlikely to have large 
consequences in an individual country (Satta, 2004). However, there are potentially life-changing 
(or life-destroying) effects on individual members of the poorest in society if they were to lose 
their microsavings. Thus, regulation is especially important for situations where the poor can 
potentially be worse off. This does not mean that no regulation at all is needed, it simply 
highlights that different regulation is necessary if the socioeconomic goals of microfinance are to 
be achieved. 
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The regulation of MFI’s often covers only some of the products offered, such as deposits, and 
not others, such as loans (Satta, 2004). The fact that law generally covers deposits is a reflection 
of the consumer protection goals of governments, and indeed, banking regulations are present in 
all countries in some form or another. These laws generally attempt to ensure the financial 
stability of deposit taking institutions. The provision of small loans and the safeguarding of small 
deposits are two key services which distinguish microfinance from regular banking and thus 
cannot, or at least should not, be considered in the same way. 
The issue with the analysis of the development of microfinance law from a credit market failure 
perspective is that microfinance has in many ways evolved to changing market conditions, and 
evolved in a way which bypassed traditional banking regulations. The village based savings and 
credit groups were organised informally all over the world until the introduction of microfinance 
as we know it (Hollis, 1999). Thus, microfinance was not established by law and did not rely on 
law to create the industry. However, MFI regulation has the potential to increase the size of the 
industry, rural outreach, operating efficiency, and access to external funding (Satta, 2004). Thus it 
can be seen from the literature that microfinance is not a clear credit market failure situation 
where the law is critical for its establishment. Rather, MFI regulation controls whether 
microfinance is successful in terms of distribution in individual countries or not, and thus 
subsequently affects the socioeconomic objectives of the industry. Indeed, the discussion 
regarding the goals of microfinance legislation is relevant at this point because it indicates that 
although the law may not have goals of efficiency, social distribution goals may be equally 
worthwhile and a law and economics discussion of the effectiveness of such laws provides a 
methodological contribution for the current thesis.  
3.6.2 How does Microfinance Legislation Promote Microfinance? 
MFI regulation in theory seeks to support the socioeconomic objectives for which microfinance 
has been designed to achieve. The formal financial sector finds poor people theoretically 
unprofitable because of the reasons discussed in the first and second sections. Further, MFI’s are 
able to operate from a smaller cost base and the development of the sector has been a result of 
internal growth which did not require the stimulation from regulation (Di Bella, 2011). Authors 
have stated that in a general sense the regulation of MFI’s strengthens their financial stability and 
sustainability which allows for more capital to be able to be provided to small and medium sized 
enterprises (SME’s) (Buera et al., 2012). Thus, the research tends to indicate that formal MFI 
regulation does help to achieve the political goal of credit availability. 
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Specific MFI regulation seeks to protect the financial system, protect depositors and to allow 
MFI financial sustainability which will in turn allow for credit availability to SME’s and low 
income people (Satta, 2004). In the case of Tanzania, Satta (2004) found that the regulatory 
guidelines in 2004 over banks restricted them from providing microfinance services because of 
limits on unsecured lending and investment in fixed assets. Indeed, this author found that no 
Tanzanian MFI’s have moved to being regulated because of the restrictive legislation framework. 
These results indicate that it is not only that regulation itself may have an effect, but that specific 
provisions within the regulation are also critical for increasing financial inclusion for the poor. 
The findings by Satta (2004) suggested that non-deposit taking MFI’s should have non-
prudential regulation only. Non-prudential regulation covers such requirements as publishing 
annual reports, risk management strategies, and the board taking ultimate responsibility and 
accountability. However, as indicated by the research of MIX (2013) the ability to take deposits 
may be critical for MFI sustainability, a result which could ensure the long-term increase in credit 
availability to the poor without reliance on NGO and subsidised funding. 
Regulation has the potential to promote microfinance by allowing access to funding either from 
microsavings or from international capital markets. These avenues of capital contribute to 
microfinance sustainability by reducing the reliability on donor funds. Greater financial 
sustainability in theory may increase credit access to the microfinance target market, who are 
costly to service because of the demographic reasons discussed in the second section of this 
chapter. 
3.6.3 How are MFI’s Shaped by Microfinance Law? 
The main challenge of policy makers has been to develop a regulatory structure which allows 
MFI’s to provide reliable sources of finance for the growth of small firms and smoothing of 
consumption expenses (Satta, 2004). The main effect of microfinance law on the functioning of 
MFI’s is that it can potentially address the main problem which MFI’s face: the reliance on 
donor capital (Eichner, 2011). As covered in the previous chapter of this thesis, microfinance 
generally achieves the social goals politically defined within developing countries. 
In the case of Tanzania it can be seen that the provision of microfinance to poor people is 
hampered by regulation which does not allow regular banks to provide microfinance (Satta, 
2004). In Tanzania the regulation is so restrictive of microfinance provision that for regulated 
banks to offer microfinance they must create a separate entity which is unregulated (Satta, 2004). 
The regulation in Tanzania does this with the motivation of protecting the financial system, 
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however the results of this are restrictions on loans which are unsecured and loans which are not 
specifically for fixed assets, which characterise microfinance loans (Satta, 2004). The implications 
of this is that there is potentially a lower amount of competition between MFI’s and also lower 
availability or outreach of microfinance to those who need it most. Authors have indicated that 
lower MFI competition and innovation can result in higher interest rates charged to borrowers 
(Herd et al., 2011). It can be argued that limiting the provision of microfinance by the traditional 
financial system can affect MFI’s in a wide variety of quantitative and qualitative ways, with 
mostly negative consequences for the poor.  
It can be considered that the operating environment of MFI’s is hampered by having no direct 
comparison with regular banks in that there is no large financial organisation which is able to 
build on market knowledge and pave the way for the smaller MFI’s. In this ideal market 
environment the small MFI’s are able to build on established firms experience and service niche 
microfinance markets out of the scope of the large firm to complete the market. On the other 
hand it is possible that large NGO-financed MFI’s are able to understand the market and share 
knowledge and currently do that. However, ideas of market efficiency allow that in order for 
MFI’s to achieve financial sustainability (of which only 40% are currently financial sustainable, 
(Microfinance-Information-Exchange, 2010) it is important for normal market situations to be 
allowed. In this example it is clear that overly restrictive regulation, and regulation which does 
not distinguish between MFI’s and regular banks has the potential to reduce the amount of 
credit available the poor. Thus, overly restrictive non-distinguishing regulation has potentially 
adverse effects on credit provision to the poor. 
3.6.4 Legislation 
Governments have at their disposal different tools to encourage or discourage certain 
behaviours, and the tool which is most relevant for the current study is legislation. 
3.6.4.1 What Can the Legislator Do?  
Legislators have the power to control social outcomes, both for good and for bad. The legislator 
has control over implementing specific interventions in order to support the achievement of the 
socioeconomic goals which microfinance is designed to achieve. However, despite socially 
motivated intentions, interventions may have adverse effects. This section discusses actions by 
the legislator which are designed to support social and economic political goals, and the 
theoretical and practical consequences of these interventions. In particular, interest rate ceilings, 
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loan portfolio proportions, and state guarantees are presented as potential direct regulation 
initiatives. 
3.6.4.1.1 Interest Rate Ceilings 
The charging of interest on loans is an ethical issue whose continued debate can be traced to 
biblical and Qur’an eras of literature (Jones, 2008). Apparently the charging of interest, or 
making money from money is forbidden by certain religious texts because it exploits those who 
are in need of finance by those who have available capital (Jones, 2008). Many of these texts state 
that the rich should lend to those who need capital with no interest costs (Jones, 2008). Modern 
financial planning and wealth creation strategies are based on a foundation of making money 
from money (or making your money work for you), showing the development of these rules in 
modern society. Although the majority of the law and economics literature is theoretically against 
interest rate ceilings (or ‘usury’), governmental restrictions on the charging of interest have been 
present across modern civilisations for most of recorded history (Jones, 2008), and continue 
today in selected pockets of the world (Herd et al., 2011).  
Authors have found that even in theory the positive benefit of interest rate ceilings is balanced 
by the disadvantages to mean that there may even be overall negative effects. In particular, usury 
laws may reduce credit availability for the poor while benefiting the rich through lower interest 
rates on loans and less competition from new businesses entering their market (Benmelech & 
Moskowitz, 2010). Indeed, these authors have found that each one percentage reduction in interest 
rate limits can lead to 4-6% less economic growth in the decade following (Benmelech & 
Moskowitz, 2010). Thus interest rate ceilings not only inhibit economic growth but on the other 
hand may also protect the poor from unnecessary financial exploitation. Interest rate ceilings 
thus may have good motivations but the practical effect may be the opposite of those intended, 
in that in the long term the poor are not protected from exploitation from interest rate caps.  
When considering the effect of interest rate caps it may also be relevant to consider the reason 
for high interest rates in the first place. There is not a clear theoretical understanding of why high 
interest rates on microfinance loans are so pervasive, yet differ widely between countries. On the 
one hand, uncollateralised loans to the marginalised in society considerably require compensation 
for the higher level of risk and costs in providing the loan. However, on the other hand 
microfinance has been designed in a way so that for both individual and group contracts, reliable 
borrowers are selected by the community and have social pressure to repay the loan on time. 
This design in theory eliminates the risk and costs, because these are outsourced to the 
community. Yet high interest rates prevail. There are two prominent possibilities for the high 
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interest rates: a lack of competition (a credit market failure given the unregulated nature of most 
MFI’s), or; MFI inefficiency. Theoretically, regulation and institutions can address these 
underlying causes more effectively than can interest rate caps. 
A key disadvantage of usury laws is that financial innovation, as seen in Islamic microfinance to 
avoid riba is easily able to overcome the issue of interest rates and instead use profit sharing, 
investment or fee models which result in a similar benefit to the bank. Thus, in order to 
overcome this type of circumventing of specific laws, the supervisory body would need to 
document and monitor microfinance products to ensure these particular methods have not been 
employed. In developing countries where weak institutions, corruption, and scantly resourced 
supervisory bodies, this method is arguably fraught with risk. 
Theoretically speaking, interest rate ceilings are designed to protect the poor from profiteering of 
loan sharks, payday lenders and unscrupulous microfinance providers who seek to profit over 
and above the cost of providing the loans. This is understandable in environments where 
microfinance borrowers pay above 30%pa interest while regular borrowers pay below 10%pa (Di 
Bella, 2011). However, authors have found that governments wishing to reduce the interest rates 
payable on microfinance loans are better occupied with creating economic environments where 
MFI’s can innovate and operate efficiently such as by investing in telecommunications, roads, 
education (Di Bella, 2011). Further, authors have suggested that rather than legislating interest 
rate ceilings and repayment schedules it is more prudent to do things to reduce the risk of over-
borrowing such as a credit database and personal bankruptcy laws which complement credit 
disclosure (Herd et al., 2011). In practice capping interest rates can result in less credit 
availability, a clear failure of the legislation. 
3.6.4.1.2 Minimum Percentage of Loans to Microfinance Clients  
In developing countries there are already established financial institutions providing targeted 
financial products to the middle and upper classes. Rather than restricting the behaviour of 
MFI’s, regulators have the potential to force existing banks to provide microfinance, whether it 
be directly or through subsidiaries. Theoretically, legislation is able to guarantee and require a 
certain percentage of retail capital (eg. 20%) is allocated to microfinance borrowers, ensuring the 
mobilisation of bank assets to increase credit availability to the poor. 
In theory this idea harnesses the existing success of financial institutions and their established 
channels of distribution and funding to increase the scope of credit access. Indeed, banks are 
already regulated and have established access to international credit markets and overnight 
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lending agreements with other domestic banks, and this leads to operating efficiencies. However, 
forcing banks to provide products which previously brought no profit to them may lead to 
operations which satisfy the minimum requirements of the regulation and nothing more. This 
direct regulation strategy relies heavily on the definition of microfinance. For example, if 
microfinance is simply loans below $1,000 it can be imagined that banks provide a set percentage 
of loans very close to that figure, rather than seek ‘real’ microfinance clients, being those just 
above the poverty line as defined in the first chapter. 
There are problems with the incentives to banks and to borrowers to engage in microfinance 
(Besley & Coate, 1995). In order to overcome these incentive problems, direct regulation 
provides a possible solution. Indeed, these legislation options accompany and facilitate market 
functioning. However, as discussed there are potential disadvantages of direct regulation which 
mean that it is realistically a last resort if CSR and facilitative regulation have not, over time, 
achieved the political goals which microfinance can meet. Direct microfinance regulation can 
potentially address the market issues of credit access not being available to the poor. However, 
while an increase in credit access may be achievable through a minimum percentage of capital 
allocated to microfinance and interest rate ceilings, it is not without potential adverse 
consequences that these initiatives are employed. 
3.6.5 Conclusion 
In the event that CSR and facilitative regulation are not enough to promote microfinance, direct 
regulation initiatives may be implemented. By legislating for the promotion of microfinance the 
positive intentions of the legislator may not be enough to ensure effectiveness. Indeed, in the 
case of interest rate ceilings it may be that the result is actually less microfinance outreach to 
target customers and more microfinance provided to the more profitable middle classes. 
However, there is the potential for direct regulation to positively affect microfinance in theory. 
For example, legislating for all loan providing institutions to provide a minimum amount of 
microfinance loans may stimulate innovation in the microfinance sector and encourage 
efficiencies of scale by building on already existing expertise in the traditional financial market. 
3.7 Conclusion 
The current chapter has analysed the literature and legal institutions in order to attribute the 
development of microfinance to the legal framework, bureaucracy, and social support. It has 
been found that whether the legislation can support the goals that microfinance aims to achieve 
depend on the situations in the country, the benchmarks by which success is measured, and a 
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variety of other market and cultural influencing factors. The contribution to answering the 
research question of the current thesis of the current chapter is the discussion of selected legal 
rules from which the positive analysis can build. 
Microfinance is an avenue for capital which may support the socioeconomic outcomes of the 
poor. Given that legislators support microfinance in their particular jurisdictions, they are then 
able to formulate regulatory responses to facilitate microfinance. At the theoretical extreme, 
governments may provide the capital themselves directly to the poor through state run 
programs. This is in many ways what is happening in India, with state-run MFI’s and interest rate 
ceilings in some regions. At the other extreme, governments may simply legislate in a way which 
facilitates microfinance through not restricting their operation and allowing market forces and 
NGO interventions to promote microfinance. A middle ground in this theoretical discussion 
may be that the government provides guarantees for the microfinance loans and savings 
accounts for the poor. However, the middle ground option does not account for the high 
transaction costs associated with providing and monitoring each loan by MFI’s, and this may 
mean that the scheme does not have the desired effects. 
The trade-off between sustainability and providing credit access is that the target market of 
microfinance brings very high transaction costs because of the likelihood of borrowers being 
illiterate, in extreme poverty, and geographically dispersed. Thus, although MFI’s may be 
sustainable by serving the poor and middle classes, it is the chronic and rural poor who are the 
theoretical target market and require the most access to credit (Di Bella, 2011). Thus, it needs to 
be considered how important the sustainability of MFI’s are considering that increased financial 
sustainability may be associated with lower outreach to the target market of microfinance. 
The fourth section of this chapter presented potential soft law and CSR outcomes to the 
development of microfinance. It was found that if the right conditions are met, CSR supports 
microfinance in achieving socioeconomic goals, however it will not be sufficient. Thus, this 
section determined that facilitative legislation may be the appropriate default option for 
microfinance regulation. In conjunction with CSR, facilitative regulation may complement to 
provide incentives to banks and borrowers which increase the use of microfinance. 
The fifth section of this chapter presented the direct regulation methods by which microfinance 
can be supported. The avenues for direct regulation indicated that restricting normal market 
functioning with regulation, regardless of the good intentions, may have the reverse effects 
unless designed with care. Indeed it was discussed in a theoretical manner that legislated interest 
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rate ceilings may have results which restrict the amount of credit available to the poor, an 
outcome which is the opposite of the goals of the legislation. However, some regulation such as 
a set amount of loans from each bank going towards microfinance loans, or the government 
guarantee of microfinance loans may actually support innovation by banks and distribution of 
credit availability to the poor. 
The foundation of government intervention is theoretically CSR. If the conditions required for 
CSR to be sufficient in supporting microfinance are absent, facilitative legislation is the next step 
of the regulator. Subsequently, if the conditions required for facilitative legislation are not 
sufficient to promote microfinance to a level to achieve socioeconomic goals then direct 
legislation may be required to achieve the outcomes which microfinance is designed to support. 
This procedure of regulatory design can be seen in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. The types of intervention to support microfinance (vicious circle). 
 
 
The law and economics of microfinance has indicated that there are many theoretical issues 
which mean that the measurement of the direct success or failure of microfinance is difficult. 
However, empirical studies have been conducted in this area and these will be covered in the 
fourth chapter of this thesis. The current chapter provides a theoretical foundation from which 
to analyse microfinance. The subsequent chapter will analyse whether the regulatory 
opportunities discussed here are practically accurate. 
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From the perspective of law and economics, this chapter has considered relevant effects the law 
can have on MFI financial sustainability from a theoretical perspective. The effect of the law on 
MFI financial sustainability can be potentially reflected in financial ratios reported by MFI’s. In 
this way an association between regulation and MFI financial sustainability can be identified in a 
potentially empirical manner if the theoretical links between these proxies are built on a sound 
foundation. The financial ratios which can potentially reflect this are: 
- Average loan balance and total outstanding loans 
- Operating Self Sustainability (OSS%) 
- PAR>30 and PAR >90 
- Profit margin 
- Assets (MFI size) 
- Outreach to the poorest women 
This chapter has identified how the law can affect the average loan balance through an explicit 
cap on loan balance for microfinance loans, and this can have potential flow through effects to 
the profit margin, outreach to the poorest women, total outstanding loans, and subsequently on 
MFI size and OSS%. Further, laws about how MFI’s are able to collect loan repayments (such as 
whether they are able to visit private residences) have the potential to influence portfolio at risk 
(PAR). Thus, given the particular nature of microfinance contracts and the demographics of the 
borrowers, microfinance law has a variety of potential ways to be reflected in financial ratios. It is 
clear from these initial theoretical discussions that regulatory goals, specific to every country, are 
the starting points for discussion. 
This chapter has identified the theoretical aspects of microfinance from a law and economics 
perspective. This means that the development of the financial market in which microfinance sits 
has been described with reference to how microfinance completes the market. In order to 
determine the practical application of these theories in depth, legal case studies will be conducted 
in three developing countries: India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and one developed country: Italy. 
Italy is an emerging microfinance market and the potential scope in providing capital for 
relatively poor entrepreneurs is a trend which makes this case of value to compare and contrast. 
Comparative microfinance law will be documented in the fifth chapter of this thesis. 
From a theoretical perspective, economic development and increases to empowerment may be 
achieved as a result of access to credit and financial services, which in turn may be supported by 
microfinance, as outlined in the second chapter of this thesis. The sustainability of MFI’s may 
promote microfinance through unrestricted outreach. Microfinance sustainability is directly 
affected by different forms of regulation. This chapter has discussed some regulatory 
opportunities and the possible effects on the promotion of microfinance. 
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The analysis of microfinance interventions from the perspective of this chapter is a description. 
There is no efficiency test involved because the current thesis is not concerned with making a 
claim that microfinance is efficient or not at achieving political goals compared with other 
methods. Rather, as shown in chapter two, the legislator wants microfinance and therefore the 
task at hand is to analyse how regulation and legislation affects MFI financial self-sustainability, 
and to develop suggestions regarding regulatory detail given particular regulatory goals. The 
theory of microfinance development and organisation has been discussed from the law and 
economics perspective. In order to determine if this theory is an accurate reflection of what is 
actually happening in the microfinance sector, the next chapter will examine previous empirical 
studies. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters of this thesis have covered a variety of literature which theoretically, 
anecdotally, or qualitatively considered the effect of microfinance on increasing the 
socioeconomic well-being of the poor which is inherently a bottom-up perspective of the issue. 
This chapter presents a critical and analytical evaluation of the empirical studies on microfinance 
published to date. It seeks to determine whether the theory presented in the previous chapter is 
actually happening. This thesis aims to address whether law and economics can help explain 
which legislation and legal institutions can promote microfinance. Thus previous chapters 
established the information we have to date about microfinance. 
The second chapter of this thesis addressed the dreams and reality of microfinance, finding that 
while the social goals of microfinance, in particular female empowerment, have been consistently 
reached, reductions in poverty have not been found. The third chapter considered microfinance 
from a law and economics perspective, including the particularities of financial inclusion for the 
poor and how different legislative initiatives can promote this political goal via microfinance. The 
third chapter thus considered the benefits and disadvantages of different types of legal initiatives, 
finding that direct legislation promoting microfinance is theoretically effective only if facilitative 
legislation and CSR have been attempted and proven unsuccessful. 
The current chapter1 seeks to focus on the few studies which have focussed on microfinance 
using empirical methodology such as experiments to examine the issues raised in previous 
chapters. This chapter is required because although the literature on microfinance is plentiful, 
published studies which follow an empirical methodology are few and far between. Thus, these 
empirical studies risk becoming ‘lost’ in the expanse of the previous chapters’ body of studies 
which do not use such rigorous methodology. Although empirical works provide a much 
stronger foundation of knowledge from which this thesis can build, the studies covered in 
previous chapters do impart a wealth of knowledge on the functioning and impact of 
microfinance which the empirical studies do not cover because of their low number and focus 
on aspects such as contract design, outreach, and financial sustainability (that is, being able to 
provide microfinance without reliance on donor funds, by generating enough revenue to cover 
the costs of providing loans). 
                                                 
1 A modified version of this chapter and chapter 3 (a combined paper titled The Law and Economics of Microfinance) has 
been accepted for publication in The Journal of Law and Commerce for print in March 2015. 
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The current chapter seeks to present the empirical work to date in order to determine if the 
theoretical conclusions drawn in previous chapters are indeed valid according to the empirical 
literature. The empirical literature on microfinance covers topics directly related to the research 
question of the current thesis. Specifically, a number of empirical works examine the trade-off 
between financial sustainability and outreach, and a couple also consider MFI regulation and the 
social and economic effects of microfinance. 
Hermes and Lensink (2007) discuss the methodological weaknesses of most microfinance papers 
in this field as being that: the variables to measure behaviour are only theoretically and indirectly 
related; that crude one-dimensional measures are used to proxy for complex constructs; and the 
endogeneity problems of the sample. These authors consider the effect of these weaknesses and 
the importance of financial sustainability of MFI’s. In particular, if MFI’s are unable to stand on 
their own feet, long term large-scale outreach to the poor cannot be guaranteed. Further, at a 
short term level these authors discuss how microfinance sustainability affects the breadth 
(number) and depth (socio economic level) of the clients served. Hence there are aspects to take 
into account when considering the research presented in this chapter. 
In order to consider the results from the empirical literature, topics covered will be based on the 
existence of empirical studies in the particular field rather than following the structure of 
previous chapters. As there are few empirical works which the current chapter is able to discuss, 
the direction of discussion must be based on the works which have been empirically designed 
and published in reliable journals. Unlike previous chapters, research without empirically sound 
methodology will not form the basis for conclusions drawn and future analyses. 
The current chapter is structured as follows. The first section discusses empirical works on the 
developmental effects of microfinance. The second section considers social effects of 
microfinance. The third section discusses the perspective of the empirical literature on the effect 
of regulation on microfinance. The fourth section presents the regulatory proposals by authors 
of empirical works, and the fifth section concludes.  
4.1.1 Empirical Analyses 
The political goals regarding microfinance are generally centred on the socioeconomic 
advancement of the population, as established in previous chapters of this thesis. The current 
thesis is not concerned with the motivation for the political goals, rather whether the political 
goals can be promoted by regulation which supports microfinance in the long term. Thus, it is 
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the effectiveness of microfinance-promoting institutions which provide the relevant perspective 
from which the discussions will begin (Allott, 1981). 
Given the political goals of microfinance and the previous analysis of impact, it can be seen that 
there is inconsistent evidence regarding the success of microfinance, given that that success 
depends on which benchmarks it is measured against. Based on the benchmarks identified, 
political goals around poverty alleviation and social goals of financial inclusion and distribution 
have been partially met. Regarding poverty alleviation, the research has indicated that only 1% of 
borrowers each year are lifted out of poverty (Shukran & Rahman, 2011), yet most borrowers are 
female and there are high levels of increased empowerment across countries (Mayoux, 1999). 
Other authors have that 1.5% of borrowers were lifted out of poverty between the years of 
1991/92 and 1998/99 in Bangladesh (Khandker, 2005). However, the long term effects of 
microfinance are complicated to establish empirically because loan terms are generally so short 
the direct effect cannot be reliably confirmed, and most borrowers do not continue to take 
further loans (Sharma, 2005). Indeed, the movement of a large number of people in and out of 
poverty (Baulch & Hoddinott, 2000) make the effect on poverty even more complicated to 
measure. Thus, many empirical papers seeking to examine microfinance success and MFI 
performance have measured different proxies such as access to credit, financial sustainability, 
and outreach. 
4.1.2 Development 
Microfinance is so popular with donors because it seems to serve the dual aims of social and 
economic development. In particular, micro-entrepreneurship has potentially long lasting effects 
on development. However, for development to be achieved, microfinance needs to facilitate 
access to credit and wealth creation. 
4.1.2.1 Access to Credit 
The effect of the size of financial firms on financial access is an important topic which is relevant 
for determining the impact of factors related to microfinance and microfinance institutions 
within the context of the financial sector. A recent study by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Singer 
(2011) examined how a higher number of large banks would influence credit availability of 
different sized firms. This study has strong theoretical and empirical importance because of 
potential assumptions by policy makers that bank size and strength increase credit access (Beck 
et al., 2011). On a more practical level, these authors noted that access to financial services by 
SME’s (Small and Medium sized Enterprises) is critical in developing countries because SME’s 
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comprise most of the private sector (Beck et al., 2011). Bank dominance refers to the proportion 
of financial business placed through large banks versus small banks, and as such is generally 
communicated in percentage terms. Bank dominance is an important issue for law and 
economics because of the direct effect regulation can have on financial system structure (via 
bank size and barriers to entry) and subsequent economic development. Bank dominance differs 
between developing countries such as Ukraine with 99% bank dominance and Colombia with 
61% of bank dominance (Beck et al., 2011). Banks and specialised financial services firms have 
innovated such products as factoring and leasing to avoid the requirement for personal financial 
history, showing that the community involvement of microfinance is but one of many financial 
service innovations which aim to expand the potential client market to include the poor. These 
authors examined the effect of financial institution size on firm access to finance with a 
methodology of combining two data sets on financial structure and firm characteristics. This 
study explores the heterogeneity which exists across countries of different economic 
development, industries, and firm sizes. This heterogeneity allowed for regressions to be 
developed to explore how trends in financial structure affect firms’ access to finance. These 
authors constructed financial service indicators by using access to finance as the independent 
variable and a variety of dummy variables such as account existence, overdraft existence and loan 
existence. Indeed, this study found that the average size of banks is not associated with access to 
finance. This is contrary to traditional banking regulatory motivations which aim to promote 
bank strength and dominance (Australian-Government, 1997). Specifically, these authors found 
that financial markets in developing countries with more large banks resulted in reduced financial 
service use by firms of all sizes. They found that it is specialised lenders (such as MFI’s) which 
increased firms’ access to finance. However, they also found that microfinance does not help 
with the financing constraints of formal and larger enterprises, which is logical given the target 
market of microfinance and the products designed to service them. Beck et al. (2011) 
commented in describing the implications of their results that policy makers control financial 
institution size and thus specific financial market structure by determining regulations which 
impose entry barriers, minimum capitalisation requirements and bank ownership restrictions.  
4.1.2.2 Wealth Creation 
The theoretical strength of microfinance lies in its ability to increase wealth through the 
mobilisation of capital for entrepreneurial and investment opportunities by the poor. This 
individual wealth creation aspect is critical for the potential benefits of microfinance because it 
runs hand in hand with increases in economic development. Bauer, Chytilová, and Morduch 
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(2012) empirically analysed from a behavioural economics perspective why microfinance has 
such financial benefits over programs such as those which focus on savings. These authors thus 
examine microfinance as an innovation for self-discipline of financial behaviour, and the results 
have been published in the American Economic Review. 
In order to determine the reason for the repayment success of microfinance, Bauer et al. (2012) 
used a random walk method2 to select nine villages per taluk (similar to a state district) and 35 
people per village (in total 573 people) in rural India. The researchers had a high response rate 
with 90% participation acceptance. The sample of respondents was generally representative of 
the population except that there was marginally lower literacy and higher marriage than the 
region average. This study determined the discount rate by asking respondents if they would 
prefer ‘Rs250 tomorrow or Rs265/280/300/330/375 in three months’ time?’ (NB. Rs is Indian 
Rupees). They also identified time preference reversals. The methodological procedure of this 
study seems sound in that the same subjective transaction costs apply to both options available 
to the subjects because all payments are in the future. Subjective transaction costs refer to 
perceived higher transaction costs of future payments and the effect that hyperbolic discounting  
has on the desire to consume sooner rather than later. Further, risk tolerance was determined by 
a simple gambling game (designed to overcome the need for literacy). The data which was 
collected related to demographics, wealth (calculated by the researchers based on other 
information), and women’s position in the household. 
The results of the study by Bauer et al. (2012) show that self-discipline is the reason why people 
ca not save but can repay loans in rural India. Specifically, women who are more present biased3 
(one-third of people worldwide) are more likely to borrow from an MFI. This is because they 
have more need to borrow (than non-present biased women) because of a greater tendency to 
spend income. It can be logically extended that microfinance is more efficient than saving 
because of social pressure and regular repayment structure which provide greater incentives for 
financial discipline than regular savings programs. Other authors have also commented on this 
hyperbolic discounting aspect of microfinance (where future events are discounted at higher 
                                                 
2 These authors randomly selected villages based on Indian Census Data and replaced unsuitable villages with 
directly comparable villages which satisfied the requirement of having access to the village head. Although this 
methodology is not without fault it does introduce a certain amount of potential bias into the results because there 
may be a variable which influences whether the participating NGO has access to the village head and also affects the 
savings and loan behaviour of residents. 
3 Present bias refers to the preference to consume today rather than later. This is also referred to as hyperbolic 
discounting. These authors categorise present-bias as when the calculated personal current discount rates are larger 
than future discount rates, and is generally one third of the population. In a practical sense, this means that these 
people are impatient about consumption choices for tomorrow but not for consumption choices in one year’s time. 
This study further distinguishes between ‘weakly’ and ‘strongly’ present-biased participants. 
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rates than in the near future) (Herd, Koen, Patnaik, & Shah, 2011). Contrary to many statistics, 
these authors found that most borrowing is used for investment, and the results hold after 
controlling for time-discounting and the propensity to borrow. These results also provide 
support for the rigid and regular repayment schedules which other studies (such as Pearlman 
(2010)) have indicated may reduce the uptake of microfinance. Further, these results explain why 
despite a move towards individual contracts, the regular repayment schedules and regular group 
meetings model has been maintained. The results of the empirical study by Bauer et al. (2012) 
show that many of the issues which affect the wealth creation of individuals in developed 
countries also affect microfinance borrowers.  
4.1.3 Poverty Reduction from Microfinance 
Microfinance has developed and provided outcomes for the world’s poor, which are measurable 
as small statistical increases in socio-economic benefits. Research has indicated that 1% to 1.5% 
of microfinance borrowers are lifted out of poverty each year (Khandker, 2005; Shukran & 
Rahman, 2011). Considering the historical increases in the amount of microfinance borrowers 
per year, this indicates a positive result. This is because it is the ability of microfinance to serve 
millions of people rejected by the traditional financial system which provides its true potential in 
achieving socioeconomic goals. When we consider the number of borrowers served by 
microfinance thirty years ago, we can see that the figure of 1.5% being lifted from poverty each 
year (between the period of 1991/92 and 1998/99) (Khandker, 2005)(pp 284) is quite small 
when there are only a few million borrowers. But now, with ever-increasing millions of 
borrowers all over the world (Satta, 2004) the benefit to society as a whole is increasing 
constantly. Indeed, the result of this is an estimated 1 million to 1.5 million microfinance 
borrowers per year lifted out of poverty. Despite the fact that those lifted out of poverty are not 
the poorest of the poor (as microfinance addresses the poor but not the extreme poor as already 
discussed), these numbers are not insignificant. Given that even those who are ‘poor’ but not ‘in 
extreme poverty’ can also be lifted out of poverty, the effect of microfinance has been 
documented to have socio economic benefits. 
This increasing outreach to more and more borrowers also indicates that the overall impact on 
microenterprises is also increasing. If, for example, only 1% of borrowers graduate from 
consumption based loans to obtaining loans to microenterprises, this is a disheartening result for 
those who plan on microfinance being the economic driver of development. However, when the 
increasing amount of borrowers is considered this figure has much more positive impact than 
when considered in isolation. 
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The economic development of developing countries has lagged behind theoretical models 
considering the provision of microfinance and donor funds (Shukran & Rahman, 2011). Indeed, 
World Bank reports have found that the economic gains from microfinance are lower than 
would be expected (Aggarwal, Klapper, & Singer, 2012), however there is an overall increase in 
wages (Buera, Kaboski, & Shin, 2012)4. This research fits in the subject of development 
economics where a large body of research has aimed at isolating causes of low economic 
development and focussed on the effect of institutions (Laffont & Triole, 1990). As such, the 
economic impact of microfinance is a question beyond the scope of the current thesis. At this 
point it is important to establish simply that microfinance is heralded as an economic innovation, 
but that a variety of institutional and other conditions potentially restrict the measurement of the 
direct economic impact of microfinance. Other authors have found that microfinance results in 
income generation and does reduce poverty in small degrees (Eichner, 2011). However, in an 
empirical economic sense the success of microfinance is supported in only a handful of 
published papers and thus the results should be interpreted with caution. However, theoretical 
arguments continue to support microfinance as a method to support micro entrepreneurship and 
this may have future economic benefits. The theoretical arguments for this have been discussed 
in the previous chapters. 
4.1.3.1 Macroeconomic Perspective 
Microfinance as a financial intervention is now of sufficient scale to allow general equilibrium 
analysis of the economic effects. In particular, a study by Buera et al. (2012) looked at the general 
and partial equilibrium effects of microfinance by examining microfinance and credit programs 
targeted at small business. The methodology for this empirical paper built on including 
endogenous saving rates between entrepreneurs and workers and high and low ability people. 
This limited scope of analysis excludes microfinance loans for consumption and may have less 
generalisable results because of this. Further, the exclusion of consumption loans results in an 
under-prediction of consumption increases attributed to microfinance and the resulting flow-
through effects on the economy. This study uses a model of entrepreneurship where financial 
development results in large aggregate impacts. The most significant finding of this particular 
research is that most people are positively affected in an economic sense by microfinance 
because of increases in equilibrium wages, not only for microfinance borrowers. 
                                                 
4 Subsequent chapters of this thesis will consider the design of institutions in promoting microfinance alongside the 
design of specific prudential regulatory provisions. 
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Under general equilibrium (GE) analyses, the research by Buera et al. (2012) found an increase in 
aggregate TFP (Total Factor Productivity). However, these authors also found that the increase 
in TFP is counterbalanced by a reduction in capital accumulations (that is, savings) because of 
the high redistributive impact of microfinance from savers to non-savers (because of the increase 
in wages and interest rates). The implication of this is that the scaling up of microfinance 
programs will lead to a small per-capita increase in income. Despite this, there are still significant 
aggregate and distributional impacts of microfinance. Importantly, general equilibrium analyses 
also found increases in equilibrium wages and interest rates. Thus, under GE, microfinance 
affects marginal entrepreneurs directly, workers indirectly (through higher wages), and may hurt 
business people or the rich because of an increase in factor prices. However, given that the aim 
of microfinance is in essence wealth distribution, this may actually be a bonus result. 
Buera et al. (2012) also examined the macroeconomic effect of microfinance based on a partial 
equilibrium (PE) analysis. A PE analysis assumes that wages and interest rates (among other 
assumptions) remain constant, whereas a GE analysis allows theoretical changes in defined 
associated inputs. Although not as easily generalizable to the real economic situation, these PE 
results did find higher increases in aggregate output and capital than under GE assumptions. 
Further, the increased rate of entry of productive entrepreneurs into the market resulted in an 
increase of capital and labour demand and output, with subsequent results being lower aggregate 
TFP than under GE analyses. Further, there were greater magnitude impacts on consumption 
and output, business starts, capital inputs, and labour inputs and outputs than under GE. 
The paper by Buera et al. (2012), published by the National Bureau of Economic Research, is 
important in establishing the effect of microfinance on economic development. Indeed, the GE 
effects of increased wages show a redistributive effect which leads to an increased welfare effect. 
Thus, although previous studies have focussed on the absolute change in poverty of borrowers, 
this study allows for nuanced effects such as relative wage increases to be discussed. 
4.1.3.2 Economic Gains From Microfinance 
A variety of economic literature supports the need for small businesses to have access to finance 
in order to achieve long term economic growth. Recent research published by The World Bank 
by Aggarwal et al. (2012) examined the role of microfinance on the access to credit of small 
businesses in Africa. This paper uses the 2009 and 2010 Gallup World Poll data which includes 
150,000 people from 157 countries and asks questions regarding demographics, well-being, 
income, politics, and financial inclusion (the existence of a bank account, access to credit, and 
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risk mitigation). These authors used the data from this survey to compare the findings of the 
literature and draw conclusions which support the development of micro-savings innovation. 
The research by Aggarwal et al. (2012) finds mixed support for microfinance in terms of 
economic gains. On the one hand, the research does show that access to finance results in 
business growth. However, on the other hand the results also indicate that the economic gains 
from microfinance are lower than were theoretically expected because of the mobilisation of 
household savings and empowerment from financial service access, and that the only certain 
positive outcome from microfinance is the smoothing of consumption expenses. Indeed, 
following this trend the authors highlight the economic drawbacks of microfinance (such as a 
credit-based poverty trap, over-indebtedness and the crowding out of other anti-poverty 
interventions) and provide evidence that suggests the promotion of methods for saving would be 
more efficient at reducing poverty in sub-Saharan Africa than loans: a result at odds with the 
research by Bauer et al. (2012). These authors find that borrower heterogeneity means that 
microfinance does not actually help to create new businesses on average, a result supported by 
Ahlin and Jiang (2008).  
The results of this paper tend to support previous literature in the area, as covered in detail in the 
second chapter of this thesis. However, despite the research paper using original data from the 
Gallup World Poll, the conclusions drawn by the paper relate to the potential for savings 
accounts rather than any conclusions drawn from the actual data analysis. The data analysis has 
been made at a descriptive level, and although providing some very interesting summaries of the 
Gallup World Poll and the implications on microfinance in sub-Saharan Africa, nonetheless few 
results are provided which contribute to the gap in the literature in this field. 
A key theoretical paper on the topic of the long term economic effects of microfinance has been 
published by Ahlin and Jiang (2008) in the Journal of Development Economics. These authors 
sought to use the Occupational Choice model to examine these effects based on the idea that 
access to credit allows some people to start businesses who previously had to subsist or rely on 
wages. Thus, microfinance can potentially reduce subsistence payoffs and reduce long term 
inequality and poverty. However, these authors found that the key to long term microfinance 
success is the ‘graduation rate’ (that is entrepreneurs who then start fully fledged firms and access 
the formal financial system). The model analysis showed that microfinance ‘graduates’ who 
achieve long term benefits come as often from saving as from having business success. The 
implications of these findings are that the quality of microfinance loans needs to be increased 
through increasing the productive efficiency of self-employed borrowers through information 
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sharing, technological transfer, and training programs. Further, these authors suggest that MFI 
loan officer incentives and MFI evaluations be structured around the requirement for 
‘graduation’ of borrowers as well as outreach and social benefits. Importantly, this theoretical 
discussion highlighted the interconnectedness between microfinance, microsavings, and long 
term poverty reduction. 
4.1.3.3 Vulnerability to External Shocks 
Prior to the GFC (Global Financial Crisis) MFI investment was an asset class for inclusion in 
investment portfolios providing sound diversification because of the general insulation from 
international markets and lower financial leverage than banks. This risk diversification benefit 
allowed microfinance to attract investment as well as donor funds, and the impact on borrowers 
was steady growth in outreach.  In an IMF Working Paper, Di Bella (2011) examined the effect 
of the GFC on microfinance, in particular the systemic risk faced by MFI’s. This author sampled 
353 MFI’s (out of 1,174 with data available on the MIX website) who conformed to a set of 
criteria regarding size and the consistency of data over the last seven years, and grouped for 
analysis into geographical regions. In determining the performance of MFI’s, these authors use 
asset and lending growth, Return on Equity (ROE) and Portfolio at Risk (PAR-30) (the 
percentage of loans in arrears in the last 30 days), and write-off ratios. This paper examined the 
systemic risk of MFI’s over a nine year period during which the GFC also occurred. The 
methodology of OLS panel regressions and general regressions seem to be robust given the 
measures taken to ensure there are not other influencing factors involved.  
Di Bella (2011) found that as MFI’s trend away from the traditional funding sources of NGO 
(Non-government Organisation) funds, there is increased exposure to changes in domestic and 
international economic conditions. The implications of this are large, especially for countries 
such as Peru, Bolivia and Kenya where microfinance composes a large percentage of total GDP 
(Gross Domestic Product). This paper found that the MFI transformation from being 
unregulated to regulated invariably results in an increase in systemic risk5. It can be simply and 
intuitively extended that the increased vulnerability to external shocks which MFI’s face from 
having other funding sources may practically spread the financial troubles of international 
markets to the front door of marginalised microfinance borrowers in developing countries. That 
is, international crises which do not greatly affect NGO-funded MFI’s now may result in 
reduced access to credit for small, rurally dispersed business people and families all over the 
developing world. This paper uncovered a number of other significant findings in relation to 
                                                 
5 This is an issue directly relevant to the current thesis and will thus be covered in detail in subsequent chapters. 
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regulation, MFI financial sustainability and the differences between regulated and non-regulated 
MFI’s, and these issues will be outlined in the relevant sections of this chapter. 
4.1.3.4 Micro-Entrepreneurship 
The theoretical economic success of microfinance lies in its ability to mobilise the household 
savings of the poor to provide loans for entrepreneurs to start or grow small businesses. 
However, some authors have commented that micro-entrepreneurship is not part of the global 
economy, nor of national or international trade statistics (Arch, 2005). The implications of this 
have been described against the ‘rising tide lifts all boats’ strategy of globalisation and the economic 
statistical influences of microfinance. Despite these theoretical issues, most empirical works on 
the economic effect of microfinance have not considered the effect of micro-entrepreneurship 
occurring at a level too small to be included in cross-country statistics, and this provides a 
consideration when analysing the quality of empirical papers in this field. However, research by 
Ahlin and Jiang (2008) does consider the importance (indeed, the critical nature) of the 
graduation of microfinance borrowers to full-scale firms on the long term economic effect of 
microfinance. 
The heterogeneity of borrower characteristics is also a subject of study in itself in that it affects 
the people who undertake microfinance and subsequently how the funds are used. A study 
published in the International Journal of Economics and Finance by Parvin, Rahman, and Jia 
(2012) examined this topic to determine the factors which influenced entrepreneurship of 
women in rural Bangladesh. These authors collected data from 248 entrepreneurs and 132 non-
entrepreneurs regarding their personal attributes, family situation and environment. The study 
used a sampling method which seems to entail using all the possible entrepreneurs in a particular 
village in rural northern Bangladesh, and a convenience sample to identify non-entrepreneurs. 
An interview schedule was applied to each participant, and it is presumed (although not stated in 
the published article) that the responses were coded to allow for quantitative statistical analysis. 
The authors used a probit model to explain the impact of these explanatory variables on the 
probability of doing micro-entrepreneurship, and the model seems sound given that it was also 
used by influential authors such as Roodman and Morduch (2009). Despite the qualitative data 
collection and other methodological considerations, the results of this study do provide some 
detail into the factors which influence female micro-entrepreneurship and should be considered. 
In particular, this study found that women participate in micro-enterprises because they want 
freedom of work and an increase in social status. Importantly, the research found that families in 
financial hardship are more likely to undertake microfinance. The factors which influence 
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entrepreneurship as a result of microfinance are of importance to the current research and to the 
empirical analysis of microfinance and associated effects. 
An important consideration in micro-entrepreneurship is the heterogeneity of borrowers. This 
means that simply providing access to credit does not necessarily create entrepreneurs (Aggarwal 
et al., 2012). Indeed, this is a logical consideration and needs to be remembered when resting the 
economic development dreams on the shoulders of microfinance. 
A foundation empirical paper on the impact of microfinance on entrepreneurship and social 
benefits has been undertaken by Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, and Kinnan (2010) and published 
as a working paper with the Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development 
(BREAD). This key empirical paper provides experimental evidence from the implementation of 
randomised MFI establishment in certain ‘bastis’ (neighbourhoods) in Hyderabad. These 
researchers partnered with Spandana, a large and growing MFI which is primarily similar to the 
Grameen model of microfinance loans, but it does not provide business or financial literacy 
training. Spanada identified 120 areas, and 2,800 households completed a baseline survey in 2005 
before the randomised establishment of MFI’s in 2006-2007. The baseline survey, while not 
being implemented randomly, did allow the researchers to track the control and experimental 
groups for changes as a result of microfinance being made available. This experimental model, 
while not being perfect, does allow for widely generalisable results on the effect of microfinance.  
These authors found that the establishment of an MFI in a new market resulted in an increase in 
50% of borrowers in that area, and access to the MFI was used to borrow, invest, and create and 
expand businesses (Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster, & Kinnan, 2009). Further, these authors found 
household differences in the effect of microfinance, with those with the propensity to start 
businesses reducing the consumption of food and temptation goods, whereas those with lower 
propensity to start businesses increasing food consumption as a result of their access to 
microfinance. These authors comment that this household discrepancy means that the long term 
effect of microfinance is difficult to assess because some households may actually get poorer 
(though they eat more), while others get richer (while eating less), as a result of access to credit. 
These authors also found that microfinance shows no effect on education, health or female 
empowerment. 
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4.2 Social Benefits of Microfinance 
From a social perspective, microfinance has been relatively successful, with much of the previous 
research indicating an increase in empowerment of borrowers and increased access to finance, 
especially for female borrowers (Mayoux, 1999; Mwenda & Muuka, 2004). Although the research 
confirming the qualitative success of microfinance is not unequivocal, varying research methods 
and countries may indicate that results are not directly comparable and this may explain the 
discrepancy. Indeed, it is the social equality and fairness aspect of political goals which continue 
to motivate governments to support microfinance, both in and out of the developing world. 
Considering that the political goals are primarily social it can be extended that the analysis of 
whether microfinance is a success or failure should be limited to social benefits. From this 
perspective, microfinance has achieved success benchmarks. 
4.2.1 Social Mobility 
The social mobility of people generally refers to the movement in social standing as a result of 
changes in income. It is a widely discussed goal of microfinance to increase social mobility of 
borrowers because of the resulting health and educational benefits from increases in income and 
social standing. An empirical study by Hamdani and Naeem (2012) applied the social mobility 
scale to 350 microfinance customers of three leading MFI’s in Rawalpindi and Islamabad in 
Pakistan. The sampling of the borrowers examined in the study was not reliably shown to be 
representative. These authors found that microfinance results in an increase in social mobility 
and living standards as well as providing financial opportunities. The results of this study allowed 
these authors to conclude that microfinance is a key strategy for quick economic revival, an 
increase in living standards, empowerment, and social mobility. Although social mobility is a key 
desired result from microfinance, empirical studies focussing on this independent variable are 
limited and there is potential scope for future research on this aspect of microfinance social 
effects. 
The key experimental paper by Banerjee et al. (2009), while examining the effect of microfinance 
from a study which randomly implemented microfinance in 104 areas of Hyderabad, also 
considered the social effects of microfinance. This paper is of relevance to this section because 
these authors found that microfinance has no effect on education, health, or female 
empowerment. Although the study only tracked participants over a 15 to 18 month period, this 
is arguably a sufficient time period in a properly implemented empirical study to establish the 
effect of microfinance on these critical social outcomes. Thus, although a variety of studies have 
131_Edle Hunt BW Stand.job
Ch.4.  Katherine Hunt 
127 
 
supported the theoretical or isolated examples of the positive effect microfinance has on social 
outcomes, in reality this is not a certain conclusion.  
4.2.2 Intergenerational Effects 
The effect of microfinance on intergenerational reductions in poverty are intuitive in that 
families with more successful businesses are better financially able to send their children to 
school, and higher education provides the children (and subsequent generations) with better 
potential long term outcomes. However, this does not account for the potential that children 
provide a cheap source of labour for a growing family business. An influential study by 
Augsburg, De Haas, Harmgart, and Meghir (2012) as a working paper for the National Bureau of 
Economic Research has analysed exactly this paradox to determine the impact that microcredit 
has on intergenerational poverty reduction, child and teenage labour and education. 
Augsburg et al. (2012) used an RCT (Randomised Controlled Trials) methodology to randomly 
provide credit to 1,198 borderline applicants previously refused microfinance in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. This experimental design allowed the authors to isolate the direct effects of 
microfinance on the variables of interest as half of the participants received credit and half did 
not, but both groups were monitored over a 14 month period. However, the potential 
population sample of this study comprised only those borderline applicants who were rejected, 
so the sample may not be representative of microfinance in general. The selection of participants 
for this study was a critical component of the experimental methodology as they were able to 
identify participants who thought they had a viable business opportunity and were on the 
borderline of being accepted. However, as the participants were refused microcredit by the bank 
previously, demographic trends were found to be different than to the existing group of 
borrowers within the microcredit institution. In particular the participants of the study were 
slightly poorer and more disadvantaged than regular borrowers, however consistent interest rates 
were charged (22%pa compared with 21%pa to regular borrowers) and the average loan was the 
equivalent of $1,012 over an average maturity of 57 weeks. 
The study examined the effect of microcredit on child and teenage labour and education in order 
to determine the intergenerational effects of microcredit (Augsburg et al., 2012). The key 
findings of this study are that microcredit results in lower education and that higher labour 
supply of teenagers between 16 and 19 years old. This is because internal labour is cheap, 
therefore the borrowers choose to transfer utility from their children to themselves for business 
activity. These authors found that microcredit does not lead to an increase in profits or an 
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increase in household income over the observation period. However, being provided with 
microcredit does increase business activity in that there are increases in business ownership and 
reductions in the purchase of temptation goods. The study also found evidence that the 
microcredit loans are too small to start or expand a business, in that borrowers either ran down 
savings (those with a business and savings) or decreased consumption (those without savings) 
over the period to compensate. Although 77% of the borrowers offered collateral for the loans, 
the result of this was adverse selection as evidenced by erratic repayment by those who offered 
collateral. 
The study by Augsburg et al. (2012) highlights that the intergenerational effects of microfinance 
may in fact be the contrary of those often promoted by microfinance advocates. Specifically, this 
research found that increases in parental wealth do not necessarily result in higher childhood 
education (especially for females), and that instead this is effectively an intergenerational transfer 
of wealth from children to parents. There may alternatively be more efficient tools at alleviating 
long term poverty, and the authors propose a combination of microfinance and CCT 
(Conditional Cash Transfer) to overcome the effective competition between business activity and 
schooling which is currently underpinned by microcredit. However, these innovations cross the 
line between treating borrowers as valued members of the financial system and charity recipients 
with conditions for doing what external ideas impose as beneficial. 
4.3 Effect of Regulation 
The effect of microfinance is only as strong and long-lasting as the foundations on which it is 
built. Regulation has the potential to promote or restrict microfinance penetration across the 
world. Indeed, authors have found that incomes differ across countries not because of 
knowledge, capital markets, population, natural resources, human capital, or culture – it is 
because of differences in the quality of institutions and economic policies (Oison, 1996). Indeed, 
this is the focus of the current thesis –ways in which regulation and institutions can be designed 
to promote microfinance and thus access to credit. Other authors have also commented that 
economic growth and poverty alleviation are not possible in societies without strong institutions 
(Arch, 2005). There has been much debate on this topic in the past, and this issue is not directly 
related to the research question of the current thesis. As such, the effect of regulation and legal 
institutions will be assumed to exist and the analysis will move forward from there.  
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4.3.1 Sustainability v Outreach 
Microfinance was developed as an innovation to increase credit access for the poor. However, 
the last few years have seen discussion on outreach shift towards financial sustainability. This is 
because authors have realised that the long term outcomes of microfinance are not possible 
based on a model of NGO funding. 
In determining the performance of microfinance institutions, authors have considered the trade-
off between sustainability and outreach. Ferro Luzzi and Weber (2006) examined the 
measurement of MFI performance in a particularly robust paper published in CRAG (Centre de 
Recherche Appliquée en Gestion). These authors use data collected by the Graduate Institute of 
Development Studies of Geneva on 45 MFI’s from 1999-2003, and utilised the particular 
variables of interest for the paper. 
The variables selected by Ferro Luzzi and Weber (2006) are of significance and reflect the view 
in the literature regarding proxies for the measurement of various microfinance factors. In 
particular, the authors use loan size as a proxy for depth of outreach in that small average loan 
sizes reflect that MFI’s reach the very poor. Further, the percentage of female borrowers is also a 
proxy for depth of outreach because loans to women are apparently more highly valued by 
society. In addition, the range of financial services provided by MFI’s affects the scope of 
outreach. The number of loan officers per branch is deemed to affect both breadth and scope of 
outreach. These authors further theoretically extend that lending to groups reflects outreach to 
the poor. These factors of analysis can be combined to determine how oriented to serving the 
poor the MFI actually is. Using this data these authors exploited the different dimensions of MFI 
performance (sustainability and outreach) to conduct factor analysis which identifies separate 
influences on sustainability and outreach individually without requiring pre-determinants. 
The results of the analysis by Ferro Luzzi and Weber (2006) were developed using factor analysis 
and cluster analysis. These authors emphasise that the efficient use of capital by small scale 
entrepreneurs leads to potentially high returns and thus a willingness to pay relatively high 
interest rates. Based on their findings, these authors comment that in order for MFI’s to 
complete the market they either focus on increasing outreach to the poor or on financial 
viability, and rarely both simultaneously. This paper is particularly important for the current 
research because it provides a unique way of analysing MFI performance in a multi-dimensional 
context, something which has not been done in other papers. However, while the results of the 
paper do provide an indication of the most important aspects of financial performance of MFI’s, 
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the effect of country-specific macroeconomic and institutional conditions caused the clusters 
(generated under cluster analysis) to be somewhat undefined. This, in combination with the 
methodological issues of factor analysis (in not being able to determine absolute effects) means 
that the results of this study are indicative of outreach and performance aspects but not 
statistically definitive. Despite these issues, the paper by Ferro Luzzi and Weber (2006) has 
provided some key results, such as illustrating the potential negative effect of competition on the 
results to microfinance borrowers, interest rate ceilings, and the time required to grant a first 
loan on financial performance of MFI’s. This research effectively found that there are a number 
of key factors critical for MFI performance and borrower outreach, and these are often at odds 
with each other. An implication of these results is that there needs to be operational efficiency of 
MFI’s which includes the monitoring of loan officers, and potentially performance based 
bonuses or a similar system as supported by Jiwani (2007). 
Empirical studies have built on the results found by Ferro Luzzi and Weber (2006) and focussed 
specifically on the effect of regulation on MFI performance. A particularly prominent study on 
this topic has been published in Applied Economics by Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007). This 
study examined performance as a function of bank-specific variables, macroeconomic 
conditions, institutions, and the regulatory framework. These authors used panel data which 
allowed them to determine if fixed or random effects were the most appropriate methodological 
perspective. In examining the data for 114 MFI’s in 62 countries these authors found that MFI’s 
are less leveraged than banks and yet 38% of MFI’s do not collect savings to supplement the 
reduced access to capital from external sources. Of importance, this research found that the 
capital ratio affects financial performance. That is to say that MFI’s which are better capitalised 
have higher financial sustainability. Further, age and size also positively impact MFI 
sustainability, potentially because of the resulting impact on funding sources. Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak (2007) found that having access to more funding sources resulted in higher financial 
sustainability, while having access to more savings resulted in greater outreach (as measured by 
the number of borrowers). The potential implication of this is that prudential regulation directly 
concerning MFI’s6 has the ability to increase the amount of savings held by MFI’s and this can 
affect outreach (a previously defined political goal from the preceding chapters). Thus there are 
indirect benefits of regulation in that increases in savings in MFI’s results in greater outreach and 
access to credit. 
                                                 
6 In terms of microfinance, prudential regulation refers to the licencing and regulation of formal MFI’s for ongoing 
activities. 
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Following the trend of the area of interest followed by Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) and 
Ferro Luzzi and Weber (2006), a paper by Haq, Skully, and Pathan (2010) examines the cost 
efficiency of MFI’s using data from the Mix Market Exchange on 39 MFI’s in Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America. These authors used a non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA), a piece-
wise linear combination that connects the best practice observations and forms a convex 
productions set of possibilities. This methodology is especially useful to apply to non-profit 
organisations where high profit and low cost are not vital. The relevance of this technique for the 
analysis of the sample selected is that the researchers do not need price information and they can 
work with a small sample size. 
Bauer and Gaskell (2000) developed two models to examine MFI cost efficiency and found that 
efficient MFI’s have greater outreach (are output-oriented) and higher operational sustainability 
(are input-oriented). Interestingly, these authors identified the Ethiopian Bank-MFI ‘DECSI’ as 
the most technically efficient. It was found that NGO-MFI’s have the highest overall mean 
efficiency, which indicates that the regulation affecting these institutions may be the most 
relatively supportive. In terms of operating efficiencies it was found that cost efficient managers 
are better at managing customers and monitoring operational costs. Further, an implication for 
the size of MFI’s is that efficiency is achieved from efficiently using resources, not simply from 
the scale of production. This is despite the fact that larger MFI’s have greater performance 
(Bauer & Gaskell, 2000). However, to the contrary this result may also indicate that any attempt 
to regulate MFI’s leads to inefficiency (because NGO’s are usually outside of regulation). 
Despite the study of the financial performance of MFI’s being limited to the data voluntarily 
provided to such companies as Mix Market Exchange, a number of studies have empirically 
examined the relationship between financial sustainability and performance and outreach. A key 
empirical World Bank study by Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2005) systematically studied 
the financial performance and outreach of 124 MFI’s in 49 countries. These authors made a 
distinction between the three main type of MFI’s (individual-based, solidarity group lenders, and 
village banks) and examined if profitability leads to lower outreach as a result of ‘mission drift’ 
(deliberately serving the wealthier and more profitable clients). These authors commented on the 
trend towards individual loans in large MFI’s such as the Grameen Bank (Bangladesh) and 
BancoSol (Bolivia), as individual loans are assumed to be more flexible. However, these authors 
found that screening and monitoring in group lending overcomes the issues of moral hazard and 
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asymmetric information7. The evidence for this finding is that as the interest rate increases there 
is a reduction in the portfolio quality in individual loans but not for group loans. 
In a summary of the empirical research on microfinance, Hermes and Lensink (2007) examined 
the trade-off between financial performance and outreach. These authors discussed how joint 
lending reduces asymmetric information because it provides incentives to the group to screen, 
monitor and enforce repayment. This effectively reduces the agency costs of the lender. Given 
that the poor are excluded from the financial system because of the cost to the bank to screen, 
monitor and enforce contracts, along with a lack of collateral, this provides the microfinance 
innovation. 
4.3.1.1 Outreach 
In determining the performance of MFI’s the outreach to borrowers is often used as a 
benchmark. The direct influences on outreach to borrowers has been studied by Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak (2007) in a paper which aims to determine the effect of regulation on MFI 
performance. This study examined 114 MFI’s from 62 countries using data from Mix 
Information Exchange. These authors determined performance as a function of bank specific 
variables, macroeconomic conditions, institutional design, and the regulatory framework.  
This particular study by Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) documented a variety of important 
results for the regulation of MFI’s, discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter. Of 
importance to the outreach, this study determined that outreach equates to reaching more 
borrowers. This benchmark in itself is problematic because a focus on quantity rather than 
quality is rarely a good strategy when the well-being of the poor is a documented outcome. 
Nonetheless, this paper followed an empirical methodology and determined that MFI’s with 
more funding sources have more savings, and that more savings deposits results in higher levels 
of outreach as discussed previously. Further, prudential regulation has been found to directly 
increase the savings held by MFI’s. As an indirect conclusion, these authors also found that 
economic freedom and property rights security did not affect MFI sustainability but did increase 
outreach to borrowers. The results of this study indicate that outreach is an established goal of 
microfinance and that regulation has the ability to directly affect it via deposit rates. 
 
 
                                                 
7 These topics are covered in the previous chapter of this thesis. 
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4.3.2 MFI Operations 
As with other financial institutions, MFI’s must manage their operations in many different areas. 
Particularly important aspects of MFI operations include group dynamics and repayment, 
innovation, sources of capital, access to finance, and regulatory failure. Each of these issues has 
the potential to affect MFI operations and hence financial self-sustainability. 
4.3.2.1 Group Dynamics & Repayment 
The economic and behavioural reasons behind the high repayment rates of microfinance loans 
made to groups is a topic of interest in the research because of the interdisciplinary relevance 
crossing the borders of economics and psychology. One of the first empirical studies to 
determine repayment in groups was conducted by Wenner (1995) who examined 25 
microfinance groups in Costa Rica. Green and Britten (1998) found that written (and thus 
formal) rules regarding how the individuals in the group should behave resulted in greater 
repayment performance. In addition, this author found that the rurally located groups had higher 
repayment because without access to other sources of credit they must repay in order to ensure 
future access to credit. Subsequent studies by Sharma and Zeller (1997) examined the similar 
issue of group repayments and studied 128 groups in four lending programs in Bangladesh. 
These authors found that more relatives in the group resulted in lower repayment because of 
collusion. In addition, Punch (2005) found that borrowers who were exposed to credit rationing 
had higher repayment levels and that self-selected groups also showed higher levels of 
repayment. These papers indicate that the model of group lending is not simply about the group, 
but also about the finer intricacies of how the group is put together and monitored, and that the 
expectation of future loans is a strong motivator. 
The empirical methodology for collecting data to examine repayment performance is an 
important consideration for many research papers. A key study on group repayment has been 
conducted by Ahlin and Townsend (2007) in examining 262 groups from the BAAC 
microfinance program in Thailand. These authors used robust economic methodology to 
explicitly derive direct empirical tests from widely discussed models of adverse selection, moral 
hazard and social sanctions. Building on these models the authors generated theoretical 
predictions regarding repayment performance and found that the results differ between models. 
This is predictable given that each model assumes different economic environments and focuses 
on different types of joint liability problems. Using this methodology Creswell (2012) found that 
high levels of relatedness reduced repayment performance, a result consistent with the findings 
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of Punch (2005). In this trend, these authors found that social ties do not actually promote group 
repayment. 
In examining the role of social ties as covered in the paper by Punch (2005), a paper by Karlan 
(2007) further built on the empirical methodology required to solve the endogeneity problem (as 
identified by Hermes and Lensink (2007) previously in this chapter) by using a natural 
experiment. Patton (2005) tested if groups with strong social connections outperform those with 
weak connections in terms of group repayments. The motivation for this study is that although 
there is trend for MFI’s to have borrowers create groups among themselves, a particular MFI in 
Peru, ‘Finca-Peru’ randomly creates groups and this provides a natural experiment situation for 
examination. At Finca-Peru, borrowers go onto a list of potential borrowers and when there are 
thirty people on the list the microfinance group begins. The result of this is that it creates groups 
with different levels of social ties, so the researchers can measure the impact of social ties on 
repayment. These authors studied 2,000 individual group members and found that strong social 
connections to other group members do result in increased repayment and saving performance 
because the members can monitor and enforce repayment more efficiently. A potential reason 
for this trend is that groups with strong social connections can tell the difference between default 
and strategic default, a key ability which separates the functioning of MFI’s from traditional 
banks. 
Other techniques have also been employed to examine group repayment behaviour, including 
the novel approach of microfinance experiments. A key paper by Cassar, Crowley, and Wydick 
(2007) used a specific microfinance experiment to disentangle the different aspects of social 
capital and the effect it has on repayment performance. These authors considered social capital 
as trust of the group members and society. The economic game was implemented in Nyanga 
(South Africa) and Berd (Armenia) to 36 microfinance groups including 498 individual 
participants. These authors found that individual repayment depends on the belief that others 
will do the same (which depends on social capital within the group). In addition, it was found 
that trust between the group is more important for repayment performance than trust for society 
as a whole and that the social and cultural homogeneity of group members also increases 
repayment performance. Further, a past positive experience by group members of a group 
helping to pay someone’s loan provides incentives to help others pay loans in the future. In 
summary, these authors found that simply knowing each other does not affect performance, but 
the level of social capital within a group does. 
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The functioning of groups in microfinance loans is one of the areas of operation which actually 
has a number of empirical studies on the topic. The studies in this area have found that groups 
without close relatives (but with some social ties), with written rules, and high trust function 
more effectively in terms of repayment. Further, repayment has been found to be higher in those 
borrowers who are credit rationed via rural locations, clearly illustrating that it is the expectation 
of future loans which contributes to repayment consistency, a trend which is also found in 
traditional financial systems with credit databases and bankruptcy laws. 
4.3.2.2 Innovation 
The potential for microfinance to be developed within a country by building on existing 
infrastructure has promising outcomes across the world, especially in the case of building on the 
penetration of mobile phones. In an OECD working paper Herd et al. (2011) examined the 
financial reform in India and considered the various ways mobile phones can be utilised in 
increasing financial inclusion. These authors discuss the additive model (where there is a new 
interface for existing customers) and the transformational model (where the telecommunications 
company provides a money transfer system through their own network, with local agents who 
give and receive cash). The additive model is the path that has been chosen by the RBI for India. 
However, these authors suggest that the government can facilitate this technological innovation 
by reducing the ‘Know Your Client’ regulation for banking services under a certain account 
balance. This is especially prudent considering that India does not have a national requirement 
for identity cards. The paper supports the potential impact of this legislative change by 
illustrating the penetration of mobile phone based financial services in Kenya, a country which 
has bank density of one third that of India and yet financial system inclusion much higher 
proportionally (also considering the relatively similar mobile phone penetration rates of the two 
countries). The potential scope for microfinance penetration through innovation is large and 
requires complementary legislation to achieve the goal. The design of this legislation is proposed 
in subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
4.3.2.3 Sources of Capital 
Banks require capital in order to provide loans to borrowers, to finance operational costs and 
fund expansion. The operations of MFI’s are no different in such a general sense regarding the 
sources from which they obtain capital, and at what cost. Traditionally MFI’s have been 
primarily financed by donor capital from NGO’s and western governments (Di Bella, 2011). 
However, there has also been a trend in the recent decades for MFI’s (especially those large and 
well established) to obtain finance from private investors who purchase shares as investments or 
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from domestic and international capital markets (Block, 2010). The recent trend in changes in 
the sources of capital MFI’s use is motivated by the increased consideration of MFI financial 
sustainability, as discussed in the previous sections. The relationship between the regulation of 
MFI’s and their performance (as measured by financial sustainability and outreach) is an area of 
research closely aligned with the research question of the current thesis. 
In determining the impact of regulation on MFI performance Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) 
conducted an empirical analysis of MFI performance. These authors found that MFI’s with 
access to savings from depositors had greater outreach. Thus, Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) 
found that regulation indirectly affects MFI’s through affecting the sources of capital available to 
them. Further, these authors also found that MFI’s with many sources of capital were more 
sustainable, as were those which were better capitalised. Given that prudential regulation has the 
potential to allow MFI’s access to savings and that being regulated may allow MFI’s to access 
capital from the domestic and international capital markets, regulation has a potentially large 
impact on sources of MFI capital, which subsequently affects outreach to borrowers Hartarska 
and Nadolnyak (2007). 
4.3.2.3.1 Savings 
‘If the poor can borrow their way out of poverty then they can equally well save their way out of it’ (Aggarwal et 
al., 2012) (pp.17). In a World Bank working paper, Aggarwal et al. (2012) present a line of 
analysis and argument for the support of microsavings programs in sub-Saharan Africa. These 
authors found that trust is critical for financial behaviour and that it is closely related to the 
problem of corrupt institutions. These authors also found that if there is low trust in the country, 
people do not borrow and they definitely do not deposit. Thus, the regulatory initiatives to 
provide support for savings may need to be much more encompassing of the whole financial 
system and country in general. That is, regulation which can promote microfinance may need to 
address the regulation of MFI’s, however, the regulation which can promote savings may need to 
address systemic corruption and financial system security, among other things.  
These authors, among others, have commented on the importance of the legal protection and 
enforcement of property rights and the flow-through effects it can have on overall trust and 
financial system functioning in a country. Indeed, it may be relevant to state at this point that if a 
government has one role in society, it is to uphold property rights, and the diversion of resources 
such as those in the form of taxes is simply to support this process (Alchian & Demsetz, 1973; 
North, 1986). These points illustrate that answering the research question of the current thesis is 
a task which requires the consideration of many potential influencing institutions. Specifically, 
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the promotion of MFI financial sustainability is affected not only by the direct regulation of 
MFI’s, but also by banking law, and the law relating to property rights. 
However, despite these challenges these authors develop theoretical arguments for microsavings 
as programs with high potential impact because savings do all the things that debt should do, but 
without the burden of debt or resource diversion. Further, Aggarwal et al. (2012) found that 
there is a large potential scope for microsavings in that people already use various savings 
methods which are expensive (such as giving no interest and charging a withdrawal fee) and risky 
(such as livestock). Thus, innovation in microsavings can provide the poor with accounts to 
which they have access and which are dependable. The issue of microsavings and the support of 
such innovations is key to the consideration of microfinance because of the previously discussed 
potential role of savings in financially self-sustainable MFI’s. 
4.3.3 Access to Finance 
4.3.3.1 Small Firms 
The importance of access to finance for small firms has been repeatedly covered in the literature 
because of the effect it has on supporting entrepreneurship and subsequent economic growth. A 
paper of interest for the current research is published in the International Journal of 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation by Satta (2003). This author made a survey of 136 small 
Tanzanian firms and found that 63% consider restrictions on access to finance as the major 
impediment on their growth. The restrictions on access to finance are also real in that 94% use 
resources from themselves or from loans from family and friends as start-up capital, rather than 
finance from a financial institution. 
4.3.3.2 Bank Size 
There are a variety of factors which influence access to finance for firms of different sizes. A 
particular World Bank Report by Beck et al. (2011) combined two unique data sets to determine 
the effect of bank size on access to finance by small firms. This study used data from the 
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) on financial structure and World Bank Enterprise 
Survey to develop a sample of 54 developing countries (and up to 50 countries per regression). 
These authors matched the samples from both surveys based on indicators developed and made 
a cross-sectional database. For the FSAP the authors developed indicators for access to finance, 
account, overdraft, and loan (with the last three acting as dummy variables). The authors ensured 
the validity of results by conducting such methodological strategies as controlling for firm-level 
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characteristics which could otherwise affect access to finance (such as firm size, public listing, 
age). The underlying assumption for the methodological design is that some industries rely more 
on external finance than others for technological reasons and that these differences are 
consistent across countries.  
Using the rigorously constructed database of financial sector and firm data, Beck et al. (2011) 
subsequently built and tested non-linear models using regressions with OLS (in order to 
determine marginal effects of interaction otherwise difficult to interpret. The results of this 
research are not necessarily consistent with initial intuition in that it was found that a greater 
number of large banks are associated with lower financial services use by firms of all sizes. 
However, it was found that a greater number of specialised lenders (regardless of the financial 
firm size) results in greater access to finance of small firms. These authors discuss the 
implications of these results in the context of development in developing countries where access 
to financial services by small firms is critical because they comprise most of the private sector. 
Further, Beck et al. (2011) explain how a particular trend in the size of financial institutions is 
affected by the regulator because entry barriers and minimum capital requirements affect bank 
ownership which subsequently affects financial institution size. The effect of this on 
microfinance is that bank dominance affects credit access, financial system inclusion, and 
microfinance competition. Thus, from the perspective of these authors, the regulator is in 
control of the access to finance by small firms through regulating with a particular market 
structure in mind. This is of direct relevance because it illustrates the control the regulator has on 
not only the functioning of the microfinance markets, but also of individual MFI’s, and logically 
on the financial sustainability of MFI’s. 
4.3.3.3 Interest Rate Ceiling 
Particular aspects of microfinance are especially relevant for law and economics discussions on 
the topic. One particular aspect of relevance is the determination and charging of interest on 
microfinance loans. In an IMF working paper Di Bella (2011) examined the effect of the GFC 
on microfinance with a particular focus on the impact on interest rates. Di Bella (2011) 
empirically examined the determinants of lending rates using data from the Microfinance 
Information Exchange (MIX) from 1995-2009 provided by 1774 MFI’s in 107 countries. Of the 
available data the study of interest sampled 353 MFI’s who had available data for seven 
consecutive years from 1998-2009 and three years of data from 2007-2009 and other selection 
criteria to minimise survivorship bias. Di Bella (2011) grouped the MFI’s based on region, 
institution type, legal status, purpose and age. This paper examined variables of MFI 
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performance, global and domestic market risk and lending rate (and spread) determination. 
Standard robustness checks seem to have been performed on the analyses to ensure validity of 
the results. 
The results of the study by Di Bella (2011) which are of most interest to this section are related 
to interest rate determinants. This issue gained prominence in the GFC, along with the profits of 
MFI’s which were supposed to exist to serve the poor. The author of this paper goes into detail 
justifying the various reasons for the interest rates charged by MFI’s being above those charged 
by commercial banks. Di Bella (2011) developed two models to account for the interest rate 
charged and the spread on loan funds. This paper found that the increased vulnerability of MFI’s 
to systemic risk because of the diversification of capital sources also makes MFI’s increasingly 
vulnerable to changes in regulation. This paper states that inappropriate regulatory caps on 
interest rates likely result in the withdrawal of MFI funding, reduced MFI scale, increased loan 
sizes, and increases in effective interest rates for the poor (as there will be a shift towards TML’s 
who charge higher interest rates than MFI’s). This paper goes on to suggest that the most 
efficient methods to reduce interest rates charged on microfinance loans are: increasing 
infrastructure, innovating MFI practices, strengthening the legal framework and increasing 
competition between MFI’s. 
4.3.4 Regulatory Failure 
When regulation aims to address a certain social issue and has negative consequences other than  
those intended, this can potentially be considered a government failure, but is not always the case 
because of other potentially associated reasons. In the context of microfinance, this can be 
especially relevant to the issue of interest rates. The paper by Di Bella (2011) discussed the 
ramifications of interest rate caps and how they resulted in reductions in access to credit for the 
poor and increased effective interest rates for the marginal poor. Under a model of interest rate 
caps the poor are forced to access credit from TML’s (as MFI outreach is reduced to cover the 
easily profitable clients such as the middle class, also known as ‘mission drift’) such as loan sharks 
which have much higher interest rates than MFI’s. This example is a clear sign of government 
and regulatory failure. Regulation may have correct intentions, however that does not guarantee 
the intended results. 
This topic of regulatory failure was also examined in an OECD working paper where Herd et al. 
(2011) discussed the case study of Andhra Pradesh (where interest rate caps were regulated after 
media coverage of microfinance-blamed suicides of rural male farmers) and stated that the 
144_Edle Hunt BW Stand.job
Ch.4.  Katherine Hunt 
140 
 
results are reduced profit of MFI’s and higher default of borrowers, which will both ultimately 
result in reduced long term credit availability to the poor. Herd et al. (2011) suggested alternative 
government actions to avoid regulatory failure such as developing a credit database and 
strengthening bankruptcy laws. These, among others, will be discussed in the following section. 
4.4 Proposed MFI Regulation 
The topic of proposed microfinance regulation has been covered in the literature by a number of 
researchers working for various international institutions such as the World Bank, CGAP, IMF 
and OECD. Experimental evidence for regulation is not a methodology often employed 
regarding microfinance, although many of the suggestions for regulatory guidelines are based on 
papers which conducted empirical methodology. Authors have emphasised that a tiered 
approach is needed for the entry of MFI’s into the market because of the risk of regulatory 
arbitrage (Satta, 2004). 
4.4.1 Non-Deposit Taking MFI’s 
The consideration for how MFI’s should be regulated rests on a framework of understanding the 
different risks faced and posed by MFI’s with different operating functions. It is intuitive that 
MFI’s which do not receive deposits pose a much lower risk to the financial stability and well-
being of the poor than MFI’s which also receive deposits. This is because a loan provider which 
collapses does not necessarily take the life savings of the poor with it, whereas a deposit taker 
may. In developing a series of recommendations for MFI regulation in Tanzania, Satta (2004) 
considered non-deposit taking MFI’s and recommended that they employ internal rules for 
board governance and auditing, rather than imposing stringent requirements to ensure financial 
stability as the law would a deposit-taking MFI. 
This concept of treating different MFI’s differently is key to the analysis of the sector from a law 
and economics perspective. The development of MFI’s to complete the financial markets clearly 
illustrates the way MFI’s differ from traditional banks. MFI’s developed the way they did because 
banks were not able to provide access to credit for the poor. Thus, MFI’s have different 
operations and purposes than banks, and should be treated differently. Further, MFI’s differ 
between themselves and the regulation of all MFI’s should not take the same form. The 
regulation of non-deposit taking MFI’s should therefore reflect the operations and potential risks 
to society. 
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4.4.2 Legal Framework 
Government initiatives to promote microfinance can potentially take the form of specific 
regulations or legal institutional policies, or a broad blanket approach to strengthening the legal 
framework in general. The suggestions from the literature on how governments can promote 
microfinance generally fall into these two categories. Works by the IMF have highlighted the 
adverse consequences of regulation, not only in terms of its costliness, but also in terms of 
potential regulatory failure (Di Bella, 2011). Indeed, various authors have concluded empirical 
studies by suggesting that rather than governments focusing on individual pieces of legislation, 
that rather the legal framework as a whole is strengthened (Di Bella, 2011). It has been stated 
that the strengthening of the legal framework entails generalising credit bureaus, increasing 
corporate governance and financial reporting (Di Bella, 2011). However, broad 
recommendations such as these provide governments of developing countries with little direct 
instruction. Further, recommendations to strengthen legal frameworks and infrastructure may in 
themselves initiate a regulatory advice failure in that the task becomes so hard (rather than 
implementing one particular regulation for example) that governments choose to do nothing 
instead. There are clearly combinations of approaches required to promote microfinance in 
developing countries. The interrelationship between microfinance and general economic and 
social conditions is one which cannot be unravelled and as such potential initiatives need to 
consider both broad-based recommendations at a government level as well as particular 
regulations which can be implemented. 
4.4.3 Credit Database and Disclosure 
There are a variety of initiatives which regulators can implement to promote microfinance. 
However, many are seen as being overly burdensome to implement or monitor. Some initiatives 
such as a credit database and disclosure regulation has the potential to promote microfinance in a 
‘softly, softly’ manner which does not have many potential disadvantages, but has many potential 
benefits. In an OECD working paper Herd et al. (2011) analyse the financial reforms of India 
and develop recommendations for microfinance regulation to promote microfinance. The 
authors based an analysis on the law of microfinance in India with the aim of avoiding the 
consequences such as were seen in Andhra Pradesh in 2010 with interest rate caps introduced by 
the state parliament. The paper established the situation of microfinance in India in 2010, and 
theoretically discussed the effect of financial sector reforms on financial sector efficiency and the 
spill-over effects on the rest of the economy. In particular it was found that 13 out of 14 of 
India’s largest MFI’s were regulated as non-bank financial companies and were not allowed to 
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take deposits. The result of this is understandably that there is lower microfinance penetration 
(as found by Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007)). 
The legal analysis conducted by Herd et al. (2011)focussed on future Indian financial reforms. 
This paper suggested that the government can do things to reduce the risk of over-borrowing 
other than caps on interest rates, such as a credit database. Further, these authors suggested that 
personal bankruptcy laws be developed to complement the credit database. These two 
suggestions for regulation affect microfinance directly by supporting borrowers and providing 
fewer transaction costs than other legislative reform in this area. 
4.4.4 Support of Mobile Phone Banking 
The OECD working paper by Herd et al. (2011), while focussing on potential financial reform 
for India, suggests that the model of financial system inclusion via mobile phones be developed. 
In order to promote financial system inclusion (and potential microfinance repayments and other 
transactions) these authors suggest regulative changes which can support this innovation. In 
particular, lowering of the requirements for ‘Know your client’ regulations for accounts under a 
certain balance are suggested in order to ensure that financial inclusion is extended across people 
of different wealth levels. This is especially relevant in India where there is no requirement for an 
identity card and thus proof of identity (for account creation and access) for the poor and 
marginalised may have other challenges on top of the fact that the traditional financial system 
has excluded them.  
A key paper by Herd et al. (2011) supports the potential impact of microfinance legislation by 
illustrating the penetration of mobile phone based financial services in Kenya, a country which 
has bank density of one third that of India, but financial system inclusion which is proportionally 
much higher (also considering the relatively similar mobile phone penetration rates of the two 
countries). In order for financial services to be provided via mobile technology regulation needs 
to support less stringent requirements to establish a financial relationship. For example, 
regulation changes in Pakistan to mobile banking rules have resulted in large increases in 
financial system access (SBP, 2007). The potential scope for microfinance penetration through 
innovation is large and requires complementary legislation to achieve the goal. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
There are knowledge gaps in our understanding of microfinance, and empirical studies 
completed to date have not covered the complete range of important issues. In order to fill these 
knowledge gaps a legal comparison of particular countries will be presented in the next chapter 
of this thesis. 
The current chapter has examined the methodology and results of key empirical papers in the 
field of microfinance. As the topic of microfinance is a blossoming, ever-changing area of 
research, reviewing the existing literature is an on-going process which has the vulnerability to 
become out of date when related to changing economic and legal conditions. In consideration of 
these issues the current chapter has reviewed the empirical research to date and the structure of 
this chapter follows the areas of research covered in empirical works. 
Empirical works on the subject of microfinance have covered areas of interest including the 
effect of microfinance on wealth creation, business start-ups, wages, and economic growth. The 
empirical results have found that there is a small but significant effect of microfinance on 
increasing business start-ups and wages. However, the effect on wealth creation, especially 
intergenerational, has been shown to be potentially negative because child business labour 
competes with education; reducing the education of children, and thus potential 
intergenerational wealth effects from such social capital. Further, the effect of microfinance on 
economic growth remains to be seen especially given that most small businesses operate on such 
a level that the data does not flow through to macroeconomic trends. 
The social benefits from microfinance have been studied empirically in terms of the effect on 
social mobility and the intergenerational effects from education. The research has consistently 
showed that microfinance increases social mobility, but the effects on education paint an 
unpromising picture. The fact that the education of children can compete with the provision of 
labour to the family business means that education often decreases for children as a direct result 
of microfinance (Augsburg et al., 2012). Thus, although the theoretical evidence presented in the 
second chapter of this thesis provides a promising effect of microfinance on social factors, in 
reality the empirical evidence does not support this. However, other social effects have 
consistently been confirmed. 
Research has discussed the effect of regulation, in particular on sustainability and outreach, MFI 
operations, access to finance, and regulatory failure. The research has found that regulation has 
the potential to greatly impact these issues discussed as it has the potential to support MFI 
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operations through ensuring operational efficiencies or for allowing access to domestic and 
international capital and investment markets and savings. In this way MFI’s have the potential to 
be flexible and adjust to country-specific factors in promoting microfinance financial 
sustainability. Further, research has discussed the effect of government initiatives which 
consistently have the opposite effect from those intended, such as interest rate ceilings.  
Authors of empirical research have proposed MFI regulatory specifications such as fewer 
requirements for non-deposit taking MFI’s, strengthening the legal framework, establishing a 
credit database and disclosure network, and legislating for the support of mobile phone banking. 
These various regulatory avenues provide potential methods for governments to promote 
microfinance while not exposing the government to excessive risk or cost in doing so. These 
proposals have also been discussed in the previous chapter of this thesis from a theoretical 
perspective. 
The law and economics analysis of microfinance requires a consideration of the economic effect 
of laws, and the reasons behind such core issues as microfinance interest rates. The analysis of 
these core empirical works on microfinance provides a perspective on these issues which 
contributes to the law and economics analysis of the current research question. This chapter has 
contributed to answering the research question of the current thesis by illustrating the established 
methodology for conducting empirical research in the field of microfinance, along with 
providing the empirical consensus on findings in the field to date. The following chapter will 
build on these findings by empirically comparing and contrasting the microfinance regulatory 
details of the four countries of focus for the current research. 
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5.1 Introduction 
With most of the world’s population living on less than US$2 per day (The-World-Bank, 2012) it 
comes as no surprise that the primary goal of many governments is to promote increases in the 
average standard of living via economic development, as well as empowerment through social 
inclusion, particularly inclusion in the financial system (Demirguc-Kunt & Klapper, 2012; Shafi 
& Medabesh, 2012; The-World-Bank, 2013a). These dual goals of social and economic 
development are the motivation for billions of dollars of donor funds flowing to various projects 
in the developing world. The ‘dish of the day’, or the destination of these funds has been shifting 
more and more from avenues which provide hand-outs (such as food, housing, medical services 
and education) to those which provide people with the opportunity to help themselves (such as 
access to the financial system via microfinance services). Indeed, with an estimated 100 million 
microfinance borrowers in the world, this industry has seen uncommon growth fuelled by donor 
favourability (MIX, 2013). However, to date the growth of microfinance, the outreach to 
borrowers who are in most need of the service, and subsequent social effects have been primarily 
reliant on donor funds (Kiweu, 2011). Thus, although the positive impact of microfinance is 
widely supported in the literature (Brau & Woller, 2004; Das, 2012), continued results rely on the 
preferences of donors, a strategy unsustainable in the long term. Despite the importance of 
research in this topic, relevant new research on the role of regulation in supporting sustainable 
microfinance is lacking. This chapter1 seeks to describe the current regulatory environment 
regarding microfinance in the countries of interest. 
The current reliance of MFI’s on donor capital means that growth is potentially limited to donor 
whims. In order for MFI’s to be able to continue providing loans irrespective of donations in the 
future, other sources of capital need to be available, and the MFI’s need to have the freedom to 
operate efficiently enough to pay for the capital sources. As with other businesses, MFI’s can 
potentially access capital through capital markets (domestic or international), shareholders 
(equity), or donors. Credit and equity sources come with their own advantages and 
disadvantages, and may suit different MFI’s depending on their organisational situations and 
goals. In some countries, such as Pakistan, equity partnerships between MFI’s and international 
TelCo’s (Telecommunication Companies) are gaining popularity, and the regulation provides no 
restrictions on it. In other countries, such as in India and Bangladesh (as well as Pakistan), large 
MFI’s are able to access the credit markets. Hence, it is not that current MFI’s are completely 
                                                 
1 A shortened version of this chapter has been published as: Hunt, K. H. M. (2014). Microfinance Regulation: A 
Four Cross-Country Comparison. In L. Brunori, E. Giovanetti & G. Guerzoni (Eds.). The Potential for 
Microcredit and Social Business in Italy (pp. 39-47). Milan, Lombardy: FrancoAngeli. 
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restricted from accessing these alternative sources of capital, it’s simply that it is not common. 
Indeed, many MFI’s today do aim to be financially self-sustainable, and some have even stopped 
receiving donor capital. However, this is the exception rather than the rule. This issue is critical 
for the current thesis, because access to capital is inherently linked to MFI’s abilities’ to operate 
in a financially sustainable manner, if that is their goal. Further, the regulation has the potential to 
affect these sources of capital, and this issue is at the core of the current thesis.   
Perspectives on the role of microfinance and MFI’s in development differ according to 
philosophical judgements. As discussed in the first chapters of this thesis, regardless of whether 
individual philosophies of microfinance revolve around microfinance as a social innovation or 
view the poor as a potential market for financial products, MFI sustainability is important. There 
are two reasons for this theoretical conclusion. The first is that MFI’s with established social 
impacts which rely on donations are potentially unable to guarantee long term social effects. The 
second is that efficient MFI’s have greater social outreach (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000; Haq, Skully, 
& Pathan, 2010; Hermes & Lensink, 2007). Thus, MFI financial sustainability is important 
irrespective of the philosophy regarding its purpose.  
This thesis is primarily concerned with this issue: the long term sustainability of microfinance as 
a tool to reach these dual goals. From the perspective of the current research, for microfinance 
to be sustainable in the future the business model needs to be financially self-sustainable in a way 
which still achieves outreach goals. In order to be financially self-sustainable, MFI’s theoretically 
need to be able to operate in a way which gives them access to sources of capital other than 
donor funds, and to provide loans with product features and costs which reflect market 
conditions. This is because a reliance on donor funds makes MFI’s susceptible to the whims of 
capital providers into the future, which may change as other social initiatives become prominent.  
As MFI’s are institutions with potentially large social effects if they collapse, the freedom to 
operate may need to be balanced by the risk to society in failure. Thus, regulation of MFI’s has 
the potential to promote and support MFI’s and, on the other hand, may restrict their operation 
to simply providing hand-outs. However, the potential effect of collapse of deposit-taking MFI’s 
provides argument against blanket deregulation which leaves deposit holders at risk (Shäfer & 
Leyens, 2009) – a potential regulatory strategy discussed in the previous chapters.  
Research has analysed the effects of MFI’s being regulated based on a tier structure which 
supports MFI growth as opposed to being unregulated, and found that there are indirect benefits 
of regulation such as an increase in access to savings which are directly related with higher 
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outreach (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007). However, previous research has not empirically 
analysed the different aspects of specific regulation and their effect on MFI sustainability, which 
is where the current thesis contributes to the body of research, and in particular to the gap in the 
research in this field. There are only a handful of papers which consider the effect of regulation 
on MFI’s, and those that exist do not explicitly consider the effect of different aspects of the 
regulation on MFI financial operations. The current thesis is unique in the focus on the effect of 
specific regulatory features on MFI operations, rather than simply whether MFI’s are ‘regulated’ 
or ‘unregulated’. The contribution of the current thesis to the literature on microfinance 
regulation can be seen from the current chapter.  
The World Bank has reported that MFI’s should be classified according to their source of 
funding, that is: other people’s money; member’s money; or the public’s money (Van Greuning, 
Gallardo, & Randhawa, 1998). This paper by the World Bank on MFI regulation suggests that it 
is the source of funding which should determine how MFI’s are regulated. However, this 
research is more than 15 years out of date and replacement reports have not yet been released. 
Given the out of date nature of this particular piece of research and the momentous changes 
which the microfinance sector has witnessed since the report’s release, it can be seen that there is 
a great need for new research on this topic. 
Chapter three established that the law has the potential to influence MFI operations at the 
different levels of regulation, being self-regulation, facilitative regulation, and direct regulation. 
This chapter develops the criteria established in the third chapter to provide a comparative 
analysis of microfinance legislation in three comparable developing countries and a developed 
country. The comparison is based on microfinance regulation criteria which influence the 
financial sustainability of MFI’s, as identified in the third chapter. 
Microfinance, and in particular, financially sustainable Microfinance Institutions (MFI’s) have the 
potential to create large and long lasting increases in the social outcomes of people across the 
world (Ahlin & Jiang, 2008). Previous chapters of this thesis have established that microfinance 
is a social, and potentially an economic tool which may provide countries with an avenue for 
financial inclusion, empowerment, entrepreneurship, and ultimately economic development. 
Despite mixed empirical results on the impact of microfinance, as covered in the second chapter 
of this thesis, microfinance research tends to indicate that it may be one of the more promising 
development tools. Given this, the current thesis is primarily concerned with how MFI’s can 
operate sustainably, and particularly how regulation can promote this. The importance of this is 
that currently most MFI’s in the world operate as non-financially sustainable receivers of 
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donations, grants, and low interest loans in order to continue providing access to the financial 
system for the poor. With continued donations, regulation which supports capital and equity 
investment in MFI’s is intuitively unnecessary, and in addition regulation cannot affect the 
continuation of donations. However, although this model works for the moment, and has 
worked for the past couple of decades, a change in priorities of donors is all that is needed for 
the system to collapse and access to finance eliminated for many of the worlds’ poorest. Hence, 
the current microfinance system is not financially self-sustainable because donors may reduce 
funding. The current thesis is not concerned with how to affect donor funding, rather how the 
regulation can support MFI’s in having access to other sources of funding, among other business 
operations issues.  
Although the current research is primarily concerned with how regulation can affect MFI’s and 
their abilities to operate in a financial sustainable way, it should be addressed that MFI’s which 
have large savings bases, access to other funding sources and are reaching more poor people, are 
also more likely to be attractive for donors to continue supporting. Indeed, there has been a 
trend in recent years often discussed as worrying where the focus of donors has allegedly shifted 
to those MFI’s which ‘score’ the best in reporting their sustainability and outreach to institutions 
such as the Microfinance Information Exchange. It can be intuitively understood that a shift in 
the focus of MFI’s from providing loans to the poor to reporting good results about efficiency 
and outreach could lead to a change of culture within the microfinance industry which leads to a 
trend of mission drift. 
This chapter examines the regulation of MFI’s in order to establish a foundation of positive 
analysis from which subsequent chapters of this thesis can build. This research has the potential 
to impact the regional and global regulation of MFI’s and provides empirical research on a topic 
not studied as yet. Previous research has not considered the particular aspects of MFI regulation 
contained within this chapter, nor focussed on the particular countries of interest here. 
The third chapter of this thesis established the regulation factors which theoretically have the 
most potential effect on the financial sustainability of MFI’s. These criteria of regulation relate to 
restrictions on business activities such as product conditions, as well as consumer protection 
provisions via risk management requirements, and on-going reporting guidelines. Thus, this 
chapter is a practical analysis and continuation of the theory presented in the third chapter. 
This chapter considers the different regulatory environments in key microfinance countries with 
a focus on the regulation which has the potential to impact MFI operations and more specifically 
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MFI financial sustainability (while maintaining outreach). Subsequent chapters will build on this 
knowledge aiming to empirically determine the effect of regulation on MFI operations. 
In order to provide a regulatory description which is of relative value to the literature, the current 
chapter will focus in detail on three relatively comparable countries, Pakistan, India, and 
Bangladesh, and also a contrasting country, Italy, where microfinance is an emerging option for 
financial access. The justification for comparing these countries is given at a later stage of this 
chapter. Thus, a cross-country comparison designed in this way not only provides a focus on 
comparable countries, but also provides a blend of comparison not examined in the previous 
research as yet. 
The topic of regulation specific for microfinance has been covered before by The World Bank in 
a report from 1998. This report, titled ‘A Framework for Regulating Microfinance Institutions’, 
sets out how MFI’s should be distinguished from each other (based on their funding structure) 
and how the regulation should be designed (in a tiered structure). This paper has provided a 
reference point for the current paper in determining some of the aspects of regulation which 
need to be compared across countries. The reason for using this report as well as others to 
develop the current research is because in 1998 the microfinance sector was much different from 
the sector which is present today. Thus, many of the analyses and recommendations in the 
World Bank report are out of date and need to be taken with a pinch of salt. This is critical, 
because the topic of research is very important, and yet few studies have covered the topic in 
recent years. Indeed, it is the lack of recent research in this important field which has provided 
motivation for the current thesis. In this way the current thesis will build upon the work by The 
World Bank to develop an understanding of microfinance regulation.  
5.2 Country Selection and Methodology 
This section of the current chapter details the process and results of the country selection 
process and the criteria for legal comparison in a continuation of the theory presented in the 
third chapter of this thesis. Further, this section considers why each component of the analysis 
has been selected. 
5.2.1 Country Selection 
The purposes of this chapter are aligned towards identifying countries which are comparable 
from which subsequent empirical chapters can build. In a strategic sense, identifying countries to 
compare can take one of two main perspectives. Some authors have indicated that the most 
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beneficial legal comparison can be made between countries which have large contextual 
differences, such as Marr and Tubaro (2013) who intentionally chose to compare Peru, Tanzania 
and the Indian state of Tamil Nadu because of the differences. On the other hand, authors have 
attempted to compare similar countries, such as the paper by Beck and Levine (2005) on the role 
of private investor protection on financial development. Both perspectives are important for 
establishing a sound empirical methodology for the current research, however, similar countries 
have been chosen for a number of reasons, which will be discussed following. 
Pakistan, India and Bangladesh have been chosen as countries of focus for the current chapter 
because of their relative comparability in terms of cultural factors which may otherwise distort 
the results. Indeed, these three countries have a shared history, and were one original country in 
the recent past until 1947, and although the cultures between these countries may be considered 
by their members as starkly different, it can be intuitively argued that the differences are 
nonetheless smaller than between, for example, Mexico and India, where direct comparison 
would be fraught with difficulty.  
In addition to these three comparable countries, Italy has been chosen as a comparison country. 
A developed country is important to include in the comparison because it has the potential to 
illustrate the trend in regulation, as microfinance is only recently having success in developed 
countries. Although microfinance exists in many developed countries in some form, Italy has 
been selected as the comparison country in part because there is specific microfinance regulation. 
A report has identified Italy as the country in Western Europe most in need of microfinance 
(European-Microfinance-Network, 2013). Thus, it is not without reason that Italy was selected as 
country for comparison for the current thesis. There is an established microcredit industry in 
Italy with thousands of borrowers, and MFI’s which have data on their borrowers’ characteristics 
and loan details. Hence, although the focus of the regulatory comparison is given to the 
developing countries with their thorough and impactful regulation, Italy is also considered to 
give the most appropriate developed countries perspective. 
A key consideration was the availability of data, as although microfinance is present in many 
countries, the availability of data on microfinance laws differ widely. Considering this, three key 
countries have been identified for consideration - Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. Indeed, from 
a historical perspective, these three countries were administered by Britain as one country until 
less than 70 years ago. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have been chosen as comparable countries 
for a number of key reasons. In particular, these countries have a similarity in history and culture, 
despite different dominant religions. There is also relative similarity across geography, language 
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and established microfinance presence. Although the countries have distinctly different cultures, 
religions, and regulatory conditions now, it can be argued that these differences are smaller than 
would exist between a geographically diverse set of countries. 
The Indian sub-continent is the location chosen for the regulatory comparison for a number of 
reasons. Importantly, Bangladesh is attributed with being the ‘home of microfinance’ and has a 
large per capita penetration (13% according to MIX Market Exchange (2012)) of this method of 
access to the financial system. Despite being a foundation country of microfinance and home to 
the Grameen Bank, The Economist Intelligence Unit (2012) has recently ranked Bangladesh as 
41st (out of 55 sampled countries) for microfinance business environment based on criteria of 
regulatory framework and practices, supporting institutional framework, and stability. Clearly, a 
country’s fame in the sector of microfinance is not an indicator of regulatory quality (in the sense 
of supporting microfinance). 
India is a country with a large number of microfinance borrowers in absolute terms but with a 
relatively smaller per capita penetration than in Bangladesh. The recent crisis in the Indian state 
of Andhra Pradesh in 2010 resulted in that state’s government providing restrictions on MFI 
operations in terms of the interest rate charged, schedule of repayment and methods of obtaining 
scheduled repayments. This crisis had significant impacts on microfinance repayments in that 
state and ultimately led to a collapse in MFI sustainability and outreach. India has recently 
implemented national legislation which shifts the power to regulate MFI’s to the Reserve Bank 
of India (RBI) in order to rectify the effects of this crisis. This crisis illustrated the effect that 
regulation can have on MFI’s and financial access. Given the large amount of data available on 
Indian microfinance and the recent changes in law, this country is a suitable comparison with 
Bangladesh for the purposes of this thesis. The Economist Intelligence Unit has ranked India as 
the 22nd best microfinance business environment – a ranking which is much higher than 
Bangladesh but which still reflects a legislative and business environment not designed towards 
promoting microfinance relative to other countries. 
In contrast to the rankings received by India and Bangladesh, Pakistan has consistently been 
ranked by the Economist Intelligence Unit as one of the environments most supportive of 
microfinance. Indeed, in 2012 Pakistan was ranked third in the world for business environment 
which supports microfinance. This is particularly interesting given that until 1971 Pakistan and 
Bangladesh were the same country (Bangladesh was then called East Pakistan), yet in 40 years 
the regulatory system has completely diverged in terms of microfinance. Considering the relative 
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similarities in history and culture between these three countries, the different effects on 
microfinance are particularly revealing.  
A key issue with the countries chosen for comparison is size. That is, India has a vastly greater 
microfinance market than that of Bangladesh or Pakistan, and has an economy which has a 
variety of size-related macroeconomic issues to be considered. Indeed, the Indian economy is the 
10th largest in the world, according to the International Monetary Fund, while Pakistan is 44th and 
Bangladesh is 59th (IMF, 2013). It is for this reason that the paper by Marr and Tubaro (2013) 
actually compared the countries of Peru and Tanzania to one Indian state, rather than India as a 
whole. However, that study was interested primarily in the wholesale lending market, and not in 
regulation, so the issue of size was more relevant for their analysis. In contrast, the Italian 
economy is the 9th largest in the world, so from this perspective Italy and India are similar 
countries for comparison, while logic would indicate that this was not the case at all. The current 
research thus takes the methodological perspective that it is not only the economic size of a 
country which provides it’s comparability with other countries on a regulatory basis. 
5.2.2 The Economist Intelligence Unit 
The comparison of microfinance regulatory environments in terms of the broader business 
environment, which includes regulation and institutions, has been done before, by the World 
Bank in 1998 (as discussed in the introduction to this chapter), and by The Economist 
Intelligence Unit (EIU). It is relevant to discuss the work by the EIU at this point because their 
analysis focussed on the regulatory effect on the microfinance business environment and their 
study overlaps the current thesis. The reports by The World Bank and EIU were used as 
reference points when developing the criteria by which to compare the countries of interest and 
the financial sustainability of MFI’s. In this way, the current research has built on previous 
research in this field to ensure validity of the findings. 
The EIU report used a variety of data in developing their rankings, primarily qualitative data 
regarding regulations, and institutions and the use of interviews of key stakeholders in all the 
countries to identify other current developments. Further, the report used an online interview 
technique to gather a broader range of responses from the microfinance network. Thus, the 
report used a variety of methodologies to achieve arguably reliable and valid results. 
In ranking 55 countries where microfinance is prevalent, The Economist Intelligence Unit 
considered a range of factors, including the following three categories and sub-factors: 
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1. Regulatory Framework and Practices 
- Regulation and supervision of microcredit portfolios 
- Formation of regulated/supervised microcredit institutions 
- Formation/operation of non-regulated microcredit institutions 
- Regulatory and supervisory capacity for microfinance (including credit and other services) 
- Regulatory framework for deposit-taking 
2. Supporting Institutional Framework 
- Accounting transparency 
- Client protection: transparency in pricing 
- Client protection: dispute resolution 
- Credit bureaus 
- Policy and practice for financial transactions through agents 
3. Adjustment Factor: Stability 
- Political shock to microfinance 
- Political stability 
In the annual EIU reports, each of the first ten sub-categories in the list above was given a score 
out of four (with four being the best and zero is the worst) and the scores for each category were 
then aggregated to develop a score out of 100 (where 100 is the best and zero the worst). The 
calculation then assigned a 50% weight to ‘regulatory framework and practices’ and to the 
‘supporting institutional framework’ to develop the final score. In addition, the criteria regarding 
‘political shock and political stability’ were combined to give a score out of 100, which was then 
used to calculate a reduction in the overall score based on the following formula: 
Reduction Amount = 100 – (Political Stability) * 0.25 
The current thesis is concerned primarily with the regulatory aspects which impact MFI financial 
sustainability and so the results of the annual study by the Economist Intelligence Unit are not 
sufficient for this analysis. Nor are the categories used. However, the methodology and results of 
the study have provided a useful reference and guide for country selection and for some aspects 
of regulation which should be analysed within the current study.  
The report discusses the key developments in each country on a yearly basis. In the case of 
Pakistan the report indicates that the country has increased its rankings again because of 
regulation which allows for branchless banking (SBP, 2011), and which has subsequently resulted 
in a six-fold increase in six months in the number of financial transactions monitored by the 
State Bank of Pakistan, a clear benefit for financial inclusion and for the operating environment 
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for MFI’s. On the other hand, other strong contributors to the rankings include inflation. For 
example, Uganda dropped in the rankings because a high inflationary environment has led to 
non-performing loans and a drop in demand for microfinance. Thus, the report places a lot of 
emphasis on the business environment in general, not only on the regulations which govern 
MFI’s. The report explains how Peru has achieved the number one ranking in the world 
consistently and recent improvements in the business environment for microfinance with a 
strengthening of deposit-taking regulations and government promotion of price transparency, 
financial literacy and credit bureaus. The report thus balances the effect of regulation and 
government initiatives on the overall effect on microfinance. 
The potential increases in understanding from the detailed comparison of the specific legal 
provisions which affect three comparable countries are great. However, the methodology needs 
to be designed in a careful manner to ensure that the value the data brings is communicated. 
Thus, the methodology for this chapter follows a dual track process of first describing the 
countries of interest and second presenting a comparative legal analysis of the identified criteria 
across countries. The description of the MFI regulatory environment for each country is critical 
to provide context for the subsequent comparative analysis. Indeed, the historical development 
of MFI regulation and country descriptions can help explain why three comparable and 
neighbouring countries have such different MFI regulation. There are various country-specific 
factors which ca not be adequately communicated in a stand-alone comparative analysis on this 
topic of research, thus the dual track approach to this chapter. 
5.3 Overview of Countries 
This section presents an overview of the microfinance and regulatory environments in the four 
countries of interest. The data used for establishing the context in each country is primarily from 
the Mix Information Exchange, with supplementary information from various reports and 
scholarly texts. For ease of explanation, all monetary figures in this section will be in USD, the 
currency used by the Mix Information Exchange in reporting on the microfinance sector. 
5.3.1 Microfinance Regulation in India 
India is such an important country for microfinance because of the high number of absolute 
borrowers. There are 26 million microfinance borrowers in India with a total of US $4.3 billion 
in outstanding loans (MIX, 2013). However, with a population of 1.2 billion people, 26 million 
borrowers is only penetration to 2% of the population. The low penetration of microfinance in 
India may be an opportunity for future growth, since there is an established framework of MFI’s 
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and regulatory supervision. This can be seen in positive light because the established system of 
MFI’s already in place in India allows scope for future growth. Indeed , supportive changes to 
the regulation of MFI’s at this early stage of microfinance penetration have the potential to 
achieve significant influence on the microfinance sector and the dual goals of microfinance 
(social and economic progress). 
The regulation of MFI’s in India has followed a similar path as reform in the banking sector as a 
whole, trending towards less government restriction on operations. A research paper by Marr 
and Tubaro (2013) has set the context for microfinance regulation in India by describing how 
economic reforms supported by high domestic demand, foreign direct investment and 
international trade have increased the country’s economic power. The paper explains that MFI 
regulation has not been supportive to MFI operation in the past and so NGO-MFI’s have 
sought partnerships with mainstream financial institutions to overcome these restrictions. 
However, new regulation has provided MFI’s with more flexibility in achieving their corporate 
goals of financial excellence. 
At the start of 2013, new regulations were implemented which shifted the regulation of 
microfinance from a state to a national level. In the past regulation was national but each state 
had the potential to implement specific and binding regulation for its resident MFI’s. The result 
of this was that some states changed (read: crashed) the microfinance sector with well-intended 
state based regulation. The most widely cited example is from 2009 when the State Government 
of Andhra Pradesh implemented microfinance law with the intention of consumer protection, 
and thus imposed interest rate caps and restrictions on repayment frequency and collection 
techniques. The national based legislation was implemented in part to avoid these kinds of 
‘hijacking’ by State governments. 
According to the Malegam Committee Report by the RBI, Self Help Groups (SHG’s) account 
for approximately 58% of the outstanding microfinance loan portfolios in India, while Non-
Banking Financial Companies (NBFC’s) account for 34%, and trusts and societies for 8% 
(Malegam, 2011). Thus the microfinance market in India is widely diversified in terms of the 
providers of microfinance, which indicates that much of the microfinance provided falls outside 
of the scope of the relevant NBFC-MFI regulations. This information indicates that although 
new regulation in this area is promising, there are still many potential issues to be addressed in 
the future. 
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5.3.2 Microfinance Regulation in Pakistan 
Pakistan is not particularly noticeable as a player in the microfinance sector when considering 
history, outreach or celebrity MFI’s. Indeed, the microfinance outreach is to just 1% of the 
population. However, the growth of microfinance in Pakistan is among the strongest in the 
world (MIX, 2013). Further, the ratio of borrowers to depositors is also very high, with 2 million 
borrowers and 1.5 million depositors (MIX, 2013). Although microfinance has existed in 
Pakistan for decades, specific regulation was only implemented in 2001 with the Microfinance 
Ordinances Act which specified how to create and operate microfinance banks (MFB’s), as the 
relevant tier of MFI’s are called in Pakistan. This law created a new area of legislation with 
jurisdiction over an industry which had previously been donor funded and very small scale.  
The regulatory system in Pakistan has evolved into a tiered system which effectively covers five 
different levels and types of MFI’s, each separately regulated (Shah, 2011). This structure has 
evolved to address the goals of the government. The government has explicitly stated that the 
purpose of the legislation is to allow MFI’s to operate sustainably with access to capital sources 
other than donations. A second key aspect of the MFI regulation in Pakistan is that it is directed 
in large part by the industry itself. In particular MFI’s have developed various self-regulatory 
bodies, and in 2009 documented a code of conduct by which all abide, as well as a system of 
credit bureaus. These industry-developed initiatives highlight the level of empowerment held by 
MFI’s in Pakistan. 
With effectively five regulatory categories, one of the key potential disadvantages of the 
regulatory system in Pakistan is that only 35% of microfinance outreach is regulated by the State 
Bank of Pakistan (SBP). The rest of microfinance outreach is regulated under different regimes 
which, while providing the benefits of a tiered regulatory system, also provide the potential for 
regulatory arbitrage.  
One of the key strengths of Pakistan’s regulatory environment is the framework to allow mobile 
and branchless banking (Lintner, 2009). This regulation allows greater financial inclusion, and 
reflects the government’s focus on progression and leveraging technology to benefit financial 
inclusion. Indeed, CGAP have indicated that this on-going discussion and revision of this aspect 
of Pakistan’s financial system is key for the development of microfinance as a sustainable 
initiative (CGAP, 2010). 
A report by the Pakistan Microfinance Network (2011) explained how the specific regulations of 
2001 resulted in a dramatic increase in investment in microfinance in Pakistan, alongside a trend 
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towards MFI’s with defined ownership and governance, plus specific management systems 
designed to achieve efficiency and outreach. These regulatory initiatives achieved a balance 
between financial risk management and the ability to operate freely, based on the tiered structure. 
Specifically, MFI’s which are able to mobilise deposits have much lower leverage than MFI’s in 
other tiers which are restricted from mobilising deposits (because of different reporting and risk 
management requirements). This means that the MFI’s which present the greatest risk to 
consumers and the financial system as a whole are regulated in a way which reflects this. In 
contrast, the MFI’s which operate in ways which pose less risk are regulated less tightly. In this 
way, the tiered regulatory structure allows flexibility for MFI’s to operate in ways which suit their 
unique organisational goals. 
5.3.3 Microfinance Regulation in Bangladesh  
Bangladesh is known as the birthplace of microfinance as we know it because it is the country 
which motivated Professor Yunus to develop financial inclusion based on trust rather than 
financial collateral. Now, Bangladesh is still a golden country with respect to microfinance. 
Indeed, with a population of 150 million of whom 20.9 million are microfinance borrowers, the 
penetration of microfinance is above 13% (MIX, 2013). Unlike the situation in India, 
Bangladesh’s statistics showing US $2.8 billion in loans and US  $2.2 billion in deposits clearly 
reflect the fact that the microfinance industry is well developed. 
The history of the Grameen Bank is a well-known example of the capacity of entrepreneurship 
to consider problems in a different way and create sustainable businesses to address those 
problems. Microfinance was borne out of the famine that crippled the country after the 
independence from Pakistan in 1971, which Professor Yunus sought to address with a market 
solution. The Bangladeshi government enacted a special ordinance in 1983 which provided a 
platform for the Grameen Bank to be able to operate under guidelines less onerous than those of 
the traditional banks in the financial system. Despite the emergence of many competitive MFI’s 
such as BRAC and ASA since then, all but Grameen are required to be regulated as NGO’s and 
operate with a social (rather than a financially sustainable) purpose exclusively. This has led to a 
dual path with the Grameen Bank on one hand, and all of the other MFI’s in Bangladesh on the 
other. 
Various commentators in Bangladesh have recently claimed that the government of Bangladesh 
has undertaken a smear campaign to gain complete control over the Grameen bank (NY-Daily-
News, 2012). Indeed, Professor Yunus was removed from his post at the MFI, and the 
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government has initiated new laws which give it the power to control the board of directors. 
Although the potential effect of these changes is unclear, what is certain is that in Bangladesh, 
even the Grameen Bank is not immune from government intervention. 
5.3.4 Microfinance Regulation in Italy 
The development of microfinance as an industry in Italy is one which is particularly relevant at 
the time of writing. Although there are only 45,000 microfinance borrowers in Italy (Borgomeo, 
2012) in a population of 60 million, the development of microfinance as an industry in Italy is 
particularly relevant because Italy has some of the highest financial exclusion in Europe with 
16% of the population excluded (European-Microfinance-Network, 2013) and a polarised 
society in terms of wealth disparity. This means that the potential market for microfinance does 
exist in Italy. The issue which seems to challenge developers of microfinance in Italy is one of 
cultural understanding of the concept of a trust-based system. That is, a system which uses social 
collateral may work in the tightly knit communities in developing countries but it does not mean 
that this system can be ‘cut and pasted’ to developed countries which are much more 
individualistic (Hofstede, 1983). Indeed, with a thriving financial system for the majority of the 
population, it is tempting to believe that borrowers who are provided with the opportunity to 
obtain a loan without the requirements of collateral, may abuse the system. This may be one of 
the reasons that microfinance did not evolve sooner in Italy. However, we wo not know for sure 
as there are many potential reasons for the slow development. 
What is considered to be microfinance in developing countries is not something which is directly 
transferrable to developed countries such as Italy. For example, while the average loan size in 
Bangladesh may be near US$100 (MIX, 2013), in Italy the needs of microfinance borrower are 
much greater. Further, the definition of microfinance in Italy seeks to ensure that the 
microfinance provided in Italy is vastly different to that provided elsewhere. Specifically, 
microfinance in Italy has tended towards two alternatives: either the loans are low interest and 
for consumption purposes (similar to charity), or the loans are for the creation of small 
businesses, with a maximum loan of around US$15,000.  
The microfinance sector in Italy emerged from a foundation of religious based organisations 
seeking to assist local community members. Many religious institutions fund programs of 
providing credit at low interest to those in the community. This historical origin potentially 
compromises the sector in financial sustainability terms if there emerges a future goal to develop 
MFI’s as sustainable providers of financial services to those excluded from the financial system. 
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The law regarding microfinance in Italy has been developed with consultation with microfinance 
and law experts; however the two brief pages of law are inadequate in providing any kind of 
regulatory framework from which the sector can develop. The importance of this lack of 
regulatory framework is uncertain, and this will be discussed in more detail in the analysis section 
of this chapter. As the sector develops in Italy, it would be a reflection of many developing 
countries if many MFI’s fell outside the scope of regulation. This may not necessarily be a bad 
thing, because the consequent risks to society of MFI collapse are low. 
5.4 Comparative Analysis 
5.4.1 Methodology for Comparative Analysis 
The methodology for conducting the comparative analysis of regulations between the four 
countries of interest is based on the criteria broadly identified in the third chapter of this thesis 
and subsequently developed. In the third chapter of this thesis a law and economics analysis 
identified different aspects of regulation which can theoretically have an impact on MFI financial 
sustainability. In this way, the current chapter is a test of the theory on which aspects of 
microfinance regulation have a potential impact on MFI financial sustainability. In particular, 
chapter three identified that regulation which promoted the use of microfinance would 
potentially contribute to MFI’s financial sustainability. The methodology of comparative analysis 
was chosen for the current study because it provides a direct examination of the differences 
between countries which may help in discussing differences in MFI financial sustainability. The 
research question for the current thesis requires a complete understanding of regulation which 
has the potential to affect MFI sustainability. In order to ensure that all aspects are considered 
the current chapter will build on the work by The World Bank and the Economist (as previously 
discussed) to focus the analyses on the most valid regulations and effects. In order to apply this, 
a dual path methodology will be undertaken and in this section is the second path being the 
comparative analysis. 
The current study builds on and is guided by previous research on microfinance regulation, and 
established methodological processes as a guide for such a study. This section presents the 
various categories of legal comparison which are made in the following section, and provides key 
information regarding the inclusion of each category and its relevance for the current research. 
What follows is a list of each of the criteria used in the current study, and a short description of 
the relevance of the criteria for answering the research question at hand. 
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5.4.1.1 Criteria 
The criteria for cross-country comparison have been identified based on the theory identified in 
the third chapter of this thesis. The theory identified previously indicates that the aspects of 
regulation which are likely to have the largest impact on MFI financial sustainability relate to 
stipulations regarding business activities, which includes provisions for risk management and 
consumer protection. These criteria will be examined, along with the differences across the 
regulatory environment in general in order to establish a contextual understanding and 
framework which builds on the current knowledge of each country provided in the previous 
section of this chapter. Following this theory, regulations pertaining to business activities have 
been categorised more specifically into sub-criteria in order to compare and consider specific 
aspects of each component of regulation. Each sub-criteria was identified based on the actual 
reference points of the regulation on that topic. Thus, for example, when considering business 
activities, an aspect of regulation which consistently appears across countries is capital 
requirements. In order to reduce the repetition of the selection process, the sub-criteria which 
have been included in this thesis represent an aspect of a broader criteria previously established 
theoretically in the third chapter of this thesis, which appears in the MFI-specific regulation of at 
least one country of interest and is theoretically directly relevant for the financial sustainability of 
MFI’s. Following are explanations for each of the sub-criteria selected.  
5.4.1.1.1 Regulatory Environment 
The overall regulatory environment needs to be understood with a view to the potential 
implications on MFI financial sustainability. Aspects of the regulatory environment are important 
because they contribute to the transaction costs which MFI’s must consider in on-going 
operational decisions. Intuitively, regulatory burdens of reporting and the regulatory system as a 
whole have potential effects on the financial sustainability of MFI’s. The aspects of the 
regulatory environment considered in the current chapter include: relevant legislation, becoming 
regulated, tiered approach to MFI regulation, tier thresholds, supervision; self-regulation; rule of 
law; and judicial system. In addition, the Economist Intelligence Unit 2012 Rankings have been 
included. 
5.4.1.1.1.1 Relevant Legislation & Regulator 
For each country of interest there are a varying number of pieces of legislation, depending on the 
thoroughness of the microfinance specific legislation (or the overlaps). It is important for this 
thesis to document which legislation is relevant and with whom the regulatory responsibility lies. 
Indeed, as pieces of regulation differ between countries, so do the regulators themselves. It is 
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important to establish the identity of the regulator in order to understand the relationship 
between the enforcement of regulation and any influencing factors. That is, if the main self-
regulatory organisation is an industry player in microfinance (and hence has a conflict of interest, 
as is the case in India), it can potentially explain inefficiencies in the system with flow-through 
effects on MFI sustainability. 
5.4.1.1.1.2 Becoming Regulated 
The process of becoming regulated needs to be described in terms of a transformation from an 
unregulated entity, as well as for a new entity seeking to participate in the microfinance market. 
The process of becoming regulated may be a simple online application (in India), or an arduous 
process based on a variety of hurdles to jump. The necessity of becoming regulated is also 
relevant to this criteria because it can affect the transaction costs which MFI’s face (and thus 
affect financial sustainability). The process of becoming regulated thus affects competition in the 
microfinance market. Research has found that an increase in competition needs to be 
accompanied by greater transparency, organisation, and regulation (Marr & Tubaro, 2013). Thus 
it is a continuous cycle of regulation. 
5.4.1.1.1.3 Self-Regulation 
The effect of self-regulation on MFI financial sustainability via market competition and 
consumer protection was examined in the third chapter of this thesis particularly focussing on 
the interaction with CSR programs. However, in the case studies of this chapter it is more 
relevant to understand self-regulation as industry motivated, created and organised institutions 
which develop codes of conduct and administer audits to MFI’s. Depending on the control of 
these organisations, it may provide a possibility for MFI supervision to be less burdensome to 
the government while providing specialised knowledge on the microfinance sector. 
5.4.1.1.1.4 Tiered Approach to MFI Regulation 
A tiered approach to MFI regulation has been proposed (and subsequently ignored in much of 
the MFI regulation) by the World Bank by Wagle (2002). In theory this system provides MFI’s 
with different legislative structures depending on their particular characteristics, and in this 
report MFI’s are classified in terms of their funding source. 
Wagle (2002) have indicated that the tiered approach to the regulation of MFI’s is the best 
method for ensuring MFI sustainability and outreach. Despite the fact that the World Bank 
released these suggested regulatory guidelines 15 years ago, very few countries have followed this 
advice. It may be that this report was issued at a time when microfinance was beginning to be a 
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regulated industry but was not large or well-known enough to have regulation designed in a way 
that reflected the suggestions by the World Bank. It may be that in providing a framework before 
the industry really took off the World Bank suggestions were overlooked. 
Given that the microfinance sector comprises a variety of MFI’s including region based co-
operatives, NGO run MFI’s, and national MFI’s with thousands of borrowers, different 
regulation for each type has been proposed by this report. As with any aspect of tiered 
regulation, there is the potential for regulatory arbitrage and other negative outcomes. However, 
overall the authors in the report consider that MFI regulation on type of products provided, 
source of funds, or size, as a preferred avenue for regulation.  
5.4.1.1.1.5 Tier Thresholds 
Regulatory systems which have a tiered approach to regulation most usually follow a system 
where different tiers of regulation apply when thresholds of business activity (such as loan 
portfolio size) are crossed. It is intuitive that a tiered regulatory system would base ‘graduation’ 
from one tier to another on pre-determined criteria, and these benchmarks may have the 
potential to influence the effectiveness of the regulation, MFI operations and firm size, and MFI 
financial sustainability. 
5.4.1.1.1.6 Rule of Law 
The rule of law relates to how much law actually influences behaviour in societies. It is important 
to consider for the current research because it illustrates that in countries with a poor rule of law 
it does not matter how adequate, efficient and encompassing the law is if it is not enforced or 
followed by the people. Thus, available data are included in the current legislative comparison. 
The comprehensive research by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (1998) and 
(The-Heritage-Foundation, 2013) provides the data for these scores. An understanding of this 
kind of factor across countries is potentially important for the analysis of MFI sustainability 
because research has found that economic freedom and property rights security (aspects 
associated with the rule of law and judicial system) increase MFI outreach but do not affect 
sustainability directly (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007). This is an important consideration because 
the definition of sustainability of MFI’s relies on the measurement not only of financial 
outcomes but also of social outcomes. 
5.4.1.1.2 Business Activities 
Regulations which govern financial services institutions commonly contain specific instructions 
about how to operate the business in order to ensure financial stability of the firm (and thus not 
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affect the financial system as a whole through collapse). These specifications may also be critical 
in affecting the financial sustainability of MFI’s. The current chapter will consider regulations 
relating to particular business activities which have been chosen because they are most likely to 
have a direct impact on MFI financial sustainability. 
5.4.1.1.2.1 Initial Capital Requirements 
The barriers to entry implemented by regulatory systems have clearly understood effects on 
competition, and in the microfinance industry, outreach and interest rates and other product 
features (Parlour & Rajan, 2001). Initial capital requirements are a simple example of barriers to 
entry in the microfinance sector. However, these barriers to entry relate only to those MFI’s 
which are regulated. In some countries, the tiered regulatory structure allows small MFI’s to 
begin operations at a micro-level and become regulated as they grow. However, in some 
countries the regulation requires that all MFI’s be regulated, and thus subject to initial capital 
requirements upon entering the market. As well as influencing the ability to enter a market, initial 
capital requirements also dictate the minimum size of an MFI, thus ensuring that all MFI’s have 
some level of commercial viability. This has a potential flow-through effect to MFI financial 
sustainability because it may provide an incentive to the MFI’s themselves to operate efficiently 
and to donors to support viable MFI’s. Indeed, a key empirical paper by Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak (2007) found that larger MFI’s (and also older MFI’s) are more financially sustainable 
than smaller MFI’s. 
5.4.1.1.2.2 On-going Capital Adequacy Requirements 
Capital adequacy ratios, along with other ratios indicate the degree of financial stability and 
financial prudence with which managers operate a business. Without specific microfinance 
regulations, MFI’s wishing to mobilise deposits for the purposes of funding business activities 
and providing loans must comply with general banking regulations. This is understandable given 
the potential risk to consumers of an MFI holding deposits as well as providing loans (Sarr, 
2006). Thus, capital adequacy requirements reflect regulatory guidelines to protect consumers by 
ensuring financial stability of MFI’s. Further, ensuring financial stability also potentially 
contributes to financial sustainability because it ensures prudent financial management of the 
company. Indeed, an empirical study by Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007) analysed the effect of 
regulation on the financial performance of MFI’s and found that better capitalised MFI’s are 
more financially sustainable. 
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5.4.1.1.2.3 Legal Form Requirement 
The requirement for MFI’s to be constituted in a particular legal form could potentially limit 
market entry and competition. Although many MFI’s are structured as companies, many are 
structured as cooperatives or building societies. Hence, the imposition of a particular legal form 
limits the freedom of MFI’s and dictates how they should grow. Regulations which insist on a 
certain legal structure may have an impact on MFI financial sustainability by affecting which 
MFI’s are able to seek capital sources other than donations, (which are available at different 
regulatory tiers) and so these criteria will be considered for the relevant countries.  
5.4.1.1.2.4 Ownership 
As with the required legal form for MFI’s, legislation may stipulate ownership requirements. For 
example, it may be required that only local citizens comprise the owners of the underlying legal 
structure or are on the board of directors. This will clearly influence business capabilities if MFI’s 
are restricted in who can own and operate them.  
5.4.1.1.2.5 Investment Requirements  
The regulation of financial institutions often contains requirements for the assets held by the 
institutions as investments. For example, regulation may restrict MFI’s from holding more than 
25% of their assets in long term or speculative assets for liquidity and risk management.  
5.4.1.1.2.6 Asset (Loan Portfolio) Guidelines 
As a general consideration, regulations are created with a particular goal in mind. Microfinance is 
theoretically a tool to achieve the dual goals of access to credit, and social empowerment.  Thus, 
governments may choose to support either goal, or both goals. The aims of the regulation may 
be seen in guidelines regarding the required loan portfolio of MFI’s. Specifically, regulation may 
insist on a certain amount of loans which support either enterprises or consumption, or restrict 
loan size to increase outreach. Restrictions on the asset portfolio of MFI’s are related to MFI 
sustainability. Further, allocations for the loan portfolio may lead to other consequences such as 
clients being forced to ‘shop-around’ for suitable microfinance loans (Karlan & Mullainathan, 
2009; Pearlman, 2010), or to seek loans from Traditional Money Lenders, which have much 
higher interest rates than from MFI’s (Lintner, 2009). Depending on the goals of the 
government, requirements for loan portfolio allocations may assist the achievement of political 
goals and MFI sustainability, or inhibit it. 
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5.4.1.1.2.7 Reporting 
The regulated requirements on what must be reported to the supervisory bodies (whether 
governmental or industry based) and how often, may reflect the attitude of the government to 
financial sustainability of MFI’s. Further, there is a potential balance between the risk 
management initiatives imposed on MFI’s through on-going audits based on government-set 
financial benchmarks, and between the freedom of MFI’s to operate based on market demands 
and competition. Indeed, governments have the potential to require so much on-going reporting 
from MFI’s that it requires large resources to check. On the other hand, governments may 
require inadequate reporting from the MFI’s, which results in issues going unchecked. In this 
study it is directly relevant which financial documents an MFI must provide (eg. Balance Sheet, 
Profit and Loss); how often (eg. weekly, annually, bi-annually); and to which body (eg. the 
government regulatory body or a self-regulatory body).  
5.4.1.1.3 Risk Management Provisions 
5.4.1.1.3.1 Sustainability Benchmarks 
The current thesis is primarily concerned with how the regulation of MFI’s can affect their 
financial sustainability. Does regulation specifically address financial sustainability through direct 
measures? This is a question which comparison of the regulation aims to answer. 
5.4.1.1.3.2 Interest Rate Caps 
Usury laws are a topic of research widely covered in the economics literature to date, as the 
practice has existed through the recent millennia. Throughout history, financial institutions have 
been developing products which use a structure and terminology to bypass the requirements 
against charging interest on loans, and that system is still present in Islamic Microfinance (and 
finance) today. However, current governments aim to impose a cap on interest rates and this is a 
potential issue for the sustainability of microfinance (Di Bella, 2011). MFI’s faced with an 
interest rate cap may seek to hide the remaining interest rate in fees for loan servicing or other 
expenses. Authors have found that MFI’s have safeguards which also allow them to perform in 
inflationary environments (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007) and this means that caps on interest 
rates may not necessarily be required when the goal of microfinance is not huge profits. 
However, it can be logically extended that where there are interest rate caps, this flexibility to 
adapt to changing inflation may not exist. There are a variety of potential impacts of interest rate 
caps and these aspects make it an important factor to compare across countries. 
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5.4.1.1.3.3 Legislated Loans to Microfinance 
Governments seeking to support microfinance have sought methods to achieve that goal outside 
of direct MFI investment. For example, some countries (such as Indonesia) legislate the need for 
banks to provide a certain amount of loans specifically to microfinance borrowers. Indeed, in 
India the RBI has determined that 40% of all loans need to be made to vulnerable aspects of the 
economy, which includes microfinance. 
5.4.1.1.3.4 Deposit Taking – Regulatory Framework to Allow (EIU) 
The provision of deposit accounts is a key source of potential loan customers and capital. The 
regulatory framework to allow deposit taking was one of the key considerations for the study by 
The Economist Intelligence Unit. The regulatory system naturally follows the process where 
institutions with deposit taking capabilities are required to follow greater reporting and scrutiny 
requirements than non-deposit taking institutions. This, in essence provides an easily understood 
tier system of regulation based on products provided. Authors have found that access to deposits 
results in greater outreach (ie. more borrowers), and this is an indirect benefit of supportive MFI 
regulation (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007).  
5.4.1.1.3.5 Mobilisation of Deposits 
An aspect of good microfinance regulatory environments is the possibility for MFI’s to mobilise 
deposits for use in providing loans and business operations. As identified in the report and 
rankings by The Economist Intelligence Unit (2012), the ability to not only take deposits but to 
mobilise those deposits for business activities is critical for MFI financial sustainability. Further, 
reports by the World Bank have also indicated that a tiered regulatory system with allowance for 
different levels of deposit mobilisation is an aspect of an appropriate microfinance regulatory 
environment (Wagle, 2002). 
5.4.1.1.3.6 Access to Finance - Debt 
Research has analysed the effect of sources of finance on MFI financial sustainability and found 
that a greater number of funding sources results in MFI’s which are more financially sustainable 
(Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007). This finding is in line with logic, since organisations with access 
to different sources of capital ensure that they have capital during the different business cycles. 
The access to capital via debt will be considered in terms of regulatory requirements.  
5.4.1.1.3.7 Access to Capital - Equity 
As with the access to debt discussed above, having access to capital via equity is not only a 
source of capital for different business cycles, but also provides the organisation with access to 
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potential shareholders who may also bring operational skill and industry knowledge (Mori, 2010). 
Restrictions on access to equity partners are linked to ownership restrictions in that some 
countries limit the ownership of MFI’s to real people with local nationality or resident tax status 
(Kyereboah-Coleman & Osei, 2008). It intuitively follows that such restrictions may limit 
companies or foreign people from acquiring equity in MFI’s. 
5.4.1.1.4 Consumer Protection 
5.4.1.1.4.1 General Provisions 
Regulatory provisions regarding consumer protection are relevant for this analysis because these 
provisions are designed to protect consumers against bank failure and insolvency. The current 
thesis is primarily concerned with developing countries where deposit guarantee mechanisms are 
not necessarily in place. Regulatory provisions regarding consumer protection are also associated 
with ensuring financial sustainability of MFI’s and ethical conduct by them. In ensuring that 
consumers are protected, regulation simultaneously provides incentives to MFI’s to operate in a 
manner which is financially prudent and takes into account risk management provisions. Risk 
management provisions are designed to protect the public in the event of bank failure. 
Regulatory restrictions which limit the operational freedom and financial management of MFI’s 
are theoretically related to the current thesis because there is a potential direct impact on the 
financial sustainability of MFI’s. For example, consumer protection regulations which dictate 
that MFI’s must follow the same risk management processes as banks with much greater 
capitalisation is a practice which may lead to MFI’s either failing to remain financially sustainable, 
or seeking to avoid being regulated under those provisions.  
5.4.1.1.4.2 Measures for Over-Indebtedness 
Consumer protection is a prime motivation for regulators to restrict the operations of MFI’s, 
particularly for preventing people from obtaining loans from different MFI’s in order to pay off 
other loans, a result of over-indebtedness. In order to address this problem, regulators have 
options of requiring MFI’s to undertake thorough information gathering before granting a loan, 
to register all loans with a credit bureau, or other possibilities. There should theoretically be a 
balance between protecting the consumers from over-indebtedness and over-burdening the 
MFI’s with administration tasks which do not add to the achievement of their organisational 
goals, which in the end are generally with the interests of the poor at heart. 
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5.4.1.1.4.3 Credit Bureaus 
For consumer protection goals to be achieved, not only do MFI’s which mobilise deposits 
theoretically need to be stable, but also credit bureaus need to be in place and effectively monitor 
borrowers loans for over-indebtedness and for the loan terms. Although it is a theoretical 
assumption that credit bureaus play an important role in consumer protection, it is not assumed 
that all countries have in place an enforced system of credit bureaus. Thus, this aspect of the 
financial system will be compared across the countries of interest. 
5.4.1.1.4.4 Deposit Protection 
The stability of financial institutions theoretically relies on the predictable withdrawal of deposits, 
because the financial ratios of banks are often reliant on leverage to achieve profitability. For this 
reason, during the Global Financial Crisis, the governments of many developed countries offered 
deposit protection for bank accounts of citizens in domestic banks. Their motivation was to 
avoid a ‘bank-run’2 which may have resulted in a systemic collapse of the financial system. 
However, in developing countries we cannot assume that sector-wide deposit protection 
schemes are in place. Thus, the measures which are implemented by governments to ensure 
deposit protection within MFI’s must be considered separately for each country of relevance. 
5.4.1.1.5 Economist Intelligence Unit 2012 Rankings  
As discussed previously in this chapter, the research by The Economist Intelligence Unit 
provides an interesting examination of the microfinance business environment across 55 
countries. The methodology undertaken in this study has already been discussed, and it will be 
briefly described here why each ranking by the study is included for reference. 
5.4.1.1.5.1 Overall Microfinance Business Environment 
The methodology undertaken by The Economist Intelligence Unit, while being based on a 
qualitative system does assign weights to the underlying categories to determine final rankings 
and scores. The combination of these underlying rankings and scores to achieve the overall rank 
and score is easily comparable and understandable. 
5.4.1.1.5.2 Regulatory Framework and Practices 
The study included an analysis and ranking of the regulatory framework of each of the countries, 
and this aspect is directly relevant to the current thesis. Indeed, the scores on this measure when 
                                                 
2 A bank-run refers to the situation when too many depositors of banks demand their money.  Banks hold liquidity 
of often less than 15%, and so they are unable to satisfy such demands from depositors. After one bank almost or 
does collapse, there is often a contagion effect where depositors of all banks attempt to take out their savings. This 
is what is known as a bank-run (Uhlig, 2010) 
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compared across the countries of interest may indicate some key differences which are 
worthwhile explaining in more depth. 
5.4.1.1.5.3 Supporting Institutional Framework 
Aspects of the supporting institutional framework are particularly interesting for the current 
thesis because of the inclusion of considerations such as the existence of credit bureaus. A cross 
country comparison of these scores may help to provide the current study with a more complete 
understanding of the relative differences between countries. 
5.4.1.1.5.4 Stability 
Results do indicate countries with potential volatile environments and this can have a flow 
through effect on microfinance. 
5.4.2 Comparative Analysis 
The current chapter aims to compare regulatory environments of the chosen countries and 
subsequently identify any natural experiments which may provide a situation where the empirical 
effect of regulation can be more reliably determined. For the countries of interest, national law is 
the relevant law to be compared. This simplifies the process, especially considering that the laws 
in India used to be state based for microfinance and this created a series of issues for the sector. 
The table which follows compares the regulation of MFI’s across the three countries of interest. 
Regulatory detail is given based on the criteria previously established to be relevant for the 
current thesis.  
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(M
RA
): 
‘In
de
pe
nd
en
t’ 
bo
dy
 w
ith
 
Ce
nt
ra
l B
an
k 
re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
on
 b
oa
rd
. 
Th
e 
M
in
ist
er
 o
f E
co
no
m
y 
an
d 
Fi
na
nc
e, 
af
te
r c
on
su
lti
ng
 
th
e 
Ba
nk
 o
f I
ta
ly
 
Be
co
m
in
g 
Re
gu
lat
ed
 
U
nc
om
pl
ic
at
ed
 p
ro
ce
ss
 to
 g
o 
fr
om
 b
ein
g 
un
re
gu
lat
ed
 to
 
re
gu
lat
ed
, w
hi
ch
 th
en
 a
llo
w
s 
N
BF
C’
s t
o 
at
tra
ct
 
co
m
m
er
ci
al 
do
m
es
tic
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t. 
O
nl
in
e 
SB
P 
ha
s p
ro
vi
de
d 
gu
id
eli
ne
s 
on
 h
ow
 N
G
O
’s 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
M
FI
 st
ru
ct
ur
es
 c
an
 b
ec
om
e 
re
gu
lat
ed
 a
s M
FB
’s.
 T
he
 
re
le
as
e 
is 
ca
lle
d:
 
N
G
O
/R
SP
S/
 C
oo
pe
ra
tiv
es-
 
A
fte
r b
ei
ng
 re
gu
lat
ed
 a
s a
n 
N
G
O
 (u
nd
er
 o
ne
 o
f 4
 A
ct
s)
 
th
ey
 c
an
 a
pp
ly
 to
 th
e 
M
RA
 to
 
be
 a
 re
gu
lat
ed
 N
G
O
-M
FI
. A
s 
at
 th
e 
7th
 A
pr
il 
20
13
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
71
5 
lic
en
ce
d 
M
FI
’s 
un
de
r t
he
 
N
o 
re
gu
lat
io
n 
op
tio
n 
ot
he
r 
th
an
 a
s a
 fi
na
nc
ial
 in
st
itu
tio
n.
 
Th
e 
re
gu
lat
io
n 
ap
pl
ies
 to
 th
e 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
m
icr
of
in
an
ce
 
pr
od
uc
ts
 o
ffe
re
d 
(b
as
ed
 o
n 
a 
de
fin
iti
on
) r
at
he
r t
ha
n 
th
e 
176_Edle Hunt BW Stand.job
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K
at
he
rin
e 
H
un
t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17
2 
 
Cr
ite
ria
 
In
di
a 
 
Pa
ki
st
an
 
Ba
ng
la
de
sh
 
It
al
y 
ap
pl
ica
tio
n 
fo
r r
eg
ist
ra
tio
n 
is 
po
ss
ib
le
 (n
ee
d 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 
ha
rd
 c
op
ie
s)
. N
ew
 N
BF
C-
M
FI
’s 
m
us
t p
ro
vi
de
 d
et
ail
s o
f 
CA
R 
an
d 
a 
3 
ye
ar
 b
us
in
es
s 
pl
an
. 
Tr
an
sfo
rm
at
ion
 G
ui
de
lin
es.
 It
 is
 
be
ne
fic
ial
 to
 b
ec
om
e 
re
gu
lat
ed
 a
s a
n 
M
FB
 b
ec
au
se
 
of
 fe
w
er
 re
st
ric
tio
ns
 o
n 
ac
ce
ss
 to
 c
ap
ita
l a
nd
 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
st
ru
ct
ur
e.
 
M
RA
.  
M
FI
 a
s a
n 
in
st
itu
tio
n.
 
Se
lf-
Re
gu
lat
io
n 
A
ll 
M
FI
’s 
m
us
t b
e 
a 
m
em
be
r 
of
 a
n 
SR
O
 re
co
gn
ise
d 
by
 th
e 
RB
I. 
M
FI
’s 
m
us
t c
om
pl
y 
w
ith
 
th
e 
Co
de
 o
f C
on
du
ct
 o
f t
he
 
SR
O
. R
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
 fo
r 
co
m
pl
ian
ce
 w
ith
 th
e 
re
gu
lat
io
ns
 li
es
 w
ith
 th
e 
N
BF
C-
M
FI
’s.
 
V
ar
io
us
 in
du
st
ry
 b
od
ies
 h
av
e 
be
en
 c
re
at
ed
 to
 p
ro
vi
de
 a
 
le
ve
l o
f o
n-
go
in
g 
se
lf-
re
gu
lat
io
n 
N
o 
re
lev
an
t i
nd
us
try
 b
od
ies
 
es
ta
bl
ish
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
pu
rp
os
e 
of
 se
lf-
re
gu
lat
in
g 
M
FI
’s 
ha
ve
 
be
en
 e
st
ab
lis
he
d 
N
ot
 re
lev
an
t 
Ti
er
ed
 A
pp
ro
ac
h 
to
 M
FI
 
Re
gu
lat
io
n 
M
FI
’s 
of
 d
iff
er
en
t s
iz
es
 
(b
as
ed
 o
n 
lo
an
s o
ut
st
an
di
ng
) 
ar
e 
re
gu
lat
ed
 d
iff
er
en
tly
 in
 
th
e 
st
ip
ul
at
io
n 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
bu
sin
es
s a
ct
iv
iti
es
. M
FI
’s 
ar
e 
ei
th
er
 ‘l
ar
ge
’ o
r ‘
sm
all
’. 
 
M
FB
’s 
ar
e 
re
gu
lat
ed
 
di
ffe
re
nt
ly 
to
 M
FI
’s 
an
d 
in
fo
rm
al 
m
ic
ro
fin
an
ce
 
pr
ov
id
er
s. 
Th
is 
ta
bl
e 
w
ill
 
co
ns
id
er
 M
FB
’s 
on
ly,
 w
ith
 
M
FI
’s 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 w
he
re
 th
e 
co
nt
ra
st
 in
 le
gi
sla
tio
n 
is 
re
lev
an
t f
or
 fi
na
nc
ial
 
su
st
ain
ab
ili
ty
.  
N
o.
 T
he
re
 is
 o
ne
 se
t o
f 
re
gu
lat
io
n 
fo
r M
FI
’s 
an
d 
a 
se
pa
ra
te
 le
gi
sla
tio
n 
fo
r t
he
 
G
ra
m
ee
n 
Ba
nk
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
ly 
st
at
ed
 O
rd
in
an
ce
. 
N
o 
Ti
er
 th
re
sh
ol
ds
 
Th
e 
be
nc
hm
ar
k 
is 
th
at
 a
 la
rg
e 
M
FI
 is
 o
ne
 w
ith
 m
or
e 
th
an
 
Rs
. 1
00
 c
ro
re
 (1
 c
ro
re
 =
 1
0 
m
ill
io
n)
 lo
an
 p
or
tfo
lio
. 
(A
pp
ro
x.
 €
14
m
ill
io
n)
 
M
FB
’s 
ne
ed
 €
7.
7m
il 
in
 p
aid
 
up
 c
ap
ita
l t
o 
be
 re
gu
lat
ed
 a
s 
su
ch
. E
ac
h 
M
FI
 h
as
 th
e 
ab
ili
ty
 to
 d
ec
id
e 
un
de
r w
hi
ch
 
re
gu
lat
or
y 
co
de
 th
ey
 a
re
 
re
gu
lat
ed
. T
he
re
 is
 n
o 
cle
ar
 
tie
r s
tru
ct
ur
e 
w
ith
 d
ef
in
ed
 
th
re
sh
ol
ds
. 
N
o 
th
re
sh
ol
ds
. 
N
o 
th
re
sh
ol
ds
, j
us
t 
be
nc
hm
ar
ks
 fo
r w
ha
t 
m
icr
oc
re
di
t i
s 
Ru
le
 o
f L
aw
 (L
a 
Po
rta
 e
t a
l.,
 
19
98
) 
4.
17
 (o
ut
 o
f 1
0)
 
3.
03
 (o
ut
 o
f 1
0)
 
N
/A
 
8.
33
 (o
ut
 o
f 1
0)
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bu
si
ne
ss
 A
ct
iv
iti
es
 
 
 
 
 
In
iti
al 
Ca
pi
ta
l R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 
Th
e 
law
 is
 d
iff
er
en
t f
or
 
Rs
. 1
 b
ill
io
n 
(A
pp
ro
x.
 €
7.
7 
N
o 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 fr
om
 th
e 
Ba
nk
in
g 
A
ct
 –
 n
ot
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
to
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K
at
he
rin
e 
H
un
t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17
3 
 
Cr
ite
ria
 
In
di
a 
 
Pa
ki
st
an
 
Ba
ng
la
de
sh
 
It
al
y 
ex
ist
in
g 
M
FI
’s 
co
nv
er
tin
g 
to
 
be
in
g 
N
BF
C-
M
FI
’s 
un
til
 
M
ar
ch
 3
1s
t  2
01
4,
 b
y 
w
hi
ch
 
tim
e 
all
 N
BF
C-
M
FI
’s 
ne
ed
 to
 
ha
ve
 N
O
F 
(N
et
 O
w
ne
d 
Fu
nd
s)
 o
f R
s. 
5 
cr
or
e 
(A
pp
ro
x.
 €
70
0,
00
0)
. T
he
re
 is
 
an
 e
xc
ep
tio
n 
fo
r t
he
 N
E
 
Re
gi
on
 fo
r R
s. 
2 
cr
or
e 
(A
pp
ro
x.
 €
28
0,
00
0)
. I
f t
he
y 
do
 n
ot
 h
av
e 
th
e 
re
qu
ire
d 
ca
pi
ta
l t
he
y 
ar
e 
re
st
ric
te
d 
to
 
len
di
ng
 o
nl
y 
10
%
 o
f f
un
ds
 in
 
m
ic
ro
fin
an
ce
 lo
an
s, 
bu
t c
an
 
st
ill
 b
e 
re
gi
st
er
ed
 a
s a
 N
BF
C-
M
FI
. 
m
ill
io
n)
 in
 p
aid
 u
p 
ca
pi
ta
l t
o 
be
 re
gu
lat
ed
 a
s a
 M
FB
. T
he
 
RS
P’
s a
nd
 o
th
er
 re
gu
lat
or
y 
tie
rs
 h
av
e 
ot
he
r c
ap
ita
l 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
, a
nd
 th
ey
 a
re
 
no
t d
ire
ct
ly
 re
gu
lat
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
SB
P.
 
M
RA
. R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 a
re
 fr
om
 
th
e 
re
gu
lat
io
n 
un
de
r w
hi
ch
 
N
G
O
’s 
w
er
e 
cr
ea
te
d 
(o
f 
w
hi
ch
 th
er
e 
ar
e 
fo
ur
). 
 
M
FI
’s 
O
n-
go
in
g 
Ca
pi
ta
l A
de
qu
ac
y 
Re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 
Ca
pi
ta
l A
de
qu
ac
y 
of
 1
5%
 o
f 
Ri
sk
 W
ei
gh
te
d 
A
ss
et
s  
Ca
pi
ta
l A
de
qu
ac
y 
of
 1
5%
 o
f 
Ri
sk
 W
ei
gh
te
d 
A
ss
et
s 
A
ll 
N
G
O
-M
FI
’s 
m
ain
ta
in
 
CA
R 
of
 a
bo
ve
 1
0%
 
Ba
nk
in
g 
A
ct
 –
 n
ot
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
to
 
M
FI
’s 
Le
ga
l F
or
m
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t 
N
o 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t. 
Le
ga
l f
or
m
 re
st
ric
tio
ns
 a
re
 
pl
ac
ed
 o
n 
M
FI
’s 
re
gu
lat
ed
 b
y 
ot
he
r s
up
er
vi
so
rs
 th
an
 th
e 
SB
P.
  
D
ep
en
ds
 o
n 
th
e 
re
gu
lat
io
n 
un
de
r w
hi
ch
 th
e 
N
G
O
 w
as
 
fo
rm
ed
. 
Ba
nk
in
g 
A
ct
 –
 n
ot
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
to
 
M
FI
’s 
O
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
N
o 
re
st
ric
tio
ns
. C
an
 b
e 
N
G
O
 
ow
ne
d 
or
 p
riv
at
e 
co
m
pa
ni
es
. 
N
o 
re
st
ric
tio
ns
. C
an
 b
e 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 w
hi
ch
 a
llo
ca
te
 
pr
of
its
 to
 sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 a
nd
 
re
ce
iv
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
. 
D
ep
en
ds
 o
n 
th
e 
re
gu
lat
io
n 
un
de
r w
hi
ch
 th
e 
N
G
O
 w
as
 
fo
rm
ed
. M
us
t b
e 
N
G
O
’s 
of
 
so
m
e 
de
sc
rip
tio
n.
 
Ba
nk
in
g 
A
ct
 –
 n
ot
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
to
 
M
FI
’s 
In
ve
st
m
en
t r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
  
N
o 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 
ot
he
r t
ha
n 
po
rtf
ol
io
 
co
m
po
sit
io
n 
re
st
ric
tio
ns
. 
Re
st
ric
tio
ns
 o
n 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 w
ith
 
sp
ec
ul
at
iv
e 
pu
rp
os
es
 (e
.g
., 
st
oc
ks
), 
re
al 
es
ta
te
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t, 
an
d 
re
nt
al/
 le
as
e 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
 w
ith
 d
ire
ct
or
s, 
em
pl
oy
ee
s, 
an
d 
ow
ne
rs
. 
Fu
nd
s m
ay
 o
nl
y 
be
 in
ve
st
ed
 
in
 g
ov
er
nm
en
t s
ec
ur
iti
es
 a
nd
 
‘A
’ r
at
ed
 se
cu
rit
ie
s. 
In
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
ot
he
r 
M
FI
’s 
ar
e 
no
t a
llo
w
ed
 to
 u
se
 
th
ei
r c
ap
ita
l f
or
 a
ny
th
in
g 
ot
he
r t
ha
n 
fo
r c
ar
ry
in
g 
on
 
th
ei
r o
pe
ra
tio
na
l a
ct
iv
iti
es
. 
Lo
ng
 te
rm
 a
ss
et
s c
a 
no
t b
e 
fu
nd
ed
 w
ith
 sh
or
t t
er
m
 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s. 
M
ain
ta
in
 an
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t r
eg
ist
er
 w
ith
 c
lea
r 
de
sc
rip
tio
ns
. 
Ba
nk
in
g 
A
ct
 –
 n
ot
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
to
 
M
FI
’s 
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K
at
he
rin
e 
H
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17
4 
 
Cr
ite
ria
 
In
di
a 
 
Pa
ki
st
an
 
Ba
ng
la
de
sh
 
It
al
y 
m
icr
of
in
an
ce
 e
nt
iti
es
 is
 
lim
ite
d 
to
 1
5%
 o
f o
w
n 
eq
ui
ty
. 
A
ss
et
 (L
oa
n 
Po
rtf
ol
io
) 
G
ui
de
lin
es
 
85
%
 o
f a
ss
et
s m
us
t b
e 
‘Q
ua
lif
yin
g 
A
ss
et
s’ 
(a
pp
lie
s t
o 
po
st
-2
01
2 
as
se
ts
 o
nl
y)
 to
 
re
ce
iv
e 
el
ig
ib
le 
ba
nk
 fu
nd
in
g.
 
In
 a
dd
iti
on
, 7
0%
 o
f l
oa
ns
 
m
us
t b
e 
fo
r i
nc
om
e 
ge
ne
ra
tio
n 
pu
rp
os
es
 (a
s 
op
po
se
d 
to
 fo
r h
ou
sin
g 
re
pa
irs
, e
du
ca
tio
n,
 m
ed
ica
l 
em
er
ge
nc
ies
). 
 
Th
e 
M
FB
 m
us
t d
et
er
m
in
e 
th
at
 th
e 
bo
rr
ow
er
 h
as
 th
e 
ab
ili
ty
 to
 re
pa
y 
th
e 
lo
an
. 
H
en
ce
, l
oa
ns
 fo
r b
us
in
es
s 
pu
rp
os
es
 a
re
 e
as
ier
 to
 v
er
ify
, 
an
d 
m
an
y 
M
FB
’s 
on
ly 
pr
ov
id
e 
lo
an
s f
or
 b
us
in
es
s 
pu
rp
os
es
. 
Lo
an
s f
or
 m
icr
oe
nt
er
pr
ise
s 
m
us
t b
e 
les
s t
ha
n 
50
%
 o
f t
he
 
to
ta
l l
oa
n 
po
rtf
ol
io
. 
Re
gu
lat
or
y 
gu
id
el
in
es
 fr
om
 
Ju
ly
 2
01
1 
ba
n 
un
of
fic
ial
 
de
du
ct
io
ns
 b
y 
len
de
rs
 fo
r s
o-
ca
lle
d 
sa
vi
ng
 sc
he
m
es
 (f
or
ce
d 
de
po
sit
s f
ro
m
 b
or
ro
w
er
s)
, 
lim
it 
ch
ar
ge
s f
or
 
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tio
n 
fe
es
 a
nd
 se
t a
 
15
-d
ay
 m
an
da
to
ry
 g
ra
ce
 
pe
rio
d 
fo
r r
ep
ay
m
en
t, 
an
d 
bo
rr
ow
er
s m
us
t p
ay
 b
ac
k 
th
eir
 lo
an
s i
n 
46
 in
st
alm
en
ts
. 
N
o 
re
st
ric
tio
ns
 
Re
po
rti
ng
 
M
us
t p
ro
vi
de
 P
&
L 
an
d 
BS
 to
 
RB
I a
nn
ua
lly
. 
W
ee
kl
y 
re
po
rt 
of
 su
m
m
ar
y 
(o
ne
 p
ag
e 
of
 fi
na
nc
ial
 
in
di
ca
to
rs
). 
A
nn
ua
l a
ud
it 
to
 
SP
B.
 N
ee
d 
an
 in
te
rn
al 
au
di
t 
de
pa
rtm
en
t w
hi
ch
 re
po
rts
 to
 
th
e 
bo
ar
d.
 A
nn
ua
l a
ud
it 
ra
tin
g.
 
A
bs
tra
ct
 o
f r
es
ul
ts
 o
f i
nt
er
na
l 
au
di
ts
 m
us
t b
e 
pu
bl
ish
ed
. 
M
RA
 m
us
t b
e 
in
fo
rm
ed
 o
f 
th
e 
in
te
re
st
 ra
te
, d
ur
at
io
n,
 
an
d 
re
pa
ym
en
t s
ch
ed
ul
e 
of
 a
ll 
lo
an
s o
n 
a 
ha
lf-
ye
ar
ly 
ba
sis
. 
Se
nd
 to
 th
e 
M
RA
 a
nn
ua
l 
re
po
rts
 o
f t
he
 B
S,
 C
F,
 
In
co
m
e-
E
xp
en
di
tu
re
, C
ha
ng
e 
in
 C
ap
ita
l, 
Po
rtf
ol
io
 
St
at
em
en
t. 
Ba
nk
in
g 
A
ct
 –
 n
ot
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
to
 
M
FI
’s 
Ri
sk
 M
an
ag
em
en
t P
ro
vi
sio
ns
 
M
us
t p
ro
vi
de
 a
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 
pr
of
its
 a
s a
 re
se
rv
e 
fu
nd
 to
 
th
e 
RB
I e
ac
h 
ye
ar
 (w
hi
ch
 w
ill
 
be
 u
se
d 
fo
r M
FI
 tr
ain
in
g 
et
c)
 
Ca
sh
 re
se
rv
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t 
(5
%
 o
f d
ep
os
its
); 
st
at
ut
or
y 
liq
ui
di
ty
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t (
10
%
 o
f 
de
m
an
d 
an
d 
tim
e 
lia
bi
lit
ies
); 
st
at
ut
or
y 
re
se
rv
e 
(2
0%
 o
f 
an
nu
al 
pr
of
its
); 
de
po
sit
or
’s 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
fu
nd
 (5
%
 o
f 
an
nu
al 
pr
of
it)
; p
ro
vi
sio
ni
ng
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 (1
00
%
 lo
ss
 
10
%
 o
f t
ot
al 
in
co
m
e 
su
rp
lu
s 
(a
cc
um
ul
at
ed
 su
rp
lu
s o
r 
pr
of
its
) m
us
t b
e 
m
ain
ta
in
ed
 
in
 a
 re
se
rv
e 
fu
nd
 (a
 se
pa
ra
te
 
ba
nk
 a
cc
ou
nt
). 
Th
e 
re
m
ain
in
g 
pr
of
its
 c
an
 b
e 
us
ed
 fo
r 
op
er
at
io
na
l a
ct
iv
iti
es
 o
r 
po
ve
rty
 a
lle
vi
at
io
n 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 
(if
 a
pp
ro
ve
d 
by
 th
e 
M
RA
). 
Ba
nk
in
g 
A
ct
 –
 n
ot
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
to
 
M
FI
’s 
179_Edle Hunt BW Stand.job
Ch
.5
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K
at
he
rin
e 
H
un
t 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17
5 
 
Cr
ite
ria
 
In
di
a 
 
Pa
ki
st
an
 
Ba
ng
la
de
sh
 
It
al
y 
de
cl
ar
ed
 o
n 
ar
re
ar
s o
f 1
80
 
da
ys
); 
ex
po
su
re
 a
ga
in
st
 
co
nt
in
ge
nt
 li
ab
ili
tie
s (
<
=
 
5 
tim
es
 e
qu
ity
). 
St
an
da
rd
s f
or
 
bo
ar
d 
co
m
po
sit
io
n 
ar
e 
do
cu
m
en
te
d.
 
Li
qu
id
ity
 o
f 1
5%
 (p
re
vi
ou
sly
 
10
%
) r
eq
ui
re
d 
(5
%
 in
 c
as
h 
an
d 
10
%
 in
 te
rm
 d
ep
os
its
) 
ba
lan
ce
d 
ha
lf-
ye
ar
ly.
 
M
FI
 to
 c
las
sif
y 
lo
an
s a
s 
“R
eg
ul
ar
”,
 “
W
at
ch
fu
l”
, “
Su
b-
st
an
da
rd
”,
 “
D
ou
bt
fu
l”
 a
nd
 
“B
ad
 L
oa
n”
 o
n 
an
 a
nn
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5.5 Analysis and Discussion 
The dual path methodology designed to explore and contrast the microfinance regulatory system 
in four countries has revealed some clear potential differences which may illustrate the link 
between MFI sustainability and regulation. This methodological approach has allowed for the 
understanding of contextual issues in each country while at the same time being able to directly 
compare key regulatory aspects. This process has provided directly analysable results, which will 
be covered in more detail here. This section will discuss the results identified in the comparative 
analysis. In order to ensure that all key results are presented, each criteria and sub-criteria will be 
separately discussed. 
The microfinance legislation of Italy displays aspects which can be attributed to the spread of 
microfinance from developing countries to the rest of the world. That is, it is intuitive that 
specific microfinance regulations are more detailed in developing countries as the innovation has 
only recently spread in a meaningful sense to Italy and other developed countries. In contrast to 
the other countries, the regulation of Italy provides no incentives for any firm to consider fitting 
in with the regulations of what is considered microcredit – there is no increased access to capital 
investment, nor outreach, from being regulated. On the contrary, the regulations only seek to 
limit the provision of microfinance by limiting the interest rate charged to one that is below 
market interest rates, a practice which theoretically ensures non-financial sustainability of MFI’s 
as discussed in chapter three. Other than basic definitions of what microcredit is in Italy, the 
Italian legislation is very brief and seeks to provide no incentives to MFI’s to operate sustainably 
or provide financial system access to those in need. However, despite the unhelpful nature of the 
Italian microcredit regulation, the regulation does not require MFI’s or institutions providing 
microcredit to follow the regulations. Thus, the negative impact of this regulation is not large. In 
the example of Italy it can be concluded that the regulation is not helpful but also does not seek 
to restrict the microfinance industry. 
5.5.1 Regulatory Environment 
The regulatory environment for microfinance is clearly vastly different across the countries of 
interest. The regulatory environment will be examined in more depth in the following sub-
sections. 
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5.5.1.1 Relevant Legislation 
The relevant microfinance legislation in each of the countries of interest differs vastly from two 
pages of vague microfinance definition in Italy to the tiers of regulation provided by Pakistan’s 
regulator. Of note is that although the tiered regulatory system in Pakistan has resulted in great 
reviews and a sound microfinance sector, it does seem as though there are too many and 
overlapping individual regulations and this may lead to regulatory arbitrage, confusion of 
responsibilities, or potential inefficiencies. In India the legislation has recently been implemented 
in 2012 and is a simple guideline for MFI regulation, a great improvement on previous legislation 
which allowed state (rather than national) control. Bangladesh has a series of regulation and 
rules, as well as the Grameen Bank Ordinance (1983) which ensures the Grameen Bank is 
regulated completely differently to other MFI’s and also to banks.  
5.5.1.2 Regulator 
The relevant regulator for MFI’s has shown that in some instances it missed most providers of 
microfinance (in Pakistan), or doubles up the regulation of the same institutions (in India). On 
the other hand, in Italy MFI’s are not regulated as separate institutions but are regulated based 
on their operations, which means that if they hold deposits they are regulated as a bank, whereas 
if they simply provide loans then they are regulated as such. Thus, in Italy the regulator for 
UniCredit (Italy’s largest bank) is the same as the regulator for PerMicro (a specialised MFI) if 
they both mobilise deposits. As of March 2011, MFB’s in Pakistan accounted for 35% of credit 
outreach; the MFIs and RSPs together accounted for 65%. Thus, in effect the SBP regulates only 
one-third of the microfinance industry. 
5.5.1.3 Becoming Regulated 
The process of becoming regulated is a critical aspect of microfinance regulation because it is the 
entry path by which the government can gain some control and consistency over MFI operations 
while simultaneously affecting market competition and entry barriers. The goal of this particular 
regulation is arguably to promote microfinance as a method of financial inclusion as well as 
maintaining consumer protection. Given the importance of the process of becoming regulated, it 
is interesting to note that the process is easy in India and Pakistan with straightforward online 
applications. However, the process in Bangladesh requires that the entity be first registered as an 
NGO, under one of four potential regulatory regimes (which leaves the option for regulatory 
arbitrage). The MFI regulation in Italy leaves no option to be regulated as such, thus the system 
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of becoming regulated is the same as the process is for a bank to become regulated – that is, very 
difficult. 
5.5.1.4 Self-Regulation 
The regulatory system in India and in Pakistan supports various self-regulatory bodies. This 
allows for a depth of regulation not possible when there is only the government regulator. 
Indeed, as specialised industry-created institutions, it is intuitive that these institutions are also 
more informed about the sector and what borrowers and MFI’s need in order to operate 
sustainably. In Bangladesh there are not any relevant self-regulatory bodies and the MRA has a 
monopoly on regulation. 
As identified in chapter three, self-regulation provides an opportunity for the leveraging off such 
initiatives as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) which allows potential efficiency because the 
regulator is able to focus on other things in more detail. If self-regulatory bodies are able to 
maintain systematic audits and develop industry reports and suggestions for the regulator then 
the overall quality of the regulatory system may be increased. Naturally, this theory relies on a 
variety of associated factors such as co-ordination between the self-regulatory bodies and the 
government.  
5.5.1.5 Tiered Approach to MFI Regulation 
As discussed previously, the tiered approach to MFI regulation is theoretically the most suitable 
regulatory strategy in terms of allowing MFI’s to grow while still being regulated and supported 
by the regulation in doing so (The-World-Bank, 2003). The tiered approach to regulation is seen 
in Pakistan, and to a lesser extent in India. However, the tiered approach to regulation is clearly 
non-existent in Bangladesh or in Italy where there are blanket rules relating to all MFI’s (with the 
exception of the Grameen Bank). In this way, MFI’s in Pakistan and to some extent in India are 
able to progress from being donor financed to being sustainable without being ‘thrown in the 
deep end’. 
5.5.1.6 Tier Thresholds 
The tier thresholds in India distinguish MFI’s based on their loan portfolio, with the distinction 
identifying ‘large’ MFI’s and ‘small’ MFI’s, with loan portfolios respectively above and below the 
Rs. 100 crore (approximately €14 million) threshold. Thus, although there is no explicit tiered 
regulatory structure, the different capital requirements for different sized banks in effect do 
provide a tiered structure to some extent. In Pakistan there are distinct tiers based on how the 
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MFI’s choose to be regulated, with more onerous regulatory requirements regarding capital, risk 
management practices and reporting for those which operate more similarly to banks than to 
NGO’s. This structure provides Pakistani MFI’s the flexibility to be regulated in a way which 
suits their organisational goals. 
5.5.1.7 Rule of Law  
The foundation paper by The-World-Bank (2013b) provides scores out of ten for India, Pakistan 
and Italy for rule of law. India and Pakistan receive very low scores with 4.17 and 3.03 
respectively, while Italy received 8.33. This may illustrate the differences in the rule of law across 
developed and developing countries. These findings are important in highlighting the role of 
enforcement in various regulatory aspects. In countries where the rule of law is low one could 
question the validity of considering microfinance regulation at all without a mirrored analysis of 
how the regulation is actually enforced. This is important given that the focus of this thesis is 
how regulation affects MFI’s – if the regulation has no effect because of a lack of enforcement 
then the consideration of specific regulations is intuitively futile. The seventh chapter of this 
thesis presents the results from fieldwork interviews and illustrates that MFI’s consider the 
regulation to have an effect on their operations, and so the rule of law, at least regarding 
microfinance regulation is sufficient to allow accurate description. 
5.5.2 Business Activities 
Regulation may inhibit or promote the operations of MFI’s in a variety of ways. Some regulation 
is designed to ensure the stability of MFI’s and the financial system as a whole and other 
regulation is designed to protect microfinance borrowers. Depending on the aims of the 
regulation there are varying impacts on the business activities of MFI’s. The different aspects of 
the regulation which impact on business activities will be discussed in the following sub-sections. 
5.5.2.1 Initial Capital Requirements 
The initial capital requirements in India allow for differences across regions, with North East 
region MFI’s allowed to have a smaller capital base. Further, the regulation in India allows that 
MFI’s which do not have the required capital can lend only 10% of their funds in microfinance. 
This is in essence also a risk management provision and ensures that even MFI’s which do not 
meet the initial capital requirements can still be regulated. On the other hand, Pakistan requires 
that MFI’s registered as MFB’s (the tier of regulation which the current comparison focussed on) 
have ten times more capital than those in India. The capital requirements in Bangladesh do not 
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exist in the specific MFI regulation, rather they relate to the requirements to be registered as an 
NGO prior to applying to operate as an MFI.  
Therefore, although the capital requirements in Pakistan are high, the negative side may be that 
barriers to market entry are created along with greater risk management and less reliance on 
donor capital. Indeed, the high capital requirements for MFB’s in Pakistan allow MFI’s to have 
established sources of capital and efficient business activities before being regulated as a 
microfinance bank.  
5.5.2.2 On-going Capital Adequacy Requirements 
There is little difference between the countries regarding on-going capital requirements, with 
India and Pakistan requiring 15% CAR and Bangladesh requiring 10% CAR. As with most of the 
regulations regarding Italy, capital adequacy requirements relate to banks, or charities, depending 
on the operations of the MFI. However, regardless of the requirement to report these ratios, 
authors have stated that most financial ratio’s do not pick up non-routine and non-auditable 
risks, and it is these risks which are the bigger threat (Wagle, 2002). 
5.5.2.3 Legal Form Requirement 
There are no large differences on the legal form requirements of MFI’s in the countries of 
interest. As discussed previously, MFI’s can have a variety of structures in many of the countries 
and the underlying structure of NGO’s in Bangladesh is not an onerous obligation of interest. 
5.5.2.4 Ownership 
Unlike many countries where microfinance is prominent, the ownership restrictions for the 
countries of interest are negligible. Indeed, it is of worth noting that although the regulatory 
systems of Italy and Bangladesh seem relatively inhibitory of microfinance in many aspects, when 
considering ownership restrictions the countries at least do not restrict microfinance operations. 
5.5.2.5 Investment Requirements  
The investment requirements which are present in Pakistan are closely related to ensuring 
financial stability by excluding speculative investments in property or stocks. On the other hand, 
the requirements in Bangladesh are that investments are solely for the purpose of carrying on 
business activities. This regulation seems contradictory in that it also states that each MFI must 
maintain a register of investments and that long term assets ca not be funded with short-term 
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liabilities – guidelines which seem at odds with the requirement to only invest in business 
activities. 
5.5.2.6 Asset (Loan Portfolio) Guidelines 
The regulations regarding the composition of the portfolio of loans are clearly stated by the 
Reserve Bank of India, with MFI’s required to provide 85% of their loans as ‘qualifying assets’3 
in order to receive loans from banks. Further, the RBI requires that at least 70% of loans from 
MFI’s must be for income generation (such as for the expansion of a small business). Here it can 
clearly be seen that the government has identified microfinance as a way to achieve economic 
growth in targeted areas. On the other hand, loans in Bangladesh must be at least 50% for 
consumption purposes. Here it can be inferred that the government of Bangladesh wants to 
support social empowerment through microfinance while the government of India wants to 
support economic growth. In Pakistan the regulation and SBP reports explicitly state that the 
goal of the regulation is to support MFI financial sustainability as a cornerstone of financial 
inclusion. 
The aims of MFI’s are important to consider in this context, because it may be that it is the 
composition of microfinance loans which are related to regulation and on-going social outcomes 
rather than other regulatory pieces. Thus, it may be relevant that 70% of MFI’s in India are 
classified as financial (versus social) lenders, compared with 50% in Peru and zero in Tanzania 
(Marr & Tubaro, 2013), showing the aims of the MFI’s. 
5.5.2.7 Reporting 
The reporting requirements of MFI’s in the countries of interest range from an annual report of 
Profit and Loss and Balance Sheet to the RBI (in India), to an internal audit and annual report to 
the SBP and a weekly financial summary (in Pakistan), to a list of requirements to be provided 
half-yearly (in Bangladesh). As discussed previously, the requirement for so many reporting 
caveats in Bangladesh is made with the intention of ensuring any issues are picked up early, 
however research has found that it does not pick up non-routine risks and it is these risks which 
are a bigger threat (Wagle, 2002). In this way, the highly summarised nature of the weekly 
                                                 
3 Directly from RBI/2012-13/138 and RPCD.CO.Plan.BC 13/04.09.01/2012-13 clarification on Priority Sector Lending: A 
“qualifying asset” shall mean a loan disbursed by MFI, which satisfies the following criteria: 
(i) The loan is to be extended to a borrower whose household annual income in rural areas does not exceed `60,000/- while for non-rural areas it 
should not exceed  ` 1,20,000/-. 
(ii) Loan does not exceed ` 35,000/- in the first cycle and `50,000/- in the subsequent cycles 
(iii) Total indebtedness of the borrower does not exceed `50,000/-. 
(iv) Tenure of loan is not less than 24 months when loan amount exceeds `15,000/- with right to borrower of prepayment without penalty. 
(v) The loan is without collateral. 
(vi) Loan is repayable by weekly, fortnightly or monthly instalments at the choice of the borrower. 
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reporting requirement in Pakistan may be a compromise. Further, in the case of Bangladesh, it 
may also be worthwhile considering the extra resources the government needs to provide to the 
MRA to actually monitor such a huge amount of financial information so regularly. Indeed, the 
regulation indicates that the MRA will be half-yearly monitoring the loan composition details as 
well as annually monitoring the Balance Sheet, Cash Flow, Income-Expenses, change in capital, 
and portfolio statement. The cost of reviewing this information for more than 600 MFI’s may 
prove to be more than the potential fines received in enforcing it. One of the key theoretical 
goals of regulation is that if possible it should be self-sustainable in itself. That is, regulation 
should be theoretically designed in a way such that the cost of enforcing the regulation is covered 
by the fines and fees associated with those being regulated (Masciandaro, Nieto, & Prast, 2007). 
In the case of microfinance this means that the cost of regulating the MFI’s needs to be borne in 
essence by the MFI’s themselves, through registration fees or fines for breaches. When the 
regulation is overly demanding regarding reporting, the flow through costs will theoretically 
impact the MFI’s in adding another cost to their operational structure. 
5.5.3 Risk Management Provisions 
The risk management provisions across the countries of interest are quite different in their level 
of complexity. Further, in countries such as India, the requirement to provide a set percentage of 
profits each year to the RBI (to be used for MFI training apparently) seems to be an avenue to 
ensure the potential for corruption in a sector otherwise outside of the scope of widespread 
corruption. Whether this is the case or not is unknown at this stage, however, with most MFI’s 
not making a profit it can be assumed that this flow of funds will be insubstantial. From a law 
and economics perspective, it is worthwhile considering the incentives that such a requirement 
creates. That is, MFI’s have no incentives to make a profit because when they do, they must 
funnel some of it to a government which does not score well on corruption indices 
(Transparency-International, 2013). Thus, this kind of regulation provides incentives to MFI’s to 
operate as low-profit entities, or potentially as ‘Social Businesses’, but certainly not as viable 
profit making institutions. Given that making profits from providing financial services to the 
poor is an issue of ethical debate, this topic will not be discussed in depth in the current thesis as 
it is outside of the scope of the research question.  
In Pakistan the risk management provisions are comprehensive, as they are with other financial 
institutions and present no serious implications for financial sustainability other than to ensure 
stability of the institutions. On the other hand, in Bangladesh there are a variety of risk 
management provisions which are confusing to say the least. For example, the requirement for 
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government approval for using profits for poverty alleviation activities seems to be an overly 
restrictive regulation. However, liquidity and other requirements seem intuitive given the 
comparison with other countries of interest.  
5.5.3.1 Sustainability Benchmarks 
Of interest regarding governmental support of MFI sustainability is simply that the SBP has 
stated the goal of its legislation is to help MFB’s attract outside investment and have a range of 
sources to capital and incentives to operate sustainably. When considering all the points of 
comparison as has been done in the current chapter, this goal is clearly seen in the various 
provisions. India does not state that it aims to support MFI’s operating sustainably but it does 
provide some leeway regarding interest rate benchmarks to help small MFI’s operate sustainably. 
5.5.3.2 Interest Rate Caps  
The subject of interest rate caps, or usury laws, is a topic of discussion widely covered in the 
economics literature and has been theoretically discussed in the previous chapter of this thesis. It 
is interesting to note the differences in approach to interest rate caps between the three countries 
for comparison. India has capped interest rates at 26% and Bangladesh at 27% with various 
different details about how the cap is calculated. Pakistan, on the other hand, imposes no interest 
rate cap on its MFI’s (and similar institutions). Despite Italian microfinance being at an infant 
stage, the regulation imposes an interest rate cap to below market interest rates. Clearly, in the 
Italian microfinance sector there are incentives to not be classified as microfinance according the 
government definition. The effect of interest rate caps has been discussed in the previous 
chapters of this thesis and the effect is theoretically that there is potentially lower access to credit 
for the poor as loans are provided more to the middle classes where lower interest rates reflect 
the cost of servicing this portion of the financial system.  
5.5.3.3 Legislated Loans to Microfinance 
The government of India has for some time used legislation to promote loans to particular areas 
of the economy. For example, domestic banks are required to provide 40% of their loans to 
‘weaker sectors’ which includes microfinance and agriculture. The other countries of interest 
show no set amount of legislated loans to microfinance. Bangladesh does have a requirement 
that 70% of clients are also borrowers, but that is a regulation which does not have foreseeable 
implications for MFI sustainability. 
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5.5.3.4 Deposit taking – Regulatory Framework to Allow (EIU) 
The report by The Economist Intelligence Unit (2012) includes the regulatory framework to 
allow deposit taking as a key component in the calculation of scores. This is because it sets the 
framework for MFI’s to be able to access another (sustainable) source of capital to fund loans 
and business activities. The analysis has shown that all the countries of interest (except Italy 
where MFI’s are regulated as banks) are able to receive some form of deposits, be it ‘thrift’ in 
India or microsavings in Bangladesh. In Bangladesh there are also guidelines for the ratio of 
deposits to loans outstanding (80% of total loans). The limit on Italian MFI’s not being able to 
receive any form of deposits means that their funding structure relies on donations. Indeed, 
statistics indicate that 82% of MFI’s in Italy are not-for-profit (Kyereboah-Coleman & Osei, 
2008). 
5.5.3.5 Mobilisation of Deposits 
When it comes to the mobilisation of deposits collected (as indicated above), the countries differ 
widely. For example, in India MFI’s can mobilise deposits so long as the bank is of a certain size 
and has a certain CAR. There is a more extensive requirement to mobilise deposits in Pakistan 
with all of the risk management provisions to be complied with beforehand. On the other side of 
the spectrum, MFI’s in Bangladesh are allowed to intermediate deposits from members up to the 
80% ratio discussed. 
5.5.3.6 Access to Finance – Debt 
Bangladesh allows the Grameen Bank (which is 25% government owned) to mobilise deposits 
and issue government guaranteed bonds and debentures. Other MFI’s need government 
authorisation to receive loans from international institutions. There is clearly a dual-path 
regulatory system in Bangladesh. On the other hand, India allows MFI’s to borrow to fund their 
business operations.  
Pakistan also provides a large fund which is available to guarantee loans for their MFI’s so they 
can access commercial debt. This is a significant regulatory movement because it provides 
Pakistani MFI’s not only with access to another form of capital, but also governmental support 
in doing so. As discussed in the third chapter of this thesis, a theoretical initiative to promote 
microfinance could be for governments to provide guarantees of microfinance loans. The 
legislation in Pakistan has taken an even bolder step by indicating that the market system will 
operate and the poor will have access to finance only if MFI’s are allowed to operate freely. 
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Thus, rather than trying to stimulate and promote microfinance itself, the government has taken 
the step towards supporting MFI’s in fulfilling their objectives. 
5.5.3.7 Access to Finance - Equity 
The regulation in India supports foreign investment in MFI’s and also provides incentives for 
MFI’s to be regulated by allowing them to attract commercial investment when they are. A 
similar structure is in place in Pakistan where there are no restrictions for investment in MFB’s, 
but there are restrictions for other tiers of regulation, thus providing incentives for MFI’s to 
‘move up’ the tiered regulatory structure as they increase in their demand for capital and scope. 
On the other hand, Bangladesh provides a vague and seemingly overlapping regulation which 
can potentially lead to regulatory arbitrage because it depends on which of the four acts the 
NGO-MFI is regulated under. 
5.5.4 Consumer Protection 
Regulation of MFI’s often has the motivation of consumer protection, whether in terms of 
deposit protection or over-indebtedness. The following sub-sections will discuss the regulatory 
factors with the motivation of protecting consumers. 
5.5.4.1 General Provisions 
Codes of conduct have been established for some years in all countries of interest, and are 
supervised by the regulatory and self-regulatory bodies where relevant. In Bangladesh, although 
client rights and responsibilities are outlined in the MRA rules of 2010, there is no real system 
for consumer protection in the financial system. 
5.5.4.2 Measures for Over-Indebtedness 
Given the crisis in Andhra Pradesh, the Indian government has had good motivation to establish 
laws which limit over-indebtedness. Indeed, the new regulations limit that people can only 
borrow from one MFI and up to a maximum of Rs. 50,000. This is similar to the system in 
Pakistan which combines over-indebtedness measures with the system of credit bureaus to 
ensure that no borrower has loans of more than PRs 300,000. In Bangladesh the MFI’s are 
responsible to consider loan usage and the ability to repay but if they fail in their analysis there is 
no documented recourse for compensation. 
 
 
193_Edle Hunt BW Stand.job
Ch.5.   Katherine Hunt   
189 
 
5.5.4.3 Credit Bureaus 
Credit bureaus are theoretically a critical aspect of implementing the measures for consumer 
protection such as over-indebtedness. In India and Pakistan there are established credit bureaus 
and there is apparently one planned for Bangladesh. Thus, all the countries of interest seem to 
realise the importance of credit bureaus in consumer protection. From the perspective of the 
sustainability of MFI’s, the requirement for MFI’s to be registered with and provide information 
to credit bureaus is an additional cost but it seems that ensuring the reputation of the sector is 
also critical in MFI sustainability so the benefit outweighs the cost.  
5.5.4.4 Deposit Protection 
A method to support deposits in MFI’s is to provide external guarantees for deposits in the case 
of MFI failure. In Pakistan there exists a provision for a depositor’s protection fund to be held 
by all MFB’s. However, in India and Bangladesh the only real provision is that depositors will be 
the first of the creditors to access assets. The law and economics perspective of this aspect was 
discussed in the third chapter of this thesis. 
5.5.5 Economist Intelligence Unit 2012 Rankings  
5.5.5.1 Overall Microfinance Business Environment 
Pakistan has consistently achieved high rankings in the overall business environment for 
microfinance, and has been ranked as third in the world. Pakistan’s neighbour, India has been 
ranked as the 22nd country, while Bangladesh, which was previously known as East Pakistan, is 
ranked 41st in the world. Despite these countries having a single origin, their regulatory systems 
for microfinance have diverged to such an extent that an analysis is worthy. Indeed, differences 
in particular microfinance law in these countries are stark. Clearly, cultural and regulatory origins 
are not enough to guarantee similarities as country-specific factors diverge. 
5.5.5.2 Regulatory Framework and Practices 
In terms of the specific regulatory framework, Pakistan is again ranked as third in the world, and 
India and Bangladesh as 28th and 37th respectively (Economist-Intelligence-Unit, 2012). As 
discussed in previous sections of this chapter, this particular aspect of the report focussed on the 
factors which are most closely related to the topic of the current thesis and thus these rankings 
are particularly interesting. However, the recent regulation in India which was not included in the 
analysis will probably result in India achieving a higher ranking in subsequent years. Hence, these 
rankings are already out of date. 
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5.5.5.3 Supporting Institutional Framework 
The institutional framework such as the existence of credit unions is an aspect which provides an 
understanding of the broader market situation. Here it can be seen that India has achieved a 
much more respectable rank, which indicates that although the particular regulation in India is 
not supportive of microfinance, there are other institutions which support the sector. A variety 
of research supports the importance of strong institutions for economic development (North, 
1989). 
5.5.5.4 Stability 
The rankings for stability illustrate the volatility of the countries in question, with none of the 
countries achieving a better rank than 29th in the world (Pakistan). With governmental changes 
and political issues present, this region is consistently low in stability. Importantly, the consistent 
rankings for stability highlight two things. The first is that these countries are affected by similar 
and potentially contagion affects through culture and politics. The second is that these countries 
are comparable for the current analysis because of systemic similarities such as instability. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Microfinance regulation in different countries has the potential to greatly affect the financial 
sustainability of MFI’s, and thus the long term viability of microfinance as a development 
mechanism. In light of this the regulations of four countries have been compared. It has been 
found that there is no one-size fits all solution when it comes to MFI regulation. Different 
cultures and different stages of microfinance uptake mean that countries need to regulate within 
maximum and minimum limits with regards to each piece of direct legislation. Countries which 
may be deemed worthy of empirical comparison nonetheless have historical differences which 
mean that the regulation is naturally different. Thus, this research has found that regulatory 
suggestions for microfinance are more likely to be contingent predictions around the existing 
legal environment around social capital, culture, maturity of the microfinance sector, among 
other things. Indeed, because of the descriptive nature of the current research, far reaching 
analytical conclusions are not able to be drawn. Policy recommendations will be discussed in 
chapter eight. Further, there are potentially interaction effects of context dependent effects such 
as trust. 
In the case of Bangladesh an explanation needs to be sought for the fact that despite being the 
pioneer country of microfinance as we know it today, the legislation of MFI’s stifles financial 
sustainability and provides a monopoly for investment in the Grameen Bank. One explanation 
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for this may be interest groups. Specifically, if politicians are benefiting from this arrangement 
then this is an explanation. As the Grameen Bank has 25% government ownership (Grameen-
Bank, 2011), this explanation may be valid. It can be logically extended that the government 
seeks profit from its ownership stake in the MFI, and ensuring competing MFI’s are unable to be 
financially sustainable may be one method to achieve this goal.  
The regulation of Bangladesh which simultaneously requires all MFI’s to be registered as NGO’s 
without access to capital markets but providing one exception, the Grameen Bank, is a situation 
which may be interpreted as rent seeking. Rent seeking in this context can be described as the 
manipulation of regulation to create economic gain for a particular stakeholder (the government) 
(Conybeare, 1982). Specifically, individual politicians have the potential to benefit greatly from 
MFI law which appears on the surface to protect the poor (in developing democracies where the 
poor compose the majority of voters) as it may encourage re-election. The government has 
created a monopoly, not of MFI’s themselves, but of financially self-sustainable MFI’s. By 
limiting the access of MFI’s to sources of capital and free business practices, this may indeed be 
a form of rent seeking by the government, who has incentives to do so via a part ownership in 
the MFI. By considering the reasons behind the development of particular regulatory trends the 
current research highlights the strong cross-country differences which limit the strength of legal 
comparisons across countries. Given the unique situation of individual countries, without 
considering contextual factors the analysis can potentially become superficial and not allow for 
practical implications to be drawn in a valid manner. 
Given that microfinance is an avenue for both social and economic outcomes it is 
understandable that governments take a perspective on which goal they aim to achieve. 
However, it is interesting when governments so closely comparable otherwise chose different 
goals. In India, the government has regulated that at least 70% of loans are for supporting 
microenterprises. On the other hand, in Bangladesh MFI’s must lend no more than 50% of their 
loan portfolio to income generating enterprises. This contrast is very interesting because it 
illustrates the motivation behind the particular regulations more than any other. It is clear that 
the Indian government wants to try and stimulate microenterprises through law which directs 
microfinance towards loans for business purposes.  On the other hand, the Bangladeshi 
government wants to support the social aims of microfinance, through law which directs 
microfinance loans for consumption purposes rather than for microenterprise creation or 
expansion. This has implications for MFI sustainability because the goal of the government 
clearly has flow through effects on the regulations drafted, and loans used for consumption 
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versus microenterprises have a different repayment rate (Agyapong, Agyapong, & Darfor, 2011). 
When the government aims for MFI’s to be financially sustainable, as in Pakistan, the legislation 
is tailored to achieve that goal. In that way, the current thesis may benefit from considering the 
goals of government as much as the underlying regulations which result. Indeed, the goal of the 
government seems to be a driving force. An additional implication is that the different 
benchmarks for microfinance success mean it is not methodologically sound to compare India, 
Bangladesh, and Pakistan, given the different goals of the government and the low through 
effect on individual regulation. The current thesis is not concerned with challenging the 
benchmarks for success or the goals set by individual governments. The current thesis accepts 
that governments have political goals and is not concerned with whether these goals are efficient 
as it has been discussed in previous research that the social goals set by governments are not 
always efficient (Sachs & Bajpai, 2001; Sumner & Tribe, 2008). 
As was established in the second and third chapters of this thesis, whether regulation can be 
considered effective or not depends in part by which benchmarks success is measured. This is 
particularly relevant given the results identified in the current chapter between the perspectives 
of the Indian and Bangladeshi governments. That is, Bangladesh supports the social aims of 
microfinance while India supports the economic aims of microfinance, and this is driven by the 
defined goals of the government. Thus, it is not possible to directly compare and critique these 
two countries legislation against each other because the benchmarks for success are different. 
Although the benchmarks for success may be potentially a topic worthy of criticism and 
research, it falls outside of the scope of the current research which makes assumptions regarding 
the benchmarks and moves forward to consider the issue from a strategic perspective. As a result 
of this, a potential solution could be for regulation to require MFI’s to measure the social and 
economic impact of their programs. If the responsibility were on MFI’s to reliably measure these 
kinds of trends, governments would be more able to decide what the motivation of the 
legislation is. MFI’s would be then able to become sources of information which would help the 
government support their activities. 
The success of many financial systems is a combination of direct, facilitative, and self-regulation, 
aspects of which were covered in the third chapter of this thesis. The combination of these three 
regulatory types allows, in theory, for the microfinance industry to develop its own best practice 
standards while having formal regulation to uphold minimum quality standards. From the trend 
of self-regulation of the three comparison countries it seems that a high level of self-regulation is 
associated with a better microfinance environment. Specifically, this means that those countries 
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which have self-regulation also happen to have high levels of MFI financial self-sustainability, 
borrower outreach, and social effects of microfinance. Although the link made between self-
regulation and the microfinance environment is at this stage theoretical, it has been established in 
this chapter that MFI indicators (such as portfolio quality and source of capital) increase in 
environments where self-regulation is common. Self-regulation in the context of Pakistan relates 
to the establishment of various industry created and government recognised regulatory bodies. 
Pakistan, third in the world for microfinance environment (Economist-Intelligence-Unit, 2013), 
has the most self-regulatory bodies, which have been formally established for over a decade.  
Although it is not possible to directly compare the use of self-regulation and direct government 
regulation (because they complement each other), it is theoretically possible that the benefit of 
self-regulation for MFI financial sustainability is greater than direct regulation because much of 
the direct regulation seems to hinder rather than support MFI financial sustainability (Arch, 
2005). Indeed, self-regulation may work better than direct regulation because of availability of 
higher quality information (through industry-designed credit bureaus), lower transaction costs, 
and potentially less rent seeking by governments. These implications of self-regulation are law 
and economics conclusions, which although theoretical do provide insights into potential 
situations when self-regulation is more appropriate than direct regulation for the issue of MFI 
financial self-sustainability. 
In contrast, India has provisions for a couple of self-regulatory bodies but their responsibilities 
potentially overlap and the administration of them poses a conflict of interest. To the extreme, 
Bangladesh has no legislated self-regulatory institutions in place. The MRA is the sole regulator 
of MFI’s in Bangladesh. However, a third body, PKSF does evaluate microfinance but in an 
inconsistent manner. When comparing the countries of interest for their scores in the report by 
The Economist and the presence of self-regulatory systems it can be seen that there is a 
consistent positive relationship. Trends in the data will be examined in the following chapter. 
It can be seen that a number of regulatory differences contribute to different working 
environments for microfinance. In particular, aspects such as freedom to set interest rates, an 
easy process for becoming regulated, relaxed loan portfolio guidelines and a high number of self-
regulation institutions with clear responsibilities potentially contribute to an environment where 
MFI’s are more able to be financially sustainable. Further, some government initiatives not only 
support MFI sustainability, but promote it, such as the guarantee fund for Pakistani MFI’s when 
accessing the credit markets. These ideas will be quantitatively presented in the subsequent 
chapter. 
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Future chapters will consider correlations to gain an indication of the effect of certain regulatory 
and institutional environments on relevant indicators which will help to contribute to answering 
the research question of the current thesis. Further, subsequent methodology may benefit from 
qualitative empirical research in the form of interviews with key players in microfinance in each 
country of interest. This kind of process would aim to interview twenty five relevant people on 
the topic on location in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Italy. 
The next chapter of this thesis will present a statistical analysis of the effect of microfinance law 
on MFI financial sustainability. Some of the data which is relevant for establishing this includes: 
World Bank reports; before and after legislation; legislation in successful microfinance 
environments; institutional details; goals of the legislator; aggregate data; entrepreneurship data; 
economic activity of the poor data; trust (Kantorowicz, 2013; World-Values-Survey, 2013).  
The current chapter has found that otherwise very similar countries potentially have 
microfinance regulations which are vastly different and which potentially have implications for 
the sustainability of MFI’s. It has been found that the regulatory environment of Pakistan is 
theoretically supportive of MFI financial self-sustainability because it has complementing 
components which consider consumer protection, financial stability, and a free business 
environment. As covered in detail in this chapter, the Pakistani regulation has a tiered structure 
which allows large multi-region MFI’s to fall under more onerous reporting and operational 
standards than small province-based MFI’s. On the other hand, the overly prescriptive laws of 
India and Bangladesh seek to provide MFI’s with requirements on how to operate, rather than 
by working together to achieve social and economic goals. 
This chapter has extended the theory presented in the third chapter of this thesis to understand 
which regulatory factors affect MFI financial sustainability, and to begin to consider in which 
way. The cross-country comparison has shown that the key influencing factor which determines 
the regulatory detail is the perspective of the government. If the perspective of the government 
is to support the social outcomes of microfinance and the focus is on consumer protection, then 
the regulation is designed in a way which inhibits MFI financial sustainability through restrictions 
on business activities such as access to capital and interest rate caps. On the other hand, when 
the government identifies MFI’s as potential engines of development and financial inclusion, the 
regulations are designed in a way which provides MFI’s with a variety of capital sources and 
freedom of business activities. There are vast differences based on the perspective of the 
government in question. Because of this, forming concrete conclusions is somewhat difficult. 
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Indeed, this means that the current research can just tell if a particular regulation can potentially 
achieve a particular goal, and more broad statements are more challenging.  
The key findings from the extensive comparative analysis presented in this chapter highlight that 
comparable countries seeking to increase financial inclusion through supporting microfinance 
have the potential to differ greatly in the specifics of microfinance regulation. This chapter has 
highlighted that differences in regulation regarding the overall regulatory environment, business 
activities, risk management provisions, and consumer protection, have potentially measurable 
effects on MFI financial self-sustainability. Differences in the MFI’s abilities to obtain finance 
and capital, capital adequacy requirements and interest rate caps all have significant impact on 
MFI operations. This chapter has brought to light the key differences in microfinance regulation 
among the countries of interest. 
Based on this strategic difference identified, it can be extended that there is also a relationship 
between the perspective of the government (and thus the trend of regulations) and the financial 
sustainability of MFI’s. Building on the criteria examined in this chapter, the next chapter will 
examine this relationship and identify if it is actually the case. A dual track strategy will be 
employed to answer this question, with both statistical analyses and qualitative interviews 
undertaken and presented in their respective following chapters. This dual track approach will 
provide the current thesis with a methodological soundness to ensure the answer to the research 
question contributes to the gap in the literature in this field while providing potential practical 
recommendations for regulators. 
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6.1 Introduction 
The long term positive effects of microfinance depend on MFI’s which are financially sustainable 
(Pollinger, Outhwaite, & Cordero-Guzmán, 2007). Previous chapters have established that the 
effect of microfinance is primarily positive and relatively cheap for governments to support (via 
regulation). Thus, microfinance is a development tool which should theoretically be supported. 
However, the current microfinance system relies on a continuous cycle of donations, grants, and 
low interest loans for MFI’s to continue operating. The financial sustainability of MFI’s will thus 
theoretically allow for the positive benefits of microfinance to be achieved consistently into the 
future. 
The issue is what affects MFI sustainability, and in what way. This research has identified 
regulation as a key factor which has the potential to affect MFI financial sustainability through 
affecting the incentives of borrowers, MFI’s and microfinance stakeholders to build an 
environment which supports MFI operations. Given that the goal of most, if not all, MFI’s is to 
provide a reliable source of capital to those otherwise excluded from the financial system, it is 
theoretically important for these institutions to be able to operate in a way which allows them to 
achieve that goal.  The previous chapter of this thesis explored how regulatory environments can 
differ widely between otherwise comparable countries, and that there are potential influences on 
MFI sustainability from these regulatory particularities. Indeed, the previous chapter identified 
that specific MFI regulation has the potential to affect how MFI’s source capital and how they 
operate their businesses. The current chapter aims to extend the analysis from the previous 
chapter to quantitatively explore the effect of regulation on MFI sustainability. 
It was established in the previous chapter that the aim of the government regarding the role of 
microfinance is critical in shaping MFI regulation. Subsequently, MFI regulation has the potential 
to affect MFI sustainability. Thus, the objectives of the government provide the key starting 
point for the direction the regulation takes and the flow through effect on microfinance 
borrowers. In this way, regulatory situations can potentially be coded in strategic ways 
categorising the perspective of the government, as well as the particular regulations within the 
regulatory environment. Both perspectives will be considered in the current paper and discussed 
in the methodology section. 
Although the previous chapter clearly identified the differences in regulation across India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Italy, the potential conclusions drawn were based on a one-sided 
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consideration of the description of the regulation only. This chapter aims to explore those 
differences with a quantitative methodology in order to draw more concrete conclusions about 
the effect of regulation on MFI sustainability. The current chapter aims to contribute to 
answering the research question by establishing if there is a relationship between regulation and 
MFI financial sustainability, and in what way. 
Determining the effect of regulation on something so specific as MFI sustainability requires a 
sound methodological process. In order to ensure the results achieved within the current chapter 
are reliable and valid a series of quantitative methodology will be undertaken to include: cross-
country; within country and across region; and within country and across time periods analysis of 
data. Further, the current research will consider a variety of potential extraneous variables such 
as corruption, trust, and business environments, among others. This methodological procedure 
will use data publicly available via the sources of the Microfinance Information Exchange, 
Microfinance Summit Campaign, and World Bank. Details of the methodological procedure will 
be outlined in the appropriate sections.  
This chapter is structured as follows. The second section presents methodological 
considerations. The third section presents the results of statistical analyses and the fourth section 
concludes. 
6.2 Methodology 
In order to answer the research question of the current thesis, the methodology requires that two 
key variables be identified and quantified. Namely, it needs to be understood what financial 
sustainability is, and what regulation is, in terms of how these aspects can be quantified. 
6.2.1 Definition of Financial Sustainability 
The operational sustainability of MFI’s is one of the criteria by which data is gathered for the 
MIX Information Exchange. MIX collects information from a number of MFI’s in each country 
(those who willingly provide the data) and gathers specific information, some of which is 
relevant for the current chapter.  
A key report by Sa-Dhan, The Association of Community Development Finance Institutions 
established what operational sustainability is in microfinance after considering potential 
viewpoints and establishing a formula. In particular, this report establishes operating 
sustainability as: 
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Operating self-sufficiency is a percentage (%), which indicates whether or not enough revenue has been earned to 
cover the Microfinance Institution's (MFI's) total costs – operational expenses, loan loss provisions and financial 
costs. P.1. 
The current research further clarifies this definition with the following requirements: 
- Independence from donations 
- Social factors plus financial factors. Move to measure the social outcomes of MFI’s, and 
decide on investment in them based on social performance as well as financial performance. 
So sustainability is achieving and measuring both outcomes. There is the ‘Microfinance 
Summit Campaign’ tick of approval for these companies, so they can be potential MFI’s to 
focus the research on. 
There are a variety of potential issues with the data available for these analyses. The primary issue 
is that there are various factors which have the potential to impact MFI sustainability other than 
regulation, and not all of these factors can be potentially controlled for in the statistical analyses. 
A primary issue is the management of the MFI, a factor which ca not accurately be quantified. 
This is because the reliability of proxies is still an issue of debate (Kolenikov & Angeles, 2009), 
and some information is impossible to know without the use of proxies. Further, the potential 
for randomisation in the current analysis is limited to the sample size. For example, with 35 listed 
MFI’s from Pakistan on the MIX website, to randomly select from that the population would 
reduce the sample size to such an extent that any results would have questionable validity. In 
order to overcome issues of sample selection two data sets have been used: MIX Information 
Exchange, and the Microfinance Summit Campaign.  
There are large amounts of data on microfinance available. The issue is that most of the data 
relates to aspects of microfinance which fall outside the scope of the current research, that is the 
effect of microfinance on social outcomes. The data obtained from the MIX and Microfinance 
Summit have been substantially narrowed to focus on the key factors relevant for this research. 
The third chapter of this thesis identified the potential financial indicators of MFI’s which may 
reflect particularities in the law. Specifically, the variables which are potentially able to reflect 
regulatory effects are: 
- Average loan balance 
- Operating Self-Sustainability (OSS%) 
- PAR>30 and >90 
- Profit margin 
- Assets (MFI size) 
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- Total outstanding loans 
- Outreach to the poorest women 
These financial indicators have been chosen based on the identification that these may have 
theoretical justification, in the third chapter of this thesis. In the third chapter it was identified 
that legal particularities such as a cap on loan sizes may affect the average loan balance, outreach 
to the poorest women, outstanding loans, and subsequently also on profit margin, OSS%, assets, 
and PAR. Other law changes may have potential effects on these financial indicators, such as 
interest rate caps or other restrictions on how MFI’s carry out their business operations. 
Previous chapters have identified that these financial indicators are those which are theoretically 
sensitive to changes in the law regarding microfinance. Further, these financial variables are 
actually reported on by most MFI’s in the world, to either MIX market exchange or the 
Microfinance Summit Campaign. Hence, the analyses of these variables have been supported in 
the theoretical considerations of chapter three, and are the variables for which data is also widely 
available. 
6.2.2 Statistical Considerations 
Empirical research is built on a foundation of reliable and valid statistical analyses of random 
samples. Thus, it is critical that the statistical techniques identified and undertaken for the current 
analysis are measuring what is sought to be analysed (validity), and in a consistent manner 
(reliability). Further, weaknesses in the data need to be discussed and the results interpreted with 
care, given the sample size and sampling method (self-selection). Standard statistical 
methodologies of OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) regression and correlation will be used to 
understand potential trends in the data.  
There is the potential for methodology such as Event Studies, but the analysis of data for this 
case is restricted because of the highly specific events in question. That is, the regulatory change 
(which would form the event) in the relevant countries is either from before reliable data existed 
(Pakistan) or too recent for available data (India). No significant law changes have been 
introduced in isolation in Bangladesh worthy of study. Further, the availability of market data 
inhibits the development of a market portfolio for comparison in the later stages of this 
technique. 
A key issue with the design of statistical analyses for the current chapter is the identification of a 
counterfactual. Arguably it can be said that Bangladesh provides a counterfactual for Pakistan 
because the regulatory environment is so restrictive in the former. However, the scope of 
analysis required to compare these countries against each other, and without a recent law change 
206_Edle Hunt BW Stand.job
Ch.6.  Katherine Hunt 
202 
 
to analyse in detail, means that too many variables need to be controlled for. One of the key and 
ever-persistent arguments against this strategy is that the fact that the countries have such 
different regulation is simply evidence that they are not two comparable countries (Eisenberg, 
2000) . 
Regression discontinuity has been considered as a potential statistical technique to use in the 
current study. However, the benchmarks which would be relevant for the current research would 
be the tier thresholds which distinguish MFI’s regulated in certain ways. Tier thresholds are 
relevant in the current research because they theoretically provide the regulation with an inherent 
foundation from which to support growing MFI’s of different sizes be regulated in different 
ways. One of the key criticisms of regulation which does not discriminate between microfinance 
and banks is that MFI’s are subject to banking law which is far too restrictive considering the 
products offered by MFI’s and the potential societal impact from those products. In this trend, 
regulation which does not discriminate between different sizes (or another criteria for the tier) of 
MFI’s also inherently inhibits MFI’s from achieving financial sustainability by applying a blanket 
of rules to MFI’s which are vastly different organisations. Most tier thresholds are based on size 
(eg. in India) but they can also be based on the number of borrowers, or as in Pakistan where the 
MFI choses the regime under which to be regulated. A key issue with using this technique is that 
the tier thresholds are not necessarily ‘arbitrary’, which is a requirements for this technique. 
Further, it is certain that the groups of MFI’s on each side of the threshold are not directly 
comparable. Indeed, it can be argued that those seeking to be regulated as a higher tier do have 
some particular characteristics which make them different to those in another tier of regulation. 
Hence, the nature of MFI’s, and the wide differences in operational goals mean that this group 
of subject institutions are inherently heterogeneous.  
One of the potential key techniques for this kind of analysis is comparing a variable before and 
after a regulation was introduced. The issue with this technique in the current thesis is that either 
the law was brought in before there is reliable ‘before’ data (eg. In Pakistan and Bangladesh), or 
else there are a series of law changes year on year which would contribute in a cumulative way to 
the change in the operating environment for MFI’s. For example, in Bangladesh there have been 
few substantial changes to the law since 2007 which can be isolated as having an effect. On the 
other hand, in Pakistan, each year the microfinance law has been changed, with no single ground 
breaking piece of legislation. This is in contrast to India where the recently implemented 
Microfinance Bill (2012) will undoubtedly have measurable effects within the coming years, but it 
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is too soon to see the results because of the lag in the implementation of the law at a practical 
level and also because of a lag in time before MFI individual data are available. 
Although the current chapter faces a broad range of challenges in designing empirical 
methodology, that is not a sufficient excuse to ignore the quantitative aspect of microfinance. 
Indeed, in presenting a clear quantitative representation of the data relative to the current thesis, 
even without sophisticated statistical techniques and empirical natural experiments is still a 
contribution to the literature in this field. This is particularly because the current thesis is 
concerned with the financial sustainability of MFI’s, which includes readily quantifiable data. 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Macro Analyses 
Macro conditions are important to consider for the current chapter in order to account for and 
potentially identify any anomalies or trends in the data which may explain specific findings 
relating to MFI sustainability. In particular, general analyses of macro data can illustrate cross-
country trends which are otherwise difficult to understand. 
6.3.1.1 Economic Growth 
The countries of interest have had patterns of economic growth which are illustrative for the 
current analysis. The data for this analysis was acquired from the World Bank Economic Growth 
Indicators, which are provided in percentage terms for each year since 1961. In order to gain an 
understanding of the on-going effects of yearly growth patterns, the cumulative amounts have 
been calculated. 
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Figure 1. Cumulative Economic Growth 1961-2011 
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Source: World Bank Economic Growth Data (Yearly), 20131. Own calculations of cumulative 
growth rates. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG 
As can be seen from the above figure, the economic growth rates of Pakistan and India have 
outpaced the world average. On the other hand, Bangladesh suffered from the flow through 
economic effects at the time of independence from Pakistan around 1970. The result of this 
shock was a ten year period of limited economic growth which affected the ultimate level of 
growth over the 50 year period illustrated. From the perspective of microfinance it can be seen 
that the Bangladeshi economic shock at the time of independence was an appropriate motivator 
which spurred Professor Yunus to develop the microfinance system of the Grameen Bank. 
Although the current research is not primarily concerned with macroeconomic indicators such as 
economic growth, a variety of research has linked the importance of law and economic growth, 
which is relevant for the current thesis (Faure & Smits, 2011; Ohnesorge, 2009). 
6.3.1.2 Poverty 
Along with social benefits, overall poverty reductions are also a goal of microfinance. Research 
has showed that global poverty rates have been reducing over the last 50 years (The-World-Bank, 
2009). Thus, it is no surprise that Figure 2 illustrates a similar trend in reduction in poverty in the 
                                                 
1 ‘Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based 
on constant 2000 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus 
any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources’. 
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countries of interest in the last decade. The data for this analysis was taken from the Progress 
Out of Poverty Index’s published by Mark Schreiner 
Figure 2. Poverty Reduction 
 
Source: Mark Schreiner’s publications for the Progress Out of Poverty Index2 (Ismail & Achmad, 
2010; Schreiner, 2009, 2013)3. 
Figure 2 illustrates that over the time period of the figure the poverty reduction in India and 
Bangladesh has been approximately 15% whereas the reduction in poverty in Pakistan has been 
less than 10%. It is not the goal of the current thesis to attribute these trends to microfinance, 
but rather to illustrate that these countries do have differences which may be of benefit 
examining in more detail in future research. From this data it can be speculated that the higher 
concentration of microfinance per capita in India has flow through effects to poverty, but 
attempting to empirically show this is outside the scope of the current thesis. 
6.3.1.2.1 India Poverty 
The previous chapter identified that different microfinance law applies to MFI’s in different 
regions of India, namely between North East India and the rest of India. Thus an analysis has 
                                                 
2 The ‘Simple Poverty Scorecard’ was used for each country for each year where data was available, which was not 
always the same for each country. Where no data was available for a particular year the rate of poverty is illustrated 
as remaining constant. 
3 Poverty rates were taken for the number of households in absolute poverty as per the World Bank’s definition of 
earning less than US$1.25 per day (The-World-Bank, 2009). Where these rates were not available the National 
Tendulkar rate was taken instead. 
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been conducted to demonstrate the trends in poverty over time for those regions in order to 
understand the motivation for the law, and also any potential effects on poverty. 
The data for this analysis was from the work by Ismail and Achmad (2010) and the ‘National 
Tendulkar 100%’ rate for the number of households in poverty scores were taken for each year 
for each state which were then divided into either North East or the rest of India, and averages 
were calculated. This score was chosen because these criteria had the most complete data. Where 
data was unavailable at the 100% rate, the ‘legacy’ score was used. 
Figure 3. Indian poverty levels by region and urban/rural status 
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Source: Mark Schreiner’s work for the Progress out of Poverty Index, 2012 (Schreiner, 2012)4 
The figure above shows how rural poverty levels, while initially much higher than urban poverty 
levels, have been falling at a more consistent rate. Further, the figure indicates that although the 
households in the North East region are more likely to be in extreme poverty if they are rurally 
located, the urban poor of the North East region have actually increased in poverty over the time 
period. This result may indicate why the law, put in place in 2012, has identified the North East 
region of India to receive particular treatment (in particular the reduced capital requirements to 
be registered as an MFI). 
 
                                                 
4 The ‘Simple Poverty Scorecard for India’ was used for this data. Regional data was taken for each year where data 
is available. 
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6.3.1.3 Corruption 
Microfinance is a tool which bears on its shoulders grand poverty alleviation and social 
empowerment goals. In order to ensure that the analysis of the effect of regulation considers 
some potential extraneous and confounding factors, a brief illustration of rates of corruption in 
the countries of interest will be presented. Data has been sourced from Transparency 
International, the leading source of data on perceived levels of corruption. 
Figure 4. Corruption Reduction Over Time 
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Source: Transparency-International (2013) and own calculations5  
Figure 4 above clearly shows the steady reduction in corruption perceptions in Bangladesh, a 
slow reduction in India, and barely any reduction in Pakistan. These results not only provide an 
indication of how corrupt these countries are, but also highlight the progress over time. 
Specifically, although previous figures have indicated that there are lower levels of poverty in 
Pakistan, the issue of corruption may affect the success of microfinance regulation to a greater 
degree than other associated factors. However, it is also worth noting that although the 
perception of corruption has reduced the most in Bangladesh over the last decade, it still has 
slightly higher corruption perception than India and Pakistan. 
 
                                                 
5 Transparency International is the leading organisation which focuses on and measures corruption in most 
countries of the world. Corruption scores have been inverted in order to show a more intuitive reflection of 
decreasing corruption levels over time. This is because the index gives higher scores for lower corruption. However, 
when considered in graphical form over time and compared to other countries it is more readily understandable to 
be presented as it has been calculated above. The website source is: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results 
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6.3.1.4 Entrepreneurship 
Authors from the World Bank have established that there is a strong relationship between 
entrepreneurial activity and economic and financial development growth indicators, as well as the 
legal and regulatory environment and governance (Klapper, Amit, Guillen, & Quesada, 2007). 
The data available to use for this include the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, and the World 
Bank Group Entrepreneurship Survey. Authors have found that the former data covers more the 
potential supply of entrepreneurs whereas the latter accounts for the actual supply of 
entrepreneurs (Acs, Desai, & Klapper, 2008). The World Bank data was chosen for this thesis 
because of its completeness for the countries of interest. 
One of the key goals of microfinance is to increase entrepreneurship (Holvoet, 2004). In order to 
consider the rates of entrepreneurship indicators in the countries of interest data from the World 
Bank has been prepared in graphical form. Data will be presented for the number of new firms 
registered, and the density of new firms.  
Figure 5. Number of new firms per calendar year  
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Source: The World Bank Entrepreneurship Data (The-World-Bank, 2013c)6  
                                                 
6 The data provided by The World Bank as a part of their ‘Doing Business’ series of surveys have been presented in 
the figure above and also figures 6 and 7. Data is presented as it appears in the original source and graphed on a 
yearly basis. The website is: http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/entrepreneurship 
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It is interesting to note that the number of new corporations being registered each year is now 
greater in India than in Italy. Considering these two economies are of a similar size indicates the 
growing pace of India and the stagnant economic environment of Italy over the last few years. 
While the numbers of new companies in Italy and Pakistan has remained relatively stable over 
the last five years, it is clearly seen that in India and Bangladesh the annual figures have almost 
doubled. These results may indicate that the process of registering corporations in India and 
Bangladesh has recently been transformed in order to capture more firms, or that there is 
actually a steady increase in entrepreneurship in these countries. Regardless of the underlying 
cause, the overall effects are nonetheless interesting. 
From the perspective of microfinance, the trend may also reflect that there has been a greater 
graduation rate of small businesses to being formal enterprises under government regulation. 
Although most of the enterprise which exists in the developing world are unregulated as a result 
of the small-scale nature, it is the goal of microfinance to support the establishment and growth 
of small enterprises until they become fully-fledged companies contributing to the economy as a 
whole. Thus, research which analyses the effectiveness of microfinance would benefit from an 
in-depth analysis of this data. With such basic analyses as the time series presented in this 
section, conclusions ca not be drawn, rather associations can be discussed. For example, the 
downward trend of new firms in Pakistan is particularly surprising given the supportive 
regulatory environment and the success of microfinance in that country, relative to the 
comparison country of Bangladesh. Indeed, the slight reduction in poverty rates in Pakistan 
relative to the other countries of interest follows a similar line of analysis. These two points 
suggest that despite the fact that the microfinance regulation in Pakistan is in theory so strong, 
the flow-through effects to economic indicators does not illustrate a potential flow-through 
effect on poverty reductions. The data analysis required to draw concrete conclusions of this 
nature are outside of the scope of the current research.   
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Figure 6. Density of new companies for Italy, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan 
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Source: The World Bank Entrepreneurship Data, 20137 
The figures preceding and following illustrate the density of newly registered limited liability 
companies per 1,000 working-age people (those ages 15-64). Figure 6 above shows how the 
density of new companies is much higher in Italy than in the Indian subcontinent. This is 
because although these countries boast similar economic size (The-World-Bank, 2013d), their 
populations are vastly different in size. In order to examine the trends in the three comparable 
countries, the following figure has been developed. 
Figure 7. New Company Density (without Italy) 
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Source: The World Bank Entrepreneurship Data, 20138 
                                                 
7 The same source as the figure preceding 
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The figure above, with a more comparable scale, illustrates again the increasing entrepreneurial 
activity in India and Bangladesh, and the relative stagnation in Pakistan. Indeed, over a seven 
year period the density of new companies increased by more than a third in India and 
Bangladesh, and barely changed in Pakistan. This is logical given the trend of new company 
registrations presented in Figure 6. For the purposes of the current thesis it is of importance to 
note that the increase in formal (and thus easily measurable) entrepreneurship in Pakistan has not 
increased in line with increasing levels of microfinance in that country. In contrast, the amount 
of new companies and the density of those companies has increased relative also to population 
growth in working age people (which naturally has a 16 year lag effect as it is for the working-age 
population) in both India and Bangladesh. Considering this finding, we would expect to find 
confirmatory findings in the data regarding access to credit as well as to poverty reduction. 
Indeed, with relation to poverty reduction it can be seen that reduction of poverty in Pakistan is 
lower over the time period than in India and Bangladesh. The purpose of this thesis is not to 
draw conclusions about the relationship between entrepreneurship and poverty reduction, 
although this association may indicate a dataset which future research may benefit from 
exploring empirically. 
6.3.1.5 Financial Development 
Microfinance is in essence a financial innovation with social benefits (Block, 2010; Brau & 
Woller, 2004). Given the interconnectedness between microfinance and the financial markets 
through which MFI’s source capital (in ideal situations), and the ability to be regulated as a 
specific sector of financial institutions, financial development is important to consider for the 
current chapter. In order to gain an understanding of financial development of the countries of 
interest figures will be presented regarding bank concentration9, bank accounts, and bank 
deposits. 
                                                                                                                                                        
8 The same source as the figure preceding 
9 Bank concentration is defined by the World Bank as: A measure of the degree of concentration in the banking 
industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest commercial banks in each country. 
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Figure 8. Bank Concentration 
 
Source:  The Little Data Book on Financial Development 2013 (The-World-Bank, 2013e)10 
The data sourced from the World Bank indicates that in all the countries of interest bank 
concentration has fallen since the year 2000. In particular, bank concentration has fallen sharply 
in Bangladesh and Pakistan and slightly in India and Italy. This is a positive result for all the 
countries because it implies that competition has subsequently increased, an aspect of financial 
markets which has the potential to increase access to financial services and benefit the poor. 
Authors have commented that financial market diversity benefits the end consumers (Allen & 
Gale, 1999). Whether this data includes microfinance is difficult to ascertain. 
In terms of measuring financial access, also a goal of microfinance, the proxy of bank accounts 
per 1,000 adults can be used. This proxy provides an indication of how many people have access 
to the formal financial system in the form of savings accounts. Authors have commented that 
for microfinance to result in quantifiable economic development, clients need to ‘graduate’ to the 
formal financial system (Ahlin & Jiang, 2008). Thus, the data which follows in the next two 
figures may reflect in part an effect of microfinance in enabling the poor to ‘graduate’ to the 
formal financial sector, or there may be various other effects which account for the trends. 
                                                 
10 This data source by The World Bank covers a variety of indicators of financial development. The aspects of this 
analysis which are relevant for this research have been included in the figures in this section. The source of the data 
remains the same for figures 8,9 and 10. 
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Figure 9. Bank Accounts per 1,000 Adults 
 
Source: The Little Data Book on Financial Development 2013                       
The figure above shows the increase in the relative number of bank accounts in all of the 
countries of interest. Data was not available for the year 2000, so the short term nature of the 
data means that interpretations should be cautious. The data indicates that in India, most people 
have a bank account, while in Bangladesh the numbers are much lower and in Pakistan only one 
fifth of the population have a bank account. Thus, although growth in bank accounts has been 
documented, financial inclusion still has a long way to go. Interestingly, in Italy most people have 
more than one bank account on average. Hence, although it is a country with the most need for 
microfinance, especially microcredit, in Europe (Kyereboah-Coleman & Osei, 2008), deposit 
accounts do have high penetration. 
In addition to the relative number of bank accounts, the amount in those bank accounts is also 
relevant to understand financial development and financial inclusion. The figure below indicates 
trends in bank deposits to GDP for the countries of interest. 
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Figure 10. Bank Deposits to GDP 
 
Source: The Little Data Book on Financial Development 2013                                      
The figure above indicates that the amounts saved in bank accounts have been consistently 
trending upwards in the countries of interest. As with other development data, this data also 
identifies Bangladesh as having the greatest increase in the indicator of interest, while Pakistan 
has the lowest rate of increase. 
6.3.1.6 Doing Business 
Various research in the past has covered the relationship between institutions and economic 
growth, as the flow-through effect of institutions on the ease of doing business is well 
established (Ohnesorge, 2009). In terms of microfinance, the ease of doing business is linked not 
only to the establishment of microenterprises and their graduation to being regulated enterprises, 
but also for the establishment and growth of MFI’s themselves. Thus the data on this area is of 
interest to this chapter. Conveniently, research by the World Bank ranks countries on various 
indicators of doing business, such as the ability to get credit, ease of doing business, and starting 
a business. This chapter makes use of this data to provide an illustration in trends of business 
environment indicators which may be a reflection or supporter of the microfinance business 
environment as well. 
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Figure 11. Ease of Doing Business World Ranks 
 
Source: The World Bank Doing Business Data (The-World-Bank, 2013a)11 
The figure above provides some interesting indications of which of the countries of interest 
provide an institutional system which supports business relative to other countries. Interestingly, 
Bangladesh and India score well above Italy on this particular scale. Although the data is not 
complete for various data points in the past, the current ranks do provide an indication of the 
countries at the present moment. 
                                                 
11 The annual Doing Business reports by The World Bank contain a number of indicators. In order to maintain 
relevance to the current research question, a select number of indicators are presented in this chapter. The data 
source is the same for figures 11, 12 and 13. The data is sourced from www.doingbusiness.org 
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Figure 12. Getting Credit Rank 
 
Source: The World Bank Doing Business Data (The-World-Bank, 2013a)12 
In contrast to the ranks for overall doing business, the ability for businesses to obtain credit is 
much higher in Italy, Bangladesh, and Pakistan than India. This is especially interesting given the 
critical role that credit plays in business establishment, and the flow through economic effects. 
Figure 13. Starting a Business Rank 
 
Source: The World Bank Doing Business Data (The-World-Bank, 2013a)13 
                                                 
12 The data source is the same as for the preceding figure 
13 The data source is the same as for the preceding figure  
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In contrast to the world rank regarding the ability to get credit, the figure above illustrates that in 
India it is much easier to start a business than in the other countries of interest, despite being the 
worst out of the four for the ability to get credit. 
6.3.2 Regulation Analysis 
The research by The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) has been covered in previous chapters 
of this thesis and is a primary empirical qualitative source of motivation for the direction of the 
current thesis. This research has consistently ranked Pakistan as one of the best environments 
for microfinance, with India and Bangladesh towards the bottom half of countries for the same 
criteria. It should be noted that changes in the Indian Microfinance Bill implemented in 2013 
mean that it is likely this country increases its’ scores in the future. In order to consider trends in 
the scores produced in this report, the main findings will be presented across time.  
Figure 14. Regulatory Framework Scores 
 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit: Global Microscope on the Microfinance Business 
Environment , 2009, 2010, 2011, 201214 
The overall score for regulatory environment shows that although Pakistan is one of the best 
countries in the world for microfinance, India and Bangladesh have actually reduced their scores 
over the last four years. 
                                                 
14 Yearly scores have been charted for each criterion in order to show trends in the data across time and comparison 
between countries. 
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Figure 15. Investment and Institutional Framework Scores 
 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit: Global Microscope on the Microfinance Business 
Environment , 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 
The figure above indicates scores in line with the regulatory systems and adaptations of the 
countries of interest. Specifically, the regulation in Pakistan clearly and explicitly states that the 
goal is to support investment in microfinance, and this can be seen in the increasing scores in 
this area. On the other hand, despite a dip in scores, the investment environment of India has 
not changed significantly in the last four years. This is in contrast to Bangladesh, where recent 
national changes in law and economic conditions have resulted in a worsening score as the years 
progress. Considering the previous results regarding the macro conditions of the countries, this 
is particularly surprising, if relationships between microfinance and development are assumed to 
exist (Ahlin, 2008 #221). 
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Figure 16. Institutional Development and Stability Scores 
 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit: Global Microscope on the Microfinance Business 
Environment , 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 
The primary purpose of the third analysis by the EIU was to provide an adjustment factor for 
the previous findings, in stability. As can be seen in the above figure, stability has been increasing 
in Pakistan, stable in Bangladesh, and decreasing in India. These scores reflect a similar 
methodological procedure to the current thesis in that other confounding factors have been 
included in order to understand other issues which may affect the core variable of the study. The 
data from the EIU reports has been valuable in tracking over time key summarised indicators. 
6.3.3 MFI Indicators 
All data in the following sections, unless otherwise stated, are compiled from MIX and the 
Microfinance Summit Campaign. Italian MFI’s do not provide data to either of these sources and 
so are not considered in the following analyses. 
6.3.3.1 Country Averages 
6.3.3.1.1 OSS% Over Time 
Trends in operating self-sustainability have the ability to reflect a change in the operating 
environment of MFI’s which may be a result of changes in regulatory structure. Operating Self 
Sufficiency, as reported in the data by MIX is defined as: financial revenue / (financial expense + 
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impairment loss + operating expense)15. Thus, although OSS% is an important indicator, it does 
not completely isolate the MFI’s ability to not rely on donations, as those income sources are 
included in financial revenue. Without well designed experiments it is not possible to isolate the 
actual cause of the change in the independent variable (operating self-sustainability) over time, 
and that is scope for future research. In order to consider trends in operational self-sufficiency in 
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, the available data has been graphed below. 
Figure 17. Operating Self-Sufficiency 1997-2012 
 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange website: mixmarket.org/data 
Figure 18 illustrates volatility in trends before the year 2002, most probably caused by a small 
sample size in those years, which mean the average scores are prone to be influenced by outliers 
more readily than in a large sample size in following years. For this reason and to examine the 
trends more closely, the years 2002 to 2012 have been isolated for the available data in the 
following figure. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Definition taken from http://www.themix.org/publications/microbanking-bulletin/2011/05/microfinance-
profits 
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Figure 18. Operating Self-Sustainability 2002-2012 
 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange website: mixmarket.org/data 
The above figure, as opposed to Figure 18, provides the most representative representation of 
trends in OSS% across time in the countries of interest because of the completeness of the data 
in this time period. The above figure indicates some interesting trends in operational self-
sustainability. For example, in 2007 the OSS of Bangladeshi MFI’s slumped, while at the same 
time those in India spiked upwards. Although only speculation, the law changes brought about in 
2007 in both of these countries may be a reason for this. In particular, in Bangladesh in 2007 the 
specific microfinance law was drafted and implemented which required all MFI’s to be registered 
and comply with the new law. The law was very restrictive in terms of product design freedom 
and restrictions on financing sources (eg. no mobilisation of deposits). In contrast, the law in 
India in 2007 partially opened up the ability for MFI’s to grow by accessing capital markets if 
they met certain criteria. Although the trends illustrated in the figure above do nothing to assist 
speculation about the cause of the spikes in each country, previous chapters of this thesis would 
suggest it may be because of regulatory changes. This is because of the theoretical link between 
OSS% and MFI regulation, as well as because of particular regulatory changes in 2006/2007 
which may explain the trends. For example, in 2007 Bangladesh implemented new law which 
greatly restricted MFI’s in their operations, and the trend in OSS% following shows a clear spike 
downwards.  
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6.3.3.1.2 Par>30 
The measure of PAR>30 is a benchmark which indicates the value of the loans which have a 
component of the principal repayment overdue by more than 30 days (Crabb, 2008).  In the 
context of microfinance this can be a particularly sensitive measure of consumer attitudes toward 
repayment as well as a potential red light which flags a future decline in financial sustainability 
because of a reduction in regular loan repayments.  
Figure 19. PAR>30 
 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange website: mixmarket.org/data 
The figure above illustrates the trend in Bangladesh toward greater portfolio problems over the 
last decade for the MFI’s which report to the MIX market database. Although it is tempting to 
attribute the increase in problematic loans to the declining quality of the Bangladeshi regulatory 
environment since 2007, there may also be other issues such as the Global Financial Crisis or 
weather events which result in localised reductions in the ability to repay microfinance loans. 
However, regardless of the cause, the increase in PAR in Bangladesh is particularly striking. Of 
note is the rise in problem loans in all countries at the same time as the Global Financial Crisis, a 
trend which suggests that the effects of the crisis did indeed reach the poor and affect their 
ability to repay their loans. Despite the relative increase, it can still be seen that in absolute terms 
all countries have consistently high repayment rates. 
The empirical work by Karlan and Zinman (2008) on the effect of interest rates on repayment 
and demand for loans suggests that in the years with no interest rate cap average interest rates 
would rise, and loan defaults or PAR>30 would increase (Karlan & Zinman, 2008). In the case 
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of India, interest rate caps were removed in 2010 (nationally however some states imposed their 
own interest rate caps), and in that year it is also noted that there is an increase in PAR>30 from 
the year before, which subsequently reduces in 2012 when an interest rate cap is brought back in. 
Although the trend in India’s data for PAR>30 cannot be attributed solely to changes in the law 
regarding microfinance interest rates (based solely on the analysis provided above) it does 
highlight a particularity which may be a worthwhile subject of future empirical research. 
6.3.3.1.3 Par>90 
In a similar vein to PAR>30, the measure of PAR>90 reflects the more serious issues in 
portfolio composition and portfolio risk. Indeed, while the PAR>30 may reflect sentiment or a 
change in localised conditions, PAR>90 is more likely to be an accurate reflection of consistent 
issues in portfolio composition caused by more long term issues with consistent repayment. 
Figure 20. PAR>90 
 Source: Microfinance Information Exchange website: mixmarket.org/data 
The clear trends in the reduction in quality of the portfolio of Bangladeshi MFI’s may intuitively 
be argued to be a result of regulatory changes which have increased the restriction on 
microfinance business operations. In this trend, an intuitive explanation could be that as MFI’s 
are restricted in their sources of capital and ability to collect repayments there are ‘forced’ to 
provide loans to a segment of society that is more risky than traditional microfinance borrowers, 
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and this results in greater portfolio risk. Further qualitative research may be able to shed light on 
the reasons for this trend, something which the data is unable to illuminate. 
Putting aside any issues of sample size and the self-selection bias which affects these trends, it is 
clearly seen that PAR>90 has become an increasing problem in Bangladesh. Indeed, the figure 
has more than quadrupled since the data begins in 2004. This reflection of portfolio problems 
may reflect a number of underlying causes such as borrower selection or repayment collection 
measures. However, regardless of the effect, the trend indicates that while portfolio risk in 
Pakistan and India has remained relatively stable over the period, in Bangladesh the issue is 
increasing year on year. The changes in regulation in Bangladesh since 2007 which further 
restrict MFI’s from collecting loan repayments in regular ways or operating their businesses as 
viable operations may be one of the explanations for this. 
One could speculate that the trend in the riskiness of the Bangladeshi microfinance portfolios is 
because the law was changed in a way which made the provision of microfinance more difficult 
and also because  
6.3.3.1.4 Profit Margin  
The profit margins of MFI’s are potentially a good summary of the ability of the managers to 
operate an efficient business considering the market environments. Separate from operating 
sustainability, profit margin is a more specific measure which divides operating income by net 
financial revenue (Hartungi, 2007 #33). Trends in this variable have the potential to reflect not 
only the external business environment, but also the operating capacity of MFI managers. 
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Figure 21. Profit Margin 2001-2012 
 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange website: mixmarket.org/data 
The measure of profit margin is particularly interesting because it illustrates an aspect of business 
functioning which is not captured by OSS%. Indeed, the previous trends examined could not 
have anticipated the slump in profit margin of Pakistani MFI’s between 2001 and 2007. And 
contrary to the crisis which affected portfolio quality, at that point the profit margin started 
increasing at a more consistent rate.  
This particular data highlights that even though the regulatory environment in Pakistan has been 
relatively supportive of MFI’s since 2001, the flow through effects to particular financial 
indicators is not guaranteed. This may be because in Pakistan MFI’s have been more traditionally 
run as businesses rather than charities and hence the MFI’s face different challenges to those 
which operate as charities.  
The case of Pakistan profit margin is particularly interesting because the MFI regulation in that 
country is apparently world class (Economist-Intelligence-Unit, 2012, 2013). However, if the law 
does not support profit margin, which is an indicator of financial self-sustainability, then it leads 
one to question how exactly the law was able to achieve such a high ranking in the world stage. If 
the theory of previous chapters is correct, then the law has the ability to greatly influence the 
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financial sustainability of MFI’s. However, this trend in profit margin indicates either a great lag 
in the time for the effect of the law to take place, or perhaps the law does not have as much 
influence as the theory would suggest.  
It remains clear that there is a stark contradiction in the profit margin trends in the countries of 
interest, if we are to continue with the theory (established in chapter three) which indicates the 
law can and does have an effect on MFI financial sustainability. From the theory of the previous 
chapters we would assume that since 2001 (when the Microfinance Ordinance was put in force 
in Pakistan) there was an increasing trend in profit margin, in line with the gradual 
‘improvement’ of the legislation which already supported MFI’s to operate as genuine 
businesses. However, what can actually be seen from the trend data portrayed above is that the 
profit margin has been negative in Pakistan, and only increasing since 2005. These results, while 
highlighting the potential weaknesses in the data, also show that a quantitative analysis of this 
research question is not sufficient. Indeed, contradictions such as those illustrated in this section 
suggest that a qualitative approach to the following chapter may be appropriate. Of note in the 
above data is that the profit margin of all the countries of interest has become positive in recent 
years. This trend towards positive profit margin may be a result of a combination of supportive 
business environment and economic factors. Alternatively, the trend toward focussing on profit 
margin and OSS% may be a result of demand from donors to give to MFI’s which are 
transparent and efficient. 
6.3.3.1.5 Loan Size 
The average loan size issued by MFI’s is a financial indicator of particular interest for research 
which is interested in the outreach of microfinance to those in most need of financial access. 
This is because a lower average loan size generally reflects greater outreach to the poorest in the 
community. In contrast, a higher (or trending higher) average loan size may reflect ‘mission 
drift’16 (Kiweu, 2011).  
                                                 
16 Mission drift is where MFI’s seeking to maintain financial sustainability provide larger loans to fewer people (in 
particular the middle classes instead of the poor) in order to reduce operating costs and increase profit margin. 
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Figure 22. Average Loan Size 
 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange website: mixmarket.org/data 
The figure above clearly illustrates the increasing average loan size over time for MFI’s in India, 
Bangladesh and Pakistan. Of particular note is the decrease in average loan sizes in Pakistan after 
2007, despite that the required maximum legislated loan size was repeatedly increased over the 
same period. The change may reflect greater outreach by MFI’s to the target market, or 
alternatively may reflect an effect of the regulation.  
6.3.3.1.6 Average MFI Size  
Various literature has commented in the past on the benefits of efficiencies of scale which come 
with increased organisation size, and this also applies to microfinance (Okeahalam, 2007). The 
various implications of MFI size mean that this variable is one of interest to consider across the 
countries. 
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Figure 23. Average MFI Assets 
 
Source: Microfinance Information Exchange website: mixmarket.org/data 
The tenfold increase in MFI size in Bangladesh over the last 10 years is the most striking feature 
of the above figure. However, the trend may be a result of self-selection of MFI’s in providing 
their financial data to MIX market, which results in only the large MFI’s contributing. On the 
other hand, the average size of Pakistani MFI’s has increased steadily until a spike in size in 2011. 
The regulatory changes leading up to that change were a doubling of the maximum microfinance 
loan size and the ability for MFI’s to take loans in foreign currency from foreign investors. 
Although this research wo not attempt to determine if these legal changes are the reason for the 
jump in MFI size, it is an interesting consideration. However, the argument against the effect of 
regulation on Pakistani MFI size is that ever since 2009 there have been well documented 
increases in the quality of the regulation, not only in 2010 as the graph above suggests. However, 
the trend may in fact reflect the lag which exists before the effect of particular regulation is 
actually reflected in company financial indicators, as well as the cumulative effect of a series of 
positive law changes over time. 
6.3.3.2 Average Loan Size v’s PAR>30 India 
The effect of microfinance regulation on MFI financial sustainability is most easily examined by 
using financial indicators as proxies for the effect on particular business operations. In order to 
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determine which financial indicators would serve as proxies for the effect of regulation links 
have been drawn from the theory of the third chapter. The theory indicates that the law can 
potentially affect average loan size through explicit loan size caps and through providing 
incentives to MFI’s to provide loans to the poorest segments of society. The result of this is that 
in theory, smaller loans have a higher proportional cost to service, and lower profit margin. 
Hence, MFI’s with smaller average loans should also have lower profit margins. Average loan 
size can also reflect the demographics of the borrowers, in that smaller loans are given to the 
poorest of society (which, as already established in the second chapter of this thesis, are not the 
normal microfinance borrowers) which poses higher risk than normal. Hence, in theory there is a 
link between the average loan size and PAR (which is a proxy for the riskiness of the portfolio). 
As can be expected, a higher PAR may be associated with lower profit and hence lower financial 
sustainability. Hence, the effect of law on average loan size and PAR may have flow through 
effects to financial sustainability. However, for the effect of the law on loan size caps to be 
determined, the association between average loan size and PAR also needs to be determined. 
The theory regarding average loan size is somewhat contradictory, because the literature indicates 
that there is a ‘sweet spot’ average loan size which has the lowest default, and it is neither too 
small to service the poorest in society, nor large enough to serve the middle classes (Jiwani, 
2007). This means that microfinance, the initiative designed to meet the financial needs of the 
poor (but not the very poor), inherently creates analysis issues. Further, dealing with averages of 
each MFI and averages of all MFI’s creates a tendency towards the middle even more so, and 
this means that the results, even in the best circumstances, can only be indicative.  
In order to examine the trend in more detail the figures are presented with data from each year 
where there is data from more than 35 MFI’s (ie. from 2003 to 2012) for validity reasons. In 
2002 data was provided by only 14 MFI’s, and in 2003 there is data for 39 MFI’s in India, and 
the figures increase each year. For each year, MFI’s which had incomplete data were deleted (for 
example only OSS% or only average loan size), as well as any outliers (for example an average 
loan balance of more than US$2,000). These data requirements apply to all yearly correlations 
and other figures in this section. 
One of the theoretical effects of microfinance law established in previous chapters is on the 
average loan size of microfinance. A low average loan size generally reflects high outreach to 
borrowers who are in the most need (the poorest), whereas a high average loan size may reflect 
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‘mission drift’17. Hence, one of the direct ways in which law can affect microfinance is through 
interest rate caps which have the potential to provide incentives to MFI’s to provide larger loans 
on average, because a greater proportional return is received from larger loans. This is despite 
the fact that Karlan and Zinman (2008) found the contrary to be true. The following figures 
relate to Indian specific MFI data from MIX Market Exchange. 
Figure 24. Average Loan Size vs. PAR>30 Scatterplot 
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17 This is the tendency to give larger loans to the middle classes, as these loans are more profitable. When there are 
interest rate caps in place, mission drift is a foreseeable consequence because interest rates generally reflect the 
higher servicing cost of poor clients. 
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Figure 25. Average Loan Size and PAR>30 Averages by year 
 
Source: The above two figures have been generated for this chapter using data from The 
Microfinance Information Exchange (mixmarket.org/data) and PowerPoint Software to 
compare and contrast the data. 
The figures above present a trend in the data which illustrates a consistent increase in loan size 
and PAR across time for Indian MFI’s. These figures above illustrate the trend in increasing 
average loan balances over time, along with an increase in PAR as well. Hence, more statistical 
analyses may be worthy of these data sets in the future. 
6.3.3.3 Average Loan Size v’s OSS% 
Theory in previous chapters have identified that there may theoretically be a relationship 
between the average loan size and OSS% because of operating costs. This is potentially relevant 
for answering the research question because law does have a clear potential (and theoretical) 
effect on OSS% in this regard. 
In the following figure the average loan size and the average OSS% for all Indian MFI’s for each 
year from 1995 to 2012 has been graphed on a scatter plot. There is a positive and significant 
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correlation (based on t-test18) between loan size and operating self-sufficiency. This is illustrated 
in the figure below. This may indicate that more sophisticated quantitative techniques are 
warranted to isolate this effect from other confounding variables. 
Figure 26. Average Loan Size v's OSS% 1995 to 2012 
Source: Yearly averages for Indian MFI’s were used for OSS% and Average Loan Size as 
documented by MIX Information Exchange. The graphical representation of the data illustrated 
above and the calculation of R2 was performed for the purposes of this chapter using MS Excel. 
The significance of the relationship was calculated manually based on R2. 
6.3.3.4 Women poorest % and OSS 
Whether MFI’s provide loans to mostly the poorest women in society is a variable easily 
measured as it is consistently reported by MFI’s to both data sources. Along with indicating 
mission drift (or the lack thereof), the percentage of women poorest also reflects the level of 
outreach. For the year 2012 data from the Microfinance Summit Campaign shows a potentially 
positive association between these two variables, as per the figure below. 
                                                 
18 The calculated t-value is 13.67, which is greater than the critical value of 2.131 at 95% significance level. 
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Figure 27. Linear regression Women poorest % to OSS% 
 
Source: India MFI specific data from 2012 was sourced from the MIX Information Exchange. 
The above regression was calculated using Stata. 
The results illustrated in the calculations above serve to highlight an aspect of the data which 
would serve to be analysed more thoroughly in future research. The data set is relatively small 
because of missing data and outliers, and considering that the Microfinance Summit Campaign 
has one of the most complete data sets for this information, these limitations are persistent. 
6.3.3.5 Large v’s Small MFI’s 
Microfinance law can develop tiers based on a number of possible variables. Most common, total 
assets are used as the differentiator between the tiers. For example, in India ‘small’ MFI’s (with 
less than approximately US$835,000) have a few different rules to ‘large’ MFI’s. One would thus 
expect, also because of scale, that large MFI’s are more efficient. However, analyses have found 
that the differences are minor. There is no clear relationship between the size of MFI’s and OSS 
for any of the years analysed. Hence figures are not included. This result is counter-intuitive and 
refutes the theoretical associations which were discussed in previous chapters. In addition, this 
result is at odds with the finding by (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007) who found that large MFI’s 
are more financially sustainable. This result could have been because of the heterogeneity 
between MFI purposes (OSS% or charity) which may provide influencing factors. In order to 
empirically determine this, the data would need to be analysed in a way which considers 
homogenous samples. 
 
 
                                                                                  
           _cons     123.5985   7.975746    15.50   0.000     107.7603    139.4368
WomenPoorest2012    -.2090332   .1067275    -1.96   0.053    -.4209729    .0029065
   Borrowers2012     .0000616   .0000372     1.66   0.101    -.0000122    .0001354
                                                                                  
         OSS2012        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                 Robust
                                                                                  
                                                       Root MSE      =  35.098
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0493
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0661
                                                       F(  2,    93) =    2.80
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      96
. reg  OSS2012  Borrowers2012 WomenPoorest2012 if  OSS2012~=0, robust
238_Edle Hunt BW Stand.job
Ch.6.  Katherine Hunt 
234 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
Previous chapters of this thesis have provided theoretical explanations and justifications for the 
effect of certain microfinance law on the operational self-sustainability (OSS) of MFI’s. Previous 
chapters have illustrated that in theory, microfinance law has the potential to greatly affect how 
MFI’s design products, conduct relationships with clients, and finance their operations. 
However, there are a number of other factors which also affect MFI operations, such as 
employment, consumer sentiment, and technology. These factors ca not necessarily be 
accounted for in simple statistical considerations. Rather, in order to examine these direct effects 
an empirical approach needs to be designed and carried out. This chapter serves to illustrate a 
path which future research can take having discussed the trends in the data. The current chapter 
has identified some aspects of the theory developed in previous chapters which are not 
supported, but rather refuted, in the analyses contained herein. 
Previous chapters have identified a number of potential associations which would indicate the 
effect of the law on MFI OSS%. However, broad analyses to determine the potential relationship 
have proven to be fruitless. Indeed, the only predicted association has been found between the 
percentage of poor women borrowers and OSS%, and the average loan size and OSS%.  
The current chapter has compared the countries of interest over time against a number of 
financial indicators. The data suggests that in all three countries of interest, operating self-
sustainability is increasing over time, as is profit margin, loan size, and average MFI size. In 
contrast, portfolio quality is generally decreasing in Bangladesh, as reflected in both PAR>30 and 
PAR>90 ratios. These results indicate that there are issues within the factors which influence 
repayment which need to be analysed in Bangladesh in future research. 
A number of correlations were run between the variables of interest. Associations have been 
found between average loan size and OSS%, indicating that as average loan size goes up, so does 
OSS. Although no line of causation can be drawn, the relationship has nonetheless been 
identified. This means that from a quantitative perspective, larger loans are associated with MFI’s 
being able to operate more sustainably. Future empirical work would benefit from exploring this 
relationship empirically. One of the contributions of this chapter to the literature is the 
examination of various potential associations and excluding most of them from being a source of 
potential interesting results in the future. In this way the current chapter has narrowed down 
variables of interest which are worthy of future empirical research. 
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The data presented in this chapter have shown some interesting trends and associations. In 
particular, it was found that there is an upward trend in profit margin and OSS% since 2007 for 
all countries of interest. Further, the rate of increase in these indicators is relatively the same for 
Bangladesh and Pakistan for 2007-2012. This trend indicates that maybe the law does not have 
such an effect on MFI operations as the theory may suggest, as Pakistan has some of the best 
microfinance law in the world, and Bangladesh some of the worst19. It would be expected that 
Pakistan may show a trend of increasing profit margin and OSS, but the opposite would be 
expected of Bangladesh, and this has not been seen in the data presented in this chapter. Hence, 
either the criteria used to determine the quality of a microfinance system is invalid, or else MFI’s 
in Bangladesh have strategies for avoiding the effects of the regulation on their business 
operations. With solely quantitative data this is not possible to determine, hence the next chapter 
will consider these issues in a qualitative way. Given that it is compulsory that all MFI’s are 
regulated by the Microfinance Regulatory Authority (MRA), this seems unlikely. Results such as 
these highlight the inherent inadequacies of quantitative data with a research question with so 
many potential confounding effects. Hence, the following chapter will address these weaknesses 
and provide a qualitative approach with fieldwork interviews in the countries of interest. 
In contrast to this result presented above, there is a distinct trend in Bangladeshi MFI’s for 
increasingly risky portfolios, as reflected in PAR>30 and >90. This upward trend indicates that 
there may potentially be an effect of the law changes in Bangladesh which are not reflected in 
OSS% and profit margin data. Indeed, this result may provide evidence for the use of PAR as a 
better reflector of the effect of microfinance law on the operational functions of MFI’s. This is 
just a possibility, as the extent of the data analysis provided herein cannot either prove or 
disprove this idea. 
In analysing the relationship between loan size and OSS% a positive relationship was found. 
Given that there is a theoretical relationship between the law and average loan size (as a 
maximum loan size can ensure all microfinance loans are below a certain size), this result 
provides a potential indirect relationship between the law and the operational self-sustainability 
of MFI’s, at the heart of the research question of the current thesis. Hence, depending on the 
specific regulation the effect may be supporting or aversive. The regulation can potentially limit 
average loan sizes by explicitly capping the maximum loan size. As per the theory discussed in 
the third chapter of this thesis, the fixed costs associated with providing loans mean that higher 
loan sizes are theoretically associated with higher profits. However, smaller loans are also 
                                                 
19 According to The Economist Intelligence Report’s country rankings from 2007-2013 
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associated with serving the poorest in the community, who need smaller rather than larger loans 
(Al-Mamun, Malarvizhi, Hossain, & Tan, 2012), which is aligned with the vision of microfinance.  
The direct effect of law can be potentially seen in the decreasing trend in average loan size in 
Pakistani MFI’s after 2007, after the effect of the maximum loan amount became apparent. This 
result is expected, as it is logical that a law regarding the size of loans has an effect on the actual 
loan sizes given to clients. However, having said this, a similar trend has not been seen in India, 
where a loan size cap also exists. 
The results of the current chapter have shed light on a number of issues where relationships 
were theoretically predicted. However, as many questions as were answered have also been raised 
from the results. For example, based on the results, if OSS% trends upwards regardless of the 
law (especially business inhibiting law such as that in Bangladesh), then how are MFI’s practically 
getting around the law? Further, why is it that Bangladeshi MFI’s are growing at such a fast rate, 
and so much larger than MFI’s of other countries of interest? Another question which is raised is 
how there is a practical relationship between PAR and OSS%. These questions have been raised 
by the quantitative analyses of this chapter, and it may be that a qualitative consideration of the 
issues is what is needed to get answers to these questions. The current thesis aims to determine 
the effect of MFI-specific law on MFI OSS%. The results of this chapter show that despite 
OSS% being a quantifiable variable, determining this effect potentially requires a qualitative 
methodology. This is because most relationships examined quantitatively showed no strong 
relationship. For this reason the subsequent chapter will summarise the results of structured 
interviews conducted in the field in the countries of interest. 
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7. Fieldwork Interviews and Results 
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7.1 Introduction 
The regulation of Microfinance Institutions (MFI’s) has the dual purpose of protecting poor 
borrowers from unscrupulous practices, and in supporting an industry which increases financial 
inclusion. Given these purposes, specific regulatory pieces are aimed at ensuring MFI’s are 
financially strong enough to provide microfinance services. As discussed in the fifth chapter of 
this thesis, those particular regulatory pieces often ensure that the MFI has a certain amount of 
capital available before offering loans to the poorest, and that they follow certain guidelines in 
seeking capital from sources other than donations. Specific regulations which have the role of 
protecting the poor from unscrupulous MFI’s include interest rate caps and credit bureaus 
(which restrict multiple lending). However, despite these various roles of MFI regulation and the 
various practical implications of regulations, little research has been published on this topic. This 
chapter builds on the previous topics to describe the implications of certain regulatory regimes & 
individual pieces of regulation from the perspectives of different stakeholders in four countries. 
Thus, although the role of MFI regulation may be to protect consumers and to strengthen the 
microfinance industry, this chapter will provide the perspectives of actual practitioners to 
describe the extent of the effect of the regulations on the microfinance sector.  
The effect of regulation on MFI financial sustainability is a research topic which benefits from a 
diversified methodological approach. Previous chapters of this thesis have established the 
theoretical effects of regulation on MFI financial self-sustainability and explored the quantitative 
indicators of these effects. However, despite the availability of data on MFI’s, direct insight into 
the practical effects of regulation is difficult to conclude without deeper insight. Indeed, the 
previous chapter of this thesis, which aimed to describe some of the issues from a quantitative 
perspective, raised more questions than it answered. For this reason, the current chapter will 
present the process and results of semi-structured interviews with key players in the 
microfinance sector in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Italy. In order to get a diverse 
perspective of the research question and the specific issues in each country interviews have been 
conducted with people at high levels of MFI’s, NGO’s, self-regulatory institutions and regulators 
of all the countries. However, despite the diversity of perspectives, all interviewees have a vested 
interest in microfinance and thus there is inherent bias in their perspectives. 
The research question for the current thesis aims to understand the effect of MFI regulation on 
MFI financial self-sustainability. This topic is important because of the role that microfinance 
plays in long term financial inclusion. The second chapter of this thesis established that 
microfinance is a development tool which while potentially producing positive social and 
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economic benefits, is unlikely to be relatively costly to governments of developing countries to 
support relative to food, medical and education initiatives. In this sense, the second chapter of 
this thesis established that although the dreams of microfinance are potentially not being reached 
in their entirety, the positive effects of microfinance mean that the initiative is worth supporting. 
Further, the second chapter established that MFI’s which are financially sustainable are more 
likely to be able to continue providing microfinancial services in the long term, regardless of 
donor whims (Arch, 2005; Pollinger, Outhwaite, & Cordero-Guzmán, 2007).  
The third chapter of this thesis further examined the operational aspects of microfinance and 
MFI’s from a law and economics perspective. The issues examined in the third chapter allowed 
for a theoretical consideration of how the law can affect MFI sustainability through allowing 
access to capital and freedom of business operations.  Despite the vast body of literature on 
microfinance over the last decades, relatively few empirical studies have been conducted, neither 
regarding the effect of microfinance, nor the operation of MFI’s. The analysis of previous 
empirical research was the topic of the fourth chapter of this thesis. The fourth chapter 
established the empirical methodology used in examining microfinance in previous research. 
However, this chapter also identified the wide gap in the literature that the current thesis seeks to 
fill. This is because although a handful of empirical studies have been conducted on the effect of 
microfinance, none have been published regarding the effect of regulation on MFI sustainability. 
Indeed, for the research question of the current thesis it can be said that there are no high quality 
comparison literature from the last decade on which to build. 
In contributing to the research on microfinance regulation the fifth chapter of this thesis 
provided an empirical legal comparison of microfinance legal structures of the four countries of 
interest. This chapter provided a unique cross-country comparison of the regulatory aspects of 
the countries of interest in an easily analysable tabular format. This analysis allowed the current 
research to establish that it seems the detail of particular MFI law depends on the motivation of 
the government toward microfinance. In particular, it could be drawn from the analysis whether 
the government saw microfinance as a social or economic tool, among other conclusions. 
However, while this analysis established the differences in law across the four countries of 
interest the actual practical effects of the law remained undetermined. 
The sixth chapter of this thesis considered the regulatory differences identified in the fifth 
chapter in a quantitative manner. There is a body of data available on MFI’s over the last five 
years. However, this chapter faced challenges regarding the consistency of data over a time 
period where the direct effect of laws could be determined. The sixth chapter thus considered 
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the potential effects in a quantitative manner and found that future research may benefit from a 
natural experiment study analysing a few of the key variables of MFI operations which are 
affected by regulation. Given the recent changes in Indian MFI law and the lack of recent data 
able to incorporate its effects, this is a potential hotspot for future research. 
The sixth chapter of this thesis raised various questions regarding: trends in portfolio quality, 
profit margin increases in Bangladesh, average loan size trends, MFI growth, and the relationship 
between portfolio quality and operational self-sustainability. Previous chapters have also raised a 
number of questions regarding whether self-regulation can really work in microfinance, and if 
there is any benefit (other than consumer protection) of having a credit information bureau. The 
current chapter will discuss these topics with reference to the results of the current interviews. 
The potentially important conclusions suggested by the fifth and sixth chapter of this thesis have 
led to the design of interviews for the current chapter. The interviews are of in-depth nature in 
order to gain real insight into the perspectives of the regulators, supervisors, and MFI’s. The 
interviews have been conducted in the field in India (Mumbai), Pakistan (Karachi), Bangladesh 
(Dhaka) and Italy (Bologna). The fact that the interviews have been conducted in the home cities 
of the people of interest, in a face to face manner means that the results have potentially more 
validity than were all interviews conducted via Skype or email.  
The results of the interviews of the current chapter will be combined with the preliminary 
conclusions of each chapter of this thesis to develop policy recommendations in the eighth 
chapter. Hence, this chapter provides the last chapter of unique research results, and the 
following chapter will build on previous chapters in developing policy recommendations. 
This chapter is structured as follows. The second section will present methodological detail. This 
is followed by the results of the interviews. The fourth section analyses and discusses the 
implications of the results, and the fifth section concludes. 
7.2 Methodology 
Qualitative research faces similar methodological considerations to quantitative research 
(Creswell, 2012). For both methodological perspectives the most important aspect is the overall 
strategy and logic of the analysis, and the second most important aspect is quality data input. 
Hence, for the current chapter to build strategically and consistently on the chapters preceding, 
the strategy needs to be planned in detail, followed by gathering the right sources of data to 
complement that strategy.  
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The technique of interviewing has long been established as a method of gaining in-depth and 
personal information which is critical for certain research fields (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 
2006). Indeed, the practical application of interviews in empirical research has become widely 
acceptable in all fields of research where personal perspective is likely to provide valuable detail 
to a subject matter where quantitative analysis is insufficient. Considering the questions raised in 
the previous chapter, this is clearly relevant for the current research. 
The current chapter is concerned with identifying the perspectives of different stakeholders on 
the issues identified in previous chapters, particularly the questions raised in chapter six. 
Through understanding what people in the industry think about microfinance law in their own 
country it is possible to understand the practical effects of microfinance law on the financial 
sustainability issues of MFI’s. This is the strategic consideration of the research.  
In order to achieve the strategic methodology for the current chapter, valid data sources need to 
be obtained. As this chapter will focus on qualitative interviews, this means that the most 
appropriate people need to be interviewed. Unlike research which can be considered as ‘bottom-
up’, such as research which determines the effect of microfinance on individual poverty levels, 
the current research takes a ‘top-down’ perspective of the issue. The result of this strategic 
perspective is that the interviewees need to also have a top-down perspective of their industry 
and all the associated effects. This is clearly understood when considering how much a branch 
teller of an MFI or a borrower would know about the funding constraints of the MFI – probably 
very little. In addition to this, interviewees need to be at a high level of responsibility within their 
respective organisations so that the opinions they express are actually reflective of the 
organisation as a whole. Indeed, many organisations only authorise a certain level of people to be 
interviewed as part of their role with that organisation, for this reason. 
These requirements mean that the interviewees for the current research are required to be of 
very high quality in terms of their positions in important organisations which are relevant to the 
current research question. In order to ensure these requirements are met, all interviewees will be 
either the CEO (Chief Executive Officer), MD (Managing Director) or Regional Manager of 
MFI’s or NGO’s. In terms of government interviews, the interviewee needs to be at a high 
enough level that they are authorised to give interviews on behalf of the Government (only high 
level employees have this authorisation). 
Despite the body of data available on microfinance and MFI’s, the trend is unclear regarding the 
effect of microfinance regulation on MFI financial sustainability. This is because of the 
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‘inconvenient’ timings of large changes in microfinance law (and thus with potentially 
measureable effects) in the relevant countries. Specifically, law changes were either implemented 
before reliable data existed (eg. Pakistan), too recently for the effects to be incorporated in the 
data (eg. India), or in too small levels (eg. Bangladesh). Hence, the previous chapter examined 
trends in the data with the aim of illustrating some of the trends in MFI sustainability and the 
regulatory aspects which could have an impact. Thus the methodology of the current chapter 
aims to complement the different methodologies of previous chapters to provide insights into 
the topic of research from a qualitative perspective which provides a different type of empirical 
data.  
7.2.1 Interviewee Selection 
In identifying individual interviewees who suit the criteria explained above the academic and 
professional network of the researcher was utilised. In this sense, months before the interviews 
were to take place various professionals in microfinance were contacted in the relevant countries 
and potential interviewees were identified. A preference was given to high level people in 
institutions which reflected the different components of the microfinance sector, such as from 
the NGO, regulator, and MFI perspectives. As a result of this focus for the interviewees and 
their positions at the head of significant stakeholders, there is inherent bias in their perspectives 
as they all have a vested interest in the microfinance sector succeeding in some way or another. 
Although the actual fieldwork interviews would only take place in Mumbai, Karachi, and Dhaka, 
quality interviewees outside of these cities were also contacted. As a result of the high level of 
interviewees and the expected weight of the given perspectives, the focus has been made on 
quality rather than quantity. Previous research has indicated that six interviews are generally 
sufficient, and that data saturation occurs after 12 interviews (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006). 
Hence, for each country a minimum of six interviews were sought to be performed. As can be 
seen from Appendix A, the list of interviewees who completed the full interview, approximately 
six interviews were achieved for each country. 
7.2.2 Interview Questions 
The interviews were semi-structured, and this means that the questions were used as a guide for 
the discussions. Indeed, given the inherent nature of qualitative research of this kind, the 
direction of the interviews individually evolved depending on the particular interest, experience, 
and perspective of the interviewee. Further, in order to ensure that the interviews proceeded in a 
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manner which was flowing and with the most possible information, a formal interview technique 
(which can make subjects suspicious and defensive (Britten, 1995)) was avoided.  
7.2.3 Process 
The discussions with interviewees were recorded electronically as well as the responses being 
either typed or hand-written during the interview (depending on the preference of the 
interviewee). This double-pronged record strategy means that the key ideas are not lost from 
interviews, and empirical results are easier to verify.  
Each interviewee was informed of the purpose of the research and the strategic perspective of 
the research question. Interviewees were ensured that the transcripts would not be published in 
complete form and that the transcripts would be sent first to them to check before any direct 
quotes appeared in the research. Most respondents were willing to share their perspective of 
their experience in microfinance, and few were concerned about being quoted. However, in 
some cases the transcript was returned with a note to refer only to the office, and not the person 
who was interviewed. Regardless of the instructions, they were always followed for privacy and 
respect reasons. 
7.2.4 Methodological Reflections 
The interview questions were designed in a way which reflected the perspective of the research – 
that is, that each microfinance law has a definable effect on MFI operations, and hence on 
microfinance borrowers. However, in the first few interviews it became apparent that this is not 
necessarily the case. It may be relevant for other sectors of law, but for microfinance it is more 
that the whole regulatory environment together has an effect on MFI operations, and individual 
laws do not impact in an isolated way. Being qualitative research and hence able to adjust the 
technique on the basis of learning from the interviewees, subsequent interviews took a more 
broad perspective. In particular, the country-specific regulatory questions were phrased in a 
different way, to allow a discussion of the issues. 
After the first few interviews, the interview process became more like a guided conversation, 
with the key areas of discussion always covered, at the appropriate point in the discussion. Key 
areas to discuss included the effect of different aspects of the law on operating costs, 
competition, innovation, outreach, access to capital/equity. A new question was incorporated 
into the interviews, which was: What are the main challenges faced by MFI’s? This question 
brought up topics of discussion which were relevant for the research but which were not elicited 
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from the other questions. This style of interviewing regulated in many unexpected revelations 
which would not have been elicited with more specific open-ended questions. 
Despite initial scepticism of the qualitative research approach (the researcher has a background 
in quantitative survey design and implementation), the flexibility of this technique has proven to 
be highly relevant and beneficial for the current research methodology. The contribution of the 
interviews will greatly enhance the validity of this research as a whole. 
7.3 Results 
The interviews were conducted across MFI’s large and small, self-regulatory institutions, ratings 
agencies, NGO’s, and the regulator. Despite the diversity of perspectives, consistency can be 
seen in the results in most cases. The trends in the effect of the law on MFI operations are 
understood by all players, and so the results of the interviews were simpler to compile than if 
each perspective presented a different opinion. This section will present a summary of the results 
of the interviews, and will be presented in a tabular format for ease of comparison. In addition, it 
will be considered explicitly how the interviews have helped to answer questions raised in the 
previous chapters of this thesis. Questions raised in the previous chapter of this thesis relate to 
portfolio quality, trends in profit margin, average loan size trends, MFI growth trends, and the 
relationship between portfolio quality and OSS%. Questions raised in chapters other than the 
previous relate to whether self-regulation can work efficiently, and if there is any real benefit of 
having a credit bureau. These issues will be covered in this section. 
The previous chapter of this thesis considered trends in portfolio quality across the countries of 
interest. Portfolio quality has the potential to impact MFI operating sustainability because of 
losses, or an increase in the cost of recovering the loans. There has been a trend towards 
decreasing portfolio quality, as reflected in PAR>30 & >90, over the last five years. The 
interviews revealed that without there being a CIB clients were taking multiple loans from 
different institutions in Bangladesh (where individual lending was possible), and this can lead to 
higher than expected defaults. Indeed, this situation is potentially supported by the over-
saturation of the microfinance market, with PKSF funded MFI’s in 95% of all villages, which 
may lead to a tendency of borrowing from multiple MFI’s. In Bangladesh, unlike in Pakistan, 
there is no CIB, nor will there likely be one in the near future according to interviews with the 
MFI’s. This is a direct effect of MFI regulation on the MFI sector, as borrowers are potentially 
allowed to become over-indebted and MFI’s have lower portfolio quality as a result of the lack 
of the CIB. This will be discussed in more detail in section 7.4.2. 
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Although Pakistan has a relatively strong regulatory environment and Bangladesh a relatively 
weak environment, MFI’s of both countries have seen an upward trend in OSS% and profit 
margin since 2007. The interviews revealed that although the regulatory environment in 
Bangladesh is not as theoretically as good as that of Pakistan (Economist-Intelligence-Unit, 
2012), the Bangladesh regulation in 2007 did have a positive effect in legitimising the 
microfinance industry and separating it formally from that of the TML’s. In doing so, the 
regulation effectively increased the potential market for microfinance. Interestingly, MFI’s have 
indicated that the regulation was beneficial because it resulted in less competition between 
MFI’s, putting them on equal footing. 
The interviews in Bangladesh provided a key result for the current research in providing 
evidence for how regulation can act explicitly (and yet indirectly) against rogue operators in the 
microfinance sector. The fact that MFI’s in Bangladesh have reported reduced competition after 
the regulation indicates that the regulation, along with the specific interest rate price cap have 
had a large effect on the microfinance industry. The regulation has resulted in a price cap below 
equilibrium, with the results that the other ‘bad’ MFI’s drop out of the market, reducing 
competition. The reduction in fly-by-night operators can arguably be seen as a benefit to society 
as a whole, and an example of the regulation partially achieving what it was designed to achieve. 
Caps on loan sizes are present in the regulation of all the countries of interest, because 
microfinance inherently requires that loans are small. In the particular case of India it was found 
in the previous chapter that average loan sizes are not decreasing, despite the cap on loan sizes. 
The interviews with the self-regulatory bodies and MFI’s in India revealed that as a result of 
interest rate caps and margin squeezes, MFI’s are seeking to provide larger and larger loans, in 
order to remain in business. Hence, from the industries perspective, it is a necessary effect of the 
regulatory restrictions on margin that loan sizes are increasing.  
The average size of MFI’s in Bangladesh has been increasing at a rapid rate, according to the data 
provided to the MIX Market website considered in the previous chapter. This growth is 
potentially explained in part by the self-selection of MFI’s which provide data to MIX in the first 
place, but there is a definite trend that is not covered completely by this consideration. Based on 
the results of the interviews in Bangladesh, the growth in MFI size is because the regulation 
effectively created a larger potential market for microfinance in legitimising the industry. Hence, 
MFI’s have had solid growth in outreach since the regulation. In addition, PKSF has increased 
its funding of small MFI’s, increasing their size. In addition to this, medium sized MFI’s such as 
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BURO have been growing by innovating with savings products and seeking increased capital 
from the capital markets. 
The quantitative considerations of the previous chapter were not able to determine what the 
relationship is between PAR and OSS%. The results in that chapter indicated that although 
OSS% was generally trending towards the positive in all countries, PAR was also increasing, 
albeit at a slower rate (except in Bangladesh, as previously discussed). The interviews revealed 
that for small MFI’s in all the countries, PAR is very challenging, and this is because of a mix of 
inexperience in operating a sustainable business model, and the lack of the ability to get recourse 
for the defaulted loans. For large MFI’s, it is the shocks in PAR and defaults that are caused by 
natural disasters which are most relevant. In Pakistan this risk is decreased because the 
government generally provides grants to cover losses as a result of agricultural shocks or law and 
order issues. Thus, for small MFI’s there is a stronger link between portfolio quality and their 
ability to maintain profitability, but it is mostly because they do not have the scale or expertise to 
operate in a financially viable way. 
Previous chapters of this thesis have considered self-regulation as a potential option for a 
regulatory system to promote long term financially viable microfinance institutions. Previous 
chapters considered how self-regulation can remove the burden from the government, while still 
ensuring a high level of industry quality. The interviews in countries with self-regulatory 
institutions (namely MFIN in India and PMN in Pakistan) revealed that the role of these bodies 
is much more important than this research previously thought. The interviews revealed that the 
self-regulatory body not only ensures MFI’s are able to set their own industry standards and keep 
each other in line, but it also serves as a forum for sharing ideas, and a powerful lobbying body 
to get changes in the legislation that would have otherwise been impossible. Indeed, these 
institutions have indicated many particular changes in the law have been a direct result of their 
negotiations with the government.  
In instances where the self-regulatory body has power because it is a funder of MFI’s, such as 
PKSF in Bangladesh and PPAF in Pakistan, it is a very efficient regulatory system for the smaller 
MFI’s – which are the ones that seek funding from these bodies. In this situation, all the 
interviews revealed that it is a very favourable situation because it takes the burden off the 
regulator to be able to focus on the larger and high-risk MFI’s. This is especially the case in 
Bangladesh where the regulator has opted for paper-based reporting (and manual entry into an 
electronic system to monitor MFI’s), and thus does not have the resources to monitor all of the 
MFI’s in a detailed manner. 
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Previous chapters of this thesis have discussed the role a CIB (Credit Information Bureau) can 
play in consumer protection of microfinance clients. The previous discussions have considered 
how a CIB can ensure that borrowers do not become over-indebted by taking multiple loans 
from different MFI’s. However, the previous considerations did not identify whether the CIB 
could actually benefit MFI’s and the microfinance industry as well. Interviews in the countries of 
interest revealed that it actually does have a strong effect on repayment, PAR, NPL’s, and hence 
financial viability of the MFI’s. The reasons given for this is that borrowers ‘take the loans more 
seriously’, and hence the best borrowers self-select to enter into microfinance contracts. For 
example, Kashf, a Pakistani MFI had a crisis in 2008 because of wide-spread non-repayment by 
borrowers which resulted in writing-off 80% of the loans outstanding. After the crisis, Kashf 
analysed what went wrong and found that although clients were defaulting with them, they were 
simultaneously taking other loans from other MFI’s. Hence, the defaulting borrowers had no 
incentive to repay the loan, as there was no punishment from default – they would still be able to 
get loans from other MFI’s. After this, Kashf pushed the government, along with other members 
of the self-regulatory organisation, to establish a CIB. 
In addition to these specific issues raised in previous chapters a comparison of responses from 
interviews will be presented in tabular format on the following pages. Implications of the results 
will be discussed in the following section. 
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be
ca
us
e 
of
 th
e 
ad
di
tio
na
l p
ap
er
w
or
k,
 
bu
t t
he
 b
or
ro
w
er
s d
o 
th
e 
se
lec
tio
n 
of
 e
ac
h 
ot
he
r. 
N
ot
 re
lev
an
t 
- 
In
te
re
st
 ra
te
 c
ap
 
Th
e 
ca
p 
is 
to
o 
tig
ht
 g
iv
en
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f c
ap
ita
l a
nd
 o
pe
ra
tin
g 
co
st
s a
nd
 h
as
 re
su
lte
d 
in
 
m
iss
io
n 
dr
ift
. G
iv
en
 th
e 
co
st
 
of
 c
ap
ita
l a
nd
 o
pe
ra
tin
g 
co
st
s 
of
 m
os
t M
FI
’s,
 th
e 
in
te
re
st
 
ra
te
 c
ap
 h
as
 e
ff
ec
tiv
el
y 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
ef
fe
ct
 a
s t
he
 m
ar
gi
n 
ca
p,
 a
nd
 th
er
e 
is 
no
 ro
om
 fo
r 
ar
bi
tra
ge
.  
Th
er
e 
is 
no
 in
te
re
st
 ra
te
 c
ap
. 
D
oe
s n
ot
 d
isa
dv
an
ta
ge
 
M
FI
’s,
 a
s t
he
y 
ha
ve
 a
 
gu
ar
an
te
ed
 lo
w
 c
os
t o
f 
fin
an
ce
 in
 th
e 
fir
st
 p
lac
e, 
an
d 
in
 fa
ct
 h
as
 th
e 
po
sit
iv
e 
ad
va
nt
ag
e 
of
 h
el
pi
ng
 to
 k
ee
p 
all
 o
f t
he
 c
om
pe
tit
io
n 
re
lat
iv
e 
to
 e
ac
h 
ot
he
r. 
H
ow
ev
er
, i
t 
ha
s a
lso
 re
su
lte
d 
in
 m
iss
io
n 
dr
ift
 a
s t
he
 M
FI
’s 
se
ek
 to
 
m
ax
im
ise
 th
e 
pr
of
it 
av
ail
ab
le
 
fo
r i
nc
re
as
in
g 
ou
tre
ac
h.
 
Th
e 
in
te
re
st
 ra
te
 c
ap
 re
st
ric
ts
 
M
FI
’s 
if 
th
ey
 se
ek
 to
 p
ro
vi
de
 
m
ic
ro
fin
an
ce
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 o
f t
he
 la
w
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, a
ct
ua
l M
FI
 
pr
ac
tic
es
 a
re
 n
ot
 m
on
ito
re
d 
by
 th
e 
re
gu
lat
or
, s
o 
in
 e
ss
en
ce
 
th
er
e 
is 
no
 in
te
re
st
 ra
te
 c
ap
. 
- 
Lo
an
 si
ze
 c
ap
 
To
o 
lo
w
 
To
o 
lo
w
. T
he
 M
FB
’s 
pu
sh
ed
 
th
e 
SB
P 
to
 in
cr
ea
se
 th
e 
lo
an
 
To
o 
lo
w
 
N
ot
 re
lev
an
t 
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K
at
he
rin
e 
H
un
t 
 
 
 
 
 
25
1 
 
Cr
ite
ria
 
In
di
a 
 
Pa
ki
st
an
 
Ba
ng
la
de
sh
 
It
al
y 
siz
e 
ca
p,
 a
nd
 th
ey
 d
id
. 
A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 th
e 
V
IS
 R
at
in
gs
 
A
ge
nc
y, 
th
e 
M
FB
’s 
di
d 
th
is 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 d
id
 n
ot
 w
an
t t
o 
be
 fo
rc
ed
 to
 se
rv
e 
th
e 
po
or
es
t i
n 
so
ci
et
y. 
N
ow
 th
e 
ca
p 
fo
r h
om
e 
lo
an
s h
as
 b
ee
n 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
to
 5
00
,0
00
 P
Rs
 
Bi
gg
es
t c
ha
lle
ng
e 
fa
ce
d 
by
 
M
FI
’s 
 
 
 
 
- 
A
cc
es
s t
o 
ca
pi
ta
l  
Th
e 
in
te
re
st
 ra
te
 a
nd
 m
ar
gi
n 
ca
p 
m
ea
n 
th
at
 th
er
e 
is 
no
 
ro
om
 fo
r p
ro
fit
 fr
om
 
m
icr
of
in
an
ce
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 in
 
In
di
a. 
Th
e 
re
su
lt 
of
 th
is 
is 
th
at
 n
o 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 a
re
 
flo
w
in
g 
in
to
 th
e 
m
icr
of
in
an
ce
 
se
ct
or
, a
nd
 th
is 
in
hi
bi
ts
 th
e 
po
te
nt
ial
 sc
ale
 o
f 
m
icr
of
in
an
ce
. I
f t
he
 M
FI
’s 
ca
n 
de
cr
ea
se
 o
pe
ra
tin
g 
co
st
s, 
th
en
 th
er
e 
is 
ro
om
 fo
r p
ro
fit
, 
bu
t t
ha
t r
eq
ui
re
s l
ev
er
ag
in
g 
of
f t
ec
hn
ol
og
y, 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
re
gu
lat
io
n 
do
es
 n
ot
 su
pp
or
t. 
H
en
ce
, a
cc
es
s t
o 
ca
pi
ta
l (
an
d 
eq
ui
ty
) i
s l
im
ite
d.
  
M
FB
’s 
ar
e 
w
el
l c
ap
ita
lis
ed
, 
bu
t t
he
y 
ne
ed
 to
 p
ro
ve
 to
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
t t
ha
t t
he
y 
ar
e 
ab
le
 to
 
op
er
at
e 
as
 e
ff
ic
ie
nt
 
bu
sin
es
se
s, 
an
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 
th
e 
Pa
ki
st
an
 In
st
itu
te
 o
f 
M
an
ag
em
en
t t
he
y 
ar
e 
in
co
m
pe
te
nt
 a
s t
he
y 
ar
e 
ju
st
 
SM
E
’s 
th
em
se
lv
es
, l
ea
rn
in
g 
to
 o
pe
ra
te
 e
ff
ic
ie
nt
ly
. 
Th
e 
D
IF
ID
 G
ua
ra
nt
ee
 fu
nd
 
ha
s h
el
pe
d 
27
 lo
an
 c
on
tra
ct
s 
ta
ke
 p
lac
e. 
A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 V
IS
 
Ra
tin
gs
 A
ge
nc
y, 
th
is 
is 
ef
fe
ct
iv
el
y 
a 
cr
ed
it 
en
ha
nc
em
en
t’.
  
 
La
rg
e 
M
FI
’s 
ar
e 
ab
le 
to
 
ac
ce
ss
 c
ap
ita
l o
n 
th
e 
ca
pi
ta
l 
m
ar
ke
ts
 w
ith
ou
t r
es
tri
ct
io
ns
, 
an
d 
as
 th
ey
 a
re
 e
nt
iti
es
 w
hi
ch
 
op
er
at
e 
in
 su
rp
lu
s, 
th
ey
 h
av
e 
no
 is
su
e 
in
 g
et
tin
g 
ac
ce
ss
 to
 
fu
nd
s. 
 
Sm
all
 M
FI
’s 
ac
ce
ss
 c
ap
ita
l 
ei
th
er
 fr
om
 d
on
at
io
ns
, l
ow
 
in
te
re
st
 lo
an
s, 
or
 fr
om
 P
K
SF
, 
th
e 
fu
nd
in
g 
bo
dy
. H
ow
ev
er
, 
w
ith
 m
or
e 
th
an
 6
00
 M
FI
’s,
 
on
ly
 2
00
 re
ce
iv
e 
re
gu
lar
 
fu
nd
in
g 
fr
om
 P
K
SF
. 
M
ed
iu
m
-s
iz
ed
 M
FI
’s 
st
ru
gg
le 
to
 o
bt
ain
 c
ap
ita
l o
n 
th
e 
ca
pi
ta
l m
ar
ke
ts
, a
nd
 ar
ea
 a
lso
 
re
st
ric
te
d 
in
 m
ob
ili
sin
g 
sa
vi
ng
s, 
fin
di
ng
 th
at
 c
ap
ita
l i
s 
no
t e
as
y 
to
 c
om
e 
by
. 
M
FI
’s 
ar
e 
fu
nd
ed
 p
rim
ar
ily
 b
y 
do
na
tio
ns
, p
ar
tic
ul
ar
ly
 fr
om
 
re
lig
io
us
 in
st
itu
tio
ns
. A
s m
os
t 
ar
e 
st
ill
 re
lia
nt
 o
n 
do
na
tio
ns
 
or
 lo
w
 in
te
re
st
 lo
an
s, 
th
eir
 
ab
ili
ty
 to
 re
ce
iv
e 
ca
pi
ta
l f
ro
m
 
co
m
m
er
ci
al 
en
tit
ies
 is
 
re
st
ric
te
d.
 
- 
Sa
vi
ng
s M
ob
ili
sa
tio
n 
N
ot
 e
as
y 
E
as
y 
on
ce
 re
gu
lat
ed
 
N
ot
 e
as
y; 
an
d 
re
st
ric
te
d 
to
 
N
ot
 p
os
sib
le
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K
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25
2 
 
Cr
ite
ria
 
In
di
a 
 
Pa
ki
st
an
 
Ba
ng
la
de
sh
 
It
al
y 
25
%
 o
f c
ap
ita
lis
at
io
n 
fo
r o
n 
de
m
an
d 
ac
co
un
ts
, u
p 
to
 5
0%
 
to
ta
l f
or
 te
rm
 d
ep
os
its
 (b
ut
 
w
ith
 a
 lo
t o
f r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 to
 
qu
ali
fy
 fo
r t
ha
t).
 
E
ffe
ct
 o
f t
he
 la
w
 o
n 
M
FI
 
In
no
va
tio
ns
 
 
 
 
 
- 
Pa
ce
 o
f i
nn
ov
at
io
n 
M
ed
iu
m
/F
as
t 
Fa
st
 
Sl
ow
 
M
ed
iu
m
 
 - 
   
 S
us
ta
in
ab
ili
ty
 
La
rg
e 
M
FI
’s 
ar
e 
de
ve
lo
pi
ng
 
se
cu
rit
isa
tio
n 
pr
od
uc
ts
 w
hi
ch
 
th
ey
 c
an
 se
ll 
to
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
t t
o 
fu
nd
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 a
nd
 sh
ar
e 
th
e 
ris
k 
of
 th
e 
lo
an
 p
or
tfo
lio
s. 
Th
er
e 
ar
e 
st
ro
ng
 in
no
va
tio
ns
 
in
 th
is 
ar
ea
, b
ec
au
se
 m
os
t 
m
ic
ro
fin
an
ce
 lo
an
s a
re
 o
nl
y 
a 
12
 m
on
th
 te
rm
 b
ut
 th
e 
se
cu
rit
ise
d 
pr
od
uc
ts
 a
re
 fo
r 3
 
ye
ar
s, 
so
 th
er
e 
is 
so
m
e 
fin
an
cia
l e
ng
in
ee
rin
g 
to
 fi
x 
th
e 
m
at
ur
ity
 d
isp
ar
ity
 a
nd
 
en
su
re
 th
ey
 a
re
 m
ar
ke
ta
bl
e 
pr
od
uc
ts
. 
In
no
va
tio
ns
 in
 w
ha
t i
s 
ac
ce
pt
ab
le
 a
s c
ol
lat
er
al,
 w
ith
 
re
gu
lat
io
n 
all
ow
in
g 
w
aiv
er
s o
f 
th
e 
‘g
en
er
al 
pr
ov
isi
on
s’ 
fo
r 
ca
pi
ta
l r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 fo
r l
oa
ns
 
se
cu
re
d 
ag
ain
st
 g
ol
d.
 T
hi
s 
m
ea
ns
 th
at
 lo
an
s s
ec
ur
ed
 b
y 
go
ld
 h
av
e 
les
s i
m
pa
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
P&
L,
 fr
ee
in
g 
up
 c
ap
ita
l f
or
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
e 
us
e 
in
 o
th
er
 lo
an
s. 
Th
e 
di
ve
rs
ifi
ca
tio
n 
of
 M
FI
 
se
rv
ice
s t
o 
in
clu
de
 re
m
itt
an
ce
 
se
rv
ice
s h
as
 n
ot
 o
nl
y 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
th
e 
re
ve
nu
e 
of
 
M
FI
’s,
 b
ut
 a
lso
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
fin
an
cia
l i
nc
lu
sio
n.
 
M
FI
’s 
ar
e 
st
ar
tin
g 
to
 d
iv
er
sif
y 
th
eir
 p
ro
du
ct
 o
ffe
rin
gs
 in
to
 
m
icr
o-
in
su
ra
nc
e 
an
d 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l m
ic
ro
fin
an
ce
, b
ut
 
th
is 
is 
no
t w
id
es
pr
ea
d.
 M
os
t 
M
FI
’s 
op
er
at
e 
w
ith
 a
 g
ro
up
-
le
nd
in
g 
m
od
el
 th
at
 h
as
 n
ot
 
ch
an
ge
d 
m
uc
h 
in
 3
0 
ye
ar
s. 
W
ith
 in
cr
ea
sin
g 
sa
tu
ra
tio
n 
in
 
th
e 
m
ic
ro
fin
an
ce
 m
ar
ke
t, 
th
es
e 
in
no
va
tio
ns
 w
ill
 h
elp
 
M
FI
’s 
po
te
nt
ial
ly 
ge
ne
ra
te
 
m
or
e 
re
ve
nu
e 
an
d 
be
 
su
st
ain
ab
le,
 b
ut
 th
at
 is
 n
ot
 
ce
rta
in
. 
M
FI
’s 
ar
e 
w
or
ki
ng
 o
n 
lo
w
er
in
g 
co
st
s a
nd
 in
cr
ea
sin
g 
th
e 
sc
ale
 o
f o
pe
ra
tio
ns
. 
- 
Pr
od
uc
ts
 
M
FI
’s 
ar
e 
no
t a
bl
e 
to
 d
ev
elo
p 
pr
od
uc
ts
 w
hi
ch
 le
ve
ra
ge
 o
ff 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
, a
nd
 th
is 
is 
a 
bi
g 
re
st
ric
tio
n 
in
 p
ro
du
ct
 
in
no
va
tio
n.
  
Th
e 
w
aiv
er
 (a
s a
bo
ve
) h
as
 
re
su
lte
d 
in
 g
ol
d-
ba
ck
ed
 
pr
od
uc
ts
. M
os
t l
oa
ns
 a
re
 fo
r 
bu
sin
es
s p
ur
po
se
s, 
w
hi
ch
 
lim
its
 th
e 
po
te
nt
ial
 m
ar
ke
t f
or
 
ex
pa
ns
io
n,
 a
t l
ea
st
 fo
r t
he
 
m
icr
oc
re
di
t p
ur
po
se
s. 
Th
er
e 
ha
s b
ee
n 
a 
tre
nd
 a
w
ay
 
fr
om
 g
ro
up
-lo
an
s b
y 
th
e 
la
rg
e 
M
FI
’s 
bu
t t
he
 c
or
e 
pr
od
uc
ts
 
ar
e 
st
ill
 lo
an
 p
ro
du
ct
s w
ith
ou
t 
an
y 
ki
nd
 o
f s
pe
ci
ali
sa
tio
n 
or
 
fle
xi
bi
lit
y 
of
 lo
an
 te
rm
s. 
M
os
t 
M
FI
 sa
vi
ng
s a
cc
ou
nt
s a
re
 st
ill
 
M
FI
’s 
ar
e 
ve
ry
 c
re
at
iv
e 
in
 
te
rm
s o
f w
hi
ch
 se
gm
en
ts
 o
f 
so
ci
et
y 
th
ey
 p
ro
vi
de
 fi
na
nc
e 
to
. F
or
 e
xa
m
pl
e, 
so
m
e 
M
FI
’s 
pr
ov
id
e 
m
icr
oc
re
di
t t
o 
ps
yc
hi
at
ric
 p
at
ie
nt
s h
av
in
g 
fo
un
d 
th
at
 th
e 
lo
an
s f
or
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K
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Cr
ite
ria
 
In
di
a 
 
Pa
ki
st
an
 
Ba
ng
la
de
sh
 
It
al
y 
ef
fe
ct
iv
el
y 
in
ac
ce
ss
ib
le
 b
y 
th
e 
de
po
sit
or
s, 
ex
ce
pt
 w
ith
 
BU
RO
. 
bu
sin
es
s a
lso
 h
elp
 th
e 
cli
ni
ca
l 
ou
tc
om
e 
as
 w
el
l a
s i
nc
lu
di
ng
 
a 
pr
ev
io
us
ly
 e
xc
lu
de
d 
se
gm
en
t o
f s
oc
ie
ty
 w
ith
in
 th
e 
fo
rm
al 
so
cie
ta
l s
tru
ct
ur
e. 
 
- 
O
ut
re
ac
h 
Th
e 
re
gu
lat
or
 w
an
ts
 to
 a
vo
id
 
th
e 
cr
ea
tio
n 
of
 ‘e
M
on
ey
’, 
as
 
ha
pp
en
ed
 in
 K
en
ya
 a
s a
 re
su
lt 
of
 th
e 
m
ob
ile
 p
ho
ne
 m
on
ey
 
tra
ns
fe
r s
ys
te
m
. H
en
ce
, t
he
re
 
ar
e 
re
gu
lat
or
y 
re
st
ric
tio
ns
 o
n 
op
er
at
in
g 
in
 a
 ‘c
as
hl
es
s’ 
w
ay
. 
Th
e 
re
su
lt 
is 
th
at
 M
FI
’s 
ca
n 
on
ly
 in
cr
ea
se
 o
ut
re
ac
h 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
tra
di
tio
na
l m
od
el
 
of
 b
ra
nc
he
s a
nd
 lo
an
 o
ffi
ce
rs
, 
w
hi
ch
 is
 n
at
ur
all
y 
m
or
e 
ex
pe
ns
iv
e 
th
an
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
w
hi
ch
 c
an
 u
se
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
 in
 a
 
sy
st
em
at
ic
 w
ay
. 
Br
an
ch
les
s b
an
ki
ng
: m
ob
ile
 
ph
on
e 
pe
ne
tra
tio
n 
of
 6
0%
 o
f 
th
e 
po
pu
lat
io
n.
 In
no
va
tio
ns
 
in
 d
eli
ve
ry
 o
f f
in
an
cia
l a
cc
es
s 
vi
a 
m
ob
ile
 p
ho
ne
s. 
 
N
ot
 a
ll 
M
FB
’s 
se
e 
Br
an
ch
le
ss
 
Ba
nk
in
g 
as
 a
 w
ay
 to
 in
cr
ea
se
 
fin
an
cia
l a
cc
es
s. 
So
m
e 
M
FB
’s 
ar
e 
se
ek
in
g 
eq
ui
ty
 p
ar
tn
er
s t
o 
pr
ov
id
e 
ca
pi
ta
l w
hi
ch
 w
ill
 
fu
nd
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
ou
tre
ac
h 
in
 
ne
w
 re
gi
on
s. 
Th
es
e 
(E
ur
op
ea
n-
M
icr
of
in
an
ce
-
N
et
w
or
k)
 M
FB
’s 
do
 n
ot
 
in
cl
ud
e 
br
an
ch
les
s b
an
ki
ng
 a
s 
a 
po
te
nt
ial
 fu
tu
re
 in
no
va
tio
n 
to
 in
cr
ea
se
 o
ut
re
ac
h.
 
PK
SF
 fu
nd
s o
ve
r 2
00
 sm
all
 
M
FI
’s 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 fo
r 
in
cr
ea
se
s i
n 
ou
tre
ac
h 
an
d 
als
o 
to
 fu
nd
 o
pe
ra
tin
g 
ex
pe
ns
es
. 
PK
SF
 (w
hi
ch
 is
 a
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t o
w
ne
d 
an
d 
fu
nd
ed
 e
nt
ity
) c
lai
m
s t
o 
ha
ve
 
op
er
at
io
ns
 v
ia 
th
e 
M
FI
’s 
th
ey
 
fin
an
ce
 in
 9
5%
 o
f t
he
 v
ill
ag
es
 
of
 B
an
gl
ad
es
h.
 H
en
ce
, P
K
SF
 
ha
ve
 a
n 
at
tit
ud
e 
th
at
 th
e 
ou
tre
ac
h 
ha
s b
ee
n 
ac
hi
ev
ed
. 
W
ith
 su
ch
 st
ro
ng
 o
ut
re
ac
h 
to
 
th
e 
vi
lla
ge
s’ 
on
e 
w
on
de
rs
 w
hy
 
po
ve
rty
 le
ve
ls 
ar
e 
st
ill
 so
 h
ig
h 
in
 B
an
gl
ad
es
h.
 
Th
e 
re
gu
lat
or
y 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t 
do
es
 n
ot
 su
pp
or
t o
r i
nh
ib
it 
th
e 
m
ar
ke
tin
g 
of
 
m
ic
ro
fin
an
ce
 in
 th
e 
It
ali
an
 
so
ci
et
y. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
m
icr
of
in
an
ce
 is
 st
ill
 re
lat
iv
el
y 
un
kn
ow
n 
an
d 
th
e 
re
gu
lat
io
n 
do
es
 n
ot
hi
ng
 to
 le
gi
tim
ise
 th
e 
se
ct
or
 in
 a
 w
ay
 w
hi
ch
 w
ill
 
po
te
nt
ial
ly 
re
su
lt 
in
 g
re
at
er
 
ou
tre
ac
h.
 
So
ft 
La
w
 
 
 
 
 
- 
Se
lf-
re
gu
lat
io
n 
M
FI
N
 
PM
N
  
PP
A
F 
th
e 
fu
nd
in
g 
bo
dy
 fo
r 
un
re
gu
lat
ed
 M
FI
’s 
PK
SF
 in
 e
ss
en
ce
 is
 a
lso
 a
 
se
lf-
re
gu
lat
or
y 
bo
dy
 b
ec
au
se
 
in
 fu
nd
in
g 
th
e 
sm
all
 M
FI
’s 
it 
als
o 
m
on
ito
rs
 th
ei
r p
ra
ct
ic
es
 
ag
ain
st
 th
eir
 o
w
n 
se
ts
 o
f r
ul
es
 
an
d 
re
gu
lat
io
ns
 o
f o
pe
ra
tio
ns
. 
PK
SF
 su
sp
en
ds
 fu
nd
in
g 
w
he
n 
th
e 
M
FI
’s 
do
 n
ot
 
D
oe
s n
ot
 e
xi
st
. 
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7.4 Analysis and Discussion 
Key findings link the importance of law (ie. that law matters) in affecting the incentives which 
govern the behaviour of MFI’s and microfinance borrowers. In essence, this is a very important 
topic to be considered from the law and economics perspective because of the potential 
ramifications for a majority of the world’s poor with regard to long term financial inclusion. The 
results of the interviews have yielded some key law and economics conclusions. In particular, the 
results have shown how influential specific regulation can be in terms of supporting the creation 
a credit bureau (which has the effect of strengthening portfolio quality and increasing consumer 
protection), as well as the ways the law can allow and encourage innovation in microfinance 
(through innovation in collateral uses, leveraging off of mobile phone technology, or 
identification of borrowers). These two law and economics implications of the research can be 
understood within the overarching framework of the perspective of the government in creating 
the microfinance law. These law and economics conclusions will be discussed in more detail in 
the following sections. 
The interviews across countries and across different stakeholders in the microfinance industry 
have yielded some very interesting and unexpected results. The perspectives of each of the 
stakeholders have been surprisingly consistent, which indicates that the microfinance ‘culture’ of 
each of the countries is country-wide, and that there is not an on-going battle about every 
regulatory aspect between the regulators and MFI’s. A key contribution of this chapter for the 
current thesis is in establishing strong links between the theory of previous chapters and 
potential conclusions. In this way, the current chapter completes the approaches used to answer 
the research question and ties the associated factors together. 
The comparative table presented above shows the different ways the law affects MFI financial 
sustainability in reality. The effects of some aspects of the law were not predicted in previous 
chapters of this thesis. For example, the importance of the general provisions for capital 
requirements for gold-backed loans in Pakistan has resulted in large growth of gold-backed 
enterprise loans and allowed the development of profitable product innovations. In addition, the 
issue of access to capital is well-known, but the management of the MFI’s was not considered as 
a primary restriction for capital in previous chapters. The interviews revealed that in fact, only 
the well-run MFI’s with low defaults and operating costs are able to access capital on the capital 
markets (or equity investors), even with government sponsored guarantee funds in place. This is 
particularly interesting because it illustrates a potential ‘vicious circle’ where the small scale MFI’s 
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are not able to achieve efficiency because they are not able to access capital. In this way, many 
results of the interviews were unexpected. 
Some results were expected, given the analyses in previous chapters. For example, the effect of 
loan size caps and interest rate caps was predicted theoretically in previous chapters. Interviews 
confirmed that in all countries, the loan size caps restricted MFI’s from diversifying products to 
other consumers, particularly small businesses, who need larger loan sizes in order to expand 
their businesses. In addition, the perspective of the government was identified in the fifth 
chapter of this thesis as the potential guiding force behind subsequent regulation of MFI’s, and 
this was confirmed in the interviews. 
7.4.1 Effect of Regulation Relies on a Number of Factors 
The interviews conducted in the field have provided such important results for the current 
research because of the clear illustration of the effect of the regulation relying on a number of 
underlying factors. In particular, the effect of the regulation depends on the maturity and normal 
practices within the microfinance market. Further, the effect of the regulation will depend on the 
regulatory history in each country, relative to the maturity of the microfinance market. This is 
particularly poignant in the countries of interest, where the microfinance regulation has been 
brought in at different stages: 2001 in Pakistan; 2008 in India; and 2007 in Bangladesh. 
Considering this, it is particularly relevant that the microfinance market in Pakistan is even now 
still in its infancy (despite an established law), and yet the Bangladesh market has been well 
established over the last 30 years. Hence, there is not necessarily an established microfinance 
sector which leads to a supportive regulatory environment for MFI’s to operate under.  
In addition to the history of the regulation, the effect of the regulation depends on the MFI’s 
themselves, and enforcement of the regulation. MFI’s in different countries have different 
management goals (eg. profit v’s serving the poorest), and different organisational origin, either 
evolving from an NGO or from a strategic financial company. It can be easily understood how 
the actual MFI characteristics affect the overall impact of the regulation on the sector. For 
example, MFI’s which are in essence NGO’s are less likely to be negatively affected by 
restrictions on savings mobilisation and capital requirements than are financially viable MFI’s 
seeking to maintain profitability, as the sources of capital are completely different.  
In addition to these findings, the interviews revealed that the microfinance regulation in all 
countries of interest is being enforced. Interviews with the regulator in Bangladesh revealed that 
each year 5-10 MFI’s lose their licence because of their inability to follow the regulation to the 
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letter. However, in the case of Bangladesh, which relies on a paper-based financial regulation 
enforcement system, there is an inherent delay in reacting to wayward MFI’s. In addition, MFI’s 
in Pakistan reflected that in order to move up to another level of regulation (in a tiered regulation 
system) the government had to be completely satisfied that they were following the regulation 
they were previously under. The interviews revealed that the perspectives of all stakeholders 
reflect the way the microfinance regulation is being continually enforced, and isn’t put in place 
simply in order to have something written in law. 
These different perspectives have been highlighted in the diversity of the perspectives given by 
the stakeholders interviewed. However, it is also important to note that despite the variety of 
factors which affect the impact of microfinance regulation, the perspectives of the interviewees 
are inherently biased towards what they hope is future microfinance success. If this research 
were so broad to have considered the perspectives of funding bodies such as DIFID and 
USAID the results may have been different. 
7.4.2 Credit Bureaus 
Credit bureaus have been considered in previous chapters as institutions built for consumer 
protection motivations. These institutions compile borrower data from all of the different MFI’s 
in order to make sure that borrowers do not become over-indebted by obtaining loans from 
different companies. In this way, the credit bureaus enforce the particular regulation about how 
many or the maximum value of microfinance loans per borrower. Further, the success of the 
credit bureau relies on information shared by the MFI’s, which can either be regulated or 
supported as industry best practice. The results of the interviews are so critical for the law and 
economics conclusions because the interviewees actually revealed the role that the credit bureau 
plays in portfolio quality. Indeed, the interviews in India and Pakistan, countries where credit 
bureaus exist, revealed that portfolio quality relies on the credit bureaus for a number of reasons. 
From the perspective of MFI’s, credit bureaus play a dual role. Not only do the credit bureaus 
ensure that clients self-select into microfinance only if they take the loans seriously enough to 
repay them, the credit bureau also serves as an industry apex of information sharing to make sure 
that borrowers are given incentives to repay their loan, because if they do not they will not be 
able to access any loans from other MFI’s either. Hence the credit bureau plays a role 
throughout the loan process. Discussions with MFI’s revealed that their portfolio quality and 
repayment rate has increased since the credit bureaus have been active. This is potentially 
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support for the ‘law matters’ principle where credit bureaus are government run and supported, 
and law and economics conclusions relating to the creation of incentives by the government. 
A key advantage of qualitative interviews is that ‘off-the-record’ responses can be understood 
without the need to quote the direct source. This is the case regarding the perspective of 
Bangladeshi MFI’s and the government regarding the creation of a credit bureau in that country. 
Sources advised that in Bangladesh a credit bureau would never be formed, regardless of the 
intentions of DIFID and other funding bodies to bankroll the institution, because the MFI’s do 
not want to share borrower information because of competition reasons1. In addition, interviews 
revealed that MFI’s want to be able to continue providing multiple loans (meaning where 
borrowers have other loans with other institutions as well) because it increases their loan 
portfolio. This is somewhat contradictory to the results from India and Pakistan, although it may 
be that although the MFI’s in Bangladesh do not want the credit bureau, if it ever arises they may 
be thankful for the increase in portfolio quality as a result. The different perspectives of 
interviewees in this example highlights that although the results of the interviewees are inherently 
biased towards supporting microfinance in the long term, their particular beliefs about what is 
appropriate do differ across countries. 
The regulation which creates and requires reporting to CIB’s affects not only the MFI’s in 
increasing portfolio quality, but also in protecting consumers from over-indebtedness. Research 
has commented in the past on the ability for microfinance borrowers to take multiple loans, with 
each loan being used to repay the previous one, being responsible for the crisis in Andhra 
Pradesh (Das, 2012). Although this does seem to be ‘protecting consumers from themselves’, it 
is common place in developed countries for such regulations to synchronously reduce defaults 
and reduce over-indebtedness. Hence, MFI regulation can directly affect all stakeholders. 
This issue is also related to general maturity of the microfinance sector in the relevant country. 
Although in Pakistan and India the MFI’s are grateful for the relevant credit bureaus, 
competition between MFI’s is quite low and an increase in outreach is possible through covering 
undiscovered territory. This is not the case in Bangladesh, where a well matured industry has 
already covered most of the country and MFI’s are usually in direct competition with each other. 
Formal establishment of a credit bureau has been found to have a potential strong effect on the 
financial sustainability of MFI’s because of an increase in portfolio quality. The interaction 
                                                 
1 Microfinance penetration in Bangladesh is very high, with competition between the largest MFI’s increasing 
(Archer & Jones-Christensen, 2011)  
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between incentives on the borrowers and incentives on the MFI’s mean that the creation of a 
credit bureau is a potential law and economics implication for the current thesis. 
7.4.3 Perspective of the Government and Innovation 
The results presented in the table above consistently fall into categories which can be traced back 
to the perspective of the government. This is particularly relevant in this chapter with regard to 
the adaptability of the regulator in changing the laws to suit industry requirements, particularly 
around innovation. 
Previous chapters of this thesis have considered the effect of the regulation on MFI financial 
self-sustainability in terms of the past and current operations. However, long term financial 
inclusion is potentially more important than what has been happening in the past. Given that 
microfinance is not a new innovation, one can assume that following the trend of what has 
happened in the past will not necessarily lead to greater outreach indefinitely. This is relative to 
all sectors, where a certain level of penetration is reached before new innovation must unlock 
further markets. Indeed, it can be logically extended that innovation in microfinance is required 
to be an integral strategy to ensure long term financial inclusion is reached. Considering this 
logical argument, it is surprising that the governments of India and Bangladesh do not support 
innovation in microfinance, nor through products, financing options, or leverage off technology. 
The regulation of these countries reflects that MFI’s are not encouraged to innovate in product 
design (such as with collateral options) such as in Pakistan, nor are they able to access the capital 
markets as easily. In addition, in interviews with the Indian government they explicitly 
communicated that they wanted to avoid the use of mobile phones in banking, to avoid the 
creation of ‘eMoney’ outside of fiscal control. Indeed, this is a potential conclusion of the current 
research given the law and economics implications and the theoretical design of microfinance 
law. However, despite the vested interest of the viewpoint of the Indian microfinance sector 
regulator in this example, it can be foreseen that at some point in time their perspective will 
change, particularly as more and more countries adopt a regulatory framework which supports 
innovations in microfinance and mobile phone banking. 
There are various ways in which MFI’s can innovate to increase financial inclusion in the long 
term. A current aspect of microfinance that is particularly relevant is the ability to leverage off 
technology. In this day and age, it is interesting to note the way the regulator in Bangladesh 
choses to rely on a paper-based system of reporting despite being created in 2007, when the 
technology was available for a digital system. This issue is also relevant in India. The interview 
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with the regulator in India revealed that they have no intention to allow mobile-phone 
repayments or branchless banking, because they do not want to create unregulated ‘eMoney’. 
However, they also have no intention of considering the way Pakistan is developing a system to 
allow for regulated eMoney, despite the countries being neighbours. The perspective of Pakistan 
is that allowing MFI’s to leverage off technology will result in financial services reaching a greater 
number of people, which is aligned with the social goals of the government. Further, the 
government of Pakistan advised me that the overall aim of their regulation is financial inclusion, 
and microfinance is just one of the initiatives they are promoting to achieve that. They are also 
building financial system stability and other associated factors. 
The interviews in Pakistan with leading MFI ‘Tameer’ illustrated how MFI regulation directly 
affects their business operations and model. In terms of capital, Tameer have an equity partner in 
TeleNor (a Norwegian Telecommunications Company) which allows the MFI to increase 
outreach using phone banking for certain services, as well as capital to invest in innovative 
infrastructure and market research. In addition, this equity partnership provides TeleNor with an 
entry point into the Pakistani mobile phone sector, which is one of the most innovative and 
progressive of developing countries. This equity partnership is directly supported by regulation 
which allows for this relationship to take place, unlike in India and Bangladesh where the 
regulation explicitly denies equity partnerships of this nature. Tameer is well known in Pakistan 
for their ‘gold-backed’ microfinance loans, which, despite only serving those with some gold 
investments, do allow a flexibility of collateral which allows the firm to have 100% repayment of 
loans. Interviews with both Tameer and the State Bank of Pakistan revealed that the gold-backed 
products are a direct result of the regulation which provides a waiver to the ‘general conditions’ 
for gold-backed loans. In effect, this means that gold-backed loans don’t require the large 
amount of capital reserves that unsecured loans require (to ensure MFI financial stability in the 
case of mass-default). Hence, the regulation has directly affected not only the operations and 
products offered by Tameer, but also allowed greater financial inclusion to those who aren’t able 
to enter the formal financial system.  
Government support for innovation through regulation has direct flow-through effects on MFI 
operations and subsequently on financial inclusion in each country. Interviews have shown that 
the regulation has the ability to allow companies to form equity partnerships with international 
firms to share knowledge, to create innovative products, or to seek to leverage off technology in 
increasing outreach to the poorest.  
 
267_Edle Hunt BW Stand.job
Ch.7.   Katherine Hunt   
263 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
The fieldwork interviews were conducted with more than 20 key people in the microfinance 
sector in the countries of interest. The benefits of qualitative research for a law and economics 
topic such as the current one are clear as answers were found for questions that could not be 
answered with theoretical or quantitative approaches alone. Indeed, the current research has 
benefited greatly from the qualitative research process, in addition to the results confirmed in the 
current chapter. Being in the field in the countries of interest, where microfinance is an 
established financial initiative, brings a different perspective to the research question. Another 
result of this immersion in the microfinance sector is the inevitable bias of the interviewees who 
have achieved success in their business lives (to be CEO’s, MD’s and heads of government 
department) within the microfinance sector. These interviewees have naturally shared a biased 
perspective, albeit from the perspectives of different stakeholders, nonetheless biased towards 
wanting microfinance to continue. 
The results of the empirical interviews revealed that consultation between industry and the 
government is critical in the regulation reflecting societal goals. Further, the interviews revealed a 
surprising consistency between the perspectives of the industry and government. The law and 
economics analysis in chapter five anticipated that there would be a constant struggle between 
MFI’s and the government, with MFI’s seeking less regulation and government seeking more 
control. However, in fact the MFI’s appreciated most of the regulation and actually sought more 
particular regulation and institutions, such as credit bureaus, to stabilise the entire industry. The 
consultative role of regulation thus ensures that it has the most appropriate effect on the 
microfinance industry from the perspective of all stakeholders. 
The interviews have shown the different ways the regulation can affect MFI financial self-
sustainability. Although the results have not highlighted the way one particular law can make or 
break a microfinance sector, the combination of the regulations, along with the regulatory and 
market history of each country plays a role. The results have indicated that governments have the 
ability to allow innovation in microfinance to support long term financial inclusion. Indeed, the 
results of the interviews have illustrated repeatedly that the fate of MFI’s in the countries of 
interest are in the hands of the regulator. That is, regulation has direct and measurable influence 
on the actual practices of MFI’s and hence on financial inclusion. With such power to guide and 
control an industry as important as microfinance, research in this topic is increasingly important. 
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8.1 Introduction 
The effect of regulation on long term financial inclusion (via microfinance) is a non-traditional 
law and economics topic. This is because of the theoretical foundation on distribution and social 
goals, rather than on welfare maximisation, which is the traditional foundation in law and 
economics. The ability of law and economics theory and methodology to be applied to non-
traditional research questions such as that of the current thesis is a strength of the academic 
discipline and legitimises the traditional areas of law and economics research.  For this reason, 
law and economics scholars should welcome such an important topic of research being 
addressed with the law and economics approach. This chapter will present how the chapters of 
this thesis build on each other to answer the research question using law and economics 
methodology and with law and economics conclusions. 
The topic of this research is not ‘classic’ because microfinance is not a classic industry: it is an 
innovative initiative to address an issue which had not been successfully addressed with 
traditional models; and MFI’s are not classic organisations. Hence, the research topic ensures 
that a traditional perspective will be inadequate to understand the research question. The 
perspective taken, which is based on distribution allows the research to consider how legal 
instruments can be used to achieve social goals in the sector of microfinance. Detail regarding 
the foundation on distribution has been discussed in the third chapter of this thesis. This chapter 
will focus on how previous chapters have contributed to answering the research question. 
Despite the ‘non-classical’ nature of microfinance and microfinance law, research which 
considers governmental social goals using economic theory has been a popular methodology in 
development research. The current research has built on the perspective of Sumner and Tribe 
(2008) and Hickey and Mohan (2003) who contend that the social goals of governments are 
‘imbedded’ with economic judgements and strategy. This inherent interconnectedness of social 
and economic policy (Sachs & Bajpai, 2001) has allowed the current research to consider the 
social goals of empowerment and financial inclusion from the perspective of the regulation 
which affects MFI’s. This perspective provides further justification for the narrowing of the 
focus of the current thesis to exclude discussions regarding whether these social goals of the 
government are in any way efficient or just. Those issues of efficiency are outside the scope of 
the current research. This intuition has been based on the development literature which has 
followed this approach.  
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The effect of regulation on microfinance is a topic of research established to be very important 
not only for the academic literature, but also for policy makers. This chapter will present the 
academic and policy conclusions by consolidating the results of previous chapters to answer the 
research question. The conclusions presented in this chapter will illustrate that best practice 
depends on how the social goals related to microfinance are defined in the first place. This 
underlying result of the research is very important because it ensures that the definition of 
benchmarks and criteria for successful law depends firstly on how social goals are defined. 
Research on microfinance law in the past has overlooked this important first step which has 
been found in the current research. 
A key issue for the current thesis is addressing how the research question became important. 
Microfinance Institutions have been operating outside of the regulatory environment for most of 
their existence in most developing countries. However, regulators intervened to stimulate 
microfinance, to legitimise the industry and to protect consumers. Regulation in microfinance is 
theoretically and often practically related to a market failure which resulted in the poor, who are 
willing and able to pay for financial services, being excluded from the financial system. The issue 
for the current thesis is whether the regulatory institutions are effective given their social goal 
related to financial inclusion. As discussed, goals differ between governments, and this means 
that the measurement of regulatory ‘success’ depends on the goal established by the government. 
This is an underlying conclusion of all the recommendations in this chapter, that the 
benchmarking of ‘successful’ law is dependent on which criteria the law is measured against. 
Previous chapters have addressed the current research question in a manner designed to better 
understand the grey area which exists between the governments social goals and the economic-
focussed regulation designed to achieve those goals. Although governments articulate economic 
goals as part of five year plans and similar, the articulation of social goals and associated 
strategies is often more closely aligned with the need for democratic governments to 
communicate the end-goals of economic progress to their voters (Sachs & Bajpai, 2001) 
This chapter is structured as follows. The first section will discuss the academic conclusions, 
including law and economics perspectives. The second section will cover policy 
recommendations. The third section will define how the current thesis answers the research 
question. The fourth section discusses the limitations of the current research and considers 
potential areas for future research. The final section concludes. 
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8.2 Academic Findings 
The literature on microfinance, what it lacks in clarity makes up for in number. There are 
thousands of research papers on microfinance taking various perspectives and invariably taking a 
bottom-up approach to determine the effect of microfinance, rather than the strategic 
perspective the current research takes. The result of that is a large gap in the research when it 
comes to the effect of regulation on microfinance, and this is the contribution of the current 
thesis. 
Initial chapters, particularly the second and fourth, have explored the literature and empirical 
research respectively. The second chapter of this thesis explored the research which has 
discussed the effect of microfinance, drawing a direct parallel to the goals of what microfinance 
is designed to achieve.  Previous chapters of this thesis have found that the reality of 
microfinance is less impressive than the grand dreams of economic development and female 
empowerment. In particular, previous research found that economic development as a result of 
microfinance is not being achieved because borrowers more likely use the funds for 
consumption rather than entrepreneurship (Ahlin & Jiang, 2008), which is inherent to the nature 
of loans to the poor – not everyone is a born entrepreneur. However, the social benefits of 
microfinance have been consistently confirmed for female empowerment, if not on the scale that 
has been predicted (Steele, Amin, & Naved, 2001). The current research has found that there is 
the potential for regulation to affect whether loans are used primarily for business or 
consumption purposes by affecting the loan sizes (larger loan sizes suit business more than 
consumption), collateral requirements, and the target market of MFI’s. Hence, although to date 
the effect of microfinance has been unconfirmed in the previous literature, there is the potential 
for regulation to play a role in the increasing success of microfinance in the future, and this will 
be covered in more detail in the following sections of this chapter. 
The fourth chapter identified that although there exist a vast number of studies on the effect of 
microfinance, very few of them are empirical, and this is why this chapter was entirely devoted to 
discussing the empirical research. This chapter showed that the existing empirical studies on 
microfinance do not consider how microfinance can be promoted in a strategic sense. Hence, 
the existing empirical literature does not cover the perspective relevant for the current research, 
and hence this thesis aims to complete a gap in the literature, which is important both for further 
theoretical research on the topic and for the practical purposes of many people in developing 
countries.  
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The fourth chapter identified that although some empirical studies on microfinance exist, the 
studies do not consider in a strategic sense how microfinance can be promoted. Hence, although 
empirical research exists, it does not exist in a meaningful sense relevant for the current research, 
and hence this thesis completes a gap in the literature which is theoretically and practically 
important for many people in developing countries. The contributions of the current research to 
providing academic conclusions for the research question will be discussed in this section. 
8.2.1 Evaluating law 
The current thesis has presented and discussed the relationship between and detail of 
microfinance law and MFI operations. One of the potential conclusions that can be conducted is 
regarding evaluating the law to determine whether it is ‘appropriate, successful, good’ law. 
However, the key finding from the research in this regard is that the regulation cannot be 
evaluated in isolation – the goal of the regulation needs to be considered, along with the history 
of the microfinance sector. Hence, the evaluation of the law needs to be conducted in each 
country, and is not necessarily a process which can be conducted in a blanket way across 
countries. This conclusion was reached through the results of the empirical interviews, which 
through open-ended questioning revealed that laws which had previously been considered 
restricting of microfinance were actually supportive of the sector. For example, in Bangladesh 
the law requires all MFI’s regardless of size, scope or source of capital to be regulated. Previous 
chapters have considered that this might have a negative effect on the microfinance sector by 
placing undue demands on small institutions which pose a low public threat. Interviews revealed 
that in actual fact the requirement legitimises the industry and removes fly-by-night operations 
which otherwise would have affected microfinance sector reputation. The reason for this is 
because of Bangladesh’s microfinance history of over 30 years, and high microfinance 
penetration interrupted by infrequent microfinance scandals. Hence, the sector in Bangladesh 
needed the regulation for legitimisation reasons. The same conclusion could not be made for 
India and Pakistan without first considering the sector characteristics, and indeed this conclusion 
may never have been reached without the empirical interviews. This is an important academic 
conclusion because it allows us to understand the complicated dynamics of law and economics 
research on the topic of microfinance. In addition, that regulation can effectively remove fly-by-
night operations provides additional support for the implementation of microfinance regulation 
in particular countries. Theoretical considerations regarding the effect of microfinance regulation 
had previously considered the effects of the regulation in terms of stimulating MFI’s in particular 
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ways. However, this result shows that microfinance regulation has the potential to act indirectly 
against rogues in the industry, and this is an unexpected conclusion of the current research. 
The conclusions presented in this section are related only to those which are considered 
academic in nature. This means that the conclusions presented here are those which complete a 
gap in the literature or provide a foundation from which future research can build. Given the 
focus of the current research, there are no directly comparable studies whose results can be 
directly compared. Hence, conclusions are not able to confirm or refute previous research 
findings, but rather provide a foundation from which future research can build. 
Given the goal of regulators, the conclusions may be:  
1. When it comes to long term financial inclusion, the regulators have more power than 
previous considerations have understood. The effect of regulation on MFI financial self-
sustainability has been shown in various ways through supportive policies. Hence, an 
initial conclusion of the current research is that law on microfinance does matter, and 
that regulators should seek a regulatory environment for microfinance which is more 
‘hands-on’ than a free-market approach. This result was found through the cross-country 
comparison interviews where most institutions in the four countries supported regulation 
and dialogue with the industry. This does not mean that regulation is necessarily always a 
good thing; only that in the countries of interest it was shown to benefit building a 
foundation through microfinance for long term financial inclusion. 
 
2. Regulators are able to create institutions which promote the achievement of social goals. 
For example, credit bureaus created by the government are able to simultaneously 
protect consumers while supporting a reduction in MFI operational costs. This direct 
link between the regulator, institutions, and social goals is a conclusion which should not 
be overlooked. 
 
3. The current research has found that there are some particular pieces of regulation which 
are ‘inappropriate’ given the governments’ social goals and considering the microfinance 
sector of that country. These regulatory ‘failures’ cannot be determined in a blanket 
approach and are specific to each country. From an academic perspective it is possible to 
evaluate these specific pieces of microfinance regulation by considering the mistakes that 
some countries have made. This is an important conclusion because it effectively 
empowers the academic literature with regard to the microfinance sector to analyse not 
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only the countries with ‘successful’ microfinance law, but also the countries which have 
made mistakes. Some of the regulatory ‘mistakes’ include limiting savings mobilisation by 
MFI’s, particularly those in Bangladesh and India. Another regulatory ‘mistake’ is the 
requirement for Pakistani MFI’s to put aside capital for NPL’s (Non-Performing Loans) 
after only 30 days, which means that the effective capital requirements of MFI’s is 
actually much higher than 15%, and harms the small MFI’s which do not have as 
efficient systems to ensure high repayment rates as the larger MFI’s do. According to the 
results of the current research, these are examples of regulatory failure. This conclusion 
supports future research in this field which focusses on regulatory mistakes, and in this 
way broadens the potential scope of research in this field. 
 
4. To understand ex-ante the effects of regulation academic perspectives would benefit 
from considering a variety of theoretical foundations and perspectives. This academic 
conclusion is reached by the fact that the effects of a credit bureau on influencing 
borrower behaviour may have been anticipated ex-ante had a behavioural law and 
economics theory also been used to analyse each particular regulatory initiative. Hence, 
although the conclusion was found anyway through empirical interviews, ex-ante 
understanding of these issues is valuable. This conclusion, while potentially assisting 
future research in this field obtain accurate ex-ante predictions, it does encourage a broad 
methodology of future research. This academic conclusion needs to be balanced with 
empirical methodology, as the ex-post findings are often equally as valid as ex-ante 
predictions. This is because it is often those findings which could not be anticipated 
which truly contribute to the scientific body of knowledge. This is because results which 
are found through empirical methodology and yet were not expected broaden the 
perspective of the scientific community in valid ways which ex-ante predictions are less 
able to do.  
For example, the finding that the relatively ‘bad’ regulation of Bangladesh actually acted 
against rogue ‘fly-by-night’ MFI’s and reduced competition in the industry is a result 
which was not predicted. The reason this result was not predicted is that the statistical 
increases in MFI size and number (discussed in the sixth chapter of this thesis) indicate 
that the regulation had no effect, or a positive effect on the operating environment of 
MFI’s. Additional statistical findings from the sixth chapter which indicated decreasing 
portfolio quality (as reflected by PAR) among Bangladeshi MFI’s indicated that MFI’s 
were growing but with less quality loans being offered. These statistical considerations 
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from the sixth chapter led to this result from the interviews being un-anticipated. Hence, 
although research on self-regulation versus public regulation has supported these kinds 
of results in the past (see, e.g. Ogus (1995))  in the current research it was not anticipated 
because of the statistical foundations which were developed to guide and inform the 
interviews. Hence, the current research may have anticipated this finding had the 
foundational work be built on theory rather than actual market data from the countries 
of interest. The fact that this result was surprising reflects the novel and practical nature 
of the research methodology itself. Indeed, as with exploratory research which has no 
precedent, the current research has also considered and documented subject areas which 
benefit from fieldwork and not simply from a consideration of theory. 
An additional unanticipated finding was that the regulatory requirement for reporting to 
a credit bureau actually helped MFI’s by increasing their portfolio quality, rather than 
solely being another administrative burden as was predicted. This result is surprising 
because if the credit bureaus have such a strong positive effect on portfolio quality and 
over-indebtedness, then why does Bangladesh still have no credit bureau? Although the 
research on credit bureaus as ‘gate keepers’ has been covered in the literature (see, eg. 
Hoek-Smit (2006)) this literature has not expressly considered microfinance. This is an 
important point, because as the first three chapters of this thesis have established, 
microfinance is not a traditional issue which literature can be applied to. This is 
illustrated by the fact that Professor Yunus received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006, not 
one for Economics, as the economics literature is still working on understanding how 
microfinance can work so successfully and yet not fit with specific economic theory 
(although much has been documented claiming the contrary). If the research on credit 
bureaus could be directly applied to the microfinance sector then one would expect that 
the world’s first and most famous microfinance country, Bangladesh, would have 
established one decades ago. This is not the case. Indeed, even India and Pakistan have 
only recently put into place credit bureaus and regulation which require reporting to 
them. An additional consideration is the statistical findings from the sixth chapter which 
indicated that profit was increasing in Bangladeshi MFI’s, despite no credit bureau being 
in place. In addition, the MFI’s in India and Pakistan, despite the credit bureaus being 
established, have not indicated strong growth since reporting to credit bureaus was made 
mandatory. However, discussions with industry leaders in Pakistan and India illustrated 
that to the contrary, the credit bureaus were facilitating their operations towards 
profitability, despite the increased reporting requirements. The fact that Bangladeshi 
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MFI’s claimed in the interviews that they would resist any efforts towards a credit bureau 
while in Pakistan the MFI’s were the initiators of the credit bureau shows that the theory 
of gate-keeping credit bureaus is not generically applicable to the microfinance sector, 
and depends on the country of interest. This surprising result, along with the previous 
result regarding rouge MFI’s illustrate that while some theory is not applicable to 
microfinance, it is impossible to know which theory is able to be transferred from 
traditional financial markets and applied to microfinance. Hence the findings of the 
current research support the combination of theoretical and empirical methodologies in 
researching microfinance.  
 
5. The current research found that self-regulation only works if it is industry-wide. The 
interviews in Pakistan revealed how certain self-regulatory institutions such as credit 
bureaus can be developed by MFI’s seeking a solution to their own portfolio problems. 
However, the interviews also showed that unless such institutions are industry-wide, self-
regulation is not a viable alternative to direct regulation. The example of this which was 
highlighted in Pakistan is the way that Kashf (a key MFI) developed their own credit 
bureau to use across their branches, yet it did not help portfolio quality because 
borrowers who had defaulted with other MFI’s would still be able to take loans with 
them. After that experience, Kashf worked with other MFI’s to create a self-regulatory 
body and an associated credit bureau to ensure it was industry-wide. In the example 
given above, direct regulation also played a part after the credit bureau was established, 
by requiring that all regulated MFI’s, called MFB’s in Pakistan, reported repayment data 
to the credit bureau. Hence, industry-wide self-regulation is a potential viable alternative 
to direct regulation however they are also potentially complements of each other.  
8.2.2 Law and Economics Perspective 
8.2.2.1 Regulatory Goal 
The comparison of regulatory goals between countries in the current research has allowed an 
increased understanding of the effect of regulation. The regulatory goal is what guides 
subsequent regulation detail. In India and Bangladesh the regulation aims to serve the poor, and 
the result of that are regulations which aim at protecting the borrowers, not at stimulating 
microfinance via sustainable institutions. This is in contrast with Pakistan, where the government 
has an overall goal of financial inclusion, and sustainable microfinance is one of the tools to 
achieve the goal. The perspectives are completely different, and that is why in Pakistan the 
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regulations clearly support MFI growth and innovation, whereas in the other countries the law 
appears (without any logical extension) to be protecting consumers. 
In Pakistan the government does not place importance on efficiency, and instead the focus is on 
the ability for MFI’s to operate in a market environment. However, initiatives such as the 
microfinance seal of excellence (Microfinance-Summit, 2013) and government pilot programs 
for the measurement of various social effects mean that it is a concern. The fact that the 
government of Pakistan does not measure or consider efficiency of microfinance is further 
support for the conclusions drawn in the second chapter of this thesis which established that 
microfinance does more good than harm, and is not particularly expensive to support. Thus the 
cost-benefit trade-off is enough to allow governments to support microfinance without undue 
efficiency considerations. 
8.2.2.1.1 Ex-ante and Ex-post Findings 
The regulation is designed with a goal in mind, and for microfinance regulation the goal is usually 
social such as financial inclusion. Ex-ante discussions regarding the research question of the 
current thesis enable us to use theory to anticipate what regulation should look like considering 
specific social goals. Following the ex-ante analysis, ex-post conclusions about how the law 
actually works can be contrasted. The third chapter of this thesis covered the theoretical analysis 
of microfinance from a law and economics perspective. In this trend, the third chapter identified 
a number of ex-ante analyses which are different to ex-post conclusions found through the 
empirical interviews, such as the effect of interest rate caps. The ex-ante analyses are considered 
such because they are based on theory only (unlike ex-post findings which are based on actual 
findings of the research) and make preliminary conclusions based on the theoretical review 
conducted. In this way the ex-ante analyses are different to hypotheses, however they do serve 
the same purpose of informing the empirical methodology of the latter chapters of this thesis. 
On the other hand, there are also some similarities between ex-ante and ex-post conclusions 
which indicate that part of the theoretical foundation used was adequate to allow ex-ante 
conclusions in an academic context. One of the discrepancies between ex-ante and ex-post 
conclusions is regarding interest rate caps. 
The third chapter identified that if the goal of regulation is to increase the outreach of financial 
access to the poor, interest rate caps may actually have the reverse effect. The law and economics 
analysis of interest rate caps concluded that regulation which seeks to improve the outreach of 
microfinance services to the poor would not include interest rate caps because of the effect on 
the profit margin and subsequent ‘mission drift’ of MFI’s under that regulatory regime. 
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However, the empirical interviews conducted provided mixed results regarding this issue. In 
particular, Bangladeshi MFI’s indicated that the interest rate cap actually was beneficial to them 
because it reduced competition in the industry. From the perspective of MFI’s in a highly 
saturated microfinance market such as in Bangladesh, reduced competition means that they have 
easier access to customers than before, allowing MFI’s to increase in size. Intuitively, reduced 
competition may have negative effects for society as a whole, however, the focus of this research 
is on the MFI financial sustainability, not on the societal benefits of regulation. The reason for 
the effect of the interest rate cap in reducing competition is that if the price cap is below 
equilibrium, which it may be considering the interest rate discussions in the third chapter of this 
thesis, the other MFI’s which are not as efficient will drop out of the market as they cannot 
provide services at below equilibrium. In this way, the regulation also addresses rogue and ‘fly-
by-night’ MFI’s which not only damage microfinance reputation, but also society. This has the 
double effect of also increasing the quality of the remaining MFI’s in the market which may have 
flow through effects on the reputation of the industry. An alternative reason for why the interest 
rate cap reduces competition (and hence is seen by a positive for the industry) is that it creates a 
‘target’ which facilitates co-ordination between MFI’s, acting like an informal cartel. Although 
the empirical literature on these possible reasons is not available, these intuitive reasons do shed 
light on some of the discrepancies found between ex-ante and ex-post conclusions. 
On the other hand, Indian MFI’s indicated that the interest rates resulted in them having to 
continue to rely on donations because it made self-sustainability impossible without mission 
drift. These two countries have the same regulatory goal, and yet ex-post conclusions show that 
the law does actually work differently in different countries. This result underlies one of the key 
academic and policy conclusions of this thesis, which is that the design of microfinance 
regulation not only depends on the goal of the government, but also the dynamics and history of 
the microfinance sector in that country. This is because the microfinance sector in India is vastly 
different and relatively newer than the microfinance sector in Bangladesh. Hence, industry 
specifics are as important as regulatory goals when it comes to predicting ex-ante how the law 
actually should work. 
The consideration of ex-ante and ex-post conclusions allows us to better understand the 
importance of empirical research when addressing research questions such as that of the current 
thesis. This confirmation allows future research in this field to understand the importance of 
making predictions and empirically determining results. 
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8.2.2.2 Social Goal: Financial Inclusion 
Governments have various social goals which they aim to achieve through different regulatory 
regimes or the creation of legal institutions. The social goals are assumed in this thesis to be a 
reflection of societal goals in general because governments are usually (in particular in 
democratic countries) a reflection of the people and will thus act in ways consistent with being 
re-elected by the population (Grossman & Helpman, 1996). Hence, the current thesis is not 
concerned with analysing whether the social goals established by the government are actually 
efficient or worth achieving in the first place. The current research has maintained the 
perspective of considering how the regulation can be designed most effectively to achieve the 
social goals established. 
Developing countries have various serious problems to deal with, both through regulatory 
measures and through charitable initiatives. There has been a trend in recent decades which has 
moved away from ‘giving a man a fish’, to ‘teaching a man how to fish’. In essence this is a trend 
towards grassroots empowerment of the people through education, training, and access to the 
resources they need to lift themselves out of poverty. A key aspect of this is financial inclusion, 
which has been defined in the first chapter of this thesis. Financial inclusion is seen as an 
umbrella term which covers access to a range of financial services for all. The achievement of 
financial inclusion, however, requires more than simply ensuring the poor have access to 
microfinance. Hence, although financial inclusion is a social goal, it requires that the population 
have some financial education, personal identification, among other challenges. Hence, 
microfinance is simply one of the strategies required to achieve financial inclusion and not the 
entire answer. 
Microfinance and regulation help to achieve the social goal of social inclusion. The results of the 
current research allow a conclusion that regulation is useful for governments seeking to achieve 
the social goal of financial inclusion via the instrument of microfinance. In particular, the results 
indicate that the specific goal of the regulation which falls under financial inclusion, being either 
to protect the poor or to support sustainable MFI’s, is the key driving force for the direction of 
the regulation in practice. However, the current research makes the contribution to the literature 
by concluding that regardless of the goal of the regulation, the regulation should create and 
enforce the provision of information to a credit bureau. However, regulation which seeks to 
simply protect the poor does not necessarily need to contain provisions for innovation or 
supporting MFI’s in the case of unforeseen widespread microfinance defaults (such as from 
weather events) as would be the case for regulation which seeks to support MFI financial 
280_Edle Hunt BW Stand.job
Ch.8.  Katherine Hunt 
276 
 
sustainability. In this way, the current research concludes that when it comes to microfinance 
regulation there is no one-size-fits-all approach. Rather, the design of the regulation needs to be 
tailored to the specific goals of the country and industry specifics of that country. 
8.2.2.3 Distribution 
The issue of distribution is an economic goal which needs a law and economics perspective to 
understand. This is because it is not based on welfare, or the efficiency of the laws, but rather 
distribution. This theoretical foundation has been discussed in the first, second and third 
chapters of this thesis. Distribution is the issue, not efficiency and not social welfare, which are 
related to market failure. Regulation has the potential to create and to address market failure, and 
law and economics can be used to see if microfinance achieves regulatory goals of distribution. 
However, the current thesis does not address the market failure, rather simply assumes that there 
has been a market failure which is why regulation has been put in place. As discussed in the third 
chapter, it is a market failure that those who are willing and able to pay for financial services are 
not being provided them (in the form of microfinance), hence regulation and charitable 
donations have been used to stimulate the market and solve the distribution issues. The results 
of the current thesis allow us to conclude that regulation can potentially play a balancing role in 
addressing the market failures which have resulted in a lack of access to finance.  
8.2.2.4 Alternatives  
Assumptions of the current thesis have restricted the analysis to include law and economics 
theories and methods. However, although it is the effect of the law on MFI’s that is the current 
focus, this assumes that law is important to begin with. Wherever assumptions are made there is 
the potential for the discussion of alternatives. Two key alternatives for the theoretical 
foundation of the current thesis are the absence of law, and social norms, however these have 
been established in previous chapters as not viable for the microfinance sector. The absence of 
law allows the market to ‘work’ on its own accord. The Chicago style of analysis allows market 
forces to ensure that what is supplied is demanded by the market. However, the empirical results 
of the current research have found that both governments and MFI’s in all the countries of 
interest welcome regulation for a number of reasons, indicating that the market did not work and 
regulation was needed. This consistency across perspectives means that the regulation is there 
for a reason.  
An alternative to regulation is social norms; that is allowing the ‘best practice’ of MFI’s and 
borrowers to ensure that the industry is protected and supported. However, this requires an 
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alignment of social norms within an industry, and the diverse cultures and practice across MFI’s 
within a country means that this is not possible. Social norms may be a viable alternative if the 
industries were more homogenous, however, with each MFI aiming for a different outcome, this 
is not a viable alternative to regulation. The social norms which would need to be aligned in the 
industry relate to the repayment behaviour of borrowers, which is also inherently related to the 
size and type of loans. For example, smaller loan sizes for consumption purposes may have 
different repayment norms than loans for small business expansion. Indeed, social norms 
relating to which MFI’s are approached by borrowers (in high microfinance density areas) are 
also relevant. In addition, social norms within MFI’s is also important, because it has the 
potential to affect how MFI’s seek clients, the terms offered, and the systems to recover late 
repayments. The social norms within MFI’s have the potential to create an informal best 
practice, as discussed as an alternative to regulation in the third chapter of this thesis. However, 
it has been seen that it is not a viable alternative because before regulation supported the 
microfinance industry, social norms alone were not able to increase access to credit.  
The second and third chapters of this thesis established that if social norms are relied upon 
without direct regulation, loan sharks can prevail and financial inclusion and MFI financial self-
sustainability goals are less likely to be reached. However, that does not mean that there is no 
role at all for social norms. Indeed, from the donors perspective, all decisions are based on social 
norms, not on regulation. Donations from governments and organisations to MFI’s are not 
regulated for, they occur without the need for regulation. Hence, social norms do play a role in 
the microfinance industry, although from a different perspective. In this sense, law does matter 
when it comes to microfinance. 
8.2.2.5 Types of Institutions 
The institutions which affect long term financial inclusion include not only formal institutions 
such as MFI’s and credit bureaus, but also informal institutions such as consultative groups and 
self-regulation which allow communication between the government and industry. This is a 
particularly important conclusion for the current thesis because it is the law and economics 
conclusion which seeks to suggest how to create efficient institutions and instruments which 
achieve society’s goals. In this regard the current thesis contributes to academic conclusions of 
institutions by illustrating the important role that both formal and informal institutions play in 
supporting microfinance. 
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The current research has found that formal institutions such as credit bureaus are equally 
important as informal institutions such as industry-created self-regulatory bodies. Both types of 
institutions have been shown to support microfinance, and thus this research provides support 
for the existence of different institutions. Indeed, the structure of these institutions, and whether 
they are created by government or industry has been found to be less important than whether 
they exist or not.  
Credit bureaus in particular are one of the key results from the current research which was not 
predicted in the theory or literature covered before the empirical analyses. However, the results 
across all of the countries of analysis confirm that the credit bureau is a key institution in a 
healthy microfinance sector because of its ability to act as a gatekeeper for the MFI’s. The credit 
bureau as a gate keeper means that it has the ability to screen particular individuals regarding 
credit attitudes, effectively curing the information asymmetries which inherently exist in all credit 
relationships. Indeed, considering the particularities of the microfinance sector, with borrowers 
who are illiterate and have no financial statements as evidence, information asymmetry is a 
concern which has resulted in the designing of social rather than physical collateral into the 
contracts. These issues were discussed in the third chapter of this thesis. However, although 
information asymmetries were considered previously in this thesis, the practical way in which 
credit bureaus address this issue is a surprising result. 
The current research is not able to conclude in detail regarding to how these institutions are 
formed, rather simply reflect on the positive effects of institutions in the countries analysed. 
Indeed, when it comes to normative conclusions, the support for institutions across 
microfinance sectors is tempered with the specific details of the microfinance sector in each 
country. 
8.2.3 Normative Implications 
The normative conclusions that can be drawn depend heavily on the goal of the regulator. Given 
the methodological challenges inherently reflected in the results of this research the conclusions 
need to be interpreted cautiously and not seen to be far reaching and all encompassing. The 
specific details of the country mean that normative conclusions can only be made for if/then 
scenarios, and not in a blanket sense. The normative academic conclusions for the current 
research are:  
1. It is recommended that every country with microfinance establishes a specialised 
microfinance credit bureau. Further, the regulation should require that all MFI’s provide 
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information to the credit bureau in a standardised manner. The results from the Pakistani 
interviews, particularly with Kashf MFI, showed that a credit bureau is so necessary to 
market functioning that it may evolve eventually (and after negative events such as MFI 
failures) if not formally put in place soon enough.   
2. The regulation of countries should support innovation in microfinance through 
partnerships with suitable institutions which can benefit the outreach of microfinance to 
the poor. In addition, the regulation should consider ways to support innovations in 
microfinance products such as those which use gold for collateral. 
3. Regulators should make microfinance law and regulate all institutions providing 
microfinance, either through soft or direct regulation. The results of this research have 
shown that regulating microfinance is a good thing for institutions increasing their 
financial self-sustainability and also for achieving the social goals of microfinance law. 
The results of this research have supported the importance of law in microfinance, and 
this is a key law and economics normative conclusion. 
8.3 Policy Implications 
Whether regulation can be considered effective or not depends in part by which benchmarks 
success is measured. This is particularly relevant given the results identified in the current chapter 
between the perspectives of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi governments. That is, Bangladesh 
supports the social aims of microfinance while Pakistan supports the economic aims of 
microfinance. Thus, it is not possible to directly compare and critique these two countries 
legislation against each other because the benchmarks for success are different. As a result of 
this, a potential solution could be for regulation to require MFI’s to measure the social and 
economic impact of their programs. If the responsibility were on MFI’s to reliably measure these 
kinds of trends, governments would be more able to decide what the motivation of the 
legislation is. In this way, MFI’s would then be able to become sources of information which 
would help the government support their activities. If MFI’s were required to undertake 
socioeconomic benchmarking then the governments would be free to set the goal of the 
regulation at MFI financial self-sustainability without having to worry about whether MFI’s are 
achieving social goals. The act of measuring social outcomes of microfinance is likely to affect 
MFI’s so that they are more focussed to towards serving the poorest (Buera, Kaboski, & Shin, 
2012). 
The current research has highlighted the effect of regulation on the reputation of the 
microfinance industry, and of differentiating formally regulated MFI’s from the ‘fly-by-night’ 
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operations which in the past have resulted in reputational damage to the entire industry. The 
qualitative interviews in Bangladesh highlighted this in that despite the MFI’s were subject to a 
new regulatory regime (and one which is arguably fastidious), the reputational benefits from 
being regulated outweigh the costs. This is clearly support for regulation of the microfinance 
industry, and that the industry is open to being regulated and entering into the formal regulation 
environment.  
Although regulation of the microfinance industry has been found to have a generally positive 
effect on MFI financial self-sustainability, there are some specific policy moves which can be 
considered as harmful for the microfinance industry as a whole. The current research, and in 
particular the interviews, have revealed that restrictions on the mobilisation of savings force 
MFI’s to rely on other sources of capital such as those from donations and capital markets. This 
kind of effect has potential ramifications for MFI financial self-sustainability as access to capital 
in a cheap and reliable manner is key for business operations, and savings serve many benefits 
which capital markets do not. However, even Pakistan, where the regulatory environment 
generally supports the mobilisation of savings, has some regulatory features which impede MFI 
financial self-sustainability. For example, the requirement for Pakistani MFI’s to put aside capital 
for NPL’s (non-performing loans) after only 30 days means that their actual CAR (Capital 
Adequacy Ratio) is much higher, and this affects smaller MFI’s which tend to have higher rates 
of non-performing loans than larger MFI’s. Hence, from a policy perspective, there are particular 
regulations which can be considered as negative.  
8.4 Answering the Research Question 
The current thesis has presented a series of analyses on microfinance separated into chapters 
which have built on each other to establish a foundation of analysis from which the research 
question can be answered. The research question for the current thesis was: 
How does regulation affect the financial self-sustainability of Microfinance Institutions? 
This thesis has established the theory of how the research question can be answered, and that 
namely relates to how the regulation can impose interest rate caps, and overly burdensome 
reporting requirements, which have negative effects on MFI operations. Previous chapters 
established the differences between the regulations of the countries of interest and considered 
the trends in the data which may be related to regulatory specifics. The previous chapter of this 
thesis tied the theory and empirical findings together to establish that microfinance law can have 
a very large effect on long term financial inclusion. The current research concludes that 
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microfinance law affects long term financial inclusion through establishing country-specific 
social goals for the law to achieve, followed by the creation of institutions and precedents to 
simultaneously encourage consumer protection, innovation, and operational sustainability 
How microfinance law supports MFI’s: 
- Credit bureaus allow an increase in portfolio quality of MFI’s by ensuring that only the 
most suitable borrowers self-select for loans and that those who are granted loans take 
the repayments seriously, knowing that if they default they will not be able to gain loans 
for other MFI’s in the future. 
- Regulation can allow for innovation in equity partnerships between MFI’s and associated 
companies (such as TelCo’s in Pakistan) and to have flexibility in designing products 
which creatively provide loans to more of the population such as those with collateral 
over gold instead of personal guarantees. 
How microfinance law can hinder MFI’s: 
- Some regulation, such as that of India and Bangladesh places a limit on the amount of 
savings the MFI can receive and subsequently mobilise for loans. These savings limits 
effectively increase the average cost of capital MFI’s face and thus should be designed in 
consultation with the specific microfinance industry of that country. 
- The regulatory option for imposing interest rate caps is something that has raised much 
discussion in the economics literature. Indeed, the usury research is directly applicable to 
microfinance and indicates that interest rate caps may actually reduce access to finance 
(Al-Azzam, 2012; Shapiro, 2009). However, the political nature of interest rates for 
microfinance means that in India and Bangladesh the interest rates are unlikely to be 
unchanged in the near future.  
8.5 Limits of the Research 
Empirical research conducted in a field without directly comparable previous studies, naturally 
have various limits to the research. Indeed, although the current research has built a foundation 
from which future studies can build considering the law and economics of microfinance, there 
are also limitations to the current research which need to be considered. The limitations of the 
current research primarily regard the restrictions on the methodological design, and limits to the 
validity of the empirical interviews. Details of these limitations will be presented in the following 
sections. 
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8.5.1 Data 
The current research uses the law and economics perspective to determine the effect of 
regulation on MFI operational self-sustainability. This particular research focus means that data 
can theoretically be matched with changes in regulations, and the effect of the regulation 
quantitatively measured. However, although there are a number of empirical research papers on 
microfinance, none have been able to quantitatively isolate the effect of the regulation (nor have 
any seriously attempted). The issue with this particular research approach is that for the current 
topic it is not able to match high quality data with points of regulatory change. In particular, this 
means that there is either high quality data at points in time without large regulatory change, or 
else there are regulatory changes either too long ago (before data was available) or too recent 
(and recent data is not available). A result of this is that the current research has not undertaken 
empirical quantitative methodologies, because of the lack of the relevant data. In contrast, the 
empirical qualitative methodologies have provided the stitching needed to piece together the 
answers to the research question. However, the issue of data is a major limit of the current 
research. Given the results of the current research future research has the potential to 
quantitatively build on the findings.  
8.5.2 Interviews 
Qualitative empirical research which uses interviews as the foundation requires that a number of 
methodological considerations are built into the research. Indeed, qualitative research requires 
the same quality of data input as quantitative research, only of a different type. Given the 
number of interviews, the quality of the interviewees is very important. A key limitation of the 
current research is that the interviewees were not sampled in a random manner. The reason for 
this is because CEO’s (or the equivalent) were the target for interviews and the matter of 
interviewing a CEO is not a straightforward process, as they invariably have other commitments 
and priorities than academic interviews. Hence, interviewees were recruited through the 
professional network of the researcher as well as through ‘cold’ emails. The result of this is that 
the interviewees (and hence the results of the interviews) are not necessarily representative of the 
total population of CEO’s and government officials. 
Another disadvantage of the interviewees is that a balance was not achieved across governments 
for the interviewees. Specifically, this means that although the head of the microfinance 
department in Pakistan was interviewed, it was only second-tier staff who were interviewed in 
India. Although this is because of logical accessibility issues, it does potentially bring into doubt 
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some of the comparability across responses. An additional issue regarding the interviews is the 
inherent bias which is a result of talking only to stakeholders in the microfinance industry. 
Although this bias was mitigated as much as possible by gaining the perspective of all key players 
in the microfinance sector, there is still some inherent bias which needs to be considered. Given 
that the interview results are the key binding force in the current research it inherently weakens 
the validity of conclusions. 
8.5.3 Scope for future research 
The current topic of research is very important for developing countries, MFI’s, borrowers, and 
donors who want to support the expansion of microfinance rather than providing ongoing 
capital for MFI’s which should have the freedom to operate sustainably. Given the importance 
of the research and the lack of existing literature on the same topic, there is vast scope for future 
research which considers the same issue. However, future research would particularly benefit 
from comparing countries other than those covered in the current research. Indeed, future 
research may benefit from comparing countries which have no microfinance law with countries 
which do. In this way the ‘free market’ of microfinance can be truly understood. 
Future research would benefit from considering the same research question and countries of 
interest but using alternative law and economics techniques. In particular, empirical quantitative 
methodologies may benefit future research, in particular regarding the effect of the recently 
released law in India which has not been considered by previous research to date. In the coming 
year data should become available which makes this a possibility. 
Research which focusses on regulatory failure rather than success would contribute greatly to the 
body of literature in this field. Indeed, the analysis of failure in the regulatory environment of 
microfinance may reveal particular conclusions which the current research focus was unable to 
uncover. Future research on regulatory failures would have the potential to consider a 
quantitative empirical methodology to determine the real effect of regulatory failure on MFI 
financial indicators. 
One of the key limitations of the current research has been the unavailability of relevant data. 
This is because of a number of factors to do with the timing of regulation and the type of data 
available. However, new initiatives such as the Microfinance Seal of Excellence (Microfinance-
Summit, 2013) seek to document new amounts of data for specific borrowers over the long 
term. As data becomes available for this initiative, and combined with new regulatory programs, 
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future research may benefit from this data. The trend towards collecting different types of data 
means that future empirical research on microfinance will benefit greatly.  
Some of the specific discrepancies between ex-ante and ex-post conclusions may be worthy of 
specific research in the future. In particular, the actual reason for why the interest rate cap 
reduces competition in the Bangladeshi microfinance market is an important topic for future 
research. The current thesis has considered a couple of potential reasons, namely that a price cap 
below equilibrium may cause inefficient MFI’s to exit the market, or that it creates a target for 
which to focus on which allows for co-ordination in a cartel-like manner. These reasons need to 
be examined empirically and the research would benefit from answers on these issues which are 
specific to microfinance. 
The research topic of microfinance is one that can potentially be considered from a bottom-up 
as well as a top-down perspective. Indeed, although the current research has taken a strategic 
perspective of the research question, a bottom-up approach that considers the effectiveness of 
the law on actually increasing borrower empowerment and repayment behaviour, may also be 
considered from the perspective of behavioural law and economics. However, a bottom-up 
approach is inappropriate for the current research question. For the current thesis, there are also 
a couple of behavioural law and economics conclusions which can be drawn from the effect of 
credit bureaus on increasing MFI portfolio quality. 
Behavioural law and economics may be applicable in explaining how credit bureaus actually 
work. Indeed, from an ex-ante perspective, had behavioural law and economics theory been used 
in more detail, the outcome may have been predictable. The empirical results showed that credit 
bureaus increase MFI portfolio quality by ensuring that only borrowers who intend to repay the 
loan self-select into microfinance, and that they take the loans much more seriously than before 
the credit bureau was in force. The ex-ante analysis that was completed did not predict this 
outcome, and assumed that the credit bureau protected the borrowers more than the MFI’s. 
Indeed, the behavioural law and economics research, particularly in the field of banking could 
have highlighted self-selection as a focus for the current research (Thakor & Udell, 1987). In 
addition to this, behavioural law and economics research regarding the actual actions by 
borrowers in contrast to ordinary economics predictions could have shown that borrowers repay 
loans not only because of future credit rationing reasons (Bester, 1985; Ghatak & Guinnane, 
1999; Lea, Webley, & Walker, 1995; Livingstone & Lunt, 1992). Economic models fail to ex-ante 
explain microfinance relationships, and that is because human behaviour in this context is not 
accounted for in these models (Williamson, 1987). However, in an ex-post sense, authors have 
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considered the economics of microfinance and accounted for behaviour. This shows that 
economics has not been able to predict microfinance behaviour, nor the success of microfinance, 
and highlights the potential relevance of behavioural law and economics for future research. 
Hence, behavioural law and economics has a role to play in understanding the conclusions of the 
current research, and provides scope for future research in this field. This contrast between ex-
ante and ex-post conclusions allows the current research to not only address the research 
question but to also comment on future methodology for such a research topic. 
8.6 Conclusion 
The research question has been answered by building a foundation of analysis on theory and 
previous research to identify appropriate methodologies. The current thesis has used 
comparative law, quantitative analysis, and empirical qualitative analysis to obtain targeted results 
which complement each other to provide a holistic answer to the research question. Each 
chapter of this thesis has contributed to understanding the context within which the research 
question must be answered.  
The current thesis established in the second chapter that the previous research on microfinance 
is equivocal regarding the economic benefits of microfinance. However, previous research does 
generally support the social effects of microfinance, namely regarding women’s empowerment. 
Hence the second chapter confirmed that although the effect of microfinance is still uncertain, it 
is relatively cheap for governments to support and does more good than harm. In extending the 
second chapter the third chapter considered microfinance from a law and economics 
perspective, identifying distribution and other theoretical foundations from which the research 
can build.  
The few empirical studies published in the past were analysed in the fourth chapter of this thesis. 
The chapter identified the various empirical methodologies used in the past and recognised that 
for the current research a strategic top-down perspective was required, rather than the bottom-
up perspectives of previous research. The fifth chapter built on this finding by establishing and 
contrasting the regulatory environments for microfinance across the four countries of interest. 
And understanding of the countries’ regulatory environments raised a number of questions and 
ex-ante predictions about the effects of the laws, which were statistically addressed in the sixth 
chapter. However, although the sixth chapter sought to answer the questions raised in the fifth 
chapter regarding the actual effect and importance of the regulation, more questions were raised 
than answered. Hence an empirical qualitative methodology was required and designed for the 
290_Edle Hunt BW Stand.job
Ch.8.  Katherine Hunt 
286 
 
seventh chapter. The results of the empirical interviews pieced together the preliminary 
conclusions and predictions of previous chapters to gain a complete understanding of how the 
current research results answer the research question. 
The current research concludes that in the microfinance sector, law does matter. Further, the 
current research has found that microfinance regulation invariably supports MFI’s in their quest 
for financial self-sustainability. In particular, the current research has identified the importance of 
the regulatory goal in determining appropriate regulation. This means that most of the 
benchmarks to determine ‘successful’ regulation rely on what the government wants to achieve 
through the regulation. Indeed, the benchmarks also rely on a consideration of the microfinance 
sector in question – as has been seen from the contrast between India and Bangladesh where the 
same regulatory goal and specific regulation regarding the interest rate cap have had vastly 
different effect on MFI’s in each country. 
Despite the contingency of results on regulatory goals, the current research has found that 
particular aspects of the regulation would be ‘successful’ in every interpretation. This includes 
support for innovation and a credit bureau specific for microfinance, as these aspects allow 
competition and MFI operational self-sustainability (or at least the possibility for it). Hence, the 
current research contributes to the law and economics literature by empirically determining ways 
the regulation can have the desired effect on the behaviour of companies and people. The 
current research has identified areas where future research would benefit – namely for research 
which is able to pair quality quantitative data with points in time of significant regulatory change. 
However, the methodological design of the current thesis does not allow for far reaching 
analytical conclusions. Future research is thus able to build on the findings of the current law and 
economics perspective to further understand how regulation can affect long term financial 
inclusion via microfinance. 
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1. Appendix A: List of Interviewees 
 
Name Institution Position Country 
Suresh Krishna Grameen India Managing Director India 
Manish Parashar Reserve Bank of India Deputy General 
Manager, Department 
of non-banking 
supervision 
India 
Alok Prasad Microfinance Institutions 
Network 
CEO India 
Ankur Kumar Sargam Sanstha (NGO) CEO India 
Mr Vasudevan Equitas CEO India 
Mr Srinivasan MFI Consultant CEO India 
Mr Ghosh Bhandan MFI CEO India 
Professor Pande Harvard University Professor India/USA 
    
Ali Atif  Kashf Foundation (MFI) Regional Manager 
Sindh 
Pakistan 
Noor Ahmed State Bank of Pakistan Senior Joint Director Pakistan 
Qazi Shoaib Ahmed State Bank of Pakistan Director Pakistan 
Syed Mohsin Ahmed Pakistan Microfinance 
Network 
CEO Pakistan 
Amir Khan First Microfinance Bank CEO Pakistan 
Nadeem Hussain Tameer Microfinance Bank CEO Pakistan 
Khalid Hussain Pakistan Institute of 
Management 
Managing Director Pakistan 
Asif Jameel Qureshi VIS Credit Ratings Company Senior Consultant Pakistan 
Faheem Ahmad VIS Credit Rating Company Founder VIS Group Pakistan 
Muhammad Saleem 
Shaikh 
APNA MFB President and CEO Pakistan 
Tanguy Gravot Advans MFB COO and Deputy 
CEO 
Pakistan 
    
Mukitul Islam BURO Bangladesh Director Bangladesh 
Mosharrof Hossain BURO Bangladesh Head of Finance Bangladesh 
Professor Baqui 
Khalily 
Institute of Microfinance CEO/ Professor Bangladesh 
Alamgir Dewan Microfinance Consultant MD Bangladesh 
Abdul Kareem PKSF CEO Bangladesh 
Khandakar Muzharul 
Haque 
Microfinance Regulatory 
Authority 
Executive Vice-
Chairman 
Bangladesh 
Mostafizur Rahman City Bank Senior Executive 
Officer 
Bangladesh 
Professor Rutherford SafeSave/ Harvard Professor Bangladesh 
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2. Appendix B: Interview Questions (Pakistan) 
 
Interview Questions: 
Background 
Please tell me a bit about your background 
What is your particular interest in microfinance? 
Please tell me a bit about the microfinance sector in your country and the changes which have 
happened to the industry. For example, how important is microfinance, how did it develop, who 
are the main players, have any MFI’s exited the market? 
Please tell me about the tiered regulatory structure in Pakistan and how it relates to your 
business. 
Policy Goals behind the black letter law 
In your opinion, what is the goal of the regulator in your country when they make microfinance 
laws?  
What is the social relevance of the policy goals behind microfinance law? 
Current relevant problems 
Tell me about how the regulation provides practical ways which support MFI’s in carrying on 
their business. 
Please tell me about any restrictions on MFI operations which are a result of the legislation. 
What are the practical effects of the restrictive regulation on MFI’s in your country? 
Country – Specific regulation questions 
What was the effect of low competition up until 2009 (there were only 4 MFB’s until then)? 
What was the effect of capital requirements differing depending in where the MFI was 
registered? Was there regulatory arbitrage by MFB’s because of that? 
As the SBP lifted maximum microfinance loan amounts from PRs150,000 to PRs300,000, what 
have been the effects of this? 
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Was financial risk increased or decreased by the restriction on foreign currency debt sources in 
2011? 
How was market competition impacted by the increase in minimum capital requirements in 
2011? 
In contrast, how did branchless banking allow existing banks to extend financial services and 
microfinance to the poor? 
What were the practical effects of the Consumer Protection Code of 2009? 
What are the effects of the PRs500,000 limit (a 2012 law) for loans to microenterprise? 
MFI’s must only lend less than 40% of their total loan portfolio for loans to microenterprises. 
What are the practical effects of this law on MFI operations? 
Future 
Do you think that banks are better suited to providing microfinance services than MFI’s? 
Is there a simpler way to reduce interest rates on microfinance loans? For example government 
guarantee of collateral instead? 
What are your suggestions for the regulation for the future? 
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Summary 
 
Microfinance may be the poster-boy of international development, but the facts remain that 100 
million borrowers are in poverty and most Microfinance Institutions (MFI’s) are not financially 
self-sustainable. This means that there are systemic faults with the industry which do not allow 
the goals of microfinance to be consistently achieved. This thesis considers the interaction 
between regulation and the goals of microfinance being achieved in the long term through 
financially self-sustainable MFI’s. Regulation has the potential to directly affect the financial 
sustainability of MFI’s through restricting or supporting their business operations regarding 
obtaining capital and product design. Given that financially self-sustainable MFI’s may increase 
long term access to financial services without reliance on donations, the influence of regulation 
in this sector is a critical area for study. Despite the importance of the topic, little research has 
discussed this. In order to consider the law and economics of microfinance this thesis will 
present the results of research which considers the issue from different methodological 
perspectives. 
The current research focus is important enough to warrant an empirical, rather than anecdotal, 
discussion. In light of this, the current thesis presents six chapters of unique research which 
build a foundation by considering previous publications on the topic of microfinance and 
culminating in a presentation of the results of legal comparison and empirical interviews.  
This thesis begins by considering the dreams and reality of the microfinance sector, addressing 
the history and current situation of microfinance in developing countries. This analysis finds that 
although microfinance results in consistent increases in female empowerment of borrowers, the 
economic impact of the microfinance initiative is inconsistent at best and non-existent at worst. 
A following chapter considers specifically the law and economics of microfinance which entails 
the role of microfinance in completing the financial market and the challenges that microfinance 
institutions face in providing their services in a financially sustainable manner. The thesis 
continues by providing a focus on the previous empirical research on microfinance, which 
primarily entail bottom-up considerations of the effect of microfinance on borrowers through 
field experiments. However, among the empirical literature, none has focussed on the impact of 
microfinance regulation on the financial self-sustainability of MFI’s – a gap in the literature the 
current thesis addresses by focusing the comparison on regulations which affect MFI operations. 
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The current thesis provides further original research results by directly comparing microfinance 
regulation in Italy, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh. After a consideration of the potential trends 
in quantitative data which are reflective of these regulatory differences, the current thesis 
presents the results of empirical semi-structured interviews conducted in the field in the 
countries of interest. The fieldwork interviews were conducted with CEO’s and MD’s of MFI’s 
along with heads of department of the relative regulatory departments of government, and with 
stakeholders such as NGO’s and Self-Regulatory Institutions. The results of the current research 
show that the existence of regulation of MFI’s is positive and that the creation of CIB’s (Credit 
Information Bureaus) and self-regulatory institutions increases the long term financial self-
sustainability of MFI’s, as does the ability of MFI’s to enter into equity partnerships and to 
receive micro-savings. The current research completes a gap in the literature regarding the law 
and economics of microfinance and informs policy makers regarding nuances in microfinance 
regulation. 
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Samenvatting 
 
 
Microfinance kan dan wel de belichaming van internationale ontwikkelingshulp zijn, feit blijft 
dat 100 miljoen kredietnemers in armoede leven en de meeste microfinance instellingen 
(MFI’s) niet financieel duurzaam zijn. Dit betekent dat er structurele verschillen zijn met de 
markt, die verhinderen dat de doelstellingen van microfinance worden bereikt. Dit proefschrift 
onderzoekt de interactie tussen regelgeving en de doelstellingen van microfinance die op de 
lange termijn door middel van financieel duurzame MFI’s worden bereikt. Regelgeving heeft 
de potentie om de financiële duurzaamheid van MFI’s direct te beïnvloeden door toepassing 
van restricties of stimuleringsmaatregelen voor de bedrijfsvoering voor het verkrijgen van 
kapitaal en productontwikkeling. Gegeven het feit dat financieel duurzame MFI’s lange 
termijn toegang tot financiële diensten (zonder dat op giften vertrouwd hoeft te worden) 
kunnen verhogen, is de invloed van regelgeving op deze sector een terrein dat aan een kritisch 
onderzoek onderworpen dient te worden. Ondanks het belang van het onderwerp is hier 
weinig onderzoek naar gedaan. In dit proefschrift worden de resultaten van onderzoek naar de 
rechtseconomische aspecten van microfinance vanuit verschillende methodologische 
perspectieven besproken. 
De huidige onderzoeksfocus is belangrijk genoeg om een empirische, in plaats van een 
beschrijvende, discussie te garanderen. Met het oog hierop bestaat dit proefschrift uit zes 
hoofdstukken met als basis de resultaten van uniek onderzoek, waarbij eerdere publicaties 
over microfinance worden meegenomen, wat resulteert in een overzicht van de uitkomsten 
van rechtsvergelijking en interviews. 
Dit proefschrift start met een bespreking van de dromen en de realiteit van de microfinance 
sector door een overzicht te geven van de geschiedenis en de huidige situatie van microfinance 
in ontwikkelingslanden. Uit deze analyse blijkt dat, ondanks dat microfinance resulteert in een 
zekere toename van de zelfstandigheid van vrouwelijke kredietnemers, de economische impact 
van het microfinance initiatief in het beste geval dubieus is of in het slechtste geval zelfs 
helemaal ontbreekt.  
Een volgend hoofdstuk bespreekt met name de rechtseconomische kant van microfinance, 
oftewel de rol van microfinance om een  volledige financiële markt te creëren en de 
uitdagingen die microfinance instellingen ondervinden om hun dienstverlening op een 
financieel duurzame wijze aan te bieden. Het proefschrift geeft vervolgens een toelichting op 
eerder empirisch onderzoek naar microfinance, dat voornamelijk bottom-up overwegingen 
behelst over het effect van microfinance op kredietnemers door experimenten uitgevoerd in 
de praktijk. In de bestaande empirische literatuur is nooit aandacht besteed aan het effect van 
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microfinance regelgeving op de financiële duurzaamheid van MFI’s – een gat in de literatuur 
dat dit proefschrift behandelt door zich met name te richten op de vergelijking van 
regelgeving die MFI activiteiten beïnvloedt.  
 
